From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:46:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fc27e666-5446-08b3-48c3-a4871d06bb68@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dbf99650-b53e-f197-aeb8-ed6fd9031837@schaufler-ca.com>
On 4/21/19 1:31 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 4/19/2019 8:27 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 4/18/19 8:44 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>>> the any security module to stack safely with any other.
>>>
>>> A new process attribute identifies which security module
>>> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
>>> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
>>> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
>>> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
>>> will be called for this information. The first security
>>> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
>>>
>>> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
>>> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
>>> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
>>> for each of the security modules that export information
>>> outside the LSM layer.
>>>
>>> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
>>> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
>>> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
>>> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
>>> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
>>> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
>>> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>>>
>>> Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the
>>> labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules
>>> do not agree on the label option to be used the operation
>>> will fail.
>>>
>>> Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security
>>> module. The first module using the facility will "own"
>>> the secmarks.
>>
>> Is it expected that enabling all security modules with this change
>> will yield permission denials on packet send/receive (e.g. sendmsg()
>> fails with permission denied), even without any configuration of
>> NetLabel or SECMARK? That's what I see.
>
> Yes.
>
> Smack is much more aggressive about using labeled networking
> than SELinux. Smack tells Netlabel to label networks, whereas
> SELinux expects them to be unlabeled. Smack has the concept of
> an "ambient" label, which is applied to unlabeled packets, and
> for which packets are sent unlabeled. SELinux only uses netlabel
> for the MLS component, whereas Smack uses it for the entire
> label. In short, it's amazing if there's a case where they do
> agree.
>
> You can make the default configuration work better by specifying
> that the Smack "floor" label be treated more like the unconfined_t.
>
> # echo _ 0 0 0 > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2
> # echo NotFloor > /sys/fs/smackfs/ambient
>
> Will result in a situation where the two MAC systems will agree
> much more often.
Not sure that should be required given that SELinux doesn't enable
labeled networking at all by default, so there is no real conflict
until/unless someone configures labeled networking for SELinux. I'll
defer to Paul on that question.
Given this restriction, to what extent have you tested Smack+SELinux
together and what worked and didn't work? Everything except for
networking-related tests?
>
>
>>
>>>
>>> git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.1-v2-full
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 +-
>>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
>>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +-
>>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
>>> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
>>> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
>>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 119 +++---
>>> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
>>> include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++--
>>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>>> include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +-
>>> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
>>> kernel/audit.c | 43 +--
>>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++--
>>> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
>>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
>>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +-
>>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 ++++--
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++--
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
>>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>>> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 ++--
>>> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>>> security/security.c | 653
>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 310 +++++++--------
>>> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
>>> security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 +
>>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 ++-
>>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++--
>>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
>>> security/smack/smack.h | 34 ++
>>> security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +-
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 388 ++++++++++---------
>>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 ++-
>>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +-
>>> 60 files changed, 1855 insertions(+), 961 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-22 12:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-19 0:44 [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 01/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 02/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 03/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 04/90] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 05/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 06/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 07/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 08/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 09/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 10/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 11/90] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 12/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 13/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 14/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 15/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 16/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 17/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 18/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 19/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 20/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 21/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 22/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 23/90] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 24/90] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 25/90] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 26/90] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 27/90] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 28/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 29/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 30/90] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 31/90] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 32/90] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 33/90] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 34/90] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 35/90] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 36/90] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 37/90] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 38/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 39/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 40/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 41/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 42/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 43/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 44/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 45/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 46/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 47/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 48/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 49/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 50/90] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 51/90] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 52/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 53/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 54/90] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 55/90] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 56/90] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 57/90] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 58/90] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 59/90] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 60/90] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 61/90] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 62/90] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 63/90] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 64/90] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 65/90] LSM: Add secmark refcounting to call_one list Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 66/90] LSM: refactor security_setprocattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 67/90] Smack: Detect if secmarks can be safely used Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 68/90] LSM: Support multiple LSMs using inode_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 13:13 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-22 20:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 21:01 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 70/90] LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 71/90] LSM: Infrastructure security blobs for mount options Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 72/90] LSM: Fix for security_init_inode_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 73/90] Smack: Advertise the secid to netlabel Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 74/90] LSM: Change error detection for UDP peer security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 75/90] Smack: Fix setting of the CIPSO MLS_CAT flags Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 76/90] Smack: Set netlabel flags properly on new label import Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 77/90] Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 78/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 79/90] Smack: Don't set the socket label on each send Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 80/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on connections Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 81/90] Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 15:27 ` [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Stephen Smalley
2019-04-21 17:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 12:46 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-04-22 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
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