From: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
mark.brown@arm.com
Subject: [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 10/44] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 17:03:55 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0e906aabc5057c5e23f1092747eaa842d20dd8b3.1567077734.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1567077734.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
From: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
commit bffe1baff5d57521b0c41b6997c41ff1993e9818 upstream.
The upstream commit 1771c6e1a567ea0ba2cccc0a4ffe68a1419fd8ef
("x86/kasan: instrument user memory access API") added KASAN instrument to
x86 user memory access API, so added such instrument to ARM64 too.
Define __copy_to/from_user in C in order to add kasan_check_read/write call,
rename assembly implementation to __arch_copy_to/from_user.
Tested by test_kasan module.
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++--
arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 4 ++--
arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index a34324436ce1..693a0d784534 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
* User space memory access functions
*/
#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
@@ -300,15 +301,29 @@ do { \
#define put_user __put_user
-extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n);
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
+{
+ kasan_check_write(to, n);
+ return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
+{
+ kasan_check_read(from, n);
+ return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+}
+
static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ kasan_check_write(to, n);
+
if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
- n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ n = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
else /* security hole - plug it */
memset(to, 0, n);
return n;
@@ -316,8 +331,10 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u
static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ kasan_check_read(from, n);
+
if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
- n = __copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ n = __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
return n;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
index 3b6d8cc9dfe0..c654df05b7d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page);
/* user mem (segment) */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_in_user);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S
index 4699cd74f87e..281e75db899a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
.endm
end .req x5
-ENTRY(__copy_from_user)
+ENTRY(__arch_copy_from_user)
ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
add end, x0, x2
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy
ret
-ENDPROC(__copy_from_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_copy_from_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
index 7512bbbc07ac..db4d187de61f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
.endm
end .req x5
-ENTRY(__copy_to_user)
+ENTRY(__arch_copy_to_user)
ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
add end, x0, x2
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
mov x0, #0
ret
-ENDPROC(__copy_to_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_copy_to_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
--
2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-29 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-29 11:33 [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 01/44] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:39 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 02/44] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 03/44] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 04/44] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 05/44] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 06/44] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 07/44] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 08/44] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 09/44] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` Viresh Kumar [this message]
2019-08-30 9:41 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 10/44] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 11/44] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 12/44] arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list Viresh Kumar
2019-09-02 14:27 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-05 7:45 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-09-06 13:49 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-10 9:35 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-10-11 6:36 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 13/44] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 14/44] arm64: Introduce cpu_die_early Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 15/44] arm64: Add a helper for parking CPUs in a loop Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 16/44] arm64: Move cpu_die_early to smp.c Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 17/44] arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 18/44] arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 19/44] arm64: Rearrange CPU errata workaround checks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 20/44] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 21/44] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 22/44] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 23/44] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 24/44] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 25/44] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 26/44] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 27/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 28/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 29/44] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 30/44] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 31/44] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 32/44] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 33/44] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 34/44] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 35/44] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 36/44] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 37/44] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 38/44] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 39/44] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 40/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 41/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 42/44] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 43/44] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 44/44] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:42 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-03 5:15 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 16:18 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Mark Rutland
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