From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.5 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 051F2C43444 for ; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BED99206B6 for ; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1547218407; bh=zHgMQeLChgWhEsEmusTjEntzdcILRAB5uMNt9HnxPLc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=kA4yNLS66NG92kgvFJfWw38diCEOcyQhC3wcacy30x2HSEKf6qngC6oxQARDaGjgj Bk7bOcAihK4pLgjrvg4FhNOR6s68GSYOWMn3GDaHDF1zoocDt9lwFi3jBmEni9zB35 zVyXtcAQIxTA1k5W4yqtvY8RC+I1uv5TF7Jgqo3I= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2390777AbfAKOiQ (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Jan 2019 09:38:16 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58832 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2390799AbfAKOiP (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Jan 2019 09:38:15 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7D8CE2063F; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:38:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1547217494; bh=zHgMQeLChgWhEsEmusTjEntzdcILRAB5uMNt9HnxPLc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=GGbhM+Uj4AA11WMWh6fMZTWRcZdfk+gpeGgVUDRFtCbwmJs2W2wX+ZYwqeAoVdlVo 0Ks6hl76Tn73BlJyBiVkoDk7JaRdcEsYrh7jkL6yeoi0zV7dfE1NrsR2RWwPHh7gnH 1pWAxfhC8ZI0uSJ6zCsS8nHK//U0Fso/GkwmBos4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Michal Hocko , Oscar Salvador , David Hildenbrand , Naoya Horiguchi , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 4.19 081/148] hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 15:14:19 +0100 Message-Id: <20190111131117.456422190@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190111131114.337122649@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190111131114.337122649@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michal Hocko commit b15c87263a69272423771118c653e9a1d0672caa upstream. We have received a bug report that an injected MCE about faulty memory prevents memory offline to succeed on 4.4 base kernel. The underlying reason was that the HWPoison page has an elevated reference count and the migration keeps failing. There are two problems with that. First of all it is dubious to migrate the poisoned page because we know that accessing that memory is possible to fail. Secondly it doesn't make any sense to migrate a potentially broken content and preserve the memory corruption over to a new location. Oscar has found out that 4.4 and the current upstream kernels behave slightly differently with his simply testcase === int main(void) { int ret; int i; int fd; char *array = malloc(4096); char *array_locked = malloc(4096); fd = open("/tmp/data", O_RDONLY); read(fd, array, 4095); for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++) array_locked[i] = 'd'; ret = mlock((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), sizeof(array_locked)); if (ret) perror("mlock"); sleep (20); ret = madvise((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), 4096, MADV_HWPOISON); if (ret) perror("madvise"); for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++) array_locked[i] = 'd'; return 0; } === + offline this memory. In 4.4 kernels he saw the hwpoisoned page to be returned back to the LRU list kernel: [] dump_trace+0x59/0x340 kernel: [] show_stack_log_lvl+0xea/0x170 kernel: [] show_stack+0x21/0x40 kernel: [] dump_stack+0x5c/0x7c kernel: [] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0 kernel: [] __pagevec_lru_add_fn+0x14c/0x160 kernel: [] pagevec_lru_move_fn+0xad/0x100 kernel: [] __lru_cache_add+0x6c/0xb0 kernel: [] add_to_page_cache_lru+0x46/0x70 kernel: [] extent_readpages+0xc3/0x1a0 [btrfs] kernel: [] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x177/0x200 kernel: [] ondemand_readahead+0x168/0x2a0 kernel: [] generic_file_read_iter+0x41f/0x660 kernel: [] __vfs_read+0xcd/0x140 kernel: [] vfs_read+0x7a/0x120 kernel: [] kernel_read+0x3b/0x50 kernel: [] do_execveat_common.isra.29+0x490/0x6f0 kernel: [] do_execve+0x28/0x30 kernel: [] call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xfb/0x130 kernel: [] ret_from_fork+0x55/0x80 And that latter confuses the hotremove path because an LRU page is attempted to be migrated and that fails due to an elevated reference count. It is quite possible that the reuse of the HWPoisoned page is some kind of fixed race condition but I am not really sure about that. With the upstream kernel the failure is slightly different. The page doesn't seem to have LRU bit set but isolate_movable_page simply fails and do_migrate_range simply puts all the isolated pages back to LRU and therefore no progress is made and scan_movable_pages finds same set of pages over and over again. Fix both cases by explicitly checking HWPoisoned pages before we even try to get reference on the page, try to unmap it if it is still mapped. As explained by Naoya: : Hwpoison code never unmapped those for no big reason because : Ksm pages never dominate memory, so we simply didn't have strong : motivation to save the pages. Also put WARN_ON(PageLRU) in case there is a race and we can hit LRU HWPoison pages which shouldn't happen but I couldn't convince myself about that. Naoya has noted the following: : Theoretically no such gurantee, because try_to_unmap() doesn't have a : guarantee of success and then memory_failure() returns immediately : when hwpoison_user_mappings fails. : Or the following code (comes after hwpoison_user_mappings block) also impli= : es : that the target page can still have PageLRU flag. : : /* : * Torn down by someone else? : */ : if (PageLRU(p) && !PageSwapCache(p) && p->mapping =3D=3D NULL) { : action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU, MF_IGNORED); : res =3D -EBUSY; : goto out; : } : : So I think it's OK to keep "if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page)))" block in : current version of your patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206120135.14079-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Debugged-by: Oscar Salvador Tested-by: Oscar Salvador Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/memory_hotplug.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) --- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c +++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -1393,6 +1394,21 @@ do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn pfn = page_to_pfn(compound_head(page)) + hpage_nr_pages(page) - 1; + /* + * HWPoison pages have elevated reference counts so the migration would + * fail on them. It also doesn't make any sense to migrate them in the + * first place. Still try to unmap such a page in case it is still mapped + * (e.g. current hwpoison implementation doesn't unmap KSM pages but keep + * the unmap as the catch all safety net). + */ + if (PageHWPoison(page)) { + if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page))) + isolate_lru_page(page); + if (page_mapped(page)) + try_to_unmap(page, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS); + continue; + } + if (!get_page_unless_zero(page)) continue; /*