* [merged] memfd-fix-cow-issue-on-map_private-and-f_seal_future_write-mappings.patch removed from -mm tree
@ 2019-12-02 19:01 akpm
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: akpm @ 2019-12-02 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hughd, joel, mm-commits, ngeoffray, shuah, stable
The patch titled
Subject: mm, memfd: fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
memfd-fix-cow-issue-on-map_private-and-f_seal_future_write-mappings.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com>
Subject: mm, memfd: fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE has unexpected behavior when used with MAP_PRIVATE: A
private mapping created after the memfd file that gets sealed with
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE loses the copy-on-write at fork behavior, meaning
children and parent share the same memory, even though the mapping is
private.
The reason for this is due to the code below:
static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
/*
* New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when
* "future write" seal active.
*/
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED
* read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert
* protections.
*/
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
}
...
}
And for the mm to know if a mapping is copy-on-write:
static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
{
return (flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE;
}
The patch fixes the issue by making the mprotect revert protection happen
only for shared mappings. For private mappings, using mprotect will have
no effect on the seal behavior.
The F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE feature was introduced in v5.1 so v5.3.x stable
kernels would need a backport.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow comment, per Christoph]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191107195355.80608-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Fixes: ab3948f58ff84 ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/shmem.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/shmem.c~memfd-fix-cow-issue-on-map_private-and-f_seal_future_write-mappings
+++ a/mm/shmem.c
@@ -2214,11 +2214,14 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file,
return -EPERM;
/*
- * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED
- * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert
- * protections.
+ * Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as
+ * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to
+ * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared
+ * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask
+ * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable.
*/
- vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
}
file_accessed(file);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from ngeoffray@google.com are
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2019-12-02 19:01 [merged] memfd-fix-cow-issue-on-map_private-and-f_seal_future_write-mappings.patch removed from -mm tree akpm
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