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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	dev@opencontainers.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 05:12:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200114051248.GX8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200114045733.GW8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 04:57:33AM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 08:07:19AM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> 
> > If I'm understanding this proposal correctly, this would be a problem
> > for the libpathrs use-case -- if this is done then there's no way to
> > avoid a TOCTOU with someone mounting and the userspace program checking
> > whether something is a mountpoint (unless you have Linux >5.6 and
> > RESOLVE_NO_XDEV). Today, you can (in theory) do it with MNT_EXPIRE:
> > 
> >   1. Open the candidate directory.
> >   2. umount2(MNT_EXPIRE) the fd.
> >     * -EINVAL means it wasn't a mountpoint when we got the fd, and the
> > 	  fd is a stable handle to the underlying directory.
> > 	* -EAGAIN or -EBUSY means that it was a mountpoint or became a
> > 	  mountpoint after the fd was opened (we don't care about that, but
> > 	  fail-safe is better here).
> >   3. Use the fd from (1) for all operations.
> 
> ... except that foo/../bar *WILL* cross into the covering mount, on any
> kernel that supports ...at(2) at all, so I would be very cautious about
> any kind "hardening" claims in that case.
> 
> I'm not sure about Linus' proposal - it looks rather convoluted and we
> get a hard to describe twist of semantics in an area (procfs symlinks
> vs. mount traversal) on top of everything else in there...

PS: one thing that might be interesting is exposing LOOKUP_DOWN via
AT_... flag - it would allow to request mount traversals at the starting
point explicitly.  Pretty much all code needed for that is already there;
all it would take is checking the flag in path_openat() and path_parentat()
and having handle_lookup_down() called there, same as in path_lookupat().

A tricky question is whether such flag should affect absolute symlinks -
i.e.

chdir /foo
ln -s /bar barf
overmount /
do lookup with that flag for /bar/splat
do lookup with that flag for barf/splat

Do we want the same results in both calls?  The first one would
traverse mounts on / and walk into /bar/splat in overmounting;
the second - see no mounts whatsoever on current directory (/foo
in old root), see the symlink to "/bar", jump to process' root
and proceed from there, first for "bar", then "splat" in it...

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-14  5:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-30  5:20 [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  5:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/1] " Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:34   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-30  8:28     ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-08  4:39       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-30  5:44 ` [PATCH RFC 0/1] " Al Viro
2019-12-30  5:49   ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:29     ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:53       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-30  8:32         ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-02  8:58           ` David Laight
2020-01-02  9:09             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-01  0:43       ` Al Viro
2020-01-01  0:54         ` Al Viro
2020-01-01  3:08           ` Al Viro
2020-01-01 14:44             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-01 23:40               ` Al Viro
2020-01-02  3:59                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-03  1:49                   ` Al Viro
2020-01-04  4:46                     ` Ian Kent
2020-01-08  3:13                     ` Al Viro
2020-01-08  3:54                       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-08 21:34                         ` Al Viro
2020-01-10  0:08                           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-10  4:15                             ` Al Viro
2020-01-10  5:03                               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-10  6:20                               ` Ian Kent
2020-01-12 21:33                                 ` Al Viro
2020-01-13  2:59                                   ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  0:25                                     ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  4:39                                       ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  5:01                                         ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  5:59                                           ` Ian Kent
2020-01-10 21:07                         ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-14  4:57                           ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  5:12                             ` Al Viro [this message]
2020-01-14 20:01                             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:25                               ` Al Viro
2020-01-15 14:29                                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:34                                   ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:48                                     ` Al Viro
2020-01-15 13:57                             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-19  3:14                               ` [RFC][PATCHSET][CFT] pathwalk cleanups and fixes Al Viro
2020-01-19 14:33                                 ` Ian Kent
2020-01-10 23:19                     ` [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks Al Viro
2020-01-13  1:48                       ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13  3:54                         ` Al Viro
2020-01-13  6:00                           ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13  6:03                             ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13 13:30                               ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  7:25                                 ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14 12:17                                   ` Ian Kent
2020-01-04  5:52               ` Andy Lutomirski

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