From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9786AC33CB2 for ; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 10:16:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E28A207FF for ; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 10:16:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1578997007; bh=WyIhIt16m1+94Tbnkg+8anM20YQiwXa69PsEMkW6yR0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=bm7hwrLfnEkBe+E6RBGsIHm9KQgGJbtOjoaV89BKe2+glMqvd9lYFCmK8vZ/UuL3H cDIYx1ljIry0baps57GaC/ORe/BtE3htSCNq40Sk3ctbJWgHZfRbqHYFr8q7PSvO3T UXmj30CflvFP5PH0Zu1sje2/iF+LafH6vPcnhcoA= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731083AbgANKIt (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jan 2020 05:08:49 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:40676 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731061AbgANKIs (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jan 2020 05:08:48 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9AADF20678; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 10:08:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1578996528; bh=WyIhIt16m1+94Tbnkg+8anM20YQiwXa69PsEMkW6yR0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yI+TkWf4l2Bt2IJBWH71bmklj5wprp+3+qFYaCSof00958+oNO+SFLkxPQjj/KGbC vj+tnBU8LCbv8Fbtr0fIxl9Fuv251wZ2ata+AHeCgQfHYPgHAD6iKv6BKBXePlwJlR N3dkWSnk8IF34kf9cnZXUg3mUkpRt1grm72/trI4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, huangwen , Ganapathi Bhat , Kalle Valo , Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 4.19 35/46] mwifiex: fix possible heap overflow in mwifiex_process_country_ie() Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 11:01:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20200114094347.269035680@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 In-Reply-To: <20200114094339.608068818@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200114094339.608068818@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Ganapathi Bhat commit 3d94a4a8373bf5f45cf5f939e88b8354dbf2311b upstream. mwifiex_process_country_ie() function parse elements of bss descriptor in beacon packet. When processing WLAN_EID_COUNTRY element, there is no upper limit check for country_ie_len before calling memcpy. The destination buffer domain_info->triplet is an array of length MWIFIEX_MAX_TRIPLET_802_11D(83). The remote attacker can build a fake AP with the same ssid as real AP, and send malicous beacon packet with long WLAN_EID_COUNTRY elemen (country_ie_len > 83). Attacker can force STA connect to fake AP on a different channel. When the victim STA connects to fake AP, will trigger the heap buffer overflow. Fix this by checking for length and if found invalid, don not connect to the AP. This fix addresses CVE-2019-14895. Reported-by: huangwen Signed-off-by: Ganapathi Bhat Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c @@ -229,6 +229,14 @@ static int mwifiex_process_country_ie(st "11D: skip setting domain info in FW\n"); return 0; } + + if (country_ie_len > + (IEEE80211_COUNTRY_STRING_LEN + MWIFIEX_MAX_TRIPLET_802_11D)) { + mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR, + "11D: country_ie_len overflow!, deauth AP\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(priv->adapter->country_code, &country_ie[2], 2); domain_info->country_code[0] = country_ie[2]; @@ -272,8 +280,9 @@ int mwifiex_bss_start(struct mwifiex_pri priv->scan_block = false; if (bss) { - if (adapter->region_code == 0x00) - mwifiex_process_country_ie(priv, bss); + if (adapter->region_code == 0x00 && + mwifiex_process_country_ie(priv, bss)) + return -EINVAL; /* Allocate and fill new bss descriptor */ bss_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_bssdescriptor),