From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>, Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Mike Stunes <mstunes@vmware.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 15:17:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210303141716.29223-3-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210303141716.29223-1-joro@8bytes.org>
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is
needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST
stack.
But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp
value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the
check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or
the SYSCALL gap.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Fixes: 315562c9af3d5 ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 1e78f4bd7bf2..28b0144daddd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -121,8 +121,18 @@ static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
}
-static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp)
+static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
+
+ /* User-mode RSP is not trusted */
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ return false;
+
+ /* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */
+ if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs))
+ return false;
+
return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
}
@@ -144,7 +154,7 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
/* Make room on the IST stack */
- if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp))
+ if (on_vc_stack(regs))
new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist);
else
new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);
--
2.30.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-04 0:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20210303141716.29223-1-joro@8bytes.org>
2021-03-03 14:17 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper Joerg Roedel
2021-03-09 16:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-03-03 14:17 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2021-03-09 16:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Check regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-03-03 14:17 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2021-03-09 16:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-03-03 14:17 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic() Joerg Roedel
2021-03-09 16:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210303141716.29223-3-joro@8bytes.org \
--to=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=cfir@google.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=erdemaktas@google.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jgross@suse.com \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=jslaby@suse.cz \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=martin.b.radev@gmail.com \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=mstunes@vmware.com \
--cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).