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* [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (49 more replies)
  0 siblings, 50 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
	lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, stable

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.236 release.
There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Jun 2021 17:59:18 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.236-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.14.236-rc1

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology

Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
    sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
    KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode

Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
    bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port.

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation

Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
    selftests/bpf: make 'dubious pointer arithmetic' test useful

Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
    selftests/bpf: fix test_align

Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
    bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction

Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
    bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu

Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
    bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged

Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
    mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums

Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
    nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect

Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
    ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate

Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
    pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`

Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
    ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification

Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
    net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify

Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
    net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify

Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
    net: caif: add proper error handling

Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
    net: caif: added cfserl_release function

Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
    Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object

Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
    Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order

Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
    ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams()

Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
    ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface()

Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
    netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches

Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
    HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch

Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
    HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init()

Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
    ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service

Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>
    vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow

Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
    vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU

Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
    vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init()

Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
    efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location()

Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
    efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared

Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>
    net: usb: cdc_ncm: don't spew notifications


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                           |   8 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c                  |   4 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c               |   5 -
 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c           |   4 +-
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c               |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c    |   1 -
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c                    |  12 +-
 drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig                     |   1 +
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c           |   2 +-
 drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c |   2 +-
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c               |  14 +-
 fs/btrfs/file-item.c                         |  10 +-
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c                          |  13 +-
 fs/ext4/extents.c                            |  43 ++--
 fs/ocfs2/file.c                              |  55 +++-
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h                 |   5 +-
 include/linux/usb/usbnet.h                   |   2 +
 include/net/caif/caif_dev.h                  |   2 +-
 include/net/caif/cfcnfg.h                    |   2 +-
 include/net/caif/cfserl.h                    |   1 +
 init/main.c                                  |   2 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                        | 369 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 kernel/sched/fair.c                          |   7 +-
 mm/hugetlb.c                                 |  14 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c                     |   7 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c                     |   4 +-
 net/caif/caif_dev.c                          |  13 +-
 net/caif/caif_usb.c                          |  14 +-
 net/caif/cfcnfg.c                            |  16 +-
 net/caif/cfserl.c                            |   5 +
 net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c                      |   4 +-
 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c                      |   4 +-
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c               |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c           |   8 +-
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c                          |   2 +
 sound/core/timer.c                           |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c     |  26 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c  | 114 +++++----
 39 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 304 deletions(-)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/47] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Grant Grundler, Hayes Wang,
	Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin

From: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit de658a195ee23ca6aaffe197d1d2ea040beea0a2 ]

RTL8156 sends notifications about every 32ms.
Only display/log notifications when something changes.

This issue has been reported by others:
	https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1832472
	https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/1083

...
[785962.779840] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd
[785962.929944] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0bda, idProduct=8156, bcdDevice=30.00
[785962.929949] usb 1-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=6
[785962.929952] usb 1-1: Product: USB 10/100/1G/2.5G LAN
[785962.929954] usb 1-1: Manufacturer: Realtek
[785962.929956] usb 1-1: SerialNumber: 000000001
[785962.991755] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_ether
[785963.017068] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: MAC-Address: 00:24:27:88:08:15
[785963.017072] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: setting rx_max = 16384
[785963.017169] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: setting tx_max = 16384
[785963.017682] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 usb0: register 'cdc_ncm' at usb-0000:00:14.0-1, CDC NCM, 00:24:27:88:08:15
[785963.019211] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_ncm
[785963.023856] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_wdm
[785963.025461] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_mbim
[785963.038824] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: renamed from usb0
[785963.089586] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
[785963.121673] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
[785963.153682] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
...

This is about 2KB per second and will overwrite all contents of a 1MB
dmesg buffer in under 10 minutes rendering them useless for debugging
many kernel problems.

This is also an extra 180 MB/day in /var/logs (or 1GB per week) rendering
the majority of those logs useless too.

When the link is up (expected state), spew amount is >2x higher:
...
[786139.600992] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.632997] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
[786139.665097] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.697100] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
[786139.729094] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.761108] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
...

Chrome OS cannot support RTL8156 until this is fixed.

Signed-off-by: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210120011208.3768105-1-grundler@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c  | 12 +++++++++++-
 include/linux/usb/usbnet.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
index eef1412c058d..468db50eb5e7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
@@ -1591,6 +1591,15 @@ cdc_ncm_speed_change(struct usbnet *dev,
 	uint32_t rx_speed = le32_to_cpu(data->DLBitRRate);
 	uint32_t tx_speed = le32_to_cpu(data->ULBitRate);
 
+	/* if the speed hasn't changed, don't report it.
+	 * RTL8156 shipped before 2021 sends notification about every 32ms.
+	 */
+	if (dev->rx_speed == rx_speed && dev->tx_speed == tx_speed)
+		return;
+
+	dev->rx_speed = rx_speed;
+	dev->tx_speed = tx_speed;
+
 	/*
 	 * Currently the USB-NET API does not support reporting the actual
 	 * device speed. Do print it instead.
@@ -1634,7 +1643,8 @@ static void cdc_ncm_status(struct usbnet *dev, struct urb *urb)
 		 * USB_CDC_NOTIFY_NETWORK_CONNECTION notification shall be
 		 * sent by device after USB_CDC_NOTIFY_SPEED_CHANGE.
 		 */
-		usbnet_link_change(dev, !!event->wValue, 0);
+		if (netif_carrier_ok(dev->net) != !!event->wValue)
+			usbnet_link_change(dev, !!event->wValue, 0);
 		break;
 
 	case USB_CDC_NOTIFY_SPEED_CHANGE:
diff --git a/include/linux/usb/usbnet.h b/include/linux/usb/usbnet.h
index e87a805cbfef..5df465dc7af8 100644
--- a/include/linux/usb/usbnet.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb/usbnet.h
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ struct usbnet {
 #		define EVENT_LINK_CHANGE	11
 #		define EVENT_SET_RX_MODE	12
 #		define EVENT_NO_IP_ALIGN	13
+	u32			rx_speed;	/* in bps - NOT Mbps */
+	u32			tx_speed;	/* in bps - NOT Mbps */
 };
 
 static inline struct usb_driver *driver_of(struct usb_interface *intf)
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 02/47] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/47] efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Heiner Kallweit, Ard Biesheuvel, Sasha Levin

From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 45add3cc99feaaf57d4b6f01d52d532c16a1caee ]

UEFI spec 2.9, p.108, table 4-1 lists the scenario that both attributes
are cleared with the description "No memory access protection is
possible for Entry". So we can have valid entries where both attributes
are cleared, so remove the check.

Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Fixes: 10f0d2f577053 ("efi: Implement generic support for the Memory Attributes table")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
index aac972b056d9..e0889922cc6d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
@@ -69,11 +69,6 @@ static bool entry_is_valid(const efi_memory_desc_t *in, efi_memory_desc_t *out)
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (!(in->attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_RO | EFI_MEMORY_XP))) {
-		pr_warn("Entry attributes invalid: RO and XP bits both cleared\n");
-		return false;
-	}
-
 	if (PAGE_SIZE > EFI_PAGE_SIZE &&
 	    (!PAGE_ALIGNED(in->phys_addr) ||
 	     !PAGE_ALIGNED(in->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT))) {
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 03/47] efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location()
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/47] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/47] vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Rasmus Villemoes, Ard Biesheuvel,
	Sasha Levin

From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>

[ Upstream commit 942859d969de7f6f7f2659a79237a758b42782da ]

snprintf() should be given the full buffer size, not one less. And it
guarantees nul-termination, so doing it manually afterwards is
pointless.

It's even potentially harmful (though probably not in practice because
CPER_REC_LEN is 256), due to the "return how much would have been
written had the buffer been big enough" semantics. I.e., if the bank
and/or device strings are long enough that the "DIMM location ..."
output gets truncated, writing to msg[n] is a buffer overflow.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Fixes: 3760cd20402d4 ("CPER: Adjust code flow of some functions")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c
index 209dc5aefc31..efbb13c6581e 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c
@@ -380,8 +380,7 @@ static int cper_dimm_err_location(struct cper_mem_err_compact *mem, char *msg)
 	if (!msg || !(mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_MODULE_HANDLE))
 		return 0;
 
-	n = 0;
-	len = CPER_REC_LEN - 1;
+	len = CPER_REC_LEN;
 	dmi_memdev_name(mem->mem_dev_handle, &bank, &device);
 	if (bank && device)
 		n = snprintf(msg, len, "DIMM location: %s %s ", bank, device);
@@ -390,7 +389,6 @@ static int cper_dimm_err_location(struct cper_mem_err_compact *mem, char *msg)
 			     "DIMM location: not present. DMI handle: 0x%.4x ",
 			     mem->mem_dev_handle);
 
-	msg[n] = '\0';
 	return n;
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 04/47] vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init()
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/47] efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/47] vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Zhen Lei, Max Gurtovoy,
	Alex Williamson, Sasha Levin

From: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit d1ce2c79156d3baf0830990ab06d296477b93c26 ]

The error code returned from vfio_ext_cap_len() is stored in 'len', not
in 'ret'.

Fixes: 89e1f7d4c66d ("vfio: Add PCI device driver")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>
Message-Id: <20210515020458.6771-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c
index a1a26465d224..86e917f1cc21 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c
@@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@ static int vfio_ecap_init(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
 			if (len == 0xFF) {
 				len = vfio_ext_cap_len(vdev, ecap, epos);
 				if (len < 0)
-					return ret;
+					return len;
 			}
 		}
 
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 05/47] vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/47] vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/47] vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Randy Dunlap, kernel test robot,
	Alex Williamson, Cornelia Huck, kvm, Jason Gunthorpe, Eric Auger,
	Sasha Levin

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit 2a55ca37350171d9b43d561528f23d4130097255 ]

zap_vma_ptes() is only available when CONFIG_MMU is set/enabled.
Without CONFIG_MMU, vfio_pci.o has build errors, so make
VFIO_PCI depend on MMU.

riscv64-linux-ld: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.o: in function `vfio_pci_mmap_open':
vfio_pci.c:(.text+0x1ec): undefined reference to `zap_vma_ptes'
riscv64-linux-ld: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.o: in function `.L0 ':
vfio_pci.c:(.text+0x165c): undefined reference to `zap_vma_ptes'

Fixes: 11c4cd07ba11 ("vfio-pci: Fault mmaps to enable vma tracking")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210515190856.2130-1-rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig
index 24ee2605b9f0..0da884bfc7a8 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 config VFIO_PCI
 	tristate "VFIO support for PCI devices"
 	depends on VFIO && PCI && EVENTFD
+	depends on MMU
 	select VFIO_VIRQFD
 	select IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER
 	help
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 06/47] vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/47] vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/47] ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Max Gurtovoy, Alex Williamson, Sasha Levin

From: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>

[ Upstream commit dc51ff91cf2d1e9a2d941da483602f71d4a51472 ]

The ->parent_module is the one that use in try_module_get. It should
also be the one the we use in module_put during vfio_platform_open().

Fixes: 32a2d71c4e80 ("vfio: platform: introduce vfio-platform-base module")
Signed-off-by: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>
Message-Id: <20210518192133.59195-1-mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c b/drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c
index aa9e792110e3..f42acc830c24 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ err_irq:
 	vfio_platform_regions_cleanup(vdev);
 err_reg:
 	mutex_unlock(&driver_lock);
-	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+	module_put(vdev->parent_module);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 07/47] ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/47] vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/47] HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Julian Anastasov, Simon Horman,
	Pablo Neira Ayuso, Sasha Levin, syzbot+e562383183e4b1766930

From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>

[ Upstream commit 56e4ee82e850026d71223262c07df7d6af3bd872 ]

syzbot reported memory leak [1] when adding service with
HASHED flag. We should ignore this flag both from sockopt
and netlink provided data, otherwise the service is not
hashed and not visible while releasing resources.

[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888115227800 (size 512):
  comm "syz-executor263", pid 8658, jiffies 4294951882 (age 12.560s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff83977188>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83977188>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83977188>] ip_vs_add_service+0x598/0x7c0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:1343
    [<ffffffff8397d770>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x810/0xa40 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2570
    [<ffffffff838449a8>] nf_setsockopt+0x68/0xa0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
    [<ffffffff839ae4e9>] ip_setsockopt+0x259/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1435
    [<ffffffff839fa03c>] raw_setsockopt+0x18c/0x1b0 net/ipv4/raw.c:857
    [<ffffffff83691f20>] __sys_setsockopt+0x1b0/0x360 net/socket.c:2117
    [<ffffffff836920f2>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline]
    [<ffffffff836920f2>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
    [<ffffffff836920f2>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2125
    [<ffffffff84350efa>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
    [<ffffffff84400068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e562383183e4b1766930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index c1672ff00963..eea0144aada7 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ ip_vs_add_service(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u,
 	ip_vs_addr_copy(svc->af, &svc->addr, &u->addr);
 	svc->port = u->port;
 	svc->fwmark = u->fwmark;
-	svc->flags = u->flags;
+	svc->flags = u->flags & ~IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED;
 	svc->timeout = u->timeout * HZ;
 	svc->netmask = u->netmask;
 	svc->ipvs = ipvs;
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 08/47] HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init()
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/47] ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/47] HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Zhen Lei, Jiri Kosina,
	Sasha Levin

From: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 3dd653c077efda8152f4dd395359617d577a54cd ]

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: 224ee88fe395 ("Input: add force feedback driver for PID devices")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
index 08174d341f4a..bc75f1efa0f4 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -1304,6 +1304,7 @@ int hid_pidff_init(struct hid_device *hid)
 
 	if (pidff->pool[PID_DEVICE_MANAGED_POOL].value &&
 	    pidff->pool[PID_DEVICE_MANAGED_POOL].value[0] == 0) {
+		error = -EPERM;
 		hid_notice(hid,
 			   "device does not support device managed pool\n");
 		goto fail;
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 09/47] HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/47] HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/47] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, Nathan Chancellor,
	Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

[ Upstream commit dc5f9f55502e13ba05731d5046a14620aa2ff456 ]

clang doesn't like printing a 32-bit integer using %hX format string:

drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c:994:18: error: format specifies type 'unsigned short' but the argument has type '__u32' (aka 'unsigned int') [-Werror,-Wformat]
                 client->name, hid->vendor, hid->product);
                               ^~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c:994:31: error: format specifies type 'unsigned short' but the argument has type '__u32' (aka 'unsigned int') [-Werror,-Wformat]
                 client->name, hid->vendor, hid->product);
                                            ^~~~~~~~~~~~

Use an explicit cast to truncate it to the low 16 bits instead.

Fixes: 9ee3e06610fd ("HID: i2c-hid: override HID descriptors for certain devices")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c
index 0294cac4c856..b16bf4358485 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c
@@ -1092,8 +1092,8 @@ static int i2c_hid_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 	hid->vendor = le16_to_cpu(ihid->hdesc.wVendorID);
 	hid->product = le16_to_cpu(ihid->hdesc.wProductID);
 
-	snprintf(hid->name, sizeof(hid->name), "%s %04hX:%04hX",
-		 client->name, hid->vendor, hid->product);
+	snprintf(hid->name, sizeof(hid->name), "%s %04X:%04X",
+		 client->name, (u16)hid->vendor, (u16)hid->product);
 	strlcpy(hid->phys, dev_name(&client->dev), sizeof(hid->phys));
 
 	ihid->quirks = i2c_hid_lookup_quirk(hid->vendor, hid->product);
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 10/47] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/47] HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Sasha Levin

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit 8971ee8b087750a23f3cd4dc55bff2d0303fd267 ]

The private helper data size cannot be updated. However, updates that
contain NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN might bogusly hit EBUSY even if the size is
the same.

Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
index dfe4e6787219..2ebeb615db15 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
@@ -370,10 +370,14 @@ static int
 nfnl_cthelper_update(const struct nlattr * const tb[],
 		     struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper)
 {
+	u32 size;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (tb[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN])
-		return -EBUSY;
+	if (tb[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN]) {
+		size = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN]));
+		if (size != helper->data_len)
+			return -EBUSY;
+	}
 
 	if (tb[NFCTH_POLICY]) {
 		ret = nfnl_cthelper_update_policy(helper, tb[NFCTH_POLICY]);
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 11/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface()
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/47] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Zhen Lei, Stefan Schmidt,
	Sasha Levin

From: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 79c6b8ed30e54b401c873dbad2511f2a1c525fd5 ]

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: be51da0f3e34 ("ieee802154: Stop using NLA_PUT*().")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210508062517.2574-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c b/net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c
index dc2960be51e0..6a7fe415d5f4 100644
--- a/net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c
+++ b/net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c
@@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ int ieee802154_add_iface(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	if (nla_put_string(msg, IEEE802154_ATTR_PHY_NAME, wpan_phy_name(phy)) ||
-	    nla_put_string(msg, IEEE802154_ATTR_DEV_NAME, dev->name))
+	    nla_put_string(msg, IEEE802154_ATTR_DEV_NAME, dev->name)) {
+		rc = -EMSGSIZE;
 		goto nla_put_failure;
+	}
 	dev_put(dev);
 
 	wpan_phy_put(phy);
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 12/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams()
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/47] Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Wei Yongjun,
	Stefan Schmidt, Sasha Levin

From: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 373e864cf52403b0974c2f23ca8faf9104234555 ]

Fix to return negative error code -ENOBUFS from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: 3e9c156e2c21 ("ieee802154: add netlink interfaces for llsec")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210519141614.3040055-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c b/net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c
index c0930b9fe848..7531cb1665d2 100644
--- a/net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c
+++ b/net/ieee802154/nl-mac.c
@@ -688,8 +688,10 @@ int ieee802154_llsec_getparams(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	    nla_put_u8(msg, IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_SECLEVEL, params.out_level) ||
 	    nla_put_u32(msg, IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_FRAME_COUNTER,
 			be32_to_cpu(params.frame_counter)) ||
-	    ieee802154_llsec_fill_key_id(msg, &params.out_key))
+	    ieee802154_llsec_fill_key_id(msg, &params.out_key)) {
+		rc = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out_free;
+	}
 
 	dev_put(dev);
 
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 13/47] Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/47] Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Marcel Holtmann, Johan Hedberg,
	Luiz Augusto von Dentz, David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski,
	linux-bluetooth, netdev, Lin Ma, Hao Xiong

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

commit 6a137caec23aeb9e036cdfd8a46dd8a366460e5d upstream.

In the cleanup routine for failed initialization of HCI device,
the flush_work(&hdev->rx_work) need to be finished before the
flush_work(&hdev->cmd_work). Otherwise, the hci_rx_work() can
possibly invoke new cmd_work and cause a bug, like double free,
in late processings.

This was assigned CVE-2021-3564.

This patch reorder the flush_work() to fix this bug.

Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hao Xiong <mart1n@zju.edu.cn>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -1458,8 +1458,13 @@ static int hci_dev_do_open(struct hci_de
 	} else {
 		/* Init failed, cleanup */
 		flush_work(&hdev->tx_work);
-		flush_work(&hdev->cmd_work);
+
+		/* Since hci_rx_work() is possible to awake new cmd_work
+		 * it should be flushed first to avoid unexpected call of
+		 * hci_cmd_work()
+		 */
 		flush_work(&hdev->rx_work);
+		flush_work(&hdev->cmd_work);
 
 		skb_queue_purge(&hdev->cmd_q);
 		skb_queue_purge(&hdev->rx_q);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 14/47] Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/47] Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/47] net: caif: added cfserl_release function Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lin Ma, Marcel Holtmann

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

commit e305509e678b3a4af2b3cfd410f409f7cdaabb52 upstream.

The hci_sock_dev_event() function will cleanup the hdev object for
sockets even if this object may still be in used within the
hci_sock_bound_ioctl() function, result in UAF vulnerability.

This patch replace the BH context lock to serialize these affairs
and prevent the race condition.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *
 		/* Detach sockets from device */
 		read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
 		sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
-			bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+			lock_sock(sk);
 			if (hci_pi(sk)->hdev == hdev) {
 				hci_pi(sk)->hdev = NULL;
 				sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *
 
 				hci_dev_put(hdev);
 			}
-			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+			release_sock(sk);
 		}
 		read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 15/47] net: caif: added cfserl_release function
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/47] Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/47] net: caif: add proper error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Skripkin, David S. Miller

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

commit bce130e7f392ddde8cfcb09927808ebd5f9c8669 upstream.

Added cfserl_release() function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/caif/cfserl.h |    1 +
 net/caif/cfserl.c         |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/include/net/caif/cfserl.h
+++ b/include/net/caif/cfserl.h
@@ -9,4 +9,5 @@
 #include <net/caif/caif_layer.h>
 
 struct cflayer *cfserl_create(int instance, bool use_stx);
+void cfserl_release(struct cflayer *layer);
 #endif
--- a/net/caif/cfserl.c
+++ b/net/caif/cfserl.c
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ static int cfserl_transmit(struct cflaye
 static void cfserl_ctrlcmd(struct cflayer *layr, enum caif_ctrlcmd ctrl,
 			   int phyid);
 
+void cfserl_release(struct cflayer *layer)
+{
+	kfree(layer);
+}
+
 struct cflayer *cfserl_create(int instance, bool use_stx)
 {
 	struct cfserl *this = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cfserl), GFP_ATOMIC);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 16/47] net: caif: add proper error handling
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/47] net: caif: added cfserl_release function Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Skripkin, David S. Miller

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

commit a2805dca5107d5603f4bbc027e81e20d93476e96 upstream.

caif_enroll_dev() can fail in some cases. Ingnoring
these cases can lead to memory leak due to not assigning
link_support pointer to anywhere.

Fixes: 7c18d2205ea7 ("caif: Restructure how link caif link layer enroll")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/caif/caif_dev.h |    2 +-
 include/net/caif/cfcnfg.h   |    2 +-
 net/caif/caif_dev.c         |    8 +++++---
 net/caif/cfcnfg.c           |   16 +++++++++++-----
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/caif/caif_dev.h
+++ b/include/net/caif/caif_dev.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void caif_free_client(struct cflayer *ad
  * The link_support layer is used to add any Link Layer specific
  * framing.
  */
-void caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct caif_dev_common *caifdev,
+int caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct caif_dev_common *caifdev,
 			struct cflayer *link_support, int head_room,
 			struct cflayer **layer, int (**rcv_func)(
 				struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *,
--- a/include/net/caif/cfcnfg.h
+++ b/include/net/caif/cfcnfg.h
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void cfcnfg_remove(struct cfcnfg *cfg);
  * @fcs:	Specify if checksum is used in CAIF Framing Layer.
  * @head_room:	Head space needed by link specific protocol.
  */
-void
+int
 cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(struct cfcnfg *cnfg,
 		     struct net_device *dev, struct cflayer *phy_layer,
 		     enum cfcnfg_phy_preference pref,
--- a/net/caif/caif_dev.c
+++ b/net/caif/caif_dev.c
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static void dev_flowctrl(struct net_devi
 	caifd_put(caifd);
 }
 
-void caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct caif_dev_common *caifdev,
+int caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct caif_dev_common *caifdev,
 		     struct cflayer *link_support, int head_room,
 		     struct cflayer **layer,
 		     int (**rcv_func)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *,
@@ -314,11 +314,12 @@ void caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *
 	enum cfcnfg_phy_preference pref;
 	struct cfcnfg *cfg = get_cfcnfg(dev_net(dev));
 	struct caif_device_entry_list *caifdevs;
+	int res;
 
 	caifdevs = caif_device_list(dev_net(dev));
 	caifd = caif_device_alloc(dev);
 	if (!caifd)
-		return;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	*layer = &caifd->layer;
 	spin_lock_init(&caifd->flow_lock);
 
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ void caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *
 		sizeof(caifd->layer.name) - 1);
 	caifd->layer.name[sizeof(caifd->layer.name) - 1] = 0;
 	caifd->layer.transmit = transmit;
-	cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(cfg,
+	res = cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(cfg,
 				dev,
 				&caifd->layer,
 				pref,
@@ -350,6 +351,7 @@ void caif_enroll_dev(struct net_device *
 	mutex_unlock(&caifdevs->lock);
 	if (rcv_func)
 		*rcv_func = receive;
+	return res;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(caif_enroll_dev);
 
--- a/net/caif/cfcnfg.c
+++ b/net/caif/cfcnfg.c
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
-void
+int
 cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(struct cfcnfg *cnfg,
 		     struct net_device *dev, struct cflayer *phy_layer,
 		     enum cfcnfg_phy_preference pref,
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(struct cfcnfg *cnfg
 {
 	struct cflayer *frml;
 	struct cfcnfg_phyinfo *phyinfo = NULL;
-	int i;
+	int i, res = 0;
 	u8 phyid;
 
 	mutex_lock(&cnfg->lock);
@@ -475,12 +475,15 @@ cfcnfg_add_phy_layer(struct cfcnfg *cnfg
 			goto got_phyid;
 	}
 	pr_warn("Too many CAIF Link Layers (max 6)\n");
+	res = -EEXIST;
 	goto out;
 
 got_phyid:
 	phyinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cfcnfg_phyinfo), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!phyinfo)
+	if (!phyinfo) {
+		res = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_err;
+	}
 
 	phy_layer->id = phyid;
 	phyinfo->pref = pref;
@@ -494,8 +497,10 @@ got_phyid:
 
 	frml = cffrml_create(phyid, fcs);
 
-	if (!frml)
+	if (!frml) {
+		res = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_err;
+	}
 	phyinfo->frm_layer = frml;
 	layer_set_up(frml, cnfg->mux);
 
@@ -513,11 +518,12 @@ got_phyid:
 	list_add_rcu(&phyinfo->node, &cnfg->phys);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&cnfg->lock);
-	return;
+	return res;
 
 out_err:
 	kfree(phyinfo);
 	mutex_unlock(&cnfg->lock);
+	return res;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cfcnfg_add_phy_layer);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 17/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/47] net: caif: add proper error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Skripkin, David S. Miller,
	syzbot+7ec324747ce876a29db6

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

commit b53558a950a89824938e9811eddfc8efcd94e1bb upstream.

In case of caif_enroll_dev() fail, allocated
link_support won't be assigned to the corresponding
structure. So simply free allocated pointer in case
of error

Fixes: 7c18d2205ea7 ("caif: Restructure how link caif link layer enroll")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ec324747ce876a29db6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/caif/caif_dev.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/caif/caif_dev.c
+++ b/net/caif/caif_dev.c
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ static int caif_device_notify(struct not
 	struct cflayer *layer, *link_support;
 	int head_room = 0;
 	struct caif_device_entry_list *caifdevs;
+	int res;
 
 	cfg = get_cfcnfg(dev_net(dev));
 	caifdevs = caif_device_list(dev_net(dev));
@@ -391,8 +392,10 @@ static int caif_device_notify(struct not
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		caif_enroll_dev(dev, caifdev, link_support, head_room,
+		res = caif_enroll_dev(dev, caifdev, link_support, head_room,
 				&layer, NULL);
+		if (res)
+			cfserl_release(link_support);
 		caifdev->flowctrl = dev_flowctrl;
 		break;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 18/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/47] ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Skripkin, David S. Miller

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

commit 7f5d86669fa4d485523ddb1d212e0a2d90bd62bb upstream.

In case of caif_enroll_dev() fail, allocated
link_support won't be assigned to the corresponding
structure. So simply free allocated pointer in case
of error.

Fixes: 7ad65bf68d70 ("caif: Add support for CAIF over CDC NCM USB interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/caif/caif_usb.c |   14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/caif/caif_usb.c
+++ b/net/caif/caif_usb.c
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ static struct cflayer *cfusbl_create(int
 	return (struct cflayer *) this;
 }
 
+static void cfusbl_release(struct cflayer *layer)
+{
+	kfree(layer);
+}
+
 static struct packet_type caif_usb_type __read_mostly = {
 	.type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_802_EX1),
 };
@@ -128,6 +133,7 @@ static int cfusbl_device_notify(struct n
 	struct cflayer *layer, *link_support;
 	struct usbnet *usbnet;
 	struct usb_device *usbdev;
+	int res;
 
 	/* Check whether we have a NCM device, and find its VID/PID. */
 	if (!(dev->dev.parent && dev->dev.parent->driver &&
@@ -170,8 +176,11 @@ static int cfusbl_device_notify(struct n
 	if (dev->num_tx_queues > 1)
 		pr_warn("USB device uses more than one tx queue\n");
 
-	caif_enroll_dev(dev, &common, link_support, CFUSB_MAX_HEADLEN,
+	res = caif_enroll_dev(dev, &common, link_support, CFUSB_MAX_HEADLEN,
 			&layer, &caif_usb_type.func);
+	if (res)
+		goto err;
+
 	if (!pack_added)
 		dev_add_pack(&caif_usb_type);
 	pack_added = true;
@@ -181,6 +190,9 @@ static int cfusbl_device_notify(struct n
 	layer->name[sizeof(layer->name) - 1] = 0;
 
 	return 0;
+err:
+	cfusbl_release(link_support);
+	return res;
 }
 
 static struct notifier_block caif_device_notifier = {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 19/47] ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/47] ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+d102fa5b35335a7e544e,
	Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 9c1fe96bded935369f8340c2ac2e9e189f697d5d upstream.

snd_timer_notify1() calls the notification to each slave for a master
event, but it passes a wrong event number.  It should be +10 offset,
corresponding to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MXXX, but it's incorrectly with
+100 offset.  Casually this was spotted by UBSAN check via syzkaller.

Reported-by: syzbot+d102fa5b35335a7e544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000e5560e05c3bd1d63@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210602113823.23777-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 sound/core/timer.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -490,9 +490,10 @@ static void snd_timer_notify1(struct snd
 		return;
 	if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)
 		return;
+	event += 10; /* convert to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MXXX */
 	list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list)
 		if (ts->ccallback)
-			ts->ccallback(ts, event + 100, &tstamp, resolution);
+			ts->ccallback(ts, event, &tstamp, resolution);
 }
 
 /* start/continue a master timer */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 20/47] ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/47] ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/47] pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid` Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, stable, Ye Bin, Jan Kara, Theodore Tso

From: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>

commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.

We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553]  ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975]  ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368]  ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179]  ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567]  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995]  ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359]  generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767]  generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152]  ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556]  __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851]  vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110]  ksys_read+0x74/0xf0

This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable).  Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -3275,7 +3275,10 @@ static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t
 		ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex2);
 
 	err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, ppath, &newex, flags);
-	if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
+	if (err != -ENOSPC && err != -EDQUOT)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag) {
 		if (split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1|EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) {
 			if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1) {
 				err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex2);
@@ -3301,30 +3304,30 @@ static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t
 					      ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
 		}
 
-		if (err)
-			goto fix_extent_len;
-		/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
-		ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
-		ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
-		err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
-		if (err)
-			goto fix_extent_len;
-
-		/* update extent status tree */
-		err = ext4_zeroout_es(inode, &zero_ex);
-
-		goto out;
-	} else if (err)
-		goto fix_extent_len;
-
-out:
-	ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
-	return err;
+		if (!err) {
+			/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
+			ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
+			ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
+			err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
+			if (!err)
+				/* update extent status tree */
+				err = ext4_zeroout_es(inode, &zero_ex);
+			/* If we failed at this point, we don't know in which
+			 * state the extent tree exactly is so don't try to fix
+			 * length of the original extent as it may do even more
+			 * damage.
+			 */
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
 
 fix_extent_len:
 	ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
 	ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
 	return err;
+out:
+	ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 21/47] pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/47] ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/47] ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mark Rutland, Christian Brauner,
	Cedric Le Goater, Christian Brauner, Eric W. Biederman,
	Martin Schwidefsky, Paul Mackerras, Andrew Morton,
	Linus Torvalds

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

commit 0711f0d7050b9e07c44bc159bbc64ac0a1022c7f upstream.

During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid.  Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid().  As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early.  As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g.  when delivering signals).

This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099e4b8 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.

Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.

Full KASAN splat below.

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
   Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273

   CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
   Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
   Call trace:
    ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
    task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
    do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
    exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
    do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
    do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
    get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
    do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
    do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
    work_pending+0xc/0x2dc

   Allocated by task 0:
    slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
    slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
    alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
    copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
    kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
    kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
    rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
    arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
    start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
    0x0

   Freed by task 270:
    slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
    slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
    slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
    kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
    put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
    put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
    proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
    proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
    proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
    new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
    vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
    ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
    __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
    __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
    __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
    __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
    invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
    el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
    do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
    el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
    el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
    el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
    which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
   The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
    224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
   The buggy address belongs to the page:
   page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
   head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
   flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
   raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
   raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   >ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
    ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec52099e4b8678a ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 init/main.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_
 	 */
 	set_mems_allowed(node_states[N_MEMORY]);
 
-	cad_pid = task_pid(current);
+	cad_pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
 
 	smp_prepare_cpus(setup_max_cpus);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 22/47] ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/47] pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/47] nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Junxiao Bi, Joseph Qi, Jan Kara,
	Mark Fasheh, Joel Becker, Changwei Ge, Gang He, Jun Piao,
	Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds

From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>

commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.

When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped.  That will cause file corruption.  Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.

Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.

    qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
             -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv

The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.

    fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
    fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ocfs2/file.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
@@ -1862,6 +1862,45 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
+ * zero out partial blocks of one cluster.
+ *
+ * start: file offset where zero starts, will be made upper block aligned.
+ * len: it will be trimmed to the end of current cluster if "start + len"
+ *      is bigger than it.
+ */
+static int ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(struct inode *inode,
+					u64 start, u64 len)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u64 start_block, end_block, nr_blocks;
+	u64 p_block, offset;
+	u32 cluster, p_cluster, nr_clusters;
+	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
+	u64 end = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
+
+	if (start + len < end)
+		end = start + len;
+
+	start_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, start);
+	end_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, end);
+	nr_blocks = end_block - start_block;
+	if (!nr_blocks)
+		return 0;
+
+	cluster = ocfs2_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
+	ret = ocfs2_get_clusters(inode, cluster, &p_cluster,
+				&nr_clusters, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	if (!p_cluster)
+		return 0;
+
+	offset = start_block - ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, cluster);
+	p_block = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, p_cluster) + offset;
+	return sb_issue_zeroout(sb, p_block, nr_blocks, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
+/*
  * Parts of this function taken from xfs_change_file_space()
  */
 static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
@@ -1871,7 +1910,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 {
 	int ret;
 	s64 llen;
-	loff_t size;
+	loff_t size, orig_isize;
 	struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
 	struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
 	handle_t *handle;
@@ -1902,6 +1941,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 	}
 
+	orig_isize = i_size_read(inode);
 	switch (sr->l_whence) {
 	case 0: /*SEEK_SET*/
 		break;
@@ -1909,7 +1949,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		sr->l_start += f_pos;
 		break;
 	case 2: /*SEEK_END*/
-		sr->l_start += i_size_read(inode);
+		sr->l_start += orig_isize;
 		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1963,6 +2003,14 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	/* zeroout eof blocks in the cluster. */
+	if (!ret && change_size && orig_isize < size) {
+		ret = ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(inode, orig_isize,
+					size - orig_isize);
+		if (!ret)
+			i_size_write(inode, size);
+	}
 	up_write(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
 	if (ret) {
 		mlog_errno(ret);
@@ -1979,9 +2027,6 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (change_size && i_size_read(inode) < size)
-		i_size_write(inode, size);
-
 	inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = current_time(inode);
 	ret = ocfs2_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode, di_bh);
 	if (ret < 0)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 23/47] nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/47] ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/47] btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+80fb126e7f7d8b1a5914,
	butt3rflyh4ck, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Jakub Kicinski

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>

commit 4ac06a1e013cf5fdd963317ffd3b968560f33bba upstream.

It's possible to trigger NULL pointer dereference by local unprivileged
user, when calling getsockname() after failed bind() (e.g. the bind
fails because LLCP_SAP_MAX used as SAP):

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  CPU: 1 PID: 426 Comm: llcp_sock_getna Not tainted 5.13.0-rc2-next-20210521+ #9
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   llcp_sock_getname+0xb1/0xe0
   __sys_getpeername+0x95/0xc0
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd5/0x180
   ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x40
   __x64_sys_getpeername+0x11/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

This can be reproduced with Syzkaller C repro (bind followed by
getpeername):
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14def446e00000

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Reported-by: syzbot+80fb126e7f7d8b1a5914@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210531072138.5219-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
+++ b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static int llcp_sock_bind(struct socket
 	if (!llcp_sock->service_name) {
 		nfc_llcp_local_put(llcp_sock->local);
 		llcp_sock->local = NULL;
+		llcp_sock->dev = NULL;
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto put_dev;
 	}
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ static int llcp_sock_bind(struct socket
 		llcp_sock->local = NULL;
 		kfree(llcp_sock->service_name);
 		llcp_sock->service_name = NULL;
+		llcp_sock->dev = NULL;
 		ret = -EADDRINUSE;
 		goto put_dev;
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 24/47] btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/47] nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/47] btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Josef Bacik, David Sterba

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

commit b86652be7c83f70bf406bed18ecf55adb9bfb91b upstream.

Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent.  This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was

	while (1) {
		ret = btrfs_search_slot();
		if (ret < 0)
			break;
	}
	ret = 0;
out:
	btrfs_free_path(path);
	return ret;

If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out.  Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the

	ret = 0;
out:

pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting.  With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.

Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/file-item.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ int btrfs_del_csums(struct btrfs_trans_h
 	u64 end_byte = bytenr + len;
 	u64 csum_end;
 	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 	u16 csum_size = btrfs_super_csum_size(fs_info->super_copy);
 	int blocksize_bits = fs_info->sb->s_blocksize_bits;
 
@@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ int btrfs_del_csums(struct btrfs_trans_h
 		path->leave_spinning = 1;
 		ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1);
 		if (ret > 0) {
+			ret = 0;
 			if (path->slots[0] == 0)
 				break;
 			path->slots[0]--;
@@ -671,7 +672,7 @@ int btrfs_del_csums(struct btrfs_trans_h
 			ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path,
 					      path->slots[0], del_nr);
 			if (ret)
-				goto out;
+				break;
 			if (key.offset == bytenr)
 				break;
 		} else if (key.offset < bytenr && csum_end > end_byte) {
@@ -715,8 +716,9 @@ int btrfs_del_csums(struct btrfs_trans_h
 			ret = btrfs_split_item(trans, root, path, &key, offset);
 			if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) {
 				btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
-				goto out;
+				break;
 			}
+			ret = 0;
 
 			key.offset = end_byte - 1;
 		} else {
@@ -726,8 +728,6 @@ int btrfs_del_csums(struct btrfs_trans_h
 		}
 		btrfs_release_path(path);
 	}
-	ret = 0;
-out:
 	btrfs_free_path(path);
 	return ret;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 25/47] btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/47] btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/47] mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, David Sterba

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.

This function has the following pattern

	while (1) {
		ret = whatever();
		if (ret)
			goto out;
	}
	ret = 0
out:
	return ret;

However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.

Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the

	ret = 0;
out:

bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -1558,6 +1558,7 @@ static noinline int fixup_inode_link_cou
 			break;
 
 		if (ret == 1) {
+			ret = 0;
 			if (path->slots[0] == 0)
 				break;
 			path->slots[0]--;
@@ -1570,17 +1571,19 @@ static noinline int fixup_inode_link_cou
 
 		ret = btrfs_del_item(trans, root, path);
 		if (ret)
-			goto out;
+			break;
 
 		btrfs_release_path(path);
 		inode = read_one_inode(root, key.offset);
-		if (!inode)
-			return -EIO;
+		if (!inode) {
+			ret = -EIO;
+			break;
+		}
 
 		ret = fixup_inode_link_count(trans, root, inode);
 		iput(inode);
 		if (ret)
-			goto out;
+			break;
 
 		/*
 		 * fixup on a directory may create new entries,
@@ -1589,8 +1592,6 @@ static noinline int fixup_inode_link_cou
 		 */
 		key.offset = (u64)-1;
 	}
-	ret = 0;
-out:
 	btrfs_release_path(path);
 	return ret;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 26/47] mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/47] btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/47] bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mina Almasry, Mike Kravetz,
	Axel Rasmussen, Peter Xu, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds,
	Sasha Levin

From: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d84cf06e3dd8c5c5b547b5d8931015fc536678e5 ]

The userfaultfd hugetlb tests cause a resv_huge_pages underflow.  This
happens when hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte() is called with !is_continue on
an index for which we already have a page in the cache.  When this
happens, we allocate a second page, double consuming the reservation,
and then fail to insert the page into the cache and return -EEXIST.

To fix this, we first check if there is a page in the cache which
already consumed the reservation, and return -EEXIST immediately if so.

There is still a rare condition where we fail to copy the page contents
AND race with a call for hugetlb_no_page() for this index and again we
will underflow resv_huge_pages.  That is fixed in a more complicated
patch not targeted for -stable.

Test:

  Hacked the code locally such that resv_huge_pages underflows produce a
  warning, then:

  ./tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd hugetlb_shared 10
	2 /tmp/kokonut_test/huge/userfaultfd_test && echo test success
  ./tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd hugetlb 10
	2 /tmp/kokonut_test/huge/userfaultfd_test && echo test success

Both tests succeed and produce no warnings.  After the test runs number
of free/resv hugepages is correct.

[mike.kravetz@oracle.com: changelog fixes]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528004649.85298-1-almasrymina@google.com
Fixes: 8fb5debc5fcd ("userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: add hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 mm/hugetlb.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
index e59e0f7ed562..0dc181290d1f 100644
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -4099,10 +4099,20 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
 	struct page *page;
 
 	if (!*pagep) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		/* If a page already exists, then it's UFFDIO_COPY for
+		 * a non-missing case. Return -EEXIST.
+		 */
+		if (vm_shared &&
+		    hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(h, dst_vma, dst_addr)) {
+			ret = -EEXIST;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(page))
+		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out;
+		}
 
 		ret = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
 						(const void __user *) src_addr,
-- 
2.30.2




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 27/47] bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/47] mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/47] bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Piotr Krysiuk, Daniel Borkmann,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>

commit 0a13e3537ea67452d549a6a80da3776d6b7dedb3 upstream.

Fix up test_verifier error messages for the case where the original error
message changed, or for the case where pointer alu errors differ between
privileged and unprivileged tests. Also, add alternative tests for keeping
coverage of the original verifier rejection error message (fp alu), and
newly reject map_ptr += rX where rX == 0 given we now forbid alu on these
types for unprivileged. All test_verifier cases pass after the change. The
test case fixups were kept separate to ease backporting of core changes.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14, skipping non-existent tests]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
 	{
-		"unpriv: adding of fp",
+		"unpriv: adding of fp, reg",
 		.insns = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
@@ -2243,9 +2243,22 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = ACCEPT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+	},
+	{
+		"unpriv: adding of fp, imm",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
 		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
 	{
 		"unpriv: cmp of stack pointer",
@@ -7766,8 +7779,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 2",
@@ -7780,6 +7794,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -7790,8 +7806,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 4",
@@ -7804,6 +7821,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -7814,8 +7833,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 6",
@@ -7826,8 +7846,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 7",
@@ -7839,8 +7860,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 8",
@@ -7852,8 +7874,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 9",
@@ -7863,8 +7886,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 10",
@@ -7876,8 +7900,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = REJECT,
 		.errstr = "math between ctx pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed",
+		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"XDP pkt read, pkt_end <= pkt_data', bad access 2",



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 28/47] bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/47] bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/47] bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 6f55b2f2a1178856c19bbce2f71449926e731914 upstream.

Small refactor to drag off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu(), so we later on can
use off_reg for generalizing some of the checks for all pointer types.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: fix minor contextual conflict for 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2094,11 +2094,12 @@ static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_v
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
-			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
-			    bool off_is_neg)
+			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
 {
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
+	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
@@ -2224,7 +2225,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 
 	switch (opcode) {
 	case BPF_ADD:
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			verbose("R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
 			return ret;
@@ -2279,7 +2280,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		}
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			verbose("R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
 			return ret;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 29/47] bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/47] bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/47] bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (20 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 24c109bb1537c12c02aeed2d51a347b4d6a9b76e upstream.

The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede769
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   19 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2025,12 +2025,18 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux
 }
 
 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
-			      u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
+			      const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+			      u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode)
 {
+	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
 			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
 	u32 off, max;
 
+	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
+	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
@@ -2121,7 +2127,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 	alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
 		     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
 
-	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg);
+	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2164,8 +2170,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
-	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
 	int ret;
 
 	dst_reg = &regs[dst];
@@ -2205,13 +2211,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 				dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
-			verbose("R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
-				off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
-	}
 
 	/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
 	 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 30/47] bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/47] bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/47] bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (19 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend, Alexei Starovoitov

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit b658bbb844e28f1862867f37e8ca11a8e2aa94a3 upstream.

Small refactor with no semantic changes in order to consolidate the max
ptr_limit boundary check.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   21 +++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2026,12 +2026,12 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux
 
 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 			      const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
-			      u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode)
+			      u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
 {
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
 			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
-	u32 off, max;
+	u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
 
 	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
 	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
@@ -2045,22 +2045,27 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
 		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
 		if (mask_to_left)
-			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
+			ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
 		else
-			*ptr_limit = -off - 1;
-		return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
+			ptr_limit = -off - 1;
+		break;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
 		if (mask_to_left) {
-			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
 		} else {
 			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
-			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
+			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
 		}
-		return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	if (ptr_limit >= max)
+		return -ERANGE;
+	*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 31/47] bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/47] bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/47] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (18 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit a6aaece00a57fa6f22575364b3903dfbccf5345d upstream.

Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2024,6 +2024,14 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux
 	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
 }
 
+enum {
+	REASON_BOUNDS	= -1,
+	REASON_TYPE	= -2,
+	REASON_PATHS	= -3,
+	REASON_LIMIT	= -4,
+	REASON_STACK	= -5,
+};
+
 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 			      const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
 			      u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
@@ -2035,7 +2043,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 
 	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
 	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
-		return -EACCES;
+		return REASON_BOUNDS;
 
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
@@ -2059,11 +2067,11 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return REASON_TYPE;
 	}
 
 	if (ptr_limit >= max)
-		return -ERANGE;
+		return REASON_LIMIT;
 	*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2083,7 +2091,7 @@ static int update_alu_sanitation_state(s
 	if (aux->alu_state &&
 	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
 	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
-		return -EACCES;
+		return REASON_PATHS;
 
 	/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
 	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
@@ -2156,7 +2164,46 @@ do_sim:
 	ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
 		*dst_reg = tmp;
-	return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
+	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
+			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+			const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+	static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
+	const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
+
+	switch (reason) {
+	case REASON_BOUNDS:
+		verbose("R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
+			off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
+		break;
+	case REASON_TYPE:
+		verbose("R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
+			off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
+		break;
+	case REASON_PATHS:
+		verbose("R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
+			dst, op, err);
+		break;
+	case REASON_LIMIT:
+		verbose("R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
+			dst, op, err);
+		break;
+	case REASON_STACK:
+		verbose("R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
+			dst, err);
+		break;
+	default:
+		verbose("verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
+			reason);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return -EACCES;
 }
 
 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
@@ -2230,10 +2277,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	switch (opcode) {
 	case BPF_ADD:
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose("R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
-			return ret;
-		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+
 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
 		 * the s32 'off' field
 		 */
@@ -2285,10 +2331,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose("R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
-			return ret;
-		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
 			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
@@ -2412,7 +2457,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
 	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
-	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (insn_bitness == 32) {
@@ -2449,10 +2493,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
 	switch (opcode) {
 	case BPF_ADD:
 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose("R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
-			return ret;
-		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
 		if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
 		    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
@@ -2473,10 +2515,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose("R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
-			return ret;
-		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
 		if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
 		    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 32/47] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/47] bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/47] bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 upstream.

Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2206,6 +2206,41 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verif
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+	 */
+	if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (dst_reg->type) {
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+				       dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+			verbose("R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1)) {
+			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -2421,23 +2456,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 
-	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
-	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
-	 */
-	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-		if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
-		    check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1)) {
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
-			return -EACCES;
-		} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
-			   check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
-					      dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
-			verbose("R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
-	}
+	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+		return -EACCES;
 
 	return 0;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 33/47] bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/47] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/47] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit f528819334881fd622fdadeddb3f7edaed8b7c9b upstream.

Add a small sanitize_needed() helper function and move sanitize_val_alu()
out of the main opcode switch. In upcoming work, we'll move sanitize_ptr_alu()
as well out of its opcode switch so this helps to streamline both.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2110,6 +2110,11 @@ static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_v
 	return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
 }
 
+static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
+{
+	return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
+}
+
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@@ -2510,11 +2515,14 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	switch (opcode) {
-	case BPF_ADD:
+	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
+	}
+
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case BPF_ADD:
 		if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
 		    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
@@ -2534,9 +2542,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
-		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
 		if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
 		    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 34/47] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/47] bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/47] bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Piotr Krysiuk, Benedict Schlueter,
	Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend, Alexei Starovoitov,
	Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 upstream.

This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.

Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.

For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.

In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
 			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
-	u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
+	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
 
 	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
 	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
@@ -2048,23 +2048,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
-		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
+		 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
+		 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
 		 */
 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
-		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
-		if (mask_to_left)
-			ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
-		else
-			ptr_limit = -off - 1;
+		ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
 		break;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
-		if (mask_to_left) {
-			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
-		} else {
-			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
-			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
-		}
+		ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
+			     ptr_reg->smin_value :
+			     ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
 		break;
 	default:
 		return REASON_TYPE;
@@ -2119,10 +2114,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
-			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+			    struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+			    const bool commit_window)
 {
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
-	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
@@ -2141,18 +2138,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 	if (vstate->speculative)
 		goto do_sim;
 
-	alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
-	alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
-		     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
-
 	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+	if (commit_window) {
+		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
+		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
+		 */
+		alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
+		alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+	} else {
+		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+	}
+
 	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 do_sim:
+	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
+	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
+	 * stack.
+	 */
+	if (commit_window)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
 	 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
@@ -2262,6 +2274,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
 	int ret;
@@ -2314,12 +2327,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	    !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	switch (opcode) {
-	case BPF_ADD:
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
+	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+				       &tmp_aux, false);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+	}
 
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case BPF_ADD:
 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
 		 * the s32 'off' field
 		 */
@@ -2370,10 +2386,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		}
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
-
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
 			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
@@ -2463,6 +2475,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 
 	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
 		return -EACCES;
+	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+				       &tmp_aux, true);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 35/47] bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/47] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/47] bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit d7a5091351756d0ae8e63134313c455624e36a13 upstream.

Update various selftest error messages:

 * The 'Rx tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types'
   is reworked into more specific/differentiated error messages for better
   guidance.

 * The change into 'value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of
   bounds' is due to moving the mixed bounds check into the speculation
   handling and thus occuring slightly later than above mentioned sanity
   check.

 * The change into 'math between map_value pointer and register with
   unbounded min value' is similarly due to register sanity check coming
   before the mixed bounds check.

 * The case of 'map access: known scalar += value_ptr from different maps'
   now loads fine given masks are the same from the different paths (despite
   max map value size being different).

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com - 4.14 backport, account for split test_verifier and
different / missing tests]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c |   34 +++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
@@ -6220,7 +6220,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6245,7 +6244,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6272,7 +6270,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6298,7 +6295,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6347,7 +6343,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6419,7 +6414,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6471,7 +6465,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6499,7 +6492,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6526,7 +6518,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6556,7 +6547,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R7 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -6615,7 +6605,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
 		.errstr = "unbounded min value",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7779,7 +7768,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7794,7 +7783,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
@@ -7806,22 +7795,23 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"check deducing bounds from const, 4",
 		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSLE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 			BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
-			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R6 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
@@ -7833,7 +7823,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7846,7 +7836,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7860,7 +7850,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7874,7 +7864,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
@@ -7886,7 +7876,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
 		.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 36/47] bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/47] bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/47] bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
	Frank van der Linden

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

commit 82abbf8d2fc46d79611ab58daa7c608df14bb3ee upstream.

Do not allow root to convert valid pointers into unknown scalars.
In particular disallow:
 ptr &= reg
 ptr <<= reg
 ptr += ptr
and explicitly allow:
 ptr -= ptr
since pkt_end - pkt == length

1.
This minimizes amount of address leaks root can do.
In the future may need to further tighten the leaks with kptr_restrict.

2.
If program has such pointer math it's likely a user mistake and
when verifier complains about it right away instead of many instructions
later on invalid memory access it's easier for users to fix their progs.

3.
when register holding a pointer cannot change to scalar it allows JITs to
optimize better. Like 32-bit archs could use single register for pointers
instead of a pair required to hold 64-bit scalars.

4.
reduces architecture dependent behavior. Since code:
r1 = r10;
r1 &= 0xff;
if (r1 ...)
will behave differently arm64 vs x64 and offloaded vs native.

A significant chunk of ptr mangling was allowed by
commit f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
yet some of it was allowed even earlier.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                       |  100 +++++++++-------------------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c |   56 ++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2292,28 +2292,24 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 
 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -2388,9 +2384,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_SUB:
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
-			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
-					dst);
+			verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
+				dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
@@ -2398,9 +2393,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		 * be able to deal with it.
 		 */
 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
-			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
-					dst);
+			verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
+				dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
@@ -2450,19 +2444,14 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_AND:
 	case BPF_OR:
 	case BPF_XOR:
-		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
-		 * (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
-		 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
-		 */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
-				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome. */
+		verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
+			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	default:
 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
-				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
+			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -2752,7 +2741,6 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *dst_reg, *src_reg;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
-	int rc;
 
 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	src_reg = NULL;
@@ -2763,43 +2751,29 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
 			if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
 				/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
-				 * an arbitrary scalar.
+				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
+				 * pointer subtraction
 				 */
-				if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-					verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
-						insn->dst_reg,
-						bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
-					return -EACCES;
+				if (opcode == BPF_SUB){
+					mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+					return 0;
 				}
-				mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
-				return 0;
+				verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
+					insn->dst_reg,
+					bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+				return -EACCES;
 			} else {
 				/* scalar += pointer
 				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
 				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
 				 */
-				rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-							     src_reg, dst_reg);
-				if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-					/* scalar += unknown scalar */
-					__mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg);
-					return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-							env, insn,
-							dst_reg, off_reg);
-				}
-				return rc;
+				return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+							       src_reg, dst_reg);
 			}
 		} else if (ptr_reg) {
 			/* pointer += scalar */
-			rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-						     dst_reg, src_reg);
-			if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-				/* unknown scalar += scalar */
-				__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
-				return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-						env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
-			}
-			return rc;
+			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+						       dst_reg, src_reg);
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
@@ -2808,17 +2782,9 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 		off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
 		__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
 		src_reg = &off_reg;
-		if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */
-			rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-						     ptr_reg, src_reg);
-			if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-				/* unknown scalar += K */
-				__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
-				return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-						env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg);
-			}
-			return rc;
-		}
+		if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
+			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+						       ptr_reg, src_reg);
 	}
 
 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -462,9 +462,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 subtraction from stack pointer",
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
-		.errstr = "R1 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R1 subtraction from stack pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -1900,9 +1898,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = ACCEPT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer += pointer",
+		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "R1 pointer += pointer",
 	},
 	{
 		"unpriv: neg pointer",
@@ -2694,7 +2691,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4),
-			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
 			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 49),
 			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 49),
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
@@ -3001,7 +2999,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 	},
@@ -3988,9 +3986,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3, 11 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer += pointer",
-		.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "R0 pointer += pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
 	},
@@ -4031,7 +4027,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -4052,7 +4048,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -4073,7 +4069,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -5304,10 +5300,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 bitwise operator &= on pointer",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 bitwise operator &= on pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 2",
@@ -5323,10 +5317,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 3",
@@ -5342,10 +5334,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic with /= operator",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 pointer arithmetic with /= operator",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 4",
@@ -5938,8 +5928,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map_in_map = { 3 },
-		.errstr = "R1 type=inv expected=map_ptr",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited",
+		.errstr = "R1 pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -7300,6 +7289,19 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 	},
 	{
+		"pkt_end - pkt_start is allowed",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
+			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+	},
+	{
 		"XDP pkt read, pkt_end mangling, bad access 1",
 		.insns = {
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
@@ -7314,7 +7316,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "R1 offset is outside of the packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
 	},
@@ -7333,7 +7335,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "R1 offset is outside of the packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
 	},



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 37/47] bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/47] bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/47] selftests/bpf: fix test_align Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jann Horn, Daniel Borkmann,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

commit dd066823db2ac4e22f721ec85190817b58059a54 upstream.

Subtraction of pointers was accidentally allowed for unpriv programs
by commit 82abbf8d2fc4. Revert that part of commit.

Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2754,7 +2754,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
 				 * pointer subtraction
 				 */
-				if (opcode == BPF_SUB){
+				if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
 					mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
 					return 0;
 				}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 38/47] selftests/bpf: fix test_align
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/47] bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/47] selftests/bpf: make dubious pointer arithmetic test useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, kernel test robot, Alexei Starovoitov,
	Daniel Borkmann

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>

commit 2b36047e7889b7efee22c11e17f035f721855731 upstream.

since commit 82abbf8d2fc4 the verifier rejects the bit-wise
arithmetic on pointers earlier.
The test 'dubious pointer arithmetic' now has less output to match on.
Adjust it.

Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c |   22 +---------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
@@ -474,27 +474,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.matches = {
 			{4, "R5=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)"},
-			/* ptr & 0x40 == either 0 or 0x40 */
-			{5, "R5=inv(id=0,umax_value=64,var_off=(0x0; 0x40))"},
-			/* ptr << 2 == unknown, (4n) */
-			{7, "R5=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
-			/* (4n) + 14 == (4n+2).  We blow our bounds, because
-			 * the add could overflow.
-			 */
-			{8, "R5=inv(id=0,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
-			/* Checked s>=0 */
-			{10, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-			/* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */
-			{12, "R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-			{14, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-			/* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine.
-			 * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able
-			 * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the
-			 * upper half of the address space.
-			 * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access
-			 * attempt will fail.
-			 */
-			{16, "R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			/* R5 bitwise operator &= on pointer prohibited */
 		}
 	},
 	{



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 39/47] selftests/bpf: make dubious pointer arithmetic test useful
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/47] selftests/bpf: fix test_align Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/47] bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
	Frank van der Linden

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

commit 31e95b61e172144bb2b626a291db1bdc0769275b upstream.

mostly revert the previous workaround and make
'dubious pointer arithmetic' test useful again.
Use (ptr - ptr) << const instead of ptr << const to generate large scalar.
The rest stays as before commit 2b36047e7889.

Fixes: 2b36047e7889 ("selftests/bpf: fix test_align")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: adjust for 4.14 (no liveness of regs in output)]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
@@ -446,11 +446,9 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 		.insns = {
 			PREP_PKT_POINTERS,
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
-			/* ptr & const => unknown & const */
-			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2),
-			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_5, 0x40),
-			/* ptr << const => unknown << const */
-			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2),
+			/* (ptr - ptr) << 2 */
+			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_3),
+			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2),
 			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_5, 2),
 			/* We have a (4n) value.  Let's make a packet offset
 			 * out of it.  First add 14, to make it a (4n+2)
@@ -473,8 +471,26 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.matches = {
-			{4, "R5=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)"},
-			/* R5 bitwise operator &= on pointer prohibited */
+			{4, "R5=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0)"},
+			/* (ptr - ptr) << 2 == unknown, (4n) */
+			{6, "R5=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
+			/* (4n) + 14 == (4n+2).  We blow our bounds, because
+			 * the add could overflow.
+			 */
+			{7, "R5=inv(id=0,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
+			/* Checked s>=0 */
+			{9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			/* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */
+			{11, "R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{13, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			/* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine.
+			 * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able
+			 * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the
+			 * upper half of the address space.
+			 * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access
+			 * attempt will fail.
+			 */
+			{15, "R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
 		}
 	},
 	{



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 40/47] bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/47] selftests/bpf: make dubious pointer arithmetic test useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/47] bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Piotr Krysiuk, Daniel Borkmann,
	John Fastabend, Alexei Starovoitov, Frank van der Linden

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 801c6058d14a82179a7ee17a4b532cac6fad067f upstream.

The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under
speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the
speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF
stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack,
potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be
extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special
compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every
program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon
their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either
domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every
stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program
to avoid such data leaking issue.

However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic
operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to
the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate
offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to
extract any restricted stack content via side-channel.

Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown
but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the
register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic
operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit
of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after
the work in 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for
the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the
immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original
instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: fixed minor 4.14 conflict because of renamed function]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |    5 +++--
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        |   27 +++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
 };
 
 /* Possible states for alu_state member. */
-#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC		1U
-#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST		2U
+#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC		(1U << 0)
+#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST		(1U << 1)
 #define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE		(1U << 2)
 #define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER		(1U << 3)
+#define BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE		(1U << 4)
 #define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE		(BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
 					 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
 
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2120,6 +2120,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 {
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+	bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
@@ -2150,6 +2151,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 		alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
 	} else {
 		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+		alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
 		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
 			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
 	}
@@ -4850,7 +4852,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
 			const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
 			struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
 			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
-			bool issrc, isneg;
+			bool issrc, isneg, isimm;
 			u32 off_reg;
 
 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
@@ -4861,16 +4863,21 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
 			isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
 			issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
 				BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
+			isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE;
 
 			off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
-			if (isneg)
-				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
-			*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
-			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
-			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
-			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
-			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
-			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+			if (isimm) {
+				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
+			} else {
+				if (isneg)
+					*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
+				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
+				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
+				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
+				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+			}
 			if (!issrc)
 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
 			insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
@@ -4878,7 +4885,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
 				insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
 					     code_sub : code_add;
 			*patch++ = *insn;
-			if (issrc && isneg)
+			if (issrc && isneg && !isimm)
 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
 			cnt = patch - insn_buf;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 41/47] bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/47] bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/47] bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, Piotr Krysiuk, Alexei Starovoitov

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 3d0220f6861d713213b015b582e9f21e5b28d2e0 upstream.

Add a container structure struct bpf_sanitize_info which holds
the current aux info, and update call-sites to sanitize_ptr_alu()
to pass it in. This is needed for passing in additional state
later on.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   18 +++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2110,15 +2110,19 @@ static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
 	return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
 }
 
+struct bpf_sanitize_info {
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
+};
+
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
 			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
-			    struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+			    struct bpf_sanitize_info *info,
 			    const bool commit_window)
 {
-	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux;
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
 	bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
@@ -2147,8 +2151,8 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
 		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
 		 */
-		alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
-		alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+		alu_state = info->aux.alu_state;
+		alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit);
 	} else {
 		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
 		alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
@@ -2276,7 +2280,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
-	struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
+	struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {};
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
 	int ret;
@@ -2327,7 +2331,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 
 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
-				       &tmp_aux, false);
+				       &info, false);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
 	}
@@ -2468,7 +2472,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		return -EACCES;
 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
-				       &tmp_aux, true);
+				       &info, true);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 42/47] bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/47] bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/47] bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Piotr Krysiuk, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit bb01a1bba579b4b1c5566af24d95f1767859771e upstream.

Masking direction as indicated via mask_to_left is considered to be
calculated once and then used to derive pointer limits. Thus, this
needs to be placed into bpf_sanitize_info instead so we can pass it
to sanitize_ptr_alu() call after the pointer move. Piotr noticed a
corner case where the off reg causes masking direction change which
then results in an incorrect final aux->alu_limit.

Fixes: 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask")
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2033,18 +2033,10 @@ enum {
 };
 
 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
-			      const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
-			      u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
+			      u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left)
 {
-	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
-	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
-			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
 	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
 
-	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
-	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
-		return REASON_BOUNDS;
-
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
@@ -2112,6 +2104,7 @@ static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
 
 struct bpf_sanitize_info {
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
+	bool mask_to_left;
 };
 
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -2143,7 +2136,16 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 	if (vstate->speculative)
 		goto do_sim;
 
-	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
+	if (!commit_window) {
+		if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
+		    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
+			return REASON_BOUNDS;
+
+		info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
+				     (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
+	}
+
+	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 43/47] bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/47] bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/47] bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Daniel Borkmann, Piotr Krysiuk, Alexei Starovoitov

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit a7036191277f9fa68d92f2071ddc38c09b1e5ee5 upstream.

In 801c6058d14a ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under
speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates
if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply
any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated
under the speculative domain.

Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and
simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars.
As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously
rejected due to simulation under zero truncation.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2169,8 +2169,12 @@ do_sim:
 	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
 	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
 	 * stack.
+	 *
+	 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
+	 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
+	 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
 	 */
-	if (commit_window)
+	if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 44/47] bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port.
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/47] bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/47] KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michael Chan, David S. Miller,
	Krzysztof Kozlowski

From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>

commit 1d86859fdf31a0d50cc82b5d0d6bfb5fe98f6c00 upstream.

The dev_port is meant to distinguish the network ports belonging to
the same PCI function.  Our devices only have one network port
associated with each PCI function and so we should not set it for
correctness.

Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -4791,7 +4791,6 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(struct b
 
 		pf->fw_fid = le16_to_cpu(resp->fid);
 		pf->port_id = le16_to_cpu(resp->port_id);
-		bp->dev->dev_port = pf->port_id;
 		memcpy(pf->mac_addr, resp->mac_address, ETH_ALEN);
 		pf->max_rsscos_ctxs = le16_to_cpu(resp->max_rsscos_ctx);
 		pf->max_cp_rings = le16_to_cpu(resp->max_cmpl_rings);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 45/47] KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/47] bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/47] sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sudip Mukherjee

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

commit 0884335a2e653b8a045083aa1d57ce74269ac81d upstream.

Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode.  The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:

  In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
  for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
  bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.

Fixes: 7ff76d58a9dc ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797a4639 ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: manual backport to old file]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3532,7 +3532,7 @@ static int cr_interception(struct vcpu_s
 	err = 0;
 	if (cr >= 16) { /* mov to cr */
 		cr -= 16;
-		val = kvm_register_read(&svm->vcpu, reg);
+		val = kvm_register_readl(&svm->vcpu, reg);
 		switch (cr) {
 		case 0:
 			if (!check_selective_cr0_intercepted(svm, val))
@@ -3577,7 +3577,7 @@ static int cr_interception(struct vcpu_s
 			kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
 			return 1;
 		}
-		kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
+		kvm_register_writel(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
 	}
 	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(&svm->vcpu, err);
 }
@@ -3607,13 +3607,13 @@ static int dr_interception(struct vcpu_s
 	if (dr >= 16) { /* mov to DRn */
 		if (!kvm_require_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr - 16))
 			return 1;
-		val = kvm_register_read(&svm->vcpu, reg);
+		val = kvm_register_readl(&svm->vcpu, reg);
 		kvm_set_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr - 16, val);
 	} else {
 		if (!kvm_require_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr))
 			return 1;
 		kvm_get_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr, &val);
-		kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
+		kvm_register_writel(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
 	}
 
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 46/47] sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/47] KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/47] xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Cheng Jian, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
	Srikar Dronamraju, Vincent Guittot, Valentin Schneider, Yang Wei

From: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

commit 60588bfa223ff675b95f866249f90616613fbe31 upstream.

select_idle_cpu() will scan the LLC domain for idle CPUs,
it's always expensive. so the next commit :

	1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")

introduces a way to limit how many CPUs we scan.

But it consume some CPUs out of 'nr' that are not allowed
for the task and thus waste our attempts. The function
always return nr_cpumask_bits, and we can't find a CPU
which our task is allowed to run.

Cpumask may be too big, similar to select_idle_core(), use
per_cpu_ptr 'select_idle_mask' to prevent stack overflow.

Fixes: 1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191213024530.28052-1-cj.chengjian@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Wei <yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Yang Wei <yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/sched/fair.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5779,6 +5779,7 @@ static inline int select_idle_smt(struct
  */
 static int select_idle_cpu(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_domain *sd, int target)
 {
+	struct cpumask *cpus = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(select_idle_mask);
 	struct sched_domain *this_sd;
 	u64 avg_cost, avg_idle;
 	u64 time, cost;
@@ -5809,11 +5810,11 @@ static int select_idle_cpu(struct task_s
 
 	time = local_clock();
 
-	for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd), target) {
+	cpumask_and(cpus, sched_domain_span(sd), &p->cpus_allowed);
+
+	for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, cpus, target) {
 		if (!--nr)
 			return -1;
-		if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &p->cpus_allowed))
-			continue;
 		if (idle_cpu(cpu))
 			break;
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 47/47] xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/47] sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2021-06-09  9:33 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Jon Hunter
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2021-06-08 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Beulich, Boris Ostrovsky, Juergen Gross

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-<N> xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().

Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).

This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.

Fixes: 8a5248fe10b1 ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to 
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev(struc
 				   struct pci_dev *dev, int devid,
 				   publish_pci_dev_cb publish_cb)
 {
-	int err = 0, slot, func = -1;
+	int err = 0, slot, func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
 	struct pci_dev_entry *t, *dev_entry;
 	struct vpci_dev_data *vpci_dev = pdev->pci_dev_data;
 
@@ -94,23 +94,26 @@ static int __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev(struc
 
 	/*
 	 * Keep multi-function devices together on the virtual PCI bus, except
-	 * virtual functions.
+	 * that we want to keep virtual functions at func 0 on their own. They
+	 * aren't multi-function devices and hence their presence at func 0
+	 * may cause guests to not scan the other functions.
 	 */
-	if (!dev->is_virtfn) {
+	if (!dev->is_virtfn || func) {
 		for (slot = 0; slot < PCI_SLOT_MAX; slot++) {
 			if (list_empty(&vpci_dev->dev_list[slot]))
 				continue;
 
 			t = list_entry(list_first(&vpci_dev->dev_list[slot]),
 				       struct pci_dev_entry, list);
+			if (t->dev->is_virtfn && !PCI_FUNC(t->dev->devfn))
+				continue;
 
 			if (match_slot(dev, t->dev)) {
 				pr_info("vpci: %s: assign to virtual slot %d func %d\n",
 					pci_name(dev), slot,
-					PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn));
+					func);
 				list_add_tail(&dev_entry->list,
 					      &vpci_dev->dev_list[slot]);
-				func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
 				goto unlock;
 			}
 		}
@@ -123,7 +126,6 @@ static int __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev(struc
 				pci_name(dev), slot);
 			list_add_tail(&dev_entry->list,
 				      &vpci_dev->dev_list[slot]);
-			func = dev->is_virtfn ? 0 : PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
 			goto unlock;
 		}
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/47] xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2021-06-09  9:33 ` Jon Hunter
  2021-06-09 11:25 ` Naresh Kamboju
  2021-06-09 18:48 ` Guenter Roeck
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Jon Hunter @ 2021-06-09  9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
	lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, stable, linux-tegra

On Tue, 08 Jun 2021 20:26:43 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.236 release.
> There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Jun 2021 17:59:18 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.236-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.14:
    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    32 tests:	32 pass, 0 fail

Linux version:	4.14.236-rc1-g872e045a48f8
Boards tested:	tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>

Jon

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-09  9:33 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Jon Hunter
@ 2021-06-09 11:25 ` Naresh Kamboju
  2021-06-09 18:48 ` Guenter Roeck
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2021-06-09 11:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: open list, Shuah Khan, Florian Fainelli, patches, lkft-triage,
	Jon Hunter, linux-stable, Pavel Machek, Andrew Morton,
	Linus Torvalds, Guenter Roeck

On Wed, 9 Jun 2021 at 00:01, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.236 release.
> There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Jun 2021 17:59:18 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.236-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>

## Build
* kernel: 4.14.236-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-4.14.y
* git commit: 872e045a48f87d3c4c6deaab477abd068fda46b3
* git describe: v4.14.235-48-g872e045a48f8
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14.235-48-g872e045a48f8

## No regressions (compared to v4.14.235)


## No fixes (compared to v4.14.235)


## Test result summary
 total: 61694, pass: 48597, fail: 1298, skip: 10549, xfail: 1250,

## Build Summary
* arm: 97 total, 97 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* dragonboard-410c: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* hi6220-hikey: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 36 total, 36 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review
  2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-06-09 11:25 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2021-06-09 18:48 ` Guenter Roeck
  49 siblings, 0 replies; 51+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2021-06-09 18:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches, lkft-triage, pavel,
	jonathanh, f.fainelli, stable

On Tue, Jun 08, 2021 at 08:26:43PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.236 release.
> There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Jun 2021 17:59:18 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 168 pass: 168 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 406 pass: 406 fail: 0

Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

Guenter

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 51+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-06-09 18:49 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/47] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/47] efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/47] vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/47] vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/47] vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/47] ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/47] HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/47] HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/47] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/47] Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/47] Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/47] net: caif: added cfserl_release function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/47] net: caif: add proper error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/47] ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/47] ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/47] pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/47] ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/47] nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/47] btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/47] btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/47] mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/47] bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/47] bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/47] bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/47] bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/47] bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/47] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/47] bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/47] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/47] bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/47] bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/47] bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/47] selftests/bpf: fix test_align Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/47] selftests/bpf: make dubious pointer arithmetic test useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/47] bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/47] bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/47] bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/47] bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/47] bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/47] KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/47] sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/47] xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-09  9:33 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Jon Hunter
2021-06-09 11:25 ` Naresh Kamboju
2021-06-09 18:48 ` Guenter Roeck

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