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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 36/47] bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers
Date: Tue,  8 Jun 2021 20:27:19 +0200
Message-ID: <20210608175931.663874661@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210608175930.477274100@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

commit 82abbf8d2fc46d79611ab58daa7c608df14bb3ee upstream.

Do not allow root to convert valid pointers into unknown scalars.
In particular disallow:
 ptr &= reg
 ptr <<= reg
 ptr += ptr
and explicitly allow:
 ptr -= ptr
since pkt_end - pkt == length

1.
This minimizes amount of address leaks root can do.
In the future may need to further tighten the leaks with kptr_restrict.

2.
If program has such pointer math it's likely a user mistake and
when verifier complains about it right away instead of many instructions
later on invalid memory access it's easier for users to fix their progs.

3.
when register holding a pointer cannot change to scalar it allows JITs to
optimize better. Like 32-bit archs could use single register for pointers
instead of a pair required to hold 64-bit scalars.

4.
reduces architecture dependent behavior. Since code:
r1 = r10;
r1 &= 0xff;
if (r1 ...)
will behave differently arm64 vs x64 and offloaded vs native.

A significant chunk of ptr mangling was allowed by
commit f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
yet some of it was allowed even earlier.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                       |  100 +++++++++-------------------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c |   56 ++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2292,28 +2292,24 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 
 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
-				dst);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
+			dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -2388,9 +2384,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_SUB:
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
-			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
-					dst);
+			verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
+				dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
@@ -2398,9 +2393,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 		 * be able to deal with it.
 		 */
 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
-			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
-					dst);
+			verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
+				dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
@@ -2450,19 +2444,14 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_AND:
 	case BPF_OR:
 	case BPF_XOR:
-		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
-		 * (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
-		 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
-		 */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
-				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome. */
+		verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
+			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	default:
 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
-				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+		verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
+			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -2752,7 +2741,6 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *dst_reg, *src_reg;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
-	int rc;
 
 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	src_reg = NULL;
@@ -2763,43 +2751,29 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
 			if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
 				/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
-				 * an arbitrary scalar.
+				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
+				 * pointer subtraction
 				 */
-				if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-					verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
-						insn->dst_reg,
-						bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
-					return -EACCES;
+				if (opcode == BPF_SUB){
+					mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+					return 0;
 				}
-				mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
-				return 0;
+				verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
+					insn->dst_reg,
+					bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
+				return -EACCES;
 			} else {
 				/* scalar += pointer
 				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
 				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
 				 */
-				rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-							     src_reg, dst_reg);
-				if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-					/* scalar += unknown scalar */
-					__mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg);
-					return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-							env, insn,
-							dst_reg, off_reg);
-				}
-				return rc;
+				return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+							       src_reg, dst_reg);
 			}
 		} else if (ptr_reg) {
 			/* pointer += scalar */
-			rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-						     dst_reg, src_reg);
-			if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-				/* unknown scalar += scalar */
-				__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
-				return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-						env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
-			}
-			return rc;
+			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+						       dst_reg, src_reg);
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
@@ -2808,17 +2782,9 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struc
 		off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
 		__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
 		src_reg = &off_reg;
-		if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */
-			rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
-						     ptr_reg, src_reg);
-			if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-				/* unknown scalar += K */
-				__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
-				return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
-						env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg);
-			}
-			return rc;
-		}
+		if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
+			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+						       ptr_reg, src_reg);
 	}
 
 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -462,9 +462,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 subtraction from stack pointer",
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
-		.errstr = "R1 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R1 subtraction from stack pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -1900,9 +1898,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.result = ACCEPT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer += pointer",
+		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "R1 pointer += pointer",
 	},
 	{
 		"unpriv: neg pointer",
@@ -2694,7 +2691,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
 				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4),
-			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
 			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 49),
 			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 49),
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
@@ -3001,7 +2999,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 	},
@@ -3988,9 +3986,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3, 11 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer += pointer",
-		.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "R0 pointer += pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
 	},
@@ -4031,7 +4027,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -4052,7 +4048,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -4073,7 +4069,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
-		.errstr = "R4 invalid mem access",
+		.errstr = "R4 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
 	},
@@ -5304,10 +5300,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 bitwise operator &= on pointer",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 bitwise operator &= on pointer",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 2",
@@ -5323,10 +5317,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 3",
@@ -5342,10 +5334,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic with /= operator",
-		.errstr = "invalid mem access 'inv'",
+		.errstr = "R0 pointer arithmetic with /= operator",
 		.result = REJECT,
-		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
 		"map element value illegal alu op, 4",
@@ -5938,8 +5928,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.fixup_map_in_map = { 3 },
-		.errstr = "R1 type=inv expected=map_ptr",
-		.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited",
+		.errstr = "R1 pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited",
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
@@ -7300,6 +7289,19 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 	},
 	{
+		"pkt_end - pkt_start is allowed",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
+				    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
+			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+	},
+	{
 		"XDP pkt read, pkt_end mangling, bad access 1",
 		.insns = {
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
@@ -7314,7 +7316,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "R1 offset is outside of the packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
 	},
@@ -7333,7 +7335,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
-		.errstr = "R1 offset is outside of the packet",
+		.errstr = "R3 pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
 	},



  parent reply index

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-08 18:26 [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/47] net: usb: cdc_ncm: dont spew notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/47] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/47] efi: cper: fix snprintf() use in cper_dimm_err_location() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/47] vfio/pci: Fix error return code in vfio_ecap_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/47] vfio/pci: zap_vma_ptes() needs MMU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/47] vfio/platform: fix module_put call in error flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/47] ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding service Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/47] HID: pidff: fix error return code in hid_pidff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/47] HID: i2c-hid: fix format string mismatch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/47] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatches Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_add_iface() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/47] ieee802154: fix error return code in ieee802154_llsec_getparams() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/47] Bluetooth: fix the erroneous flush_work() order Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/47] Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/47] net: caif: added cfserl_release function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/47] net: caif: add proper error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/47] net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/47] ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/47] ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/47] pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/47] ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/47] nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/47] btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/47] btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/47] mm, hugetlb: fix simple resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/47] bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/47] bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/47] bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/47] bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/47] bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/47] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/47] bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/47] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/47] bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/47] bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/47] selftests/bpf: fix test_align Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/47] selftests/bpf: make dubious pointer arithmetic test useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/47] bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/47] bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/47] bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/47] bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/47] bnxt_en: Remove the setting of dev_port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/47] KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/47] sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-08 18:27 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/47] xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-06-09  9:33 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/47] 4.14.236-rc1 review Jon Hunter
2021-06-09 11:25 ` Naresh Kamboju
2021-06-09 18:48 ` Guenter Roeck

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    --in-reply-to=20210608175931.663874661@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=fllinden@amazon.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Stable Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/stable/0 stable/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 stable stable/ https://lore.kernel.org/stable \
		stable@vger.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index stable

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.stable


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git