From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, bhe@redhat.com, david@redhat.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, prudo@redhat.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
vgoyal@redhat.com
Subject: [patch 15/15] proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 16:43:58 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211120004358.K3wyLJN5Y%akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211119164248.50feee07c5d2cc6cc4addf97@linux-foundation.org>
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Subject: proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()
To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and has
some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block, I can
easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":
[ 11.327580] systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
[ 11.339697] kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
[ 11.370964] kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
[ 11.373997] kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
[ 11.385357] kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
[ 11.386722] kdump[467]: saving vmcore
[ 16.531275] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
[ 16.531705] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 16.532037] #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
[ 16.532396] PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
[ 16.532872] Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 16.533154] CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
[ 16.533513] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 16.534198] RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
[ 16.534552] Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
[ 16.535670] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
[ 16.535998] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
[ 16.536441] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
[ 16.536878] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
[ 16.537315] R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
[ 16.537755] R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
[ 16.538200] FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 16.538696] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 16.539055] CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
[ 16.539510] Call Trace:
[ 16.539679] <TASK>
[ 16.539828] read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
[ 16.540063] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x2f/0x80
[ 16.540323] ? inode_security+0x22/0x60
[ 16.540572] proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
[ 16.540807] vfs_read+0x95/0x190
[ 16.541022] ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
[ 16.541238] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 16.541475] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on wrong
access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly handled
via clac()+stac().
To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c~proc-vmcore-fix-clearing-user-buffer-by-properly-using-clear_user
+++ a/fs/proc/vmcore.c
@@ -154,9 +154,13 @@ ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size
nr_bytes = count;
/* If pfn is not ram, return zeros for sparse dump files */
- if (!pfn_is_ram(pfn))
- memset(buf, 0, nr_bytes);
- else {
+ if (!pfn_is_ram(pfn)) {
+ tmp = 0;
+ if (!userbuf)
+ memset(buf, 0, nr_bytes);
+ else if (clear_user(buf, nr_bytes))
+ tmp = -EFAULT;
+ } else {
if (encrypted)
tmp = copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(pfn, buf,
nr_bytes,
@@ -165,12 +169,12 @@ ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size
else
tmp = copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, nr_bytes,
offset, userbuf);
-
- if (tmp < 0) {
- up_read(&vmcore_cb_rwsem);
- return tmp;
- }
}
+ if (tmp < 0) {
+ up_read(&vmcore_cb_rwsem);
+ return tmp;
+ }
+
*ppos += nr_bytes;
count -= nr_bytes;
buf += nr_bytes;
_
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-20 0:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20211119164248.50feee07c5d2cc6cc4addf97@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 02/15] ipc: WARN if trying to remove ipc object which is absent Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 03/15] shm: extend forced shm destroy to support objects from several IPC nses Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 05/15] hexagon: export raw I/O routines for modules Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 06/15] hexagon: clean up timer-regs.h Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 08/15] mm: kmemleak: slob: respect SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE flag Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 10/15] hugetlb, userfaultfd: fix reservation restore on userfaultfd error Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 12/15] mm/damon/dbgfs: use '__GFP_NOWARN' for user-specified size buffer allocation Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 13/15] mm/damon/dbgfs: fix missed use of damon_dbgfs_lock Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` [patch 14/15] kmap_local: don't assume kmap PTEs are linear arrays in memory Andrew Morton
2021-11-20 0:43 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
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