From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux@roeck-us.net, shuah@kernel.org,
patches@kernelci.org, lkft-triage@lists.linaro.org,
pavel@denx.de, jonathanh@nvidia.com, f.fainelli@gmail.com,
sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com, slade@sladewatkins.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 00/24] 4.9.306-rc1 review
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:59:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155856.295480966@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.306 release.
There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 11 Mar 2022 15:58:48 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.306-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linux 4.9.306-rc1
Emmanuel Gil Peyrot <linkmauve@linkmauve.fr>
ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
ARM: early traps initialisation
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 785 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +-
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 10 +
arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 32 ++
arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 79 +++-
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 24 +
arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 71 +++
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 65 ++-
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 37 +-
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 37 +-
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 11 +
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 198 ++++++--
arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 -
arch/x86/Makefile | 5 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 41 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 223 ++++++---
drivers/firmware/psci.c | 15 +
include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 74 +++
include/linux/bpf.h | 11 +
kernel/sysctl.c | 8 +
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
25 files changed, 1596 insertions(+), 153 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 15:59 Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/24] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/24] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:58 ` Ben Hutchings
2022-03-09 22:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/24] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/24] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/24] Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/24] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/24] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/24] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/24] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/24] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/24] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/24] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/24] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/24] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/24] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/24] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/24] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/24] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/24] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/24] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/24] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/24] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/24] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/24] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/24] 4.9.306-rc1 review Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 19:18 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10 3:32 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 11:41 ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-10 11:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 20:26 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 3:45 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 11:39 ` Pavel Machek
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