From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EBBCC433EF for ; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:09:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234617AbiCIQKa (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Mar 2022 11:10:30 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44588 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234881AbiCIQIM (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Mar 2022 11:08:12 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7D4F5B89C; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 08:04:38 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 11A2BB82233; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:04:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 59394C340E8; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:04:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1646841874; bh=wBLb1JgeLGCmIlJRSZ+nBqsfFArPm7x3PghLmULm8JI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=eBSy8HqQMzhpnmRSHQWo9pFYHF6bA8LBT3GVqMsrCWinW9QEV8+3aqHH2xNImzM7b hANX0FVOO4vU0Mpe2bH9kBLROxoI7oQeTLGO7aYTwFM0pyYZArZ7dVL+jwxdccMwca wCls1JZ0xTuUWqbcsh7GiMNyK2nvVXXFRSSzboC0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips , Borislav Petkov Subject: [PATCH 5.4 08/18] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:59:57 +0100 Message-Id: <20220309155856.799858164@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220309155856.552503355@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220309155856.552503355@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Kim Phillips commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream. Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation on AMD Processors" whitepaper. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. -See :ref:`[1] ` :ref:`[5] ` :ref:`[7] ` -:ref:`[10] ` :ref:`[11] `. +See :ref:`[1] ` :ref:`[5] ` :ref:`[6] ` +:ref:`[7] ` :ref:`[10] ` :ref:`[11] `. Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) --------------------------------------- @@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers: .. _spec_ref6: -[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors `_. +[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors `_. ARM white papers: