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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 07/43] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Date: Wed,  9 Mar 2022 16:59:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155859.950507222@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.734715884@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>

commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/43] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/43] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/43] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/43] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/43] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/43] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/43] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/43] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/43] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/43] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/43] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/43] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/43] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/43] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/43] arm64: Add HWCAP for self-synchronising virtual counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/43] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/43] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/43] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/43] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/43] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/43] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/43] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/43] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/43] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/43] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/43] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/43] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/43] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/43] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/43] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/43] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/43] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/43] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/43] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/43] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/43] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/43] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/43] slip: fix macro redefine warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/43] block: drop unused includes in <linux/genhd.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Fox Chen
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:14 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10  3:33   ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 10:30   ` Anders Roxell
2022-03-10 10:52     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10  4:39 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10  6:00 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-10  8:10 ` Bagas Sanjaya

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