From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45940C433EF for ; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:20:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242963AbiCJOVQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:21:16 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43458 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S243937AbiCJOSc (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:18:32 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ADF911693A8; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 06:15:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3DAC2B82615; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:15:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A3CDFC340EB; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:15:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1646921706; bh=/sdHsyS+hr3Sal/XN/Ek01i3/VYlSRYBbNSleu30DIE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FAipqprAzDAdDI9Kd1SwlQvA76DlBTCZrEaTEYncuhFZ+5f62nBI0w9u+l99sRpxL p/Tknzf6TLgO4bK8fewEVEZ3SDjLdQl6jBUnuNgC7NKo+6vTsqAh6y6MS/HWvvV+HB 7opWGX208YzNGny62nSfXkc7O9kDPxq0HgTx4/+0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn , Jonathan Corbet , Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 4.9 06/38] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:13:19 +0100 Message-Id: <20220310140808.323981477@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220310140808.136149678@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220310140808.136149678@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Lukas Bulwahn commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream. The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence. Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that. Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet [bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware. - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.