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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.16 06/53] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:09:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140812.018440868@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140811.832630727@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>

commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 14:09 [PATCH 5.16 00/53] 5.16.14-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 01/53] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 02/53] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 03/53] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 04/53] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 05/53] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 07/53] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 08/53] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 09/53] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 10/53] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 11/53] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 12/53] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 13/53] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 14/53] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 15/53] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 16/53] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 17/53] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 18/53] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 19/53] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 20/53] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 21/53] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 22/53] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 23/53] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 24/53] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 25/53] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 26/53] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 27/53] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 28/53] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 29/53] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 30/53] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 31/53] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 32/53] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 33/53] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 34/53] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 35/53] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 36/53] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 37/53] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 38/53] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 39/53] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 40/53] arm64: Do not include __READ_ONCE() block in assembly files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 41/53] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 42/53] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 43/53] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 44/53] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 45/53] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 46/53] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 47/53] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 48/53] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 49/53] xen/9p: use alloc/free_pages_exact() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 50/53] xen/pvcalls: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 51/53] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 52/53] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 53/53] Revert "ACPI: PM: s2idle: Cancel wakeup before dispatching EC GPE" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 18:48 ` [PATCH 5.16 00/53] 5.16.14-rc2 review Jon Hunter
2022-03-10 19:32 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 21:30 ` Justin Forbes
2022-03-10 21:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-03-10 23:20 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-10 23:20 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11  0:14 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-11  1:03 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11  3:11 ` Zan Aziz
2022-03-11  8:14 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-03-11 10:55 ` Bagas Sanjaya

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