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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 57/58] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref()
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:19:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140814.600852103@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140812.983088611@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Commit 66e3531b33ee51dad17c463b4d9c9f52e341503d upstream.

When calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() the returned value must
be tested and the reaction to that value should be appropriate.

In case of failure in xennet_get_responses() the reaction should not be
to crash the system, but to disable the network device.

The calls in setup_netfront() can be replaced by calls of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(). While at it avoid double free of ring
pages and grant references via xennet_disconnect_backend() in this case.

This is CVE-2022-23042 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -988,7 +988,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
 	struct device *dev = &queue->info->netdev->dev;
 	struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog;
 	struct xdp_buff xdp;
-	unsigned long ret;
 	int slots = 1;
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 verdict;
@@ -1030,8 +1029,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
 			goto next;
 		}
 
-		ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
-		BUG_ON(!ret);
+		if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) {
+			dev_alert(dev,
+				  "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
+			queue->info->broken = true;
+			dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref);
 
@@ -1252,6 +1256,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struc
 					   &need_xdp_flush);
 
 		if (unlikely(err)) {
+			if (queue->info->broken) {
+				spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock);
+				return 0;
+			}
 err:
 			while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq)))
 				__skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb);
@@ -1916,7 +1924,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
 			struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn)
 {
 	struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs;
-	struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs;
+	struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL;
 	grant_ref_t gref;
 	int err;
 
@@ -1936,21 +1944,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
 
 	err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto grant_tx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	queue->tx_ring_ref = gref;
 
 	rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
 	if (!rxs) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page");
-		goto alloc_rx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 	SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs);
 	FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto grant_rx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	queue->rx_ring_ref = gref;
 
 	if (feature_split_evtchn)
@@ -1963,22 +1971,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
 		err = setup_netfront_single(queue);
 
 	if (err)
-		goto alloc_evtchn_fail;
+		goto fail;
 
 	return 0;
 
 	/* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to
 	 * granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point.
 	 */
-alloc_evtchn_fail:
-	gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_rx_ring_fail:
-	free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
-alloc_rx_ring_fail:
-	gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_tx_ring_fail:
-	free_page((unsigned long)txs);
-fail:
+ fail:
+	if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+		gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0,
+					  (unsigned long)rxs);
+		queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+	} else {
+		free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
+	}
+	if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+		gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0,
+					  (unsigned long)txs);
+		queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+	} else {
+		free_page((unsigned long)txs);
+	}
 	return err;
 }
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 14:18 [PATCH 5.15 00/58] 5.15.28-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/58] slip: fix macro redefine warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/58] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/58] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/58] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/58] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/58] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/58] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/58] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/58] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:18 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/58] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/58] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/58] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/58] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/58] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/58] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/58] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/58] arm64: Add HWCAP for self-synchronising virtual counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/58] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/58] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/58] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/58] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/58] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/58] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/58] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/58] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/58] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/58] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/58] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/58] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/58] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/58] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/58] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/58] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/58] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/58] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/58] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/58] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/58] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/58] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/58] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/58] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/58] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/58] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/58] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/58] arm64: Do not include __READ_ONCE() block in assembly files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/58] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/58] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 48/58] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/58] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 50/58] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/58] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/58] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/58] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/58] xen/9p: use alloc/free_pages_exact() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/58] xen/pvcalls: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/58] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/58] Revert "ACPI: PM: s2idle: Cancel wakeup before dispatching EC GPE" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 18:48 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/58] 5.15.28-rc2 review Jon Hunter
2022-03-10 19:04 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-10 19:32 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 22:12 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11  1:03 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11  7:34 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-11  8:27 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-03-11 10:08 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-03-11 10:26 ` Anders Roxell

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