From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A9C1C433FE for ; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 13:11:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229996AbiJCNL6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Oct 2022 09:11:58 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59542 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230013AbiJCNLz (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Oct 2022 09:11:55 -0400 Received: from smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com (smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com [185.125.188.121]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 19BDE4E63D; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 06:11:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from quatroqueijos.. (unknown [179.93.174.77]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B4EA942FB7; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 13:11:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=canonical.com; s=20210705; t=1664802688; bh=u+NBCJUlej0km0jw+nwT7PcFAyIKIs2oOyoRKNz3QyM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=FVPSBhMs2JbgAi2zfFjuMAkC2/Ps9QPBvW2s6dXk4Nor3RW2TbrfePoScE+i4lvTM OrtBLnhpqabhpe9utmwPtslMDC8Y3hththkJMyebLQZHek/ZML4xTp6QmYsvmQBEWH PKZo7/BvxJhzTxW+Z+hjVaJrveuZj57dPW6XduCyuMNSAZvWnXkKKEpd7IOoWqt9M/ vBLgA/vlQa/F1rqLerm2y5xE2GuEJ4U3JE8yjIjDYyZIXoE14t5u5QQP9ME3wcRKf2 mk065LiQMkvyhJNncoCGKNqvY1XvJKuDqiIJfVmwt4EU6/lvITSeS0xGiJyNDSaPg6 Ukk1Qrxh+a+Bw== From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, jpoimboe@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 5.4 09/37] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 10:10:10 -0300 Message-Id: <20221003131038.12645-10-cascardo@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com> References: <20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Alexandre Chartre commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream. Add the "retbleed=" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto". Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel). [peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov [cascardo: this effectively remove the UNRET mitigation as an option, so it has to be complemented by a later pick of the same commit later. This is done in order to pick retbleed_select_mitigation] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index db9d53b879f8..e0fb1e5e5113 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4298,6 +4298,18 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 769071688c11..24380bcc3d3d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -111,6 +112,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); @@ -705,6 +712,71 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) + break; + + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt @@ -1913,7 +1985,7 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, -- 2.34.1