From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98F5AC433FE for ; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 13:12:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230075AbiJCNMQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Oct 2022 09:12:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60086 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230043AbiJCNMP (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Oct 2022 09:12:15 -0400 Received: from smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com (smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com [185.125.188.121]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60ADE4E84D; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 06:12:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from quatroqueijos.. (unknown [179.93.174.77]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-relay-canonical-1.canonical.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D684E42FB4; Mon, 3 Oct 2022 13:11:52 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=canonical.com; s=20210705; t=1664802715; bh=Bq/so8mhSvkDT9S5b+/iuxmZcGJDq1a4XsFvOC+55fI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=WftK/exxu5EdOpQRmPqA/p4LcC7kZKnBNs7+y385e71lHgYss7/0Y96Y2P+Da9fQc YBJcwN+YulC+ME7iQrf1NrqrfAiwDeDMLTWa9RtyUIuF54uPvsUfPXHEOQwz+hBWzy V8jISkRNrNCeOyJ6Pjz+ne6jOcfx+mxunWPNGwcVPYfoUezyLtbV7+hzcLsAPKhhcB LyFFJeX6efr5QVB3lZ5eueKRyWROSpAwuhG+/pec1JhABIqz1xACtA2QcfosrqRaNy /mzNbqTAUEwfo5ajzbIqME7+4831whJOqxrkA70tgeG6lR2rJ+Qj2voCRsRzc3K0PU EHQkDvu9iS+HQ== From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, jpoimboe@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 5.4 16/37] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 10:10:17 -0300 Message-Id: <20221003131038.12645-17-cascardo@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com> References: <20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Peter Zijlstra commit 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 upstream. Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs). [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index c56042916a7c..973784cfe23a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */ #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 74f81db13585..d0baeb89f5ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -743,11 +743,16 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, }; enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { @@ -757,6 +762,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = @@ -782,6 +789,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" #define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -794,8 +802,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) - break; + /* + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + */ break; } @@ -805,15 +815,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the + * retbleed= cmdline option. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS; + break; + default: + pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); + } + } + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = - SPECTRE_V2_NONE; - static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init = diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 0ee6cd7155b0..69345a8a1762 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1131,24 +1131,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), @@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN); } - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) -- 2.34.1