From: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
mark.brown@arm.com
Subject: [PATCH v4.4 V2 11/43] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 10:57:59 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7d56c56af2f883958d5e74fa3178a1f774b9fd94.1562908075.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1562908074.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
commit f71c2ffcb20dd8626880747557014bb9a61eb90e upstream.
Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers
are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user
operations.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ v4.4: fixup for v4.4 style uaccess primitives ]
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 20 ++++++++++++--------
arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++--
arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +++---
arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 693a0d784534..a25b8726ffa9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -303,19 +303,20 @@ do { \
extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
-extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n);
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_write(to, n);
- return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ return __arch_copy_from_user(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n);
+
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_read(from, n);
- return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ return __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n);
+
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
@@ -338,22 +339,25 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi
return n;
}
-static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n) && access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
- n = __copy_in_user(to, from, n);
+ n = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n);
return n;
}
+#define copy_in_user __copy_in_user
#define __copy_to_user_inatomic __copy_to_user
#define __copy_from_user_inatomic __copy_from_user
-static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
{
if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
- n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
+ n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
return n;
}
+#define clear_user __clear_user
extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
index c654df05b7d7..abe4e0984dbb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page);
/* user mem (segment) */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_in_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user);
/* physical memory */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memstart_addr);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
index a9723c71c52b..fc6bb0f83511 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.text
-/* Prototype: int __clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
+/* Prototype: int __arch_clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
* Purpose : clear some user memory
* Params : addr - user memory address to clear
* : sz - number of bytes to clear
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
*
* Alignment fixed up by hardware.
*/
-ENTRY(__clear_user)
+ENTRY(__arch_clear_user)
ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
mov x2, x1 // save the size for fixup return
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ USER(9f, strb wzr, [x0] )
ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
ret
-ENDPROC(__clear_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_clear_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
index 81c8fc93c100..0219aa85b3cc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
.endm
end .req x5
-ENTRY(__copy_in_user)
+ENTRY(__arch_copy_in_user)
ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
add end, x0, x2
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
mov x0, #0
ret
-ENDPROC(__copy_in_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_copy_in_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
--
2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-12 5:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-12 5:27 [PATCH v4.4 V2 00/43] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 01/43] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 02/43] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 03/43] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 04/43] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 05/43] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 06/43] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 07/43] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 08/43] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 09/43] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 10/43] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:27 ` Viresh Kumar [this message]
2019-07-31 12:37 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 11/43] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Mark Rutland
2019-08-01 3:38 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 12/43] arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 13/43] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 14/43] arm64: Introduce cpu_die_early Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 15/43] arm64: Move cpu_die_early to smp.c Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 12:35 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-01 3:35 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 16/43] arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 17/43] arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 18/43] arm64: Rearrange CPU errata workaround checks Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 19/43] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 20/43] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 21/43] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 22/43] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 23/43] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 24/43] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 16:45 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-01 5:20 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-06 12:18 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-08 12:06 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-28 10:23 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-28 16:08 ` Mark Rutland
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 25/43] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 13:09 ` Julien Thierry
2019-08-01 5:09 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01 6:30 ` Julien Thierry
2019-08-01 6:35 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01 6:57 ` Greg KH
2019-08-01 7:05 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01 7:34 ` Will Deacon
2019-08-01 7:41 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01 8:43 ` Greg KH
2019-08-01 8:49 ` Julien Thierry
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 26/43] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 27/43] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 28/43] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 29/43] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 30/43] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 31/43] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 32/43] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 33/43] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 34/43] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 35/43] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 36/43] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 37/43] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 38/43] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 39/43] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 40/43] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 41/43] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 42/43] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12 5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 43/43] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-07-15 13:09 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 00/43] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Mark Rutland
2019-07-16 3:44 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 2:52 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 17:02 ` Mark Rutland
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