From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 968E3C742AA for ; Fri, 12 Jul 2019 05:30:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B50521530 for ; Fri, 12 Jul 2019 05:30:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="AzrkWM5i" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726092AbfGLFaW (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 Jul 2019 01:30:22 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-f194.google.com ([209.85.214.194]:38066 "EHLO mail-pl1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725791AbfGLFaV (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 Jul 2019 01:30:21 -0400 Received: by mail-pl1-f194.google.com with SMTP id az7so4204775plb.5 for ; Thu, 11 Jul 2019 22:30:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mSGnDnoJppey6/ef3bclxREaifXq44bcCaQXzmdFJKI=; b=AzrkWM5iIo1ZtcqhzA8o8nP1Av4xp/bxDcLghhm5ED764ZwvHpspBZwqV9oK7PBbXD D7jWNli9CznjZyErdy++iBfdrqmaLoyVLCMlLWCq1DqhFE9CLVeoIsW3NjXOqkSjrIwE iynF9AxwDbCmGQCS5Hc/zz0lxvzaX/EvKRlXiXuY2b1H5ZQ6EeMCDhw7aHkj+4Pdqe35 OzSiMpInWMu6THdHPi7vgYmegdi/JbkvDz2P+eWPotUmU7WBOpQY7aydtSs7Tf7P93Z9 tWtZ/A7jgtwsqiQrHDgefKkba57bgJ15fEUYv+hgxvRZOBK8k69wQwaygYzfP4i0JKqh PfPQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mSGnDnoJppey6/ef3bclxREaifXq44bcCaQXzmdFJKI=; b=RoPxS/YekXWGUYMcLXr33nBZXUewTQpIOl3629RLqZc+CXseb64GtvMKiEMVtQUn5S E7cf3MwwUKs117h4mjXcZElUeXEHqsvYURviemti1AbeDxPUiZlKDecMhjCxQtA1mvSP 8goAN7u6umSol3R1BGgZ8nAeqIWRacskGkOiOWt863RPA14blEZk/8YIoef5zIzroOtH LnzVLqDAWZKdczEnKUL7okZv7HNiR99bEwMIadwOHgGnWeTrydRScjpBostZYxxOKDVb 7kw3kt9dh6eeyKOcQ4L3sGmqboomVXRprxpntSBJwiOE+zuEJ5vTG/byADzhuqug2+6s WGsQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUEgtLUT6SuZk4nvNsrMS9x+BHw31QmLO2F8s/gNf2rtGJMwvF1 33sp35Oq2dVifwkUcyuaFW1CHQpGp/k= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy8cQfZ9iiEsPFM2ANyBiTRPycOuNDfwTGL3TD8RjFzF/umNpZBZcvlayrEgrWEh3z2wMMJ7Q== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:7083:: with SMTP id z3mr9264552plk.278.1562909420730; Thu, 11 Jul 2019 22:30:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([122.172.28.117]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i124sm14749991pfe.61.2019.07.11.22.30.19 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 11 Jul 2019 22:30:20 -0700 (PDT) From: Viresh Kumar To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry Cc: Viresh Kumar , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Catalin Marinas , Marc Zyngier , Mark Rutland , Will Deacon , Russell King , Vincent Guittot , mark.brown@arm.com Subject: [PATCH v4.4 V2 30/43] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 10:58:18 +0530 Message-Id: <8565dc5d671ce50168b4873cedaf899190c24663.1562908075.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Will Deacon commit aa6acde65e03186b5add8151e1ffe36c3c62639b upstream. Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar --- arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index 06a931eb2673..dec95bd82e31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -53,3 +53,27 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) vectors __kvm_hyp_vector .endr ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18) + stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + mov x0, #0x84000000 + smc #0 + ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 18) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 80765feae955..dbd7b944a37e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM +extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[]; + static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) { @@ -91,6 +93,9 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, spin_unlock(&bp_lock); } #else +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL + static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -115,6 +120,21 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); } + +#include + +static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) +{ + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; + + if (psci_ops.get_version) + install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, + (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end); + + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ @@ -192,6 +212,28 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00, (1 << MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT) | 1), }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, #endif { } -- 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b