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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	dev@opencontainers.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 16:08:16 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiq11+thoe60qhsSHk_nbRF2TRL1Wnf6eHcYObjhJmsww@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200108213444.GF8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Wed, Jan 8, 2020 at 1:34 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> The point is, we'd never followed mounts on /proc/self/cwd et.al.
> I hadn't checked 2.0, but 2.1.100 ('97, before any changes from me)
> is that way.

Hmm. If that's the case, maybe they should be marked implicitly as
O_PATH when opened?

> Actually, scratch that - 2.0 behaves the same way
> (mountpoint crossing is done in iget() there; is that Minix influence
> or straight from the Lions' book?)

I don't think I ever had access to Lions' - I've _seen_ a printout of
it later, and obviously maybe others did,

More likely it's from Maurice Bach: the Design of the Unix Operating
System. I'm pretty sure that's where a lot of the FS layer stuff came
from.  Certainly the bad old buffer head interfaces, and quite likely
the iget() stuff too.

> 0.10: forward traversal in iget(), back traversal in fs/namei.c:find_entry()

Whee, you _really_ went back in time.

So I did too.

And looking at that code in iget(), I doubt it came from anywhere.
Christ. It's just looping over a fixed-size array, both when finding
the inode, and finding the superblock.

Cute, but unbelievably stupid. It was a more innocent time.

In other words, I think you can chalk it up to just me, because
blaming anybody else for that garbage would be very very unfair indeed
;)

> How would your proposal deal with access("/proc/self/fd/42/foo", MAY_READ)
> vs. faccessat(42, "foo", MAY_READ)?

I think that in a perfect world, the O_PATH'ness of '42' would be the
deciding factor. Wouldn't those be the best and most consistent
semantics?

And then 'cwd'/'root' always have the O_PATH behavior.

> The latter would trigger automount,
> the former would not...  Or would you extend that to "traverse mounts
> upon following procfs links, if the file in question had been opened with
> O_PATH"?

Exactly.

But you know what? I do not believe this is all that important, and I
doubt it will matter to anybody.

So what matters most is what makes the most sense to the VFS layer,
and what makes the most sense to _you_.

Because my reaction from this thread is that not only have you thought
about this issue and followed the history a whole lot more than I
would ever have done, it's also that I trust you to DTRT.

I think it would be good to have some self-consistency, but at the
same time clearly we already don't really, and our behavior here has
subtly changed over the years (and not so subtly - if you go back
sufficiently far, /proc behavior wrt file descriptors has had both
"dup()" behavior and "make a new file descriptor with the same inode"
behavior, afaik).

               Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-10  0:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-30  5:20 [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  5:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/1] " Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:34   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-30  8:28     ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-08  4:39       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-30  5:44 ` [PATCH RFC 0/1] " Al Viro
2019-12-30  5:49   ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:29     ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-12-30  7:53       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-30  8:32         ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-02  8:58           ` David Laight
2020-01-02  9:09             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-01  0:43       ` Al Viro
2020-01-01  0:54         ` Al Viro
2020-01-01  3:08           ` Al Viro
2020-01-01 14:44             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-01 23:40               ` Al Viro
2020-01-02  3:59                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-03  1:49                   ` Al Viro
2020-01-04  4:46                     ` Ian Kent
2020-01-08  3:13                     ` Al Viro
2020-01-08  3:54                       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-08 21:34                         ` Al Viro
2020-01-10  0:08                           ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2020-01-10  4:15                             ` Al Viro
2020-01-10  5:03                               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-10  6:20                               ` Ian Kent
2020-01-12 21:33                                 ` Al Viro
2020-01-13  2:59                                   ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  0:25                                     ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  4:39                                       ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  5:01                                         ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14  5:59                                           ` Ian Kent
2020-01-10 21:07                         ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-14  4:57                           ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  5:12                             ` Al Viro
2020-01-14 20:01                             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:25                               ` Al Viro
2020-01-15 14:29                                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:34                                   ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-15 14:48                                     ` Al Viro
2020-01-15 13:57                             ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-19  3:14                               ` [RFC][PATCHSET][CFT] pathwalk cleanups and fixes Al Viro
2020-01-19 14:33                                 ` Ian Kent
2020-01-10 23:19                     ` [PATCH RFC 0/1] mount: universally disallow mounting over symlinks Al Viro
2020-01-13  1:48                       ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13  3:54                         ` Al Viro
2020-01-13  6:00                           ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13  6:03                             ` Ian Kent
2020-01-13 13:30                               ` Al Viro
2020-01-14  7:25                                 ` Ian Kent
2020-01-14 12:17                                   ` Ian Kent
2020-01-04  5:52               ` Andy Lutomirski

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