tpmdd-devel Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"open list:INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE IMA"
	<linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"moderated list:TPM DEVICE DRIVER"
	<tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE"
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	"open list:INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE IMA"
	<linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: remove chip_num parameter from in-kernel API
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 10:07:31 -0400
Message-ID: <cbcb78c6-fa36-32d3-891e-96544875d97c@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171023123817.18559-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

On 10/23/2017 08:38 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> The reasoning is simple and obvious. Since every call site passes the
> value TPM_ANY_NUM (0xFFFF) the parameter does not have right to exist.
> Refined the documentation of the corresponding functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>   drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c    |  2 +-
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c         | 38 ++++++++--------
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c    | 87 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h              |  2 +-
>   include/linux/tpm.h                 | 43 ++++++++----------
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c |  2 +-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   |  2 +-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c  |  2 +-
>   security/keys/trusted.c             | 35 ++++++++-------
>   9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> index d6d448266f07..8823efcddab8 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>
>   static int tpm_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
>   {
> -	return tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, data, max);
> +	return tpm_get_random(data, max);
>   }
>
>   static struct hwrng tpm_rng = {
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> index a114e8f7fb90..ec351111643b 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> @@ -81,34 +81,32 @@ void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_put_ops);
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_chip_find_get() - return tpm_chip for a given chip number
> - * @chip_num: id to find
> + * tpm_chip_find_get() - reserved the first available TPM chip
>    *
> - * The return'd chip has been tpm_try_get_ops'd and must be released via
> - * tpm_put_ops
> + * Finds the first available TPM chip and reserves its class device and
> + * operations.
> + *
> + * Return: a reserved &struct tpm_chip instance
>    */
> -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
> +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void)
>   {
> -	struct tpm_chip *chip, *res = NULL;
> +	struct tpm_chip *chip;
> +	struct tpm_chip *res = NULL;
>   	int chip_prev;
> +	int chip_num;
>
>   	mutex_lock(&idr_lock);
>
> -	if (chip_num == TPM_ANY_NUM) {
> -		chip_num = 0;
> -		do {
> -			chip_prev = chip_num;
> -			chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
> -			if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
> -				res = chip;
> -				break;
> -			}
> -		} while (chip_prev != chip_num);
> -	} else {
> -		chip = idr_find(&dev_nums_idr, chip_num);
> -		if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip))
> +	chip_num = 0;
> +
> +	do {
> +		chip_prev = chip_num;
> +		chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
> +		if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
>   			res = chip;
> -	}
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	} while (chip_prev != chip_num);
>
>   	mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);


Here you are keeping the loop, which I think is good and I would like 
you to keep it...


> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> index d8e2e5bca903..b3907d3556ce 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -802,18 +802,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
>   }
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_is_tpm2 - is the chip a TPM2 chip?
> - * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
> + * tpm_is_tpm2 - do we a have a TPM2 chip?
>    *
> - * Returns < 0 on error, and 1 or 0 on success depending whether the chip
> - * is a TPM2 chip.
> + * Return:
> + *     1 if we have a TPM2 chip.
> + *     0 if we don't have a TPM2 chip.
> + *     A negative number for system errors (errno).
>    */
> -int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
> +int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	int rc;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -826,22 +827,18 @@ int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_is_tpm2);
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
> - * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
> - * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to retrieve
> - * @res_buf:	TPM_PCR value
> - *		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
> + * tpm_pcr_read - read a PCR value from SHA1 bank
> + * @pcr_idx:	the PCR to be retrieved
> + * @res_buf:	the value of the PCR
>    *
> - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
> - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
> - * the module usage count.
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
>    */
> -int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> +int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	int rc;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
> @@ -882,16 +879,17 @@ static int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
>   }
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
> - * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
> - * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to extend
> - * @hash:	hash value used to extend pcr value
> + * tpm_pcr_extend - extend a PCR value in SHA1 bank.
> + * @pcr_idx:	the PCR to be retrieved
> + * @hash:	the hash value used to extend the PCR value
> + *
> + * Note: with TPM 2.0 extends also those banks with a known digest size to the
> + * cryto subsystem in order to prevent malicious use of those PCR banks. In the
> + * future we should dynamically determine digest sizes.
>    *
> - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
> - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
> - * the module usage count.
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
>    */
> -int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> +int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
>   {


I think every kernel internal TPM driver API should be called with the 
tpm_chip as a parameter. This is in foresight of namespacing of IMA 
where we want to provide the flexibility of passing a dedicated vTPM to 
each namespace and IMA would use the chip as a parameter to all of these 
functions to talk to the right tpm_vtpm_proxy instance. From that 
perspective this patch goes into the wrong direction.

    Stefan

>   	int rc;
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
> @@ -899,7 +897,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
>   	u32 count = 0;
>   	int i;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1012,12 +1010,12 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	return rc;
>   }
>
> -int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> +int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	int rc;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1120,14 +1118,13 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
>   };
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_get_random() - acquire random bytes
>    * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
>    * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
>    *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
>    */
> -int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
> +int tpm_get_random(u8 *out, size_t max)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
> @@ -1138,7 +1135,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
>   	if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1181,21 +1178,22 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload
>    * @options: authentication values and other options
>    * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
>    *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
> - * are supported.
> + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
> + * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
> + *
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
>    */
> -int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   		     struct trusted_key_options *options)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	int rc;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1207,21 +1205,22 @@ int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted);
>
>   /**
> - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key payload
>    * @options: authentication values and other options
>    * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
>    *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
> - * are supported.
> + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
> + * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
> + *
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
>    */
> -int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   		       struct trusted_key_options *options)
>   {
>   	struct tpm_chip *chip;
>   	int rc;
>
> -	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> +	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
>   	if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
>   		return -ENODEV;
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index c1866cc02e30..269c32bb3af0 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)
>   		     delay_msec * 1000);
>   };
>
> -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num);
> +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void);
>   __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>   void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 5a090f5ab335..54cd6d903d31 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -24,11 +24,6 @@
>
>   #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
>
> -/*
> - * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
> - */
> -#define	TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
> -
>   struct tpm_chip;
>   struct trusted_key_payload;
>   struct trusted_key_options;
> @@ -53,44 +48,42 @@ struct tpm_class_ops {
>   };
>
>   #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
> -
> -extern int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num);
> -extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
> -extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
> -extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
> -extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max);
> -extern int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> -			    struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +extern int tpm_is_tpm2(void);
> +extern int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
> +extern int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
> +extern int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen);
> +extern int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max);
> +extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   			    struct trusted_key_options *options);
> -extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> -			      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   			      struct trusted_key_options *options);
>   #else
> -static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
> +static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
>   {
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
> +static inline int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> +{
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
> +static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> +{
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
> +static inline int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> +{
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) {
> +static inline int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max)
> +{
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -
> -static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> -				   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   				   struct trusted_key_options *options)
>   {
>   	return -ENODEV;
>   }
> -static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> -				     struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>   				     struct trusted_key_options *options)
>   {
>   	return -ENODEV;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> index 802d5d20f36f..b5828bafab26 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
>   	if (!ima_used_chip)
>   		return;
>
> -	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
> +	if (tpm_pcr_read(idx, pcr) != 0)
>   		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
>   }
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 2967d497a665..21be72f604cd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
>   	int rc;
>
>   	ima_used_chip = 0;
> -	rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
> +	rc = tpm_pcr_read(0, pcr_i);
>   	if (rc == 0)
>   		ima_used_chip = 1;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index a02a86d51102..d33966ff210d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
>   	if (!ima_used_chip)
>   		return result;
>
> -	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
> +	result = tpm_pcr_extend(pcr, hash);
>   	if (result != 0)
>   		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
>   	return result;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index ddfaebf60fc8..f912b5bffdad 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
>    * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
>    * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
>    */
> -static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
> -			    size_t buflen)
> +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
>   {
>   	int rc;
>
>   	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> -	rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
> +	rc = tpm_send(cmd, buflen);
>   	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
>   	if (rc > 0)
>   		/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
> @@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
>
>   	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>   		return -EPERM;
> -	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +	ret = tpm_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>   	if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>   		return ret;
> -	return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
> +	return tpm_pcr_extend(pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
>   }
>
>   /*
> @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
>   	unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
>   	int ret;
>
> -	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +	ret = tpm_get_random(ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>   	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
>   		return ret;
>
> @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
>   	store32(tb, handle);
>   	storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>
> -	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> +	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
>   	if (ret < 0)
>   		return ret;
>
> @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
>   	store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
>   	store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
>   	store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
> -	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> +	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
>   	if (ret < 0)
>   		return ret;
>
> @@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
>   	if (ret < 0)
>   		goto out;
>
> -	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +	ret = tpm_get_random(td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>   	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
>   		goto out;
>   	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
> @@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
>   	store8(tb, cont);
>   	storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> -	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> +	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
>   	if (ret < 0)
>   		goto out;
>
> @@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>
>   	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
>   	keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
> -	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +	ret = tpm_get_random(nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>   	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
>   		pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
>   		return ret;
> @@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>   	store8(tb, cont);
>   	storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> -	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> +	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
>   	if (ret < 0) {
>   		pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
>   		return ret;
> @@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>   	int i;
>   	int tpm2;
>
> -	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> +	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
>   	if (tpm2 < 0)
>   		return tpm2;
>
> @@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>   	struct trusted_key_options *options;
>   	int tpm2;
>
> -	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> +	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
>   	if (tpm2 < 0)
>   		return NULL;
>
> @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>   	size_t key_len;
>   	int tpm2;
>
> -	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> +	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
>   	if (tpm2 < 0)
>   		return tpm2;
>
> @@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>   	switch (key_cmd) {
>   	case Opt_load:
>   		if (tpm2)
> -			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
> +			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(payload, options);
>   		else
>   			ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
>   		dump_payload(payload);
> @@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>   		break;
>   	case Opt_new:
>   		key_len = payload->key_len;
> -		ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
> +		ret = tpm_get_random(payload->key, key_len);
>   		if (ret != key_len) {
>   			pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
>   			goto out;
>   		}
>   		if (tpm2)
> -			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
> +			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(payload, options);
>   		else
>   			ret = key_seal(payload, options);
>   		if (ret < 0)



  reply index

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-23 12:38 Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-10-23 14:07 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2017-10-23 16:31   ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jason Gunthorpe
2017-10-24 15:44     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found]       ` <20171024154440.3jeupmus43jcgbbz-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-24 15:51         ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-24 15:55           ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jason Gunthorpe
2017-10-24 16:07             ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-24 16:11               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-10-24 16:14                 ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-24 17:46                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-10-24 17:56                     ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-24 17:02                 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2017-10-24 17:37                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-10-24 17:44                     ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
     [not found]                     ` <20171024173757.GA1806-ePGOBjL8dl3ta4EC/59zMFaTQe2KTcn/@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-24 18:04                       ` Dmitry Torokhov
2017-10-24 18:15                   ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found]                     ` <20171024181512.iaxtzgxexhki7aqr-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-24 18:40                       ` Peter Huewe
2017-10-24 16:23           ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-10-24 16:35             ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
     [not found]               ` <CANc+2y4vtr+kbhC_7Rv=rHA2LgEVBHLFEu+DYYK1UmpU63PCgQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-24 18:22                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found]                   ` <20171024182235.d7b3oajc5zcjs57v-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-25 14:51                     ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-25 19:11                       ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-10-26 16:23                         ` PrasannaKumar Muralidharan
2017-10-24 14:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=cbcb78c6-fa36-32d3-891e-96544875d97c@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --to=stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mpm@selenic.com \
    --cc=safford@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

tpmdd-devel Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/tpmdd-devel/0 tpmdd-devel/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 tpmdd-devel tpmdd-devel/ https://lore.kernel.org/tpmdd-devel \
		tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
	public-inbox-index tpmdd-devel

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/net.sourceforge.lists.tpmdd-devel


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git