From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-22.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,NICE_REPLY_A,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3EF80C2B9F4 for ; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 05:40:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from phobos.denx.de (phobos.denx.de [85.214.62.61]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 14FD861C17 for ; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 05:40:15 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 14FD861C17 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=siemens.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Received: from h2850616.stratoserver.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id D580382D6F; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:13 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=siemens.com Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Received: by phobos.denx.de (Postfix, from userid 109) id E6E3A82D73; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:11 +0200 (CEST) Received: from goliath.siemens.de (goliath.siemens.de [192.35.17.28]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9447982D62 for ; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:08 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=siemens.com Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=jan.kiszka@siemens.com Received: from mail2.sbs.de (mail2.sbs.de [192.129.41.66]) by goliath.siemens.de (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPS id 15S5e287005873 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:02 +0200 Received: from [167.87.73.78] ([167.87.73.78]) by mail2.sbs.de (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 15S5e1Pl004396; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:01 +0200 Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] watchdog: rti_wdt: Add support for loading firmware To: Simon Glass Cc: Tom Rini , Lokesh Vutla , U-Boot Mailing List , Le Jin , Bao Cheng Su , Nian Gao , Chao Zeng References: <88d7d3e323c27417d7109b8a92bf53a08ad77654.1622626660.git.jan.kiszka@siemens.com> <96039724-9a5f-dbb8-d46b-b268a0d9a8c2@ti.com> <20210607114007.GD9516@bill-the-cat> <20210611140831.GU9516@bill-the-cat> <54a75091-0499-8902-b7f5-b1f75ae0091c@siemens.com> From: Jan Kiszka Message-ID: <53a5e923-04a1-3ca6-14ed-d051c123fab3@siemens.com> Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 07:40:00 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.11.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.2 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean On 27.06.21 20:18, Simon Glass wrote: > Hi Jan, > > On Sun, 27 Jun 2021 at 12:01, Jan Kiszka wrote: >> >> On 26.06.21 20:29, Simon Glass wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> On Fri, 11 Jun 2021 at 08:08, Tom Rini wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 07:14:21PM +0530, Lokesh Vutla wrote: >>>>> Hi Tom, >>>>> >>>>> On 09/06/21 6:47 pm, Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>> On 07.06.21 13:44, Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>>> On 07.06.21 13:40, Tom Rini wrote: >>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 07, 2021 at 03:33:52PM +0530, Lokesh Vutla wrote: >>>>>>>>> +Tom, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Tom, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 02/06/21 3:07 pm, Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>>>>>> From: Jan Kiszka >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To avoid the need of extra boot scripting on AM65x for loading a >>>>>>>>>> watchdog firmware, add the required rproc init and loading logic for the >>>>>>>>>> first R5F core to the watchdog start handler. In case the R5F cluster is >>>>>>>>>> in lock-step mode, also initialize the second core. The firmware itself >>>>>>>>>> is embedded into U-Boot binary to ease access to it and ensure it is >>>>>>>>>> properly hashed in case of secure boot. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> One possible firmware source is https://github.com/siemens/k3-rti-wdt. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka >>>>>>>>>> --- >>>>>>>>>> drivers/watchdog/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++++ >>>>>>>>>> drivers/watchdog/Makefile | 5 +++ >>>>>>>>>> drivers/watchdog/rti_wdt.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >>>>>>>>>> drivers/watchdog/rti_wdt_fw.S | 20 ++++++++++++ >>>>>>>>>> 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>>>>>>>>> create mode 100644 drivers/watchdog/rti_wdt_fw.S >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig b/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig >>>>>>>>>> index f0ff2612a6..1a1fddfe9f 100644 >>>>>>>>>> --- a/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig >>>>>>>>>> +++ b/drivers/watchdog/Kconfig >>>>>>>>>> @@ -209,6 +209,26 @@ config WDT_K3_RTI >>>>>>>>>> Say Y here if you want to include support for the K3 watchdog >>>>>>>>>> timer (RTI module) available in the K3 generation of processors. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> +if WDT_K3_RTI >>>>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>>>> +config WDT_K3_RTI_LOAD_FW >>>>>>>>>> + bool "Load watchdog firmware" >>>>>>>>>> + depends on REMOTEPROC >>>>>>>>>> + help >>>>>>>>>> + Automatically load the specified firmware image into the MCU R5F >>>>>>>>>> + core 0. On the AM65x, this firmware is supposed to handle the expiry >>>>>>>>>> + of the watchdog timer, typically by resetting the system. >>>>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>>>> +config WDT_K3_RTI_FW_FILE >>>>>>>>>> + string "Watchdog firmware image file" >>>>>>>>>> + default "k3-rti-wdt.fw" >>>>>>>>>> + depends on WDT_K3_RTI_LOAD_FW >>>>>>>>>> + help >>>>>>>>>> + Firmware image to be embedded into U-Boot and loaded on watchdog >>>>>>>>>> + start. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I need your input on this proach. Is it okay to include the linker file unders >>>>>>>>> drivers? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Maybe? I suppose the first thing that springs to mind is why aren't we >>>>>>>> using binman and including this blob (which I happily see is GPLv2) >>>>>>>> similar to how we do things with x86 for one example. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See https://www.mail-archive.com/u-boot@lists.denx.de/msg377894.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jan >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Did this help to answer open questions? Otherwise, please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd also like to avoid that his patch alone blocks 1-3 of the series >>>>>> needless - but I would also not mind getting everything in at once. >>>>> >>>>> Can you provide your reviewed-by if you are okay with this approach? >>>> >>>> I was kind of hoping Simon would chime in here on binman usage. So, >>>> re-re-reading the above URL, yes, fsloader wouldn't be the right choice >>>> for watchdog firmware. But I think binman_entry_find() and related >>>> could work, in general, for this case of "need firmware blob embedded in >>>> to image". That said, this isn't just any firmware blob, it's the >>>> watchdog firmware. The less reliance on other things the safer it is. >>>> That means this would be an exception to the general firmware blob >>>> loading rule and yeah, OK, we can do it this way. Sorry for the delay. >>> >>> Yes I've been a little tied up recently. But I think this should use >>> binman. We really don't want to be building binary firmware into >>> U-Boot itself! >>> >>> Also Tom says, see x86 for a load of binaries of different types and >>> how they are accessed at runttime. This is what binman is for. >>> >> >> Please take the time and study my arguments. I'm open for better >> proposals, but they need to be concrete and addressing my points. > > Do you mean 'properly hashed' and 'easy access', or something else? > What can binman not do? Binman itself can stick things into binary images. But that is at most half of the tasks needed here. I would need concrete guidance how to - access that binary from u-boot proper in a reasonably simple way - make sure the binary can be signed and the signature is evaluated before using it Jan -- Siemens AG, T RDA IOT Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux