* [PATCH v4 01/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB definitions
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 02/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB Accessor functions Joerg Roedel
` (74 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Extend the vmcb_safe_area with SEV-ES fields and add a new
'struct ghcb' which will be used for guest-hypervisor communication.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 8a1f5382a4ea..9a3e0b802716 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -200,13 +200,56 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_save_area {
u64 br_to;
u64 last_excp_from;
u64 last_excp_to;
+
+ /*
+ * The following part of the save area is valid only for
+ * SEV-ES guests when referenced through the GHCB.
+ */
+ u8 reserved_7[104];
+ u64 reserved_8; /* rax already available at 0x01f8 */
+ u64 rcx;
+ u64 rdx;
+ u64 rbx;
+ u64 reserved_9; /* rsp already available at 0x01d8 */
+ u64 rbp;
+ u64 rsi;
+ u64 rdi;
+ u64 r8;
+ u64 r9;
+ u64 r10;
+ u64 r11;
+ u64 r12;
+ u64 r13;
+ u64 r14;
+ u64 r15;
+ u8 reserved_10[16];
+ u64 sw_exit_code;
+ u64 sw_exit_info_1;
+ u64 sw_exit_info_2;
+ u64 sw_scratch;
+ u8 reserved_11[56];
+ u64 xcr0;
+ u8 valid_bitmap[16];
+ u64 x87_state_gpa;
+};
+
+struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) ghcb {
+ struct vmcb_save_area save;
+ u8 reserved_save[2048 - sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area)];
+
+ u8 shared_buffer[2032];
+
+ u8 reserved_1[10];
+ u16 protocol_version; /* negotiated SEV-ES/GHCB protocol version */
+ u32 ghcb_usage;
};
static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
{
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area) != 0x298);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area) != 1032);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vmcb_control_area) != 256);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ghcb) != 4096);
}
struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index c0da4dd78ac5..af6dc22437c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4099,6 +4099,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
static int __init svm_init(void)
{
+ __unused_size_checks();
+
return kvm_init(&svm_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_svm),
__alignof__(struct vcpu_svm), THIS_MODULE);
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 02/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB Accessor functions
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 01/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB definitions Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 03/75] KVM: SVM: Use __packed shorthand Joerg Roedel
` (73 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Building a correct GHCB for the hypervisor requires setting valid bits
in the GHCB. Simplify that process by providing accessor functions to
set values and to update the valid bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 9a3e0b802716..0420250b008b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -341,4 +341,65 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb {
#define SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_MP)
+/* GHCB Accessor functions */
+
+#define DEFINE_GHCB_INDICES(field) \
+ u16 idx = offsetof(struct vmcb_save_area, field) / 8; \
+ u16 byte_idx = idx / 8; \
+ u16 bit_idx = idx % 8; \
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(byte_idx > ARRAY_SIZE(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+
+#define GHCB_SET_VALID(ghcb, field) \
+ { \
+ DEFINE_GHCB_INDICES(field) \
+ (ghcb)->save.valid_bitmap[byte_idx] |= BIT(bit_idx); \
+ }
+
+#define DEFINE_GHCB_SETTER(field) \
+ static inline void \
+ ghcb_set_##field(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 value) \
+ { \
+ GHCB_SET_VALID(ghcb, field) \
+ (ghcb)->save.field = value; \
+ }
+
+#define DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(field) \
+ static inline bool ghcb_is_valid_##field(const struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+ { \
+ DEFINE_GHCB_INDICES(field) \
+ return !!((ghcb)->save.valid_bitmap[byte_idx] \
+ & BIT(bit_idx)); \
+ } \
+ \
+ static inline void \
+ ghcb_set_##field(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 value) \
+ { \
+ GHCB_SET_VALID(ghcb, field) \
+ (ghcb)->save.field = value; \
+ }
+
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(cpl)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rip)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsp)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rax)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rcx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbp)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsi)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdi)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r8)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r9)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r10)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r11)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r12)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r13)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r14)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r15)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_code)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0)
+
#endif
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 03/75] KVM: SVM: Use __packed shorthand
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 01/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB definitions Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 02/75] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB Accessor functions Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 04/75] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-ES CPU feature Joerg Roedel
` (72 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Dave Hansen, virtualization, hpa,
Jiri Slaby, Joerg Roedel, David Rientjes, Martin Radev,
Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Kees Cook, Cfir Cohen,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Dan Williams, Juergen Gross,
Mike Stunes, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Masami Hiramatsu,
Erdem Aktas
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Use the shorthand to make it more readable.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 0420250b008b..af91ced0f370 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -150,14 +150,14 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE BIT(0)
#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE BIT(1)
-struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_seg {
+struct vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
u16 attrib;
u32 limit;
u64 base;
-};
+} __packed;
-struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_save_area {
+struct vmcb_save_area {
struct vmcb_seg es;
struct vmcb_seg cs;
struct vmcb_seg ss;
@@ -231,9 +231,9 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_save_area {
u64 xcr0;
u8 valid_bitmap[16];
u64 x87_state_gpa;
-};
+} __packed;
-struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) ghcb {
+struct ghcb {
struct vmcb_save_area save;
u8 reserved_save[2048 - sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area)];
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) ghcb {
u8 reserved_1[10];
u16 protocol_version; /* negotiated SEV-ES/GHCB protocol version */
u32 ghcb_usage;
-};
+} __packed;
static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
@@ -252,11 +252,11 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ghcb) != 4096);
}
-struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb {
+struct vmcb {
struct vmcb_control_area control;
u8 reserved_control[1024 - sizeof(struct vmcb_control_area)];
struct vmcb_save_area save;
-};
+} __packed;
#define SVM_CPUID_FUNC 0x8000000a
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 04/75] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-ES CPU feature
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 03/75] KVM: SVM: Use __packed shorthand Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 05/75] x86/traps: Move pf error codes to <asm/trap_pf.h> Joerg Roedel
` (71 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
Encrypted State. This feature enhances SEV by also encrypting the
guest register state, making it in-accessible to the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 02dabc9e77b0..069a774f6d57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */
#define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index d4806eac9325..7eaca090e2e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
* SME feature (set in scattered.c).
* For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
- * SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
+ * SEV and SEV_ES feature (set in scattered.c).
*
* In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
* don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
@@ -644,6 +644,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
clear_sev:
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 62b137c3c97a..30f354989cf1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 05/75] x86/traps: Move pf error codes to <asm/trap_pf.h>
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 04/75] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-ES CPU feature Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 06/75] x86/insn: Make inat-tables.c suitable for pre-decompression code Joerg Roedel
` (70 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Move the definition of the x86 page-fault error code bits to the new
header file asm/trap_pf.h. This makes it easier to include them into
pre-decompression boot code. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 19 +------------------
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..305bc1214aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H
+#define _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H
+
+/*
+ * Page fault error code bits:
+ *
+ * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
+ * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
+ * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
+ * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
+ * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
+ * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
+ */
+enum x86_pf_error_code {
+ X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
+ X86_PF_WRITE = 1 << 1,
+ X86_PF_USER = 1 << 2,
+ X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
+ X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
+ X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
+};
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 714b1a30e7b0..6a308355ea29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/idtentry.h>
#include <asm/siginfo.h> /* TRAP_TRACE, ... */
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs);
@@ -41,22 +42,4 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
unsigned long fault_address);
#endif
-/*
- * Page fault error code bits:
- *
- * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
- * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
- * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
- * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
- * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
- * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
- */
-enum x86_pf_error_code {
- X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
- X86_PF_WRITE = 1 << 1,
- X86_PF_USER = 1 << 2,
- X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
- X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
- X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
-};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 06/75] x86/insn: Make inat-tables.c suitable for pre-decompression code
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 05/75] x86/traps: Move pf error codes to <asm/trap_pf.h> Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-17 13:58 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 07/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction fetch Joerg Roedel
` (69 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The inat-tables.c file has some arrays in it that contain pointers to
other arrays. These pointers need to be relocated when the kernel
image is moved to a different location.
The pre-decompression boot-code has no support for applying ELF
relocations, so initialize these arrays at runtime in the
pre-decompression code to make sure all pointers are correctly
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++-
tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk b/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
index a42015b305f4..af38469afd14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
+++ b/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ function convert_operands(count,opnd, i,j,imm,mod)
END {
if (awkchecked != "")
exit 1
+
+ print "#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED\n"
+
# print escape opcode map's array
print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
print "const insn_attr_t * const inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
@@ -388,6 +391,51 @@ END {
for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
if (atable[i,j])
print " ["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]","
- print "};"
+ print "};\n"
+
+ print "#else /* !__BOOT_COMPRESSED */\n"
+
+ print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "/* Group opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_group_tables[INAT_GRP_MAX + 1]"\
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "/* AVX opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_avx_tables[X86_VEX_M_MAX + 1]"\
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "static void inat_init_tables(void)"
+ print "{"
+
+ # print escape opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print Escape opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < geid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (etable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_escape_tables["i"]["j"] = "etable[i,j]";"
+ print ""
+
+ # print group opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print Group opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < ggid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (gtable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_group_tables["i"]["j"] = "gtable[i,j]";"
+ print ""
+ # print AVX opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print AVX opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < gaid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (atable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_avx_tables["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]";"
+
+ print "}"
+ print "#endif"
}
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk b/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
index a42015b305f4..af38469afd14 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ function convert_operands(count,opnd, i,j,imm,mod)
END {
if (awkchecked != "")
exit 1
+
+ print "#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED\n"
+
# print escape opcode map's array
print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
print "const insn_attr_t * const inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
@@ -388,6 +391,51 @@ END {
for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
if (atable[i,j])
print " ["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]","
- print "};"
+ print "};\n"
+
+ print "#else /* !__BOOT_COMPRESSED */\n"
+
+ print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "/* Group opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_group_tables[INAT_GRP_MAX + 1]"\
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "/* AVX opcode map array */"
+ print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_avx_tables[X86_VEX_M_MAX + 1]"\
+ "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
+ print ""
+
+ print "static void inat_init_tables(void)"
+ print "{"
+
+ # print escape opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print Escape opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < geid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (etable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_escape_tables["i"]["j"] = "etable[i,j]";"
+ print ""
+
+ # print group opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print Group opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < ggid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (gtable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_group_tables["i"]["j"] = "gtable[i,j]";"
+ print ""
+ # print AVX opcode map's array
+ print "\t/* Print AVX opcode map array */"
+ for (i = 0; i < gaid; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
+ if (atable[i,j])
+ print "\tinat_avx_tables["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]";"
+
+ print "}"
+ print "#endif"
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 06/75] x86/insn: Make inat-tables.c suitable for pre-decompression code
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 06/75] x86/insn: Make inat-tables.c suitable for pre-decompression code Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-17 13:58 ` Masami Hiramatsu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Masami Hiramatsu @ 2020-07-17 13:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 14:08:08 +0200
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> The inat-tables.c file has some arrays in it that contain pointers to
> other arrays. These pointers need to be relocated when the kernel
> image is moved to a different location.
>
> The pre-decompression boot-code has no support for applying ELF
> relocations, so initialize these arrays at runtime in the
> pre-decompression code to make sure all pointers are correctly
> initialized.
OK, This looks good to me.
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Thank you,
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++-
> tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++-
> 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk b/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> index a42015b305f4..af38469afd14 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> +++ b/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> @@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ function convert_operands(count,opnd, i,j,imm,mod)
> END {
> if (awkchecked != "")
> exit 1
> +
> + print "#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED\n"
> +
> # print escape opcode map's array
> print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
> print "const insn_attr_t * const inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
> @@ -388,6 +391,51 @@ END {
> for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> if (atable[i,j])
> print " ["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]","
> - print "};"
> + print "};\n"
> +
> + print "#else /* !__BOOT_COMPRESSED */\n"
> +
> + print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "/* Group opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_group_tables[INAT_GRP_MAX + 1]"\
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "/* AVX opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_avx_tables[X86_VEX_M_MAX + 1]"\
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "static void inat_init_tables(void)"
> + print "{"
> +
> + # print escape opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print Escape opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < geid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (etable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_escape_tables["i"]["j"] = "etable[i,j]";"
> + print ""
> +
> + # print group opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print Group opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < ggid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (gtable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_group_tables["i"]["j"] = "gtable[i,j]";"
> + print ""
> + # print AVX opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print AVX opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < gaid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (atable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_avx_tables["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]";"
> +
> + print "}"
> + print "#endif"
> }
>
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk b/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> index a42015b305f4..af38469afd14 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
> @@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ function convert_operands(count,opnd, i,j,imm,mod)
> END {
> if (awkchecked != "")
> exit 1
> +
> + print "#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED\n"
> +
> # print escape opcode map's array
> print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
> print "const insn_attr_t * const inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
> @@ -388,6 +391,51 @@ END {
> for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> if (atable[i,j])
> print " ["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]","
> - print "};"
> + print "};\n"
> +
> + print "#else /* !__BOOT_COMPRESSED */\n"
> +
> + print "/* Escape opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_escape_tables[INAT_ESC_MAX + 1]" \
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "/* Group opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_group_tables[INAT_GRP_MAX + 1]"\
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "/* AVX opcode map array */"
> + print "static const insn_attr_t *inat_avx_tables[X86_VEX_M_MAX + 1]"\
> + "[INAT_LSTPFX_MAX + 1];"
> + print ""
> +
> + print "static void inat_init_tables(void)"
> + print "{"
> +
> + # print escape opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print Escape opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < geid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (etable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_escape_tables["i"]["j"] = "etable[i,j]";"
> + print ""
> +
> + # print group opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print Group opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < ggid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (gtable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_group_tables["i"]["j"] = "gtable[i,j]";"
> + print ""
> + # print AVX opcode map's array
> + print "\t/* Print AVX opcode map array */"
> + for (i = 0; i < gaid; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < max_lprefix; j++)
> + if (atable[i,j])
> + print "\tinat_avx_tables["i"]["j"] = "atable[i,j]";"
> +
> + print "}"
> + print "#endif"
> }
>
> --
> 2.27.0
>
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 07/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction fetch
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 06/75] x86/insn: Make inat-tables.c suitable for pre-decompression code Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 08/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction decoding Joerg Roedel
` (68 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Factor out the code to fetch the instruction from user-space to a helper
function.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/umip.c | 26 +++++-----------------
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
index 2b6ccf2c49f1..b8b9ef1bbd06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
@@ -19,5 +19,7 @@ void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);
int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs);
+int insn_fetch_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE]);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
index 8d5cbe1bbb3b..c9e5345da793 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
@@ -317,11 +317,11 @@ static void force_sig_info_umip_fault(void __user *addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- int not_copied, nr_copied, reg_offset, dummy_data_size, umip_inst;
- unsigned long seg_base = 0, *reg_addr;
+ int nr_copied, reg_offset, dummy_data_size, umip_inst;
/* 10 bytes is the maximum size of the result of UMIP instructions */
unsigned char dummy_data[10] = { 0 };
unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+ unsigned long *reg_addr;
void __user *uaddr;
struct insn insn;
int seg_defs;
@@ -329,26 +329,12 @@ bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!regs)
return false;
- /*
- * If not in user-space long mode, a custom code segment could be in
- * use. This is true in protected mode (if the process defined a local
- * descriptor table), or virtual-8086 mode. In most of the cases
- * seg_base will be zero as in USER_CS.
- */
- if (!user_64bit_mode(regs))
- seg_base = insn_get_seg_base(regs, INAT_SEG_REG_CS);
-
- if (seg_base == -1L)
- return false;
-
- not_copied = copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)(seg_base + regs->ip),
- sizeof(buf));
- nr_copied = sizeof(buf) - not_copied;
+ nr_copied = insn_fetch_from_user(regs, buf);
/*
- * The copy_from_user above could have failed if user code is protected
- * by a memory protection key. Give up on emulation in such a case.
- * Should we issue a page fault?
+ * The insn_fetch_from_user above could have failed if user code
+ * is protected by a memory protection key. Give up on emulation
+ * in such a case. Should we issue a page fault?
*/
if (!nr_copied)
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
index 31600d851fd8..0c4f7ebc261b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -1369,3 +1369,41 @@ void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
return (void __user *)-1L;
}
}
+
+/**
+ * insn_fetch_from_user() - Copy instruction bytes from user-space memory
+ * @regs: Structure with register values as seen when entering kernel mode
+ * @buf: Array to store the fetched instruction
+ *
+ * Gets the linear address of the instruction and copies the instruction bytes
+ * to the buf.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *
+ * Number of instruction bytes copied.
+ *
+ * 0 if nothing was copied.
+ */
+int insn_fetch_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE])
+{
+ unsigned long seg_base = 0;
+ int not_copied;
+
+ /*
+ * If not in user-space long mode, a custom code segment could be in
+ * use. This is true in protected mode (if the process defined a local
+ * descriptor table), or virtual-8086 mode. In most of the cases
+ * seg_base will be zero as in USER_CS.
+ */
+ if (!user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
+ seg_base = insn_get_seg_base(regs, INAT_SEG_REG_CS);
+ if (seg_base == -1L)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+ not_copied = copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)(seg_base + regs->ip),
+ MAX_INSN_SIZE);
+
+ return MAX_INSN_SIZE - not_copied;
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 08/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction decoding
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 07/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction fetch Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 09/75] x86/insn: Add insn_get_modrm_reg_off() Joerg Roedel
` (67 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Factor out the code used to decode an instruction with the correct
address and operand sizes to a helper function.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/umip.c | 23 +---------------
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
index b8b9ef1bbd06..392b4fe377f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
@@ -21,5 +21,7 @@ unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);
int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_fetch_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE]);
+bool insn_decode(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE], int buf_size);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
index c9e5345da793..4d9044340e78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/umip.c
@@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
unsigned long *reg_addr;
void __user *uaddr;
struct insn insn;
- int seg_defs;
if (!regs)
return false;
@@ -339,27 +338,7 @@ bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!nr_copied)
return false;
- insn_init(&insn, buf, nr_copied, user_64bit_mode(regs));
-
- /*
- * Override the default operand and address sizes with what is specified
- * in the code segment descriptor. The instruction decoder only sets
- * the address size it to either 4 or 8 address bytes and does nothing
- * for the operand bytes. This OK for most of the cases, but we could
- * have special cases where, for instance, a 16-bit code segment
- * descriptor is used.
- * If there is an address override prefix, the instruction decoder
- * correctly updates these values, even for 16-bit defaults.
- */
- seg_defs = insn_get_code_seg_params(regs);
- if (seg_defs == -EINVAL)
- return false;
-
- insn.addr_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_ADDR_SZ(seg_defs);
- insn.opnd_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(seg_defs);
-
- insn_get_length(&insn);
- if (nr_copied < insn.length)
+ if (!insn_decode(&insn, regs, buf, nr_copied))
return false;
umip_inst = identify_insn(&insn);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
index 0c4f7ebc261b..f52046f90dd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -1407,3 +1407,48 @@ int insn_fetch_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE])
return MAX_INSN_SIZE - not_copied;
}
+
+/**
+ * insn_decode() - Decode an instruction
+ * @insn: Structure to store decoded instruction
+ * @regs: Structure with register values as seen when entering kernel mode
+ * @buf: Buffer containing the instruction bytes
+ * @buf_size: Number of instruction bytes available in buf
+ *
+ * Decodes the instruction provided in buf and stores the decoding results in
+ * insn. Also determines the correct address and operand sizes.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *
+ * True if instruction was decoded, False otherwise.
+ */
+bool insn_decode(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE], int buf_size)
+{
+ int seg_defs;
+
+ insn_init(insn, buf, buf_size, user_64bit_mode(regs));
+
+ /*
+ * Override the default operand and address sizes with what is specified
+ * in the code segment descriptor. The instruction decoder only sets
+ * the address size it to either 4 or 8 address bytes and does nothing
+ * for the operand bytes. This OK for most of the cases, but we could
+ * have special cases where, for instance, a 16-bit code segment
+ * descriptor is used.
+ * If there is an address override prefix, the instruction decoder
+ * correctly updates these values, even for 16-bit defaults.
+ */
+ seg_defs = insn_get_code_seg_params(regs);
+ if (seg_defs == -EINVAL)
+ return false;
+
+ insn->addr_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_ADDR_SZ(seg_defs);
+ insn->opnd_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(seg_defs);
+
+ insn_get_length(insn);
+ if (buf_size < insn->length)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 09/75] x86/insn: Add insn_get_modrm_reg_off()
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 08/75] x86/umip: Factor out instruction decoding Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 10/75] x86/insn: Add insn_has_rep_prefix() helper Joerg Roedel
` (66 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Masami Hiramatsu, hpa,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Mike Stunes,
Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm,
virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add a function to the instruction decoder which returns the pt_regs
offset of the register specified in the reg field of the modrm byte.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 1 +
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
index 392b4fe377f9..f748f57f1491 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
+int insn_get_modrm_reg_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);
int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_fetch_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs,
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
index f52046f90dd3..a8ac5c5e94f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
enum reg_type {
REG_TYPE_RM = 0,
+ REG_TYPE_REG,
REG_TYPE_INDEX,
REG_TYPE_BASE,
};
@@ -441,6 +442,13 @@ static int get_reg_offset(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
regno += 8;
break;
+ case REG_TYPE_REG:
+ regno = X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.value);
+
+ if (X86_REX_R(insn->rex_prefix.value))
+ regno += 8;
+ break;
+
case REG_TYPE_INDEX:
regno = X86_SIB_INDEX(insn->sib.value);
if (X86_REX_X(insn->rex_prefix.value))
@@ -809,6 +817,21 @@ int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
return get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_RM);
}
+/**
+ * insn_get_modrm_reg_off() - Obtain register in reg part of the ModRM byte
+ * @insn: Instruction containing the ModRM byte
+ * @regs: Register values as seen when entering kernel mode
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *
+ * The register indicated by the reg part of the ModRM byte. The
+ * register is obtained as an offset from the base of pt_regs.
+ */
+int insn_get_modrm_reg_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ return get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_REG);
+}
+
/**
* get_seg_base_limit() - obtain base address and limit of a segment
* @insn: Instruction. Must be valid.
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 10/75] x86/insn: Add insn_has_rep_prefix() helper
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 09/75] x86/insn: Add insn_get_modrm_reg_off() Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-17 14:06 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 11/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Disable red-zone usage Joerg Roedel
` (65 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add a function to check whether an instruction has a REP prefix.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 1 +
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
index f748f57f1491..a0f839aa144d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(params) (params & 0xf)
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(oper_sz, addr_sz) (oper_sz | (addr_sz << 4))
+bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn);
void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_get_modrm_reg_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
index a8ac5c5e94f0..8ed9d645259c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -53,6 +53,30 @@ static bool is_string_insn(struct insn *insn)
}
}
+/**
+ * insn_has_rep_prefix() - Determine if instruction has a REP prefix
+ * @insn: Instruction containing the prefix to inspect
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *
+ * true if the instruction has a REP prefix, false if not.
+ */
+bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ insn_get_prefixes(insn);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
+ insn_byte_t p = insn->prefixes.bytes[i];
+
+ if (p == 0xf2 || p == 0xf3)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* get_seg_reg_override_idx() - obtain segment register override index
* @insn: Valid instruction with segment override prefixes
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 10/75] x86/insn: Add insn_has_rep_prefix() helper
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 10/75] x86/insn: Add insn_has_rep_prefix() helper Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-17 14:06 ` Masami Hiramatsu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Masami Hiramatsu @ 2020-07-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 14:08:12 +0200
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> Add a function to check whether an instruction has a REP prefix.
This looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Thank you,
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
> index f748f57f1491..a0f839aa144d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> #define INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(params) (params & 0xf)
> #define INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(oper_sz, addr_sz) (oper_sz | (addr_sz << 4))
>
> +bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn);
> void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
> int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
> int insn_get_modrm_reg_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
> index a8ac5c5e94f0..8ed9d645259c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
> @@ -53,6 +53,30 @@ static bool is_string_insn(struct insn *insn)
> }
> }
>
> +/**
> + * insn_has_rep_prefix() - Determine if instruction has a REP prefix
> + * @insn: Instruction containing the prefix to inspect
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + *
> + * true if the instruction has a REP prefix, false if not.
> + */
> +bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + insn_get_prefixes(insn);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
> + insn_byte_t p = insn->prefixes.bytes[i];
> +
> + if (p == 0xf2 || p == 0xf3)
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * get_seg_reg_override_idx() - obtain segment register override index
> * @insn: Valid instruction with segment override prefixes
> --
> 2.27.0
>
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 11/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Disable red-zone usage
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 10/75] x86/insn: Add insn_has_rep_prefix() helper Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 12/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add IDT Infrastructure Joerg Roedel
` (64 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The x86-64 ABI defines a red-zone on the stack:
The 128-byte area beyond the location pointed to by %rsp is considered
to be reserved and shall not be modified by signal or interrupt
handlers. Therefore, functions may use this area for temporary data
that is not needed across function calls. In particular, leaf
functions may use this area for their entire stack frame, rather than
adjusting the stack pointer in the prologue and epilogue. This area is
known as the red zone.
This is not compatible with exception handling, because the IRET frame
written by the hardware at the stack pointer and the functions to handle
the exception will overwrite the temporary variables of the interrupted
function, causing undefined behavior. So disable red-zones for the
pre-decompression boot code.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
index fe605205b4ce..4d6a16a47e9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ targets += cpustr.h
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(REALMODE_CFLAGS) -D_SETUP
+KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(REALMODE_CFLAGS) -D_SETUP -mno-red-zone
KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 7619742f91c9..95ac85b8ef27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS := -m$(BITS) -O2
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-aliasing $(call cc-option, -fPIE, -fPIC)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := -march=i386
-cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_64) := -mcmodel=small
+cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_64) := -mcmodel=small -mno-red-zone
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cflags-y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-mmx -mno-sse
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 12/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add IDT Infrastructure
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 11/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Disable red-zone usage Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 13/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c Joerg Roedel
` (63 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add code needed to setup an IDT in the early pre-decompression
boot-code. The IDT is loaded first in startup_64, which is after
EfiExitBootServices() has been called, and later reloaded when the
kernel image has been relocated to the end of the decompression area.
This allows to setup different IDT handlers before and after the
relocation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 25 +++++++-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 44 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h | 3 +
6 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 95ac85b8ef27..46928cb90d19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += $(obj)/early_serial_console.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr.o
ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr_64.o
+ vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/idt_64.o $(obj)/idt_handlers_64.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/pgtable_64.o
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 97d37f0a34f5..4174d2f97b29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/desc_defs.h>
#include "pgtable.h"
/*
@@ -410,6 +411,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
.Lon_kernel_cs:
+ pushq %rsi
+ call load_stage1_idt
+ popq %rsi
+
/*
* paging_prepare() sets up the trampoline and checks if we need to
* enable 5-level paging.
@@ -537,6 +542,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
shrq $3, %rcx
rep stosq
+/*
+ * Load stage2 IDT
+ */
+ pushq %rsi
+ call load_stage2_idt
+ popq %rsi
+
/*
* Do the extraction, and jump to the new kernel..
*/
@@ -690,10 +702,21 @@ SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(gdt)
.quad 0x0000000000000000 /* TS continued */
SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, gdt_end)
+SYM_DATA_START(boot_idt_desc)
+ .word boot_idt_end - boot_idt
+ .quad 0
+SYM_DATA_END(boot_idt_desc)
+ .balign 8
+SYM_DATA_START(boot_idt)
+ .rept BOOT_IDT_ENTRIES
+ .quad 0
+ .quad 0
+ .endr
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(boot_idt, SYM_L_GLOBAL, boot_idt_end)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
SYM_DATA(image_offset, .long 0)
#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
SYM_DATA_LOCAL(efi32_boot_args, .long 0, 0, 0)
SYM_DATA(efi_is64, .byte 1)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..082cd6bca033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static void set_idt_entry(int vector, void (*handler)(void))
+{
+ unsigned long address = (unsigned long)handler;
+ gate_desc entry;
+
+ memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
+
+ entry.offset_low = (u16)(address & 0xffff);
+ entry.segment = __KERNEL_CS;
+ entry.bits.type = GATE_TRAP;
+ entry.bits.p = 1;
+ entry.offset_middle = (u16)((address >> 16) & 0xffff);
+ entry.offset_high = (u32)(address >> 32);
+
+ memcpy(&boot_idt[vector], &entry, sizeof(entry));
+}
+
+/* Have this here so we don't need to include <asm/desc.h> */
+static void load_boot_idt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
+{
+ asm volatile("lidt %0"::"m" (*dtr));
+}
+
+/* Setup IDT before kernel jumping to .Lrelocated */
+void load_stage1_idt(void)
+{
+ boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
+
+ load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
+}
+
+/* Setup IDT after kernel jumping to .Lrelocated */
+void load_stage2_idt(void)
+{
+ boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
+
+ load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..36dee2f40a8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Early IDT handler entry points
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+/* For ORIG_RAX */
+#include "../../entry/calling.h"
+
+.macro EXCEPTION_HANDLER name function error_code=0
+SYM_FUNC_START(\name)
+
+ /* Build pt_regs */
+ .if \error_code == 0
+ pushq $0
+ .endif
+
+ pushq %rdi
+ pushq %rsi
+ pushq %rdx
+ pushq %rcx
+ pushq %rax
+ pushq %r8
+ pushq %r9
+ pushq %r10
+ pushq %r11
+ pushq %rbx
+ pushq %rbp
+ pushq %r12
+ pushq %r13
+ pushq %r14
+ pushq %r15
+
+ /* Call handler with pt_regs */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ /* Error code is second parameter */
+ movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
+ call \function
+
+ /* Restore regs */
+ popq %r15
+ popq %r14
+ popq %r13
+ popq %r12
+ popq %rbp
+ popq %rbx
+ popq %r11
+ popq %r10
+ popq %r9
+ popq %r8
+ popq %rax
+ popq %rcx
+ popq %rdx
+ popq %rsi
+ popq %rdi
+
+ /* Remove error code and return */
+ addq $8, %rsp
+
+ iretq
+SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
+ .endm
+
+ .text
+ .code64
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 726e264410ff..062ae3ae6930 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/boot.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/desc_defs.h>
#define BOOT_CTYPE_H
#include <linux/acpi.h>
@@ -133,4 +134,8 @@ int count_immovable_mem_regions(void);
static inline int count_immovable_mem_regions(void) { return 0; }
#endif
+/* idt_64.c */
+extern gate_desc boot_idt[BOOT_IDT_ENTRIES];
+extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
+
#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
index a91f3b6e4f2a..5621fb3f2d1a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ struct desc_ptr {
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+/* Boot IDT definitions */
+#define BOOT_IDT_ENTRIES 32
+
/* Access rights as returned by LAR */
#define AR_TYPE_RODATA (0 * (1 << 9))
#define AR_TYPE_RWDATA (1 * (1 << 9))
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 13/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 12/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add IDT Infrastructure Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 14/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler Joerg Roedel
` (62 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The file contains only code related to identity mapped page-tables.
Rename the file and compile it always in.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/{kaslr_64.c => ident_map_64.c} | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 9 ---------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
rename arch/x86/boot/compressed/{kaslr_64.c => ident_map_64.c} (95%)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 46928cb90d19..c825c95d13b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-y := $(obj)/vmlinux.lds $(obj)/kernel_info.o $(obj)/head_$(BITS).o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += $(obj)/early_serial_console.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr.o
ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr_64.o
+ vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/ident_map_64.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/idt_64.o $(obj)/idt_handlers_64.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/pgtable_64.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
similarity index 95%
rename from arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c
rename to arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index f9c5c13d979b..d9932a133ac9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@
#define __PAGE_OFFSET __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE
#include "../../mm/ident_map.c"
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled;
+unsigned int pgdir_shift = 39;
+unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d = 1;
+#endif
+
+/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+
/* Used to track our page table allocation area. */
struct alloc_pgt_data {
unsigned char *pgt_buf;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index d7408af55738..7c61a8c5b9cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -43,17 +43,8 @@
#define STATIC
#include <linux/decompress/mm.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled;
-unsigned int pgdir_shift __ro_after_init = 39;
-unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d __ro_after_init = 1;
-#endif
-
extern unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void);
-/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
-
/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 062ae3ae6930..3a030a878d53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ int count_immovable_mem_regions(void);
static inline int count_immovable_mem_regions(void) { return 0; }
#endif
+/* ident_map_64.c */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+extern unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled, pgdir_shift, ptrs_per_p4d;
+#endif
+
+/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
+extern pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask;
+
/* idt_64.c */
extern gate_desc boot_idt[BOOT_IDT_ENTRIES];
extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 13/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 13/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:23 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, kvm,
Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev, Joerg Roedel,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:15PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> The file contains only code related to identity mapped page-tables.
> Rename the file and compile it always in.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 14/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 13/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 15/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page-table Joerg Roedel
` (61 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Install a page-fault handler to add an identity mapping to addresses
not yet mapped. Also do some checking whether the error code is sane.
This makes non SEV-ES machines use the exception handling
infrastructure in the pre-decompressions boot code too, making it less
likely to break in the future.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 6 ++++
4 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index d9932a133ac9..e3d980ae9c2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -19,10 +19,13 @@
/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#include "error.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
/* Use the static base for this part of the boot process */
#undef __PAGE_OFFSET
@@ -160,3 +163,39 @@ void finalize_identity_maps(void)
{
write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
}
+
+static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long address, unsigned long ip)
+{
+ error_putstr(msg);
+
+ error_putstr("\nError Code: ");
+ error_puthex(error_code);
+ error_putstr("\nCR2: 0x");
+ error_puthex(address);
+ error_putstr("\nRIP relative to _head: 0x");
+ error_puthex(ip - (unsigned long)_head);
+ error_putstr("\n");
+
+ error("Stopping.\n");
+}
+
+void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ unsigned long address = native_read_cr2();
+
+ /*
+ * Check for unexpected error codes. Unexpected are:
+ * - Faults on present pages
+ * - User faults
+ * - Reserved bits set
+ */
+ if (error_code & (X86_PF_PROT | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_RSVD))
+ do_pf_error("Unexpected page-fault:", error_code, address, regs->ip);
+
+ /*
+ * Error code is sane - now identity map the 2M region around
+ * the faulting address.
+ */
+ add_identity_map(address & PMD_MASK, PMD_SIZE);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
index 082cd6bca033..5f083092a86d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -40,5 +40,7 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
{
boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
+ set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
+
load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
index 36dee2f40a8b..b20e57504a94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -68,3 +68,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
.text
.code64
+
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 3a030a878d53..345c90fbc500 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
#define memptr unsigned
#endif
+/* boot/compressed/vmlinux start and end markers */
+extern char _head[], _end[];
+
/* misc.c */
extern memptr free_mem_ptr;
extern memptr free_mem_end_ptr;
@@ -146,4 +149,7 @@ extern pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask;
extern gate_desc boot_idt[BOOT_IDT_ENTRIES];
extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
+/* IDT Entry Points */
+void boot_page_fault(void);
+
#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 14/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 14/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:16PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> Install a page-fault handler to add an identity mapping to addresses
> not yet mapped. Also do some checking whether the error code is sane.
>
> This makes non SEV-ES machines use the exception handling
> infrastructure in the pre-decompressions boot code too, making it less
> likely to break in the future.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 15/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page-table
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 14/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 16/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code Joerg Roedel
` (60 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When booted through startup_64 the kernel keeps running on the EFI
page-table until the KASLR code sets up its own page-table. Without
KASLR the pre-decompression boot code never switches off the EFI
page-table. Change that by unconditionally switching to a kernel
controlled page-table after relocation.
This makes sure we can make changes to the mapping when necessary, for
example map pages unencrypted in SEV and SEV-ES guests.
Also remove the debug_putstr() calls in initialize_identity_maps()
because the function now runs before console_init() is called.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 51 +++++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 3 --
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 4174d2f97b29..36f18d5592f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -543,10 +543,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
rep stosq
/*
- * Load stage2 IDT
+ * Load stage2 IDT and switch to our own page-table
*/
pushq %rsi
call load_stage2_idt
+ call initialize_identity_maps
popq %rsi
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index e3d980ae9c2b..ecf9353b064d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -86,9 +86,31 @@ phys_addr_t physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
*/
static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
+/*
+ * Adds the specified range to what will become the new identity mappings.
+ * Once all ranges have been added, the new mapping is activated by calling
+ * finalize_identity_maps() below.
+ */
+void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long end = start + size;
+
+ /* Align boundary to 2M. */
+ start = round_down(start, PMD_SIZE);
+ end = round_up(end, PMD_SIZE);
+ if (start >= end)
+ return;
+
+ /* Build the mapping. */
+ kernel_ident_mapping_init(&mapping_info, (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt,
+ start, end);
+}
+
/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
void initialize_identity_maps(void)
{
+ unsigned long start, size;
+
/* If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required. */
set_sev_encryption_mask();
@@ -121,37 +143,24 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void)
*/
top_level_pgt = read_cr3_pa();
if (p4d_offset((pgd_t *)top_level_pgt, 0) == (p4d_t *)_pgtable) {
- debug_putstr("booted via startup_32()\n");
pgt_data.pgt_buf = _pgtable + BOOT_INIT_PGT_SIZE;
pgt_data.pgt_buf_size = BOOT_PGT_SIZE - BOOT_INIT_PGT_SIZE;
memset(pgt_data.pgt_buf, 0, pgt_data.pgt_buf_size);
} else {
- debug_putstr("booted via startup_64()\n");
pgt_data.pgt_buf = _pgtable;
pgt_data.pgt_buf_size = BOOT_PGT_SIZE;
memset(pgt_data.pgt_buf, 0, pgt_data.pgt_buf_size);
top_level_pgt = (unsigned long)alloc_pgt_page(&pgt_data);
}
-}
-/*
- * Adds the specified range to what will become the new identity mappings.
- * Once all ranges have been added, the new mapping is activated by calling
- * finalize_identity_maps() below.
- */
-void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
-{
- unsigned long end = start + size;
-
- /* Align boundary to 2M. */
- start = round_down(start, PMD_SIZE);
- end = round_up(end, PMD_SIZE);
- if (start >= end)
- return;
-
- /* Build the mapping. */
- kernel_ident_mapping_init(&mapping_info, (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt,
- start, end);
+ /*
+ * New page-table is set up - map the kernel image and load it
+ * into cr3.
+ */
+ start = (unsigned long)_head;
+ size = _end - _head;
+ add_identity_map(start, size);
+ write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index 7c61a8c5b9cf..856dc1c9bb0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -903,9 +903,6 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
- /* Prepare to add new identity pagetables on demand. */
- initialize_identity_maps();
-
/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 15/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page-table
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 15/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page-table Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:23 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:17PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> When booted through startup_64 the kernel keeps running on the EFI
> page-table until the KASLR code sets up its own page-table. Without
> KASLR the pre-decompression boot code never switches off the EFI
> page-table. Change that by unconditionally switching to a kernel
> controlled page-table after relocation.
>
> This makes sure we can make changes to the mapping when necessary, for
> example map pages unencrypted in SEV and SEV-ES guests.
>
> Also remove the debug_putstr() calls in initialize_identity_maps()
> because the function now runs before console_init() is called.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 16/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 15/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page-table Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 17/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end Joerg Roedel
` (59 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
With the page-fault handler in place the identity mapping can be built
on-demand. So remove the code which manually creates the mappings and
unexport/remove the functions used for it.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 6 ++----
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 24 +-----------------------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 10 ----------
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index ecf9353b064d..c63257bf8373 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -87,11 +87,9 @@ phys_addr_t physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
/*
- * Adds the specified range to what will become the new identity mappings.
- * Once all ranges have been added, the new mapping is activated by calling
- * finalize_identity_maps() below.
+ * Adds the specified range to the identity mappings.
*/
-void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
+static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long end = start + size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index 856dc1c9bb0d..c466fb738de0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -399,8 +399,6 @@ static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
*/
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
- add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start,
- mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size);
/* Avoid initrd. */
initrd_start = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
@@ -420,14 +418,10 @@ static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
- add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start,
- mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size);
/* Avoid boot parameters. */
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params);
- add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start,
- mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size);
/* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
@@ -436,11 +430,6 @@ static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
/* Enumerate the immovable memory regions */
num_immovable_mem = count_immovable_mem_regions();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
- /* Make sure video RAM can be used. */
- add_identity_map(0, PMD_SIZE);
-#endif
}
/*
@@ -919,19 +908,8 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
} else {
/* Update the new physical address location. */
- if (*output != random_addr) {
- add_identity_map(random_addr, output_size);
+ if (*output != random_addr)
*output = random_addr;
- }
-
- /*
- * This loads the identity mapping page table.
- * This should only be done if a new physical address
- * is found for the kernel, otherwise we should keep
- * the old page table to make it be like the "nokaslr"
- * case.
- */
- finalize_identity_maps();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 345c90fbc500..ea6174bad699 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -98,17 +98,7 @@ static inline void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-void initialize_identity_maps(void);
-void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size);
-void finalize_identity_maps(void);
extern unsigned char _pgtable[];
-#else
-static inline void initialize_identity_maps(void)
-{ }
-static inline void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
-{ }
-static inline void finalize_identity_maps(void)
-{ }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 16/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 16/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:18PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> With the page-fault handler in place the identity mapping can be built
> on-demand. So remove the code which manually creates the mappings and
> unexport/remove the functions used for it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 17/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 16/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 18/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add stage1 #VC handler Joerg Roedel
` (58 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Changing the function to take start and end as parameters instead of
start and size simplifies the callers, which don't need to calculate
the size if they already have start and end.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index c63257bf8373..62e42c11a336 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -89,10 +89,8 @@ static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
/*
* Adds the specified range to the identity mappings.
*/
-static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
+static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
- unsigned long end = start + size;
-
/* Align boundary to 2M. */
start = round_down(start, PMD_SIZE);
end = round_up(end, PMD_SIZE);
@@ -107,8 +105,6 @@ static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
void initialize_identity_maps(void)
{
- unsigned long start, size;
-
/* If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required. */
set_sev_encryption_mask();
@@ -155,9 +151,7 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void)
* New page-table is set up - map the kernel image and load it
* into cr3.
*/
- start = (unsigned long)_head;
- size = _end - _head;
- add_identity_map(start, size);
+ add_identity_map((unsigned long)_head, (unsigned long)_end);
write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
}
@@ -189,7 +183,8 @@ static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
- unsigned long address = native_read_cr2();
+ unsigned long address = native_read_cr2() & PMD_MASK;
+ unsigned long end = address + PMD_SIZE;
/*
* Check for unexpected error codes. Unexpected are:
@@ -204,5 +199,5 @@ void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
* Error code is sane - now identity map the 2M region around
* the faulting address.
*/
- add_identity_map(address & PMD_MASK, PMD_SIZE);
+ add_identity_map(address, end);
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 17/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 17/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:24 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:19PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> Changing the function to take start and end as parameters instead of
> start and size simplifies the callers, which don't need to calculate
> the size if they already have start and end.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 18/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add stage1 #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 17/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 19/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Call set_sev_encryption_mask earlier Joerg Roedel
` (57 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add the first handler for #VC exceptions. At stage 1 there is no GHCB
yet becaue the kernel might still be running on the EFI page table.
The stage 1 handler is limited to the MSR based protocol to talk to
the hypervisor and can only support CPUID exit-codes, but that is
enough to get to stage 2.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S | 4 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 45 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 37 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 160 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index c825c95d13b9..b66f393e5a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/idt_64.o $(obj)/idt_handlers_64.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/pgtable_64.o
+ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += $(obj)/sev-es.o
endif
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
index 5f083092a86d..f3ca7324be44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ void load_stage1_idt(void)
{
boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage1_vc);
+
load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
index b20e57504a94..92eb4df478a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -70,3 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
.code64
EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_stage1_vc do_vc_no_ghcb error_code=1
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index ea6174bad699..65da40777bc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -141,5 +141,6 @@ extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
/* IDT Entry Points */
void boot_page_fault(void);
+void boot_stage1_vc(void);
#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bb91cbb5920e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * AMD Encrypted Register State Support
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * misc.h needs to be first because it knows how to include the other kernel
+ * headers in the pre-decompression code in a way that does not break
+ * compilation.
+ */
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
+{
+ unsigned long low, high;
+
+ asm volatile("rdmsr\n" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
+ "c" (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB));
+
+ return ((high << 32) | low);
+}
+
+static inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
+{
+ u32 low, high;
+
+ low = val & 0xffffffffUL;
+ high = val >> 32;
+
+ asm volatile("wrmsr\n" : : "c" (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB),
+ "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
+}
+
+#undef __init
+#define __init
+
+/* Include code for early handlers */
+#include "../../kernel/sev-es-shared.c"
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index e8370e64a155..2816eb01463f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -448,6 +448,7 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET 0xc001103b
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB 0xc0010130
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d49a8a429d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * AMD Encrypted Register State Support
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_ENCRYPTED_STATE_H
+#define __ASM_ENCRYPTED_STATE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define GHCB_SEV_CPUID_REQ 0x004UL
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX 0
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX 1
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_ECX 2
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX 3
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, reg) (GHCB_SEV_CPUID_REQ | \
+ (((unsigned long)reg & 3) << 30) | \
+ (((unsigned long)fn) << 32))
+
+#define GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP 0x005UL
+#define GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE 0x100UL
+
+#define GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(v) ((v) & 0xfff)
+#define VMGEXIT() { asm volatile("rep; vmmcall\n\r"); }
+
+void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code);
+
+static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
+{
+ u64 mask = (1ULL << bits) - 1;
+
+ return (val & mask);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
index 082f45631fa9..f5d2325aa0b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#define X86_TRAP_XF 19 /* SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
#define X86_TRAP_VE 20 /* Virtualization Exception */
#define X86_TRAP_CP 21 /* Control Protection Exception */
+#define X86_TRAP_VC 29 /* VMM Communication Exception */
#define X86_TRAP_IRET 32 /* IRET Exception */
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0bea32341afa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * AMD Encrypted Register State Support
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+ *
+ * This file is not compiled stand-alone. It contains code shared
+ * between the pre-decompression boot code and the running Linux kernel
+ * and is included directly into both code-bases.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
+ * page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
+ * hypervisor and only the CPUID exit-code.
+ */
+void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32);
+ unsigned long val;
+
+ /* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */
+ if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID)
+ goto fail;
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+ if (GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP)
+ goto fail;
+ regs->ax = val >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+ if (GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP)
+ goto fail;
+ regs->bx = val >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_ECX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+ if (GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP)
+ goto fail;
+ regs->cx = val >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+ if (GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP)
+ goto fail;
+ regs->dx = val >> 32;
+
+ /* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
+ regs->ip += 2;
+
+ return;
+
+fail:
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE);
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ /* Shouldn't get here - if we do halt the machine */
+ while (true)
+ asm volatile("hlt\n");
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 19/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Call set_sev_encryption_mask earlier
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 18/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add stage1 #VC handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 20/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check return value of kernel_ident_mapping_init() Joerg Roedel
` (56 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Call set_sev_encryption_mask() while still on the stage 1 #VC-handler,
because the stage 2 handler needs our own page-tables to be set up, to
which calling set_sev_encryption_mask() is a prerequisite.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 +++++++-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 3 ---
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 36f18d5592f4..963bf2ce11cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -543,9 +543,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
rep stosq
/*
- * Load stage2 IDT and switch to our own page-table
+ * If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required in the
+ * page-table setup code below. When the guest also has SEV-ES enabled
+ * set_sev_encryption_mask() will cause #VC exceptions, but the stage2
+ * handler can't map its GHCB because the page-table is not set up yet.
+ * So set up the encryption mask here while still on the stage1 #VC
+ * handler. Then load stage2 IDT and switch to our own page-table.
*/
pushq %rsi
+ call set_sev_encryption_mask
call load_stage2_idt
call initialize_identity_maps
popq %rsi
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index 62e42c11a336..b4f2a5f503cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -105,9 +105,6 @@ static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
void initialize_identity_maps(void)
{
- /* If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required. */
- set_sev_encryption_mask();
-
/* Exclude the encryption mask from __PHYSICAL_MASK */
physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 20/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check return value of kernel_ident_mapping_init()
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 19/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Call set_sev_encryption_mask earlier Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 21/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add set_page_en/decrypted() helpers Joerg Roedel
` (55 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The function can fail to create an identity mapping, check for that
and bail out if it happens.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index b4f2a5f503cd..aa91bebc0fe9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
*/
static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
+ int ret;
+
/* Align boundary to 2M. */
start = round_down(start, PMD_SIZE);
end = round_up(end, PMD_SIZE);
@@ -98,8 +100,9 @@ static void add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
return;
/* Build the mapping. */
- kernel_ident_mapping_init(&mapping_info, (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt,
- start, end);
+ ret = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&mapping_info, (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt, start, end);
+ if (ret)
+ error("Error: kernel_ident_mapping_init() failed\n");
}
/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 21/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add set_page_en/decrypted() helpers
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 20/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check return value of kernel_ident_mapping_init() Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 22/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup GHCB Based VC Exception handler Joerg Roedel
` (54 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The functions are needed to map the GHCB for SEV-ES guests. The GHCB is
used for communication with the hypervisor, so its content must not be
encrypted. After the GHCB is not needed anymore it must be mapped
encrypted again so that the running kernel image can safely re-use the
memory.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index aa91bebc0fe9..05742f641a06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
@@ -165,6 +166,138 @@ void finalize_identity_maps(void)
write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
}
+static pte_t *split_large_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
+ pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long __address)
+{
+ unsigned long page_flags;
+ unsigned long address;
+ pte_t *pte;
+ pmd_t pmd;
+ int i;
+
+ pte = (pte_t *)info->alloc_pgt_page(info->context);
+ if (!pte)
+ return NULL;
+
+ address = __address & PMD_MASK;
+ /* No large page - clear PSE flag */
+ page_flags = info->page_flag & ~_PAGE_PSE;
+
+ /* Populate the PTEs */
+ for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+ set_pte(&pte[i], __pte(address | page_flags));
+ address += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ideally we need to clear the large PMD first and do a TLB
+ * flush before we write the new PMD. But the 2M range of the
+ * PMD might contain the code we execute and/or the stack
+ * we are on, so we can't do that. But that should be safe here
+ * because we are going from large to small mappings and we are
+ * also the only user of the page-table, so there is no chance
+ * of a TLB multihit.
+ */
+ pmd = __pmd((unsigned long)pte | info->kernpg_flag);
+ set_pmd(pmdp, pmd);
+ /* Flush TLB to establish the new PMD */
+ write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
+
+ return pte + pte_index(__address);
+}
+
+static void clflush_page(unsigned long address)
+{
+ unsigned int flush_size;
+ char *cl, *start, *end;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardcode cl-size to 64 - CPUID can't be used here because that might
+ * cause another #VC exception and the GHCB is not ready to use yet.
+ */
+ flush_size = 64;
+ start = (char *)(address & PAGE_MASK);
+ end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * First make sure there are no pending writes on the cache-lines to
+ * flush.
+ */
+ asm volatile("mfence" : : : "memory");
+
+ for (cl = start; cl != end; cl += flush_size)
+ clflush(cl);
+}
+
+static int set_clr_page_flags(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
+ unsigned long address,
+ pteval_t set, pteval_t clr)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgdp = (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt;
+ p4d_t *p4dp;
+ pud_t *pudp;
+ pmd_t *pmdp;
+ pte_t *ptep, pte;
+
+ /*
+ * First make sure there is a PMD mapping for 'address'.
+ * It should already exist, but keep things generic.
+ *
+ * To map the page just read from it and fault it in if there is no
+ * mapping yet. add_identity_map() can't be called here because that
+ * would unconditionally map the address on PMD level, destroying any
+ * PTE-level mappings that might already exist. Use assembly here so
+ * the access won't be optimized away.
+ */
+ asm volatile("mov %[address], %%r9"
+ :: [address] "g" (*(unsigned long *)address)
+ : "r9", "memory");
+
+ /*
+ * The page is mapped at least with PMD size - so skip checks and walk
+ * directly to the PMD.
+ */
+ p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, address);
+ pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, address);
+ pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
+
+ if (pmd_large(*pmdp))
+ ptep = split_large_pmd(info, pmdp, address);
+ else
+ ptep = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, address);
+
+ if (!ptep)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Changing encryption attributes of a page requires to flush it from
+ * the caches.
+ */
+ if ((set | clr) & _PAGE_ENC)
+ clflush_page(address);
+
+ /* Update PTE */
+ pte = *ptep;
+ pte = pte_set_flags(pte, set);
+ pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, clr);
+ set_pte(ptep, pte);
+
+ /* Flush TLB after changing encryption attribute */
+ write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int set_page_decrypted(unsigned long address)
+{
+ return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, 0, _PAGE_ENC);
+}
+
+int set_page_encrypted(unsigned long address)
+{
+ return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, _PAGE_ENC, 0);
+}
+
static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
unsigned long address, unsigned long ip)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 65da40777bc1..5e569e8a7d75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static inline void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+extern int set_page_decrypted(unsigned long address);
+extern int set_page_encrypted(unsigned long address);
extern unsigned char _pgtable[];
#endif
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 22/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup GHCB Based VC Exception handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 21/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add set_page_en/decrypted() helpers Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 23/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Unmap GHCB page before booting the kernel Joerg Roedel
` (53 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Install an exception handler for #VC exception that uses a GHCB. Also
add the infrastructure for handling different exit-codes by decoding
the instruction that caused the exception and error handling.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 4 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 7 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 7 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 111 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 39 ++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 154 +++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 329 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 883da0abf779..0c3401decd10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1520,6 +1520,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
help
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index b66f393e5a87..601fc7abf8ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-pointer-sign
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
+# sev-es.c inludes generated $(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/inat-tables.c
+CFLAGS_sev-es.o += -I$(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/
+
KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE :=n
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
index f3ca7324be44..804a502ee0d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -46,5 +46,9 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage2_vc);
+#endif
+
load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
index 92eb4df478a1..22890e199f5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -72,5 +72,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_stage1_vc do_vc_no_ghcb error_code=1
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_stage1_vc do_vc_no_ghcb error_code=1
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_stage2_vc do_boot_stage2_vc error_code=1
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index 9652d5c2afda..dba49e75095a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -441,6 +441,13 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
parse_elf(output);
handle_relocations(output, output_len, virt_addr);
debug_putstr("done.\nBooting the kernel.\n");
+
+ /*
+ * Flush GHCB from cache and map it encrypted again when running as
+ * SEV-ES guest.
+ */
+ sev_es_shutdown_ghcb();
+
return output;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 5e569e8a7d75..4d37a28370ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
void set_sev_encryption_mask(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
+#else
+static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
+#endif
+
/* acpi.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
acpi_physical_address get_rsdp_addr(void);
@@ -144,5 +150,6 @@ extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
/* IDT Entry Points */
void boot_page_fault(void);
void boot_stage1_vc(void);
+void boot_stage2_vc(void);
#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index bb91cbb5920e..7e2cec170026 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -13,10 +13,17 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include "error.h"
+
+struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
+
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
unsigned long low, high;
@@ -38,8 +45,112 @@ static inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
"a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
}
+static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ char buffer[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ memcpy(buffer, (unsigned char *)ctxt->regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
+
+ insn_init(&ctxt->insn, buffer, MAX_INSN_SIZE, 1);
+ insn_get_length(&ctxt->insn);
+
+ ret = ctxt->insn.immediate.got ? ES_OK : ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ void *dst, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ memcpy(dst, buf, size);
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ void *src, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ memcpy(buf, src, size);
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
#undef __init
+#undef __pa
#define __init
+#define __pa(x) ((unsigned long)(x))
+
+#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED
+
+/* Basic instruction decoding support needed */
+#include "../../lib/inat.c"
+#include "../../lib/insn.c"
/* Include code for early handlers */
#include "../../kernel/sev-es-shared.c"
+
+static bool early_sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
+{
+ if (!sev_es_negotiate_protocol())
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED);
+
+ if (set_page_decrypted((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Page is now mapped decrypted, clear it */
+ memset(&boot_ghcb_page, 0, sizeof(boot_ghcb_page));
+
+ boot_ghcb = &boot_ghcb_page;
+
+ /* Initialize lookup tables for the instruction decoder */
+ inat_init_tables();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_ghcb)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * GHCB Page must be flushed from the cache and mapped encrypted again.
+ * Otherwise the running kernel will see strange cache effects when
+ * trying to use that page.
+ */
+ if (set_page_encrypted((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page))
+ error("Can't map GHCB page encrypted");
+}
+
+void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result result;
+
+ if (!boot_ghcb && !early_sev_es_setup_ghcb())
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(boot_ghcb);
+ result = vc_init_em_ctxt(&ctxt, regs, exit_code);
+ if (result != ES_OK)
+ goto finish;
+
+ switch (exit_code) {
+ default:
+ result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+finish:
+ if (result == ES_OK) {
+ vc_finish_insn(&ctxt);
+ } else if (result != ES_RETRY) {
+ /*
+ * For now, just halt the machine. That makes debugging easier,
+ * later we just call sev_es_terminate() here.
+ */
+ while (true)
+ asm volatile("hlt\n");
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index 5d49a8a429d3..7c0807b84546 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -9,7 +9,14 @@
#define __ASM_ENCRYPTED_STATE_H
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
+#define GHCB_SEV_INFO 0x001UL
+#define GHCB_SEV_INFO_REQ 0x002UL
+#define GHCB_INFO(v) ((v) & 0xfffUL)
+#define GHCB_PROTO_MAX(v) (((v) >> 48) & 0xffffUL)
+#define GHCB_PROTO_MIN(v) (((v) >> 32) & 0xffffUL)
+#define GHCB_PROTO_OUR 0x0001UL
#define GHCB_SEV_CPUID_REQ 0x004UL
#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX 0
#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX 1
@@ -19,12 +26,44 @@
(((unsigned long)reg & 3) << 30) | \
(((unsigned long)fn) << 32))
+#define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 0x0001UL
+#define GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE 0x0000UL
+
#define GHCB_SEV_CPUID_RESP 0x005UL
#define GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE 0x100UL
+#define GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE_REASON(reason_set, reason_val) \
+ (((((u64)reason_set) & 0x7) << 12) | \
+ ((((u64)reason_val) & 0xff) << 16))
+#define GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST 0
+#define GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED 1
#define GHCB_SEV_GHCB_RESP_CODE(v) ((v) & 0xfff)
#define VMGEXIT() { asm volatile("rep; vmmcall\n\r"); }
+enum es_result {
+ ES_OK, /* All good */
+ ES_UNSUPPORTED, /* Requested operation not supported */
+ ES_VMM_ERROR, /* Unexpected state from the VMM */
+ ES_DECODE_FAILED, /* Instruction decoding failed */
+ ES_EXCEPTION, /* Instruction caused exception */
+ ES_RETRY, /* Retry instruction emulation */
+};
+
+struct es_fault_info {
+ unsigned long vector;
+ unsigned long error_code;
+ unsigned long cr2;
+};
+
+struct pt_regs;
+
+/* ES instruction emulation context */
+struct es_em_ctxt {
+ struct pt_regs *regs;
+ struct insn insn;
+ struct es_fault_info fi;
+};
+
void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code);
static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 2e8a30f06c74..c68d1618c9b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6 0x036
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7 0x037
#define SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE 0x040
+#define SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP 0x05f
#define SVM_EXIT_INTR 0x060
#define SVM_EXIT_NMI 0x061
#define SVM_EXIT_SMI 0x062
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 0bea32341afa..7ac6e6b0ae57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -9,6 +9,118 @@
* and is included directly into both code-bases.
*/
+static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
+{
+ u64 val = GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE;
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the hypervisor what went wrong - only reason-set 0 is
+ * currently supported.
+ */
+ val |= GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE_REASON(0, reason);
+
+ /* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(val);
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ while (true)
+ asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
+}
+
+static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ /* Do the GHCB protocol version negotiation */
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_SEV_INFO_REQ);
+ VMGEXIT();
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+
+ if (GHCB_INFO(val) != GHCB_SEV_INFO)
+ return false;
+
+ if (GHCB_PROTO_MAX(val) < GHCB_PROTO_OUR ||
+ GHCB_PROTO_MIN(val) > GHCB_PROTO_OUR)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
+{
+ memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+}
+
+static bool vc_decoding_needed(unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ /* Exceptions don't require to decode the instruction */
+ return !(exit_code >= SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE &&
+ exit_code <= SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP);
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
+
+ memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+ ctxt->regs = regs;
+
+ if (vc_decoding_needed(exit_code))
+ ret = vc_decode_insn(ctxt);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ ctxt->regs->ip += ctxt->insn.length;
+}
+
+static enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ u64 exit_code, u64 exit_info_1,
+ u64 exit_info_2)
+{
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ /* Fill in protocol and format specifiers */
+ ghcb->protocol_version = GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX;
+ ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
+
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, exit_code);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ if ((ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1 & 0xffffffff) == 1) {
+ u64 info = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+ unsigned long v;
+
+ info = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+ v = info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
+
+ /* Check if exception information from hypervisor is sane. */
+ if ((info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID) &&
+ ((v == X86_TRAP_GP) || (v == X86_TRAP_UD)) &&
+ ((info & SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_MASK) == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT)) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = v;
+ if (info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR)
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = info >> 32;
+ ret = ES_EXCEPTION;
+ } else {
+ ret = ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = ES_OK;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
@@ -64,3 +176,45 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
while (true)
asm volatile("hlt\n");
}
+
+static enum es_result vc_insn_string_read(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ void *src, char *buf,
+ unsigned int data_size,
+ unsigned int count,
+ bool backwards)
+{
+ int i, b = backwards ? -1 : 1;
+ enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ void *s = src + (i * data_size * b);
+ char *d = buf + (i * data_size);
+
+ ret = vc_read_mem(ctxt, s, d, data_size);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_insn_string_write(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ void *dst, char *buf,
+ unsigned int data_size,
+ unsigned int count,
+ bool backwards)
+{
+ int i, s = backwards ? -1 : 1;
+ enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ void *d = dst + (i * data_size * s);
+ char *b = buf + (i * data_size);
+
+ ret = vc_write_mem(ctxt, d, b, data_size);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 23/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Unmap GHCB page before booting the kernel
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 22/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup GHCB Based VC Exception handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 24/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions Joerg Roedel
` (52 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Force a page-fault on any further accesses to the GHCB page when they
shouldn't happen anymore. This will catch the bugs where a #VC exception
is raised when no one is expected anymore.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index 05742f641a06..063a60edcf99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -298,6 +298,11 @@ int set_page_encrypted(unsigned long address)
return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, _PAGE_ENC, 0);
}
+int set_page_non_present(unsigned long address)
+{
+ return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, 0, _PAGE_PRESENT);
+}
+
static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
unsigned long address, unsigned long ip)
{
@@ -316,8 +321,14 @@ static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
- unsigned long address = native_read_cr2() & PMD_MASK;
- unsigned long end = address + PMD_SIZE;
+ unsigned long address = native_read_cr2();
+ unsigned long end;
+ bool ghcb_fault;
+
+ ghcb_fault = sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(address);
+
+ address &= PMD_MASK;
+ end = address + PMD_SIZE;
/*
* Check for unexpected error codes. Unexpected are:
@@ -327,6 +338,8 @@ void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
*/
if (error_code & (X86_PF_PROT | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_RSVD))
do_pf_error("Unexpected page-fault:", error_code, address, regs->ip);
+ else if (ghcb_fault)
+ do_pf_error("Page-fault on GHCB page:", error_code, address, regs->ip);
/*
* Error code is sane - now identity map the 2M region around
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 4d37a28370ed..2e5f82acc122 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static inline void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
extern int set_page_decrypted(unsigned long address);
extern int set_page_encrypted(unsigned long address);
+extern int set_page_non_present(unsigned long address);
extern unsigned char _pgtable[];
#endif
@@ -117,8 +118,13 @@ void set_sev_encryption_mask(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
+extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
#else
static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
+static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
+{
+ return false;
+}
#endif
/* acpi.c */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index 7e2cec170026..e3abf8737015 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -121,6 +121,20 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
*/
if (set_page_encrypted((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page))
error("Can't map GHCB page encrypted");
+
+ /*
+ * GHCB page is mapped encrypted again and flushed from the cache.
+ * Mark it non-present now to catch bugs when #VC exceptions trigger
+ * after this point.
+ */
+ if (set_page_non_present((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page))
+ error("Can't unmap GHCB page");
+}
+
+bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
+{
+ /* Check whether the fault was on the GHCB page */
+ return ((address & PAGE_MASK) == (unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page);
}
void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 24/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 23/75] x86/boot/compressed/64: Unmap GHCB page before booting the kernel Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 25/75] x86/fpu: Move xgetbv()/xsetbv() into separate header Joerg Roedel
` (51 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Add support for decoding and handling #VC exceptions for IOIO events.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapted code to #VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 32 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 246 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index e3abf8737015..4f2fc7a85c2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -24,6 +24,35 @@
struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
+/*
+ * Copy a version of this function here - insn-eval.c can't be used in
+ * pre-decompression code.
+ */
+static bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ insn_get_prefixes(insn);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
+ insn_byte_t p = insn->prefixes.bytes[i];
+
+ if (p == 0xf2 || p == 0xf3)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Only a dummy for insn_get_seg_base() - Early boot-code is 64bit only and
+ * doesn't use segments.
+ */
+static unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
+{
+ return 0UL;
+}
+
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
unsigned long low, high;
@@ -151,6 +180,9 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
goto finish;
switch (exit_code) {
+ case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+ result = vc_handle_ioio(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
+ break;
default:
result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 7ac6e6b0ae57..66d60e34eba0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -218,3 +218,217 @@ static enum es_result vc_insn_string_write(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ret;
}
+
+#define IOIO_TYPE_STR BIT(2)
+#define IOIO_TYPE_IN 1
+#define IOIO_TYPE_INS (IOIO_TYPE_IN | IOIO_TYPE_STR)
+#define IOIO_TYPE_OUT 0
+#define IOIO_TYPE_OUTS (IOIO_TYPE_OUT | IOIO_TYPE_STR)
+
+#define IOIO_REP BIT(3)
+
+#define IOIO_ADDR_64 BIT(9)
+#define IOIO_ADDR_32 BIT(8)
+#define IOIO_ADDR_16 BIT(7)
+
+#define IOIO_DATA_32 BIT(6)
+#define IOIO_DATA_16 BIT(5)
+#define IOIO_DATA_8 BIT(4)
+
+#define IOIO_SEG_ES (0 << 10)
+#define IOIO_SEG_DS (3 << 10)
+
+static enum es_result vc_ioio_exitinfo(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u64 *exitinfo)
+{
+ struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
+ *exitinfo = 0;
+
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
+ /* INS opcodes */
+ case 0x6c:
+ case 0x6d:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_INS;
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_SEG_ES;
+ *exitinfo |= (ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff) << 16;
+ break;
+
+ /* OUTS opcodes */
+ case 0x6e:
+ case 0x6f:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUTS;
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_SEG_DS;
+ *exitinfo |= (ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff) << 16;
+ break;
+
+ /* IN immediate opcodes */
+ case 0xe4:
+ case 0xe5:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_IN;
+ *exitinfo |= insn->immediate.value << 16;
+ break;
+
+ /* OUT immediate opcodes */
+ case 0xe6:
+ case 0xe7:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUT;
+ *exitinfo |= insn->immediate.value << 16;
+ break;
+
+ /* IN register opcodes */
+ case 0xec:
+ case 0xed:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_IN;
+ *exitinfo |= (ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff) << 16;
+ break;
+
+ /* OUT register opcodes */
+ case 0xee:
+ case 0xef:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUT;
+ *exitinfo |= (ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff) << 16;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
+ case 0x6c:
+ case 0x6e:
+ case 0xe4:
+ case 0xe6:
+ case 0xec:
+ case 0xee:
+ /* Single byte opcodes */
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_DATA_8;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Length determined by instruction parsing */
+ *exitinfo |= (insn->opnd_bytes == 2) ? IOIO_DATA_16
+ : IOIO_DATA_32;
+ }
+ switch (insn->addr_bytes) {
+ case 2:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_16;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_32;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_64;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (insn_has_rep_prefix(insn))
+ *exitinfo |= IOIO_REP;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
+ u64 exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ ret = vc_ioio_exitinfo(ctxt, &exit_info_1);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_STR) {
+
+ /* (REP) INS/OUTS */
+
+ bool df = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) == X86_EFLAGS_DF);
+ unsigned int io_bytes, exit_bytes;
+ unsigned int ghcb_count, op_count;
+ unsigned long es_base;
+ u64 sw_scratch;
+
+ /*
+ * For the string variants with rep prefix the amount of in/out
+ * operations per #VC exception is limited so that the kernel
+ * has a chance to take interrupts and re-schedule while the
+ * instruction is emulated.
+ */
+ io_bytes = (exit_info_1 >> 4) & 0x7;
+ ghcb_count = sizeof(ghcb->shared_buffer) / io_bytes;
+
+ op_count = (exit_info_1 & IOIO_REP) ? regs->cx : 1;
+ exit_info_2 = min(op_count, ghcb_count);
+ exit_bytes = exit_info_2 * io_bytes;
+
+ es_base = insn_get_seg_base(ctxt->regs, INAT_SEG_REG_ES);
+
+ /* Read bytes of OUTS into the shared buffer */
+ if (!(exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN)) {
+ ret = vc_insn_string_read(ctxt,
+ (void *)(es_base + regs->si),
+ ghcb->shared_buffer, io_bytes,
+ exit_info_2, df);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Issue an VMGEXIT to the HV to consume the bytes from the
+ * shared buffer or to have it write them into the shared buffer
+ * depending on the instruction: OUTS or INS.
+ */
+ sw_scratch = __pa(ghcb) + offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
+ ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, sw_scratch);
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO,
+ exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Read bytes from shared buffer into the guest's destination. */
+ if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN) {
+ ret = vc_insn_string_write(ctxt,
+ (void *)(es_base + regs->di),
+ ghcb->shared_buffer, io_bytes,
+ exit_info_2, df);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (df)
+ regs->di -= exit_bytes;
+ else
+ regs->di += exit_bytes;
+ } else {
+ if (df)
+ regs->si -= exit_bytes;
+ else
+ regs->si += exit_bytes;
+ }
+
+ if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_REP)
+ regs->cx -= exit_info_2;
+
+ ret = regs->cx ? ES_RETRY : ES_OK;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* IN/OUT into/from rAX */
+
+ int bits = (exit_info_1 & 0x70) >> 1;
+ u64 rax = 0;
+
+ if (!(exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN))
+ rax = lower_bits(regs->ax, bits);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, rax);
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO, exit_info_1, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN) {
+ if (!ghcb_is_valid_rax(ghcb))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ regs->ax = lower_bits(ghcb->save.rax, bits);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 25/75] x86/fpu: Move xgetbv()/xsetbv() into separate header
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 24/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 26/75] x86/sev-es: Add CPUID handling to #VC handler Joerg Roedel
` (50 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The xgetbv() function is needed in pre-decompression boot code, but
asm/fpu/internal.h can't be included there directly. Doing so opens
the door to include-hell due to various include-magic in
boot/compressed/misc.h.
Avoid that by moving xgetbv()/xsetbv() to a separate header file and
include this instead.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 33 +------------------------
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xcr.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xcr.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 845e7481ab77..1c724bbace04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/trace/fpu.h>
@@ -619,36 +620,4 @@ static inline void switch_fpu_finish(struct fpu *new_fpu)
__write_pkru(pkru_val);
}
-/*
- * MXCSR and XCR definitions:
- */
-
-static inline void ldmxcsr(u32 mxcsr)
-{
- asm volatile("ldmxcsr %0" :: "m" (mxcsr));
-}
-
-extern unsigned int mxcsr_feature_mask;
-
-#define XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK 0x00000000
-
-static inline u64 xgetbv(u32 index)
-{
- u32 eax, edx;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd0" /* xgetbv */
- : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
- : "c" (index));
- return eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
-}
-
-static inline void xsetbv(u32 index, u64 value)
-{
- u32 eax = value;
- u32 edx = value >> 32;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd1" /* xsetbv */
- : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (index));
-}
-
#endif /* _ASM_X86_FPU_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xcr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xcr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d8e8fafebfdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xcr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_FPU_XCR_H
+#define _ASM_X86_FPU_XCR_H
+
+/*
+ * MXCSR and XCR definitions:
+ */
+
+static inline void ldmxcsr(u32 mxcsr)
+{
+ asm volatile("ldmxcsr %0" :: "m" (mxcsr));
+}
+
+extern unsigned int mxcsr_feature_mask;
+
+#define XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK 0x00000000
+
+static inline u64 xgetbv(u32 index)
+{
+ u32 eax, edx;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd0" /* xgetbv */
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (index));
+ return eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
+}
+
+static inline void xsetbv(u32 index, u64 value)
+{
+ u32 eax = value;
+ u32 edx = value >> 32;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd1" /* xsetbv */
+ : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (index));
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_FPU_XCR_H */
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 26/75] x86/sev-es: Add CPUID handling to #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 25/75] x86/fpu: Move xgetbv()/xsetbv() into separate header Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 27/75] x86/idt: Move IDT to data segment Joerg Roedel
` (49 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Handle #VC exceptions caused by CPUID instructions. These happen in
early boot code when the KASLR code checks for RDTSC.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index 4f2fc7a85c2f..851d7af29d79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
@@ -183,6 +184,9 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
result = vc_handle_ioio(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
+ result = vc_handle_cpuid(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
+ break;
default:
result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 66d60e34eba0..59884926fae5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -432,3 +432,38 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return ret;
}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
+ u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
+
+ if (cr4 & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
+ /* Safe to read xcr0 */
+ ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK));
+ else
+ /* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */
+ ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_CPUID, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!(ghcb_is_valid_rax(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rbx(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rcx(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rdx(ghcb)))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
+ regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ regs->bx = ghcb->save.rbx;
+ regs->cx = ghcb->save.rcx;
+ regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 27/75] x86/idt: Move IDT to data segment
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 26/75] x86/sev-es: Add CPUID handling to #VC handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 28/75] x86/idt: Split idt_data setup out of set_intr_gate() Joerg Roedel
` (48 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
With SEV-ES, exception handling is needed very early, even before the
kernel has cleared the bss segment. In order to prevent clearing the
currently used IDT, move the IDT to the data segment.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 0db21206f2f3..b920f2352df5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data apic_idts[] = {
};
/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in the cpu entry area */
-static gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_bss;
+static gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_data;
struct desc_ptr idt_descr __ro_after_init = {
.size = IDT_TABLE_SIZE - 1,
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 27/75] x86/idt: Move IDT to data segment
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 27/75] x86/idt: Move IDT to data segment Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:25 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:29PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> With SEV-ES, exception handling is needed very early, even before the
> kernel has cleared the bss segment. In order to prevent clearing the
> currently used IDT, move the IDT to the data segment.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 28/75] x86/idt: Split idt_data setup out of set_intr_gate()
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 27/75] x86/idt: Move IDT to data segment Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 29/75] x86/idt: Move two function from k/idt.c to i/a/desc.h Joerg Roedel
` (47 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The code to setup idt_data is needed for early exception handling, but
set_intr_gate() can't be used that early because it has pv-ops in its
code path, which don't work that early.
Split out the idt_data initialization part from set_intr_gate() so
that it can be used separatly.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index b920f2352df5..367eb6a593dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -205,18 +205,24 @@ idt_setup_from_table(gate_desc *idt, const struct idt_data *t, int size, bool sy
}
}
+static void init_idt_data(struct idt_data *data, unsigned int n,
+ const void *addr)
+{
+ BUG_ON(n > 0xFF);
+
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+ data->vector = n;
+ data->addr = addr;
+ data->segment = __KERNEL_CS;
+ data->bits.type = GATE_INTERRUPT;
+ data->bits.p = 1;
+}
+
static __init void set_intr_gate(unsigned int n, const void *addr)
{
struct idt_data data;
- BUG_ON(n > 0xFF);
-
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
- data.vector = n;
- data.addr = addr;
- data.segment = __KERNEL_CS;
- data.bits.type = GATE_INTERRUPT;
- data.bits.p = 1;
+ init_idt_data(&data, n, addr);
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, &data, 1, false);
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 28/75] x86/idt: Split idt_data setup out of set_intr_gate()
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 28/75] x86/idt: Split idt_data setup out of set_intr_gate() Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:26 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:30PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> The code to setup idt_data is needed for early exception handling, but
> set_intr_gate() can't be used that early because it has pv-ops in its
> code path, which don't work that early.
>
> Split out the idt_data initialization part from set_intr_gate() so
> that it can be used separatly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 29/75] x86/idt: Move two function from k/idt.c to i/a/desc.h
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 28/75] x86/idt: Split idt_data setup out of set_intr_gate() Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 30/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT Joerg Roedel
` (46 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Move these two functions from kernel/idt.c to include/asm/desc.h:
* init_idt_data()
* idt_init_desc()
These functions are needed to setup IDT entries very early and need to
be called from head64.c. To be usable this early these functions need to
be compiled without instrumentation and the stack-protector feature.
These features need to be kept enabled for kernel/idt.c, so head64.c
must use its own versions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 34 --------------------------------
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
index 1ced11d31932..476082a83d1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
@@ -383,6 +383,33 @@ static inline void set_desc_limit(struct desc_struct *desc, unsigned long limit)
void alloc_intr_gate(unsigned int n, const void *addr);
+static inline void init_idt_data(struct idt_data *data, unsigned int n,
+ const void *addr)
+{
+ BUG_ON(n > 0xFF);
+
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+ data->vector = n;
+ data->addr = addr;
+ data->segment = __KERNEL_CS;
+ data->bits.type = GATE_INTERRUPT;
+ data->bits.p = 1;
+}
+
+static inline void idt_init_desc(gate_desc *gate, const struct idt_data *d)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) d->addr;
+
+ gate->offset_low = (u16) addr;
+ gate->segment = (u16) d->segment;
+ gate->bits = d->bits;
+ gate->offset_middle = (u16) (addr >> 16);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ gate->offset_high = (u32) (addr >> 32);
+ gate->reserved = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
extern unsigned long system_vectors[];
extern void load_current_idt(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
index 5621fb3f2d1a..f7e7099af595 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc_defs.h
@@ -74,6 +74,13 @@ struct idt_bits {
p : 1;
} __attribute__((packed));
+struct idt_data {
+ unsigned int vector;
+ unsigned int segment;
+ struct idt_bits bits;
+ const void *addr;
+};
+
struct gate_struct {
u16 offset_low;
u16 segment;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 367eb6a593dd..d3f0c8133300 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -11,13 +11,6 @@
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
-struct idt_data {
- unsigned int vector;
- unsigned int segment;
- struct idt_bits bits;
- const void *addr;
-};
-
#define DPL0 0x0
#define DPL3 0x3
@@ -178,20 +171,6 @@ bool idt_is_f00f_address(unsigned long address)
}
#endif
-static inline void idt_init_desc(gate_desc *gate, const struct idt_data *d)
-{
- unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) d->addr;
-
- gate->offset_low = (u16) addr;
- gate->segment = (u16) d->segment;
- gate->bits = d->bits;
- gate->offset_middle = (u16) (addr >> 16);
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- gate->offset_high = (u32) (addr >> 32);
- gate->reserved = 0;
-#endif
-}
-
static __init void
idt_setup_from_table(gate_desc *idt, const struct idt_data *t, int size, bool sys)
{
@@ -205,19 +184,6 @@ idt_setup_from_table(gate_desc *idt, const struct idt_data *t, int size, bool sy
}
}
-static void init_idt_data(struct idt_data *data, unsigned int n,
- const void *addr)
-{
- BUG_ON(n > 0xFF);
-
- memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
- data->vector = n;
- data->addr = addr;
- data->segment = __KERNEL_CS;
- data->bits.type = GATE_INTERRUPT;
- data->bits.p = 1;
-}
-
static __init void set_intr_gate(unsigned int n, const void *addr)
{
struct idt_data data;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 29/75] x86/idt: Move two function from k/idt.c to i/a/desc.h
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 29/75] x86/idt: Move two function from k/idt.c to i/a/desc.h Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:29 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:31PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
I'm not a huge fan of the Subject. :) Maybe:
x86/idt: Make IDT init functions static inlines
>
> Move these two functions from kernel/idt.c to include/asm/desc.h:
>
> * init_idt_data()
> * idt_init_desc()
>
> These functions are needed to setup IDT entries very early and need to
> be called from head64.c. To be usable this early these functions need to
> be compiled without instrumentation and the stack-protector feature.
> These features need to be kept enabled for kernel/idt.c, so head64.c
> must use its own versions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
But regardless:
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 30/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 29/75] x86/idt: Move two function from k/idt.c to i/a/desc.h Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 31/75] x86/head/64: Reload GDT after switch to virtual addresses Joerg Roedel
` (45 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Handling exceptions during boot requires a working GDT. The kernel GDT
is not yet ready for use, so install a temporary boot GDT.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index cbb71c1b574f..51059bfd4b99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -61,6 +61,25 @@ unsigned long vmemmap_base __ro_after_init = __VMEMMAP_BASE_L4;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmemmap_base);
#endif
+/*
+ * GDT used before %gs is set up and the kernel can use gdt_page. Needed for
+ * early exception handling.
+ */
+struct desc_struct boot_gdt[GDT_ENTRIES] = {
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa09b, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff),
+};
+
+/*
+ * Address needs to be set at runtime because it references the boot_gdt while
+ * the kernel still uses a direct mapping.
+ */
+struct desc_ptr boot_gdt_descr = {
+ .size = sizeof(boot_gdt),
+ .address = 0,
+};
+
#define __head __section(.head.text)
static void __head *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 16da4ac01597..473e60a12e2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -73,6 +73,26 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
/* Set up the stack for verify_cpu(), similar to initial_stack below */
leaq (__end_init_task - SIZEOF_PTREGS)(%rip), %rsp
+ /* Setup boot GDT descriptor and load boot GDT */
+ leaq boot_gdt(%rip), %rax
+ movq %rax, boot_gdt_descr+2(%rip)
+ lgdt boot_gdt_descr(%rip)
+
+ /* New GDT is live - reload data segment registers */
+ movl $__KERNEL_DS, %eax
+ movl %eax, %ds
+ movl %eax, %ss
+ movl %eax, %es
+
+ /* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
+ pushq $__KERNEL_CS
+ leaq .Lon_kernel_cs(%rip), %rax
+ pushq %rax
+ lretq
+
+.Lon_kernel_cs:
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 31/75] x86/head/64: Reload GDT after switch to virtual addresses
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 30/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 32/75] x86/head/64: Load segment registers earlier Joerg Roedel
` (44 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reload the GDT after switching to virtual addresses to make sure it will
not go away when the lower mappings are removed. This will also reload
the GDT for booting APs, which will need a working GDT too to handle #VC
exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 473e60a12e2f..87ea9f540608 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -164,6 +164,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
1:
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ /* Setup boot GDT descriptor and load boot GDT */
+ leaq boot_gdt(%rip), %rax
+ movq %rax, boot_gdt_descr+2(%rip)
+ lgdt boot_gdt_descr(%rip)
+
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
cpuid
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 32/75] x86/head/64: Load segment registers earlier
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 31/75] x86/head/64: Reload GDT after switch to virtual addresses Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 33/75] x86/head/64: Switch to initial stack earlier Joerg Roedel
` (43 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Make sure segments are properly set up before setting up an IDT and
doing anything that might cause a #VC exception. This is later needed
for early exception handling.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 52 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 87ea9f540608..61aa1e56fc9c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -169,6 +169,32 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
movq %rax, boot_gdt_descr+2(%rip)
lgdt boot_gdt_descr(%rip)
+ /* set up data segments */
+ xorl %eax,%eax
+ movl %eax,%ds
+ movl %eax,%ss
+ movl %eax,%es
+
+ /*
+ * We don't really need to load %fs or %gs, but load them anyway
+ * to kill any stale realmode selectors. This allows execution
+ * under VT hardware.
+ */
+ movl %eax,%fs
+ movl %eax,%gs
+
+ /* Set up %gs.
+ *
+ * The base of %gs always points to fixed_percpu_data. If the
+ * stack protector canary is enabled, it is located at %gs:40.
+ * Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses init data section until
+ * the per cpu areas are set up.
+ */
+ movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
+ movl initial_gs(%rip),%eax
+ movl initial_gs+4(%rip),%edx
+ wrmsr
+
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
cpuid
@@ -204,32 +230,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
*/
lgdt early_gdt_descr(%rip)
- /* set up data segments */
- xorl %eax,%eax
- movl %eax,%ds
- movl %eax,%ss
- movl %eax,%es
-
- /*
- * We don't really need to load %fs or %gs, but load them anyway
- * to kill any stale realmode selectors. This allows execution
- * under VT hardware.
- */
- movl %eax,%fs
- movl %eax,%gs
-
- /* Set up %gs.
- *
- * The base of %gs always points to fixed_percpu_data. If the
- * stack protector canary is enabled, it is located at %gs:40.
- * Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses init data section until
- * the per cpu areas are set up.
- */
- movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
- movl initial_gs(%rip),%eax
- movl initial_gs+4(%rip),%edx
- wrmsr
-
/* rsi is pointer to real mode structure with interesting info.
pass it to C */
movq %rsi, %rdi
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 33/75] x86/head/64: Switch to initial stack earlier
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 32/75] x86/head/64: Load segment registers earlier Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector Joerg Roedel
` (42 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Make sure there is a stack once the kernel runs from virual addresses.
At this stage any secondary CPU which boots will have lost its stack
because the kernel switched to a new page-table which does not map the
real-mode stack anymore.
This is needed for handling early #VC exceptions caused by instructions
like CPUID.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 61aa1e56fc9c..fcaa5dbd728a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
movl initial_gs+4(%rip),%edx
wrmsr
+ /*
+ * Setup a boot time stack - Any secondary CPU will have lost its stack
+ * by now because the cr3-switch above unmaps the real-mode stack
+ */
+ movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
+
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
cpuid
@@ -215,9 +221,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
/* Make changes effective */
movq %rax, %cr0
- /* Setup a boot time stack */
- movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
-
/* zero EFLAGS after setting rsp */
pushq $0
popfq
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 33/75] x86/head/64: Switch to initial stack earlier Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:34 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 35/75] x86/head/64: Load IDT earlier Joerg Roedel
` (41 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The code inserted by the stack protector does not work in the early
boot environment because it uses the GS segment, at least with memory
encryption enabled. Make sure the early code is compiled without this
feature enabled.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index e77261db2391..1b166b866059 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
endif
+# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
+nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
+
# If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
# Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
# boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:34 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 16:34 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, kvm,
Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev, Joerg Roedel,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:36PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> The code inserted by the stack protector does not work in the early
> boot environment because it uses the GS segment, at least with memory
> encryption enabled. Make sure the early code is compiled without this
> feature enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index e77261db2391..1b166b866059 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
> endif
>
> +# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
> +nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
> +CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
Recent refactoring[1] for stack protector suggests this should just
unconditionally be:
CFLAGS_head64.o += -fno-stack-protector
But otherwise, yeah, this should be fine here -- it's all early init
stuff.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200626185913.92890-1-masahiroy@kernel.org/
> +
> # If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
> # Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
> # boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
> --
> 2.27.0
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
2020-07-15 1:34 ` Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-15 16:34 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 16:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 06:34:24PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:36PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > +# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
> > +nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
> > +CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
>
> Recent refactoring[1] for stack protector suggests this should just
> unconditionally be:
>
> CFLAGS_head64.o += -fno-stack-protector
>
> But otherwise, yeah, this should be fine here -- it's all early init
> stuff.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Thanks, I am not sure this patch will be needed in the next version, as
I am currently rebasing to tip/master, which also made idt_descr static
in kernel/idt.c.
So with that I think I have to move the early IDT init functions to
kernel/idt.c too and setup %gs earlier in head_64.S to make
stack-protector happy.
The %gs setup actually needs to happen two times, one time when the
kernel still runs identity mapped and then again when it switched to
virtual addresses.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 35/75] x86/head/64: Load IDT earlier
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 36/75] x86/head/64: Move early exception dispatch to C code Joerg Roedel
` (40 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Load the IDT right after switching to virtual addresses in head_64.S
so that the kernel can handle #VC exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 84b645cc8bc9..19ccb1211004 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ void vsmp_init(void);
static inline void vsmp_init(void) { }
#endif
+
void setup_bios_corruption_check(void);
void early_platform_quirks(void);
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp);
extern unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void);
extern int early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address);
+extern void early_idt_setup_early_handler(unsigned long descr_addr, unsigned long physaddr);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID
extern void x86_intel_mid_early_setup(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 51059bfd4b99..3598c091ff24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -508,3 +508,21 @@ void __init x86_64_start_reservations(char *real_mode_data)
start_kernel();
}
+
+void __head early_idt_setup_early_handler(unsigned long descr_addr, unsigned long physaddr)
+{
+ struct desc_ptr *descr = (struct desc_ptr *)descr_addr;
+ gate_desc *idt = (gate_desc *)descr->address;
+ int i;
+
+ idt = fixup_pointer(idt, physaddr);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS; i++) {
+ struct idt_data data;
+ gate_desc desc;
+
+ init_idt_data(&data, i, early_idt_handler_array[i]);
+ idt_init_desc(&desc, &data);
+ native_write_idt_entry(idt, i, &desc);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index fcaa5dbd728a..8f9548071e84 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -105,6 +105,31 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
pushq %rsi
call __startup_64
+ /* Save return value */
+ pushq %rax
+
+ /*
+ * Load IDT with early handlers - needed for SEV-ES
+ * Do this here because this must only happen on the boot CPU
+ * and the code below is shared with secondary CPU bringup.
+ */
+
+ /* IDT descriptor with pointer to IDT table as first parameter */
+ leaq idt_descr(%rip), %rdi
+
+ /* Kernel _text offset as second parameter */
+ leaq _text(%rip), %rsi
+
+ /*
+ * Setup IDT with early entries - The entries already use virtual
+ * addresses, so the IDT can't be used until the kernel switched to
+ * virtual addresses too.
+ */
+ call early_idt_setup_early_handler
+
+ /* Restore __startup_64 return value*/
+ popq %rax
+ /* Restore pointer to real_mode_data */
popq %rsi
/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
@@ -201,6 +226,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
*/
movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
+ /* Load IDT */
+ lidt idt_descr(%rip)
+
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
cpuid
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 36/75] x86/head/64: Move early exception dispatch to C code
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 35/75] x86/head/64: Load IDT earlier Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 37/75] x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection Joerg Roedel
` (39 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Move the assembly coded dispatch between page-faults and all other
exceptions to C code to make it easier to maintain and extend.
Also change the return-type of early_make_pgtable() to bool and make it
static.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 11 +----------
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 76aa21e8128d..001b719a5e29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <asm-generic/pgtable_uffd.h>
extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
-int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+bool __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm);
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 19ccb1211004..5b3a9883ecc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ extern void reserve_standard_io_resources(void);
extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp);
extern unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void);
-extern int early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address);
extern void early_idt_setup_early_handler(unsigned long descr_addr, unsigned long physaddr);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 3598c091ff24..32080e34ba92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/extable.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
/*
* Manage page tables very early on.
@@ -316,7 +318,7 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
}
/* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
+bool __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
{
unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
@@ -326,7 +328,7 @@ int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ? */
if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
- return -1;
+ return false;
again:
pgd_p = &early_top_pgt[pgd_index(address)].pgd;
@@ -383,10 +385,10 @@ int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
}
pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
- return 0;
+ return true;
}
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+static bool __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
{
unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
pmdval_t pmd;
@@ -396,6 +398,15 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
}
+void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+{
+ if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_PF &&
+ early_make_pgtable(native_read_cr2()))
+ return;
+
+ early_fixup_exception(regs, trapnr);
+}
+
/* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized
yet. */
static void __init clear_bss(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 8f9548071e84..86473d49619d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -375,18 +375,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
- cmpq $14,%rsi /* Page fault? */
- jnz 10f
- GET_CR2_INTO(%rdi) /* can clobber %rax if pv */
- call early_make_pgtable
- andl %eax,%eax
- jz 20f /* All good */
-
-10:
movq %rsp,%rdi /* RDI = pt_regs; RSI is already trapnr */
- call early_fixup_exception
+ call do_early_exception
-20:
decl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 37/75] x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 36/75] x86/head/64: Move early exception dispatch to C code Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 38/75] x86/sev-es: Print SEV-ES info into kernel log Joerg Roedel
` (38 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add the sev_es_active function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled.
Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature
checking in the running code.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 9 ++++++++-
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 848ce43b9040..6f61bb93366a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
extern u64 sme_me_mask;
+extern u64 sev_status;
extern bool sev_enabled;
void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
+bool sev_es_active(void);
#define __bss_decrypted __attribute__((__section__(".bss..decrypted")))
@@ -71,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 2816eb01463f..cac329037777 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -451,7 +451,9 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB 0xc0010130
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT 1
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 4a781cf99e92..21be138ceef6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
* section is later cleared.
*/
u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
+u64 sev_status __section(.data) = 0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
@@ -347,7 +348,13 @@ bool sme_active(void)
bool sev_active(void)
{
- return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
+ return !!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
+}
+
+/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
+bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
+{
+ return !!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
}
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index e2b0e2ac07bb..68d75379e06a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
return;
+ /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */
+ sev_status = msr;
+
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
sme_me_mask = me_mask;
sev_enabled = true;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 38/75] x86/sev-es: Print SEV-ES info into kernel log
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 37/75] x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 39/75] x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image Joerg Roedel
` (37 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Refactor the message printed to the kernel log which indicates whether
SEV or SME is active to print a list of enabled encryption features.
This will scale better in the future when more memory encryption
features might be added. Also add SEV-ES to the list of features.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 21be138ceef6..cbf7935c873b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -408,6 +408,31 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end);
}
+static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
+{
+ pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
+
+ /* Secure Memory Encryption */
+ if (sme_active()) {
+ /*
+ * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
+ * features below.
+ */
+ pr_cont(" SME\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+ if (sev_active())
+ pr_cont(" SEV");
+
+ /* Encrypted Register State */
+ if (sev_es_active())
+ pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
+
+ pr_cont("\n");
+}
+
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
{
if (!sme_me_mask)
@@ -422,8 +447,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
if (sev_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
- pr_info("AMD %s active\n",
- sev_active() ? "Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)"
- : "Secure Memory Encryption (SME)");
+ print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 39/75] x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 38/75] x86/sev-es: Print SEV-ES info into kernel log Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 40/75] x86/sev-es: Setup early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
` (36 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Joerg Roedel, Mike Stunes,
Kees Cook, kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, virtualization,
Martin Radev, Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa,
Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Setup sev-es.c and include the code from the
pre-decompression stage to also build it into the image of the running
kernel. Temporarily add __maybe_unused annotations to avoid build
warnings until the functions get used.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 21 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 1b166b866059..81276033a80e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 59884926fae5..df6750aef3c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
* and is included directly into both code-bases.
*/
-static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
+static void __maybe_unused sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
{
u64 val = GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
}
-static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
+static bool __maybe_unused sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
{
u64 val;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
return true;
}
-static void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
+static void __maybe_unused vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
{
memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
}
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ static bool vc_decoding_needed(unsigned long exit_code)
exit_code <= SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP);
}
-static enum es_result vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
- struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long exit_code)
+static enum es_result __maybe_unused vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long exit_code)
{
enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ret;
}
-static void vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static void __maybe_unused vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->regs->ip += ctxt->insn.length;
}
@@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ static enum es_result vc_ioio_exitinfo(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u64 *exitinfo)
return ES_OK;
}
-static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static enum es_result __maybe_unused
+vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u64 exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
@@ -433,8 +434,8 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return ret;
}
-static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
- struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static enum es_result __maybe_unused vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0b698b653c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
+#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
+{
+ return native_read_msr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
+}
+
+static inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
+{
+ u32 low, high;
+
+ low = (u32)(val);
+ high = (u32)(val >> 32);
+
+ native_write_msr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, low, high);
+}
+
+static int vc_fetch_insn_kernel(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ return copy_from_kernel_nofault(buffer, (unsigned char *)ctxt->regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ char buffer[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+ enum es_result ret;
+ int res;
+
+ res = vc_fetch_insn_kernel(ctxt, buffer);
+ if (unlikely(res == -EFAULT)) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = ctxt->regs->ip;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ insn_init(&ctxt->insn, buffer, MAX_INSN_SIZE - res, 1);
+ insn_get_length(&ctxt->insn);
+
+ ret = ctxt->insn.immediate.got ? ES_OK : ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ char *dst, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ unsigned long error_code = X86_PF_PROT | X86_PF_WRITE;
+ char __user *target = (char __user *)dst;
+ u64 d8;
+ u32 d4;
+ u16 d2;
+ u8 d1;
+
+ switch (size) {
+ case 1:
+ memcpy(&d1, buf, 1);
+ if (put_user(d1, target))
+ goto fault;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ memcpy(&d2, buf, 2);
+ if (put_user(d2, target))
+ goto fault;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ memcpy(&d4, buf, 4);
+ if (put_user(d4, target))
+ goto fault;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ memcpy(&d8, buf, 8);
+ if (put_user(d8, target))
+ goto fault;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: Invalid size: %zu\n", __func__, size);
+ return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return ES_OK;
+
+fault:
+ if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
+ error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
+
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = error_code;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = (unsigned long)dst;
+
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ char *src, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ unsigned long error_code = X86_PF_PROT;
+ char __user *s = (char __user *)src;
+ u64 d8;
+ u32 d4;
+ u16 d2;
+ u8 d1;
+
+ switch (size) {
+ case 1:
+ if (get_user(d1, s))
+ goto fault;
+ memcpy(buf, &d1, 1);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (get_user(d2, s))
+ goto fault;
+ memcpy(buf, &d2, 2);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ if (get_user(d4, s))
+ goto fault;
+ memcpy(buf, &d4, 4);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ if (get_user(d8, s))
+ goto fault;
+ memcpy(buf, &d8, 8);
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: Invalid size: %zu\n", __func__, size);
+ return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return ES_OK;
+
+fault:
+ if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
+ error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
+
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = error_code;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = (unsigned long)src;
+
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+}
+
+/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
+#include "sev-es-shared.c"
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 40/75] x86/sev-es: Setup early #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 39/75] x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 41/75] x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB based boot " Joerg Roedel
` (35 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Setup an early handler for #VC exceptions. There is no GHCB mapped
yet, so just re-use the vc_no_ghcb_handler. It can only handle CPUID
exit-codes, but that should be enough to get the kernel through
verify_cpu() and __startup_64() until it runs on virtual addresses.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 03b7c4ca425a..e6a029b76b3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ extern int sysenter_setup(void);
/* Defined in head.S */
extern struct desc_ptr early_gdt_descr;
+extern struct desc_ptr early_idt_descr;
extern void switch_to_new_gdt(int);
extern void load_direct_gdt(int);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index 7c0807b84546..ec0e112a742b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -73,4 +73,7 @@ static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
return (val & mask);
}
+/* Early IDT entry points for #VC handler */
+extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 32080e34ba92..9ea8a0437b66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/extable.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
/*
* Manage page tables very early on.
@@ -537,3 +538,33 @@ void __head early_idt_setup_early_handler(unsigned long descr_addr, unsigned lon
native_write_idt_entry(idt, i, &desc);
}
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+static void __head set_early_idt_handler(gate_desc *idt, int n, void *handler)
+{
+ struct idt_data data;
+ gate_desc desc;
+
+ init_idt_data(&data, n, handler);
+ idt_init_desc(&desc, &data);
+ native_write_idt_entry(idt, n, &desc);
+}
+#endif
+
+void __head early_idt_setup(struct desc_ptr *descr, unsigned long physbase)
+{
+ gate_desc *idt = (gate_desc *)descr->address;
+ void __maybe_unused *handler;
+
+ idt = fixup_pointer(idt, physbase);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ /* VMM Communication Exception */
+ handler = fixup_pointer(vc_no_ghcb, physbase);
+ set_early_idt_handler(idt, X86_TRAP_VC, handler);
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize IDT descriptor and load IDT */
+ early_idt_descr.address = (unsigned long)idt;
+ native_load_idt(&early_idt_descr);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 86473d49619d..3bd4c36d1d36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -93,6 +93,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
.Lon_kernel_cs:
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ /* Setup IDT - Needed for SEV-ES */
+ pushq %rsi
+ /* early_idt_setup - first parameter */
+ leaq idt_descr(%rip), %rdi
+ /* early_idt_setup - second parameter */
+ leaq _text(%rip), %rsi
+ call early_idt_setup
+ popq %rsi
+
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
@@ -382,6 +391,33 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+/*
+ * VC Exception handler used during very early boot. The
+ * early_idt_handler_array can't be used because it returns via the
+ * paravirtualized INTERRUPT_RETURN and pv-ops don't work that early.
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
+ UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
+
+ /* Build pt_regs */
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
+
+ /* Call C handler */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
+ call do_vc_no_ghcb
+
+ /* Unwind pt_regs */
+ POP_REGS
+
+ /* Remove Error Code */
+ addq $8, %rsp
+
+ /* Pure iret required here - don't use INTERRUPT_RETURN */
+ iretq
+SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
+#endif
#define SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name) \
SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -523,6 +559,9 @@ SYM_DATA_END(level1_fixmap_pgt)
SYM_DATA(early_gdt_descr, .word GDT_ENTRIES*8-1)
SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
+SYM_DATA(early_idt_descr, .word NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS * 16)
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_idt_descr_base, .quad 0)
+
.align 16
/* This must match the first entry in level2_kernel_pgt */
SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 41/75] x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB based boot #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 40/75] x86/sev-es: Setup early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 42/75] x86/sev-es: Setup per-cpu GHCBs for the runtime handler Joerg Roedel
` (34 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add the infrastructure to handle #VC exceptions when the kernel runs
on virtual addresses and has a GHCB mapped. This handler will be used
until the runtime #VC handler takes over.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 14 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 1 +
6 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
index 6669164abadc..5b648066504c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@
#define NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS 32
/* Bitmask of exception vectors which push an error code on the stack: */
-#define EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK 0x00027d00
+#define EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK 0x20027d00
#define GDT_SIZE (GDT_ENTRIES*8)
#define GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES 3
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index ec0e112a742b..824e9e6b067c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -75,5 +75,6 @@ static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
/* Early IDT entry points for #VC handler */
extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
+extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9ea8a0437b66..23d492091f3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
early_make_pgtable(native_read_cr2()))
return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_VC &&
+ handle_vc_boot_ghcb(regs))
+ return;
+#endif
+
early_fixup_exception(regs, trapnr);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index df6750aef3c8..4153b1b1048f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
* and is included directly into both code-bases.
*/
-static void __maybe_unused sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
+static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
{
u64 val = GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void __maybe_unused sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
}
-static bool __maybe_unused sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
+static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
{
u64 val;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static bool __maybe_unused sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
return true;
}
-static void __maybe_unused vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
+static void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
{
memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
}
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ static bool vc_decoding_needed(unsigned long exit_code)
exit_code <= SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP);
}
-static enum es_result __maybe_unused vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
- struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long exit_code)
+static enum es_result vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long exit_code)
{
enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static enum es_result __maybe_unused vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ret;
}
-static void __maybe_unused vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static void vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->regs->ip += ctxt->insn.length;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 0b698b653c0b..bb3e702a71eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
* Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
*/
+#include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
@@ -18,6 +20,18 @@
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
+/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
+static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/*
+ * Needs to be in the .data section because we need it NULL before bss is
+ * cleared
+ */
+static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
+
+/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
+void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
+
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
return native_read_msr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
@@ -161,3 +175,105 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-es-shared.c"
+
+/*
+ * This function runs on the first #VC exception after the kernel
+ * switched to virtual addresses.
+ */
+static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
+{
+ /* First make sure the hypervisor talks a supported protocol. */
+ if (!sev_es_negotiate_protocol())
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the boot_ghcb. The first exception comes in before the bss
+ * section is cleared.
+ */
+ memset(&boot_ghcb_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Alright - Make the boot-ghcb public */
+ boot_ghcb = &boot_ghcb_page;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init vc_early_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector;
+
+ if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_PF)
+ native_write_cr2(ctxt->fi.cr2);
+
+ ctxt->regs->orig_ax = ctxt->fi.error_code;
+ do_early_exception(ctxt->regs, trapnr);
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ enum es_result result;
+
+ switch (exit_code) {
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Unexpected #VC exception
+ */
+ result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_code = regs->orig_ax;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result result;
+
+ /* Do initial setup or terminate the guest */
+ if (unlikely(boot_ghcb == NULL && !sev_es_setup_ghcb()))
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(boot_ghcb);
+
+ result = vc_init_em_ctxt(&ctxt, regs, exit_code);
+ if (result == ES_OK)
+ result = vc_handle_exitcode(&ctxt, boot_ghcb, exit_code);
+
+ /* Done - now check the result */
+ switch (result) {
+ case ES_OK:
+ vc_finish_insn(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_UNSUPPORTED:
+ early_printk("PANIC: Unsupported exit-code 0x%02lx in early #VC exception (IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_VMM_ERROR:
+ early_printk("PANIC: Failure in communication with VMM (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_DECODE_FAILED:
+ early_printk("PANIC: Failed to decode instruction (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_EXCEPTION:
+ vc_early_forward_exception(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_RETRY:
+ /* Nothing to do */
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+fail:
+ show_regs(regs);
+
+ while (true)
+ halt();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 1d6cb07f4f86..3966749d07ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/kdebug.h>
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 42/75] x86/sev-es: Setup per-cpu GHCBs for the runtime handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 41/75] x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB based boot " Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 43/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and Map stacks for #VC handler Joerg Roedel
` (33 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The runtime handler needs a GHCB per CPU. Set them up and map them
unencrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 3 ++
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6f61bb93366a..af3e58aa1603 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
+void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index bb3e702a71eb..734afaee378d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
*/
#include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
@@ -29,6 +34,13 @@ static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
*/
static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
+/* #VC handler runtime per-cpu data */
+struct sev_es_runtime_data {
+ struct ghcb ghcb_page;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
+
/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
@@ -198,6 +210,48 @@ static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
return true;
}
+static void __init sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(int cpu)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+
+ data = memblock_alloc(sizeof(*data), PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!data)
+ panic("Can't allocate SEV-ES runtime data");
+
+ per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu) = data;
+}
+
+static void __init sev_es_init_ghcb(int cpu)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ int err;
+
+ data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
+
+ err = early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page,
+ sizeof(data->ghcb_page));
+ if (err)
+ panic("Can not map GHCBs unencrypted");
+
+ memset(&data->ghcb_page, 0, sizeof(data->ghcb_page));
+}
+
+void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON((offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, ghcb_page) % PAGE_SIZE) != 0);
+
+ if (!sev_es_active())
+ return;
+
+ /* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(cpu);
+ sev_es_init_ghcb(cpu);
+ }
+}
+
static void __init vc_early_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index b038695f36c5..907ac2b378a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -1081,6 +1081,9 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
/* Init cpu_entry_area before IST entries are set up */
setup_cpu_entry_areas();
+ /* Init GHCB memory pages when running as an SEV-ES guest */
+ sev_es_init_vc_handling();
+
idt_setup_traps();
/*
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 43/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and Map stacks for #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 42/75] x86/sev-es: Setup per-cpu GHCBs for the runtime handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 44/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and setup IST entry for #VC Joerg Roedel
` (32 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Allocate and map an IST stack and a fall-back stack for the #VC handler.
The memory for the stacks is allocated only when SEV-ES is active.
The #VC handler needs to use an IST stack because it could be raised
from kernel space with unsafe stack, e.g. in the SYSCALL entry path.
Since the #VC exception can be nested, the #VC handler switches back to
the interrupted stack when entered from kernel space. If switching back
is not possible the fall-back stack will be used.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 8 +++++--
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 8902fdb7de13..f87e4c0c16f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -11,25 +11,29 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
-#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize) \
- char DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
- char NMI_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
- char DB_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
- char MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
- char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \
+#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size) \
+ char DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
+ char NMI_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
+ char DB_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
+ char MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
+ char VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
+ char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
+ char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
+ char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \
/* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
struct exception_stacks {
- ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0)
+ ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0, 0)
};
/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
struct cea_exception_stacks {
- ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE)
+ ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
};
/*
@@ -40,6 +44,8 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {
ESTACK_NMI,
ESTACK_DB,
ESTACK_MCE,
+ ESTACK_VC,
+ ESTACK_VC2,
N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
};
@@ -139,4 +145,7 @@ static inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu)
#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va(name) \
CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
+#define __this_cpu_ist_bot_va(name) \
+ CEA_ESTACK_BOT(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 4a94d38cd141..c49cf594714b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -24,11 +24,13 @@ static const char * const exception_stack_names[] = {
[ ESTACK_NMI ] = "NMI",
[ ESTACK_DB ] = "#DB",
[ ESTACK_MCE ] = "#MC",
+ [ ESTACK_VC ] = "#VC",
+ [ ESTACK_VC2 ] = "#VC2",
};
const char *stack_type_name(enum stack_type type)
{
- BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 4);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
if (type == STACK_TYPE_IRQ)
return "IRQ";
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES] ____cacheline_aligned = {
EPAGERANGE(NMI),
EPAGERANGE(DB),
EPAGERANGE(MCE),
+ EPAGERANGE(VC),
+ EPAGERANGE(VC2),
};
static bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
@@ -88,7 +92,7 @@ static bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
struct pt_regs *regs;
unsigned int k;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 4);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
begin = (unsigned long)__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 734afaee378d..64002d86a237 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
@@ -37,10 +38,41 @@ static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
/* #VC handler runtime per-cpu data */
struct sev_es_runtime_data {
struct ghcb ghcb_page;
+
+ /* Physical storage for the per-cpu IST stack of the #VC handler */
+ char ist_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Physical storage for the per-cpu fall-back stack of the #VC handler.
+ * The fall-back stack is used when it is not safe to switch back to the
+ * interrupted stack in the #VC entry code.
+ */
+ char fallback_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
+static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct cpu_entry_area *cea;
+ unsigned long vaddr;
+ phys_addr_t pa;
+
+ data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
+ cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
+
+ /* Map #VC IST stack */
+ vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC);
+ pa = __pa(data->ist_stack);
+ cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+ /* Map VC fall-back stack */
+ vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2);
+ pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack);
+ cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
+}
+
/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
@@ -249,6 +281,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(cpu);
sev_es_init_ghcb(cpu);
+ sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(cpu);
}
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 44/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and setup IST entry for #VC
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 43/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and Map stacks for #VC handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler Joerg Roedel
` (31 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Allocate IST entry number 4 for the #VC handler and setup it up in the
per-cpu TSS. This will setup the TSS for all CPUs before they even
start, so that the boot-code for secondary CPUs can handle #VC
exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 288b065955b7..d0c6c10c18a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define IST_INDEX_NMI 1
#define IST_INDEX_DB 2
#define IST_INDEX_MCE 3
+#define IST_INDEX_VC 4
/*
* Set __PAGE_OFFSET to the most negative possible address +
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 64002d86a237..d415368f16ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -56,11 +56,13 @@ static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
struct cpu_entry_area *cea;
+ struct tss_struct *tss;
unsigned long vaddr;
phys_addr_t pa;
data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
+ tss = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
/* Map #VC IST stack */
vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC);
@@ -71,6 +73,9 @@ static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2);
pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack);
cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+ /* Set IST entry in TSS */
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, VC);
}
/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 44/75] x86/sev-es: Allocate and setup IST entry for #VC Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 9:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 46/75] x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info() Joerg Roedel
` (30 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When an NMI hits in the #VC handler entry code before it switched to
another stack, any subsequent #VC exception in the NMI code-path will
overwrite the interrupted #VC handlers stack.
Make sure this doesn't happen by explicitly adjusting the #VC IST entry
in the NMI handler for the time in can cause #VC exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 8 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 6 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index 824e9e6b067c..330140a189be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -77,4 +77,12 @@ static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+extern void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void sev_es_ist_exit(void);
+#else
+static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
+static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index d7c5e44b26f7..d94a5bb0bebc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/nmi.h>
@@ -489,6 +490,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());
nmi_restart:
+ /* Needs to happen before DR7 is accessed */
+ sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
+
this_cpu_write(nmi_dr7, local_db_save());
nmi_enter();
@@ -502,6 +506,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
local_db_restore(this_cpu_read(nmi_dr7));
+ sev_es_ist_exit();
+
if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2) != read_cr2()))
write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index d415368f16ec..2a7cc72db1d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -78,6 +78,67 @@ static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, VC);
}
+static bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp)
+{
+ return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bot_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function handles the case when an NMI or an NMI-like exception
+ * like #DB is raised in the #VC exception handler entry code. In this
+ * case the IST entry for VC must be adjusted, so that any subsequent VC
+ * exception will not overwrite the stack contents of the interrupted VC
+ * handler.
+ *
+ * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
+ * unconditionally back-adjusted in sev_es_nmi_exit(). Otherwise a
+ * nested nmi_exit() call (#VC->NMI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry
+ * too early.
+ */
+void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
+ unsigned long *p;
+
+ if (!sev_es_active())
+ return;
+
+ /* Read old IST entry */
+ old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
+
+ /* Make room on the IST stack */
+ if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp))
+ new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist);
+ else
+ new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);
+
+ /* Store old IST entry */
+ p = (unsigned long *)new_ist;
+ *p = old_ist;
+
+ /* Set new IST entry */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
+}
+
+void noinstr sev_es_ist_exit(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ist;
+ unsigned long *p;
+
+ if (!sev_es_active())
+ return;
+
+ /* Read IST entry */
+ ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
+ p = (unsigned long *)ist;
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *p);
+}
+
/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 907ac2b378a8..59d17e541df9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <asm/umip.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -733,6 +734,7 @@ static bool is_sysenter_singlestep(struct pt_regs *regs)
static __always_inline void debug_enter(unsigned long *dr6, unsigned long *dr7)
{
+
/*
* Disable breakpoints during exception handling; recursive exceptions
* are exceedingly 'fun'.
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 9:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 10:26 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 9:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:47PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -489,6 +490,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
> this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());
> nmi_restart:
>
> + /* Needs to happen before DR7 is accessed */
> + sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
> +
> this_cpu_write(nmi_dr7, local_db_save());
>
> nmi_enter();
> @@ -502,6 +506,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
>
> local_db_restore(this_cpu_read(nmi_dr7));
>
> + sev_es_ist_exit();
> +
> if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2) != read_cr2()))
> write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
> if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
I really hate all this #VC stuff :-(
So the above will make the NMI do 4 unconditional extra CALL+RET, a LOAD
(which will potentially miss) and a compare and branch.
How's that a win for normal people? Can we please turn all these
sev_es_*() hooks into something like:
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enabled_key);
static __always_inline void sev_es_foo()
{
if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enabled_key))
__sev_es_foo();
}
So that normal people will only see an extra NOP?
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> index d415368f16ec..2a7cc72db1d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,67 @@ static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
> tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, VC);
> }
>
> +static bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp)
noinstr or __always_inline
> +{
> + return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bot_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This function handles the case when an NMI or an NMI-like exception
> + * like #DB is raised in the #VC exception handler entry code. In this
I've yet to find you handle the NMI-like cases..
> + * case the IST entry for VC must be adjusted, so that any subsequent VC
> + * exception will not overwrite the stack contents of the interrupted VC
> + * handler.
> + *
> + * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
> + * unconditionally back-adjusted in sev_es_nmi_exit(). Otherwise a
> + * nested nmi_exit() call (#VC->NMI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry
> + * too early.
Is this comment accurate, I cannot find the patch touching
nmi_enter/exit()?
> + */
> +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
> + unsigned long *p;
> +
> + if (!sev_es_active())
> + return;
> +
> + /* Read old IST entry */
> + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
> +
> + /* Make room on the IST stack */
> + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp))
> + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist);
> + else
> + new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);
> +
> + /* Store old IST entry */
> + p = (unsigned long *)new_ist;
> + *p = old_ist;
> +
> + /* Set new IST entry */
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
> +}
> +
> +void noinstr sev_es_ist_exit(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long ist;
> + unsigned long *p;
> +
> + if (!sev_es_active())
> + return;
> +
> + /* Read IST entry */
> + ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
> + return;
> +
> + /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
> + p = (unsigned long *)ist;
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *p);
> +}
That's pretty disguisting :-(
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
2020-07-15 9:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 10:26 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 10:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 10:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:47:02AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:47PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enabled_key);
>
> static __always_inline void sev_es_foo()
> {
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enabled_key))
> __sev_es_foo();
> }
>
> So that normal people will only see an extra NOP?
Yes, that is a good idea, I will use a static key for these cases.
> > +static bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp)
>
> noinstr or __always_inline
Will add __always_inline, thanks.
> > +/*
> > + * This function handles the case when an NMI or an NMI-like exception
> > + * like #DB is raised in the #VC exception handler entry code. In this
>
> I've yet to find you handle the NMI-like cases..
The comment is not 100% accurate anymore, I will update it. Initially
#DB was an NMI-like case, but I figured that with .text.noinstr and the
way the #VC entry code switches stacks, there is no #DB special handling
necessary anymore.
> > + * case the IST entry for VC must be adjusted, so that any subsequent VC
> > + * exception will not overwrite the stack contents of the interrupted VC
> > + * handler.
> > + *
> > + * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
> > + * unconditionally back-adjusted in sev_es_nmi_exit(). Otherwise a
> > + * nested nmi_exit() call (#VC->NMI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry
> > + * too early.
>
> Is this comment accurate, I cannot find the patch touching
> nmi_enter/exit()?
Right, will update that too. I had the sev-es NMI stack adjustment in
nmi_enter/exit first, but needed to move it out because the possible DR7
access needs the #VC stack already adjusted.
> > + */
> > +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
> > + unsigned long *p;
> > +
> > + if (!sev_es_active())
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /* Read old IST entry */
> > + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
> > +
> > + /* Make room on the IST stack */
> > + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp))
> > + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist);
> > + else
> > + new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);
> > +
> > + /* Store old IST entry */
> > + p = (unsigned long *)new_ist;
> > + *p = old_ist;
> > +
> > + /* Set new IST entry */
> > + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void noinstr sev_es_ist_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long ist;
> > + unsigned long *p;
> > +
> > + if (!sev_es_active())
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /* Read IST entry */
> > + ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
> > +
> > + if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
> > + p = (unsigned long *)ist;
> > + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *p);
> > +}
>
> That's pretty disguisting :-(
Yeah, but its needed because ... IST :(
I am open for suggestions on how to make it less disgusting. Or maybe
you like it more if you think of it as a software implementation of what
hardware should actually do to make IST less painful.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
2020-07-15 10:26 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 10:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 10:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 12:26:53PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:47:02AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > That's pretty disguisting :-(
>
> Yeah, but its needed because ... IST :(
> I am open for suggestions on how to make it less disgusting. Or maybe
> you like it more if you think of it as a software implementation of what
> hardware should actually do to make IST less painful.
No bright ideas, sadly..
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 46/75] x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info()
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 47/75] x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler Joerg Roedel
` (29 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The get_stack_info functionality is needed in the entry code for the #VC
exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 7 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
index 5ae5a68e469d..49600643faba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ bool in_entry_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info);
int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
struct stack_info *info, unsigned long *visit_mask);
+bool get_stack_info_noinstr(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
+ struct stack_info *info);
const char *stack_type_name(enum stack_type type);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index b037cfa7c0c5..df9757699485 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ static int die_counter;
static struct pt_regs exec_summary_regs;
-bool in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
- struct stack_info *info)
+bool noinstr in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
+ struct stack_info *info)
{
unsigned long *begin = task_stack_page(task);
unsigned long *end = task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE;
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ bool in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
return true;
}
-bool in_entry_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
+/* Called from get_stack_info_noinstr - so must be noinstr too */
+bool noinstr in_entry_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
{
struct entry_stack *ss = cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id());
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index c49cf594714b..5a85730eb0ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES] ____cacheline_aligned = {
EPAGERANGE(VC2),
};
-static bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
+static bool __always_inline in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
{
unsigned long begin, end, stk = (unsigned long)stack;
const struct estack_pages *ep;
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
return true;
}
-static bool in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
+static bool __always_inline in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
{
unsigned long *end = (unsigned long *)this_cpu_read(hardirq_stack_ptr);
unsigned long *begin = end - (IRQ_STACK_SIZE / sizeof(long));
@@ -151,32 +151,38 @@ static bool in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
return true;
}
-int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
- struct stack_info *info, unsigned long *visit_mask)
+bool noinstr get_stack_info_noinstr(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
+ struct stack_info *info)
{
- if (!stack)
- goto unknown;
-
- task = task ? : current;
-
if (in_task_stack(stack, task, info))
- goto recursion_check;
+ return true;
if (task != current)
- goto unknown;
+ return false;
if (in_exception_stack(stack, info))
- goto recursion_check;
+ return true;
if (in_irq_stack(stack, info))
- goto recursion_check;
+ return true;
if (in_entry_stack(stack, info))
- goto recursion_check;
+ return true;
- goto unknown;
+ return false;
+}
+
+int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
+ struct stack_info *info, unsigned long *visit_mask)
+{
+ task = task ? : current;
+
+ if (!stack)
+ goto unknown;
+
+ if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, task, info))
+ goto unknown;
-recursion_check:
/*
* Make sure we don't iterate through any given stack more than once.
* If it comes up a second time then there's something wrong going on:
@@ -196,4 +202,5 @@ int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
unknown:
info->type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
return -EINVAL;
+
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 770b613790b3..f5e1e60c9095 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks*, cea_exception_stacks);
DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct doublefault_stack, doublefault_stack);
#endif
-struct cpu_entry_area *get_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
+/* Is called from entry code, so must be noinstr */
+noinstr struct cpu_entry_area *get_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
{
unsigned long va = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU + cpu * CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area) % PAGE_SIZE != 0);
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 47/75] x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 46/75] x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info() Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 48/75] x86/sev-es: Add Runtime #VC Exception Handler Joerg Roedel
` (28 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The #VC handler needs special entry code because:
1. It runs on an IST stack
2. It needs to be able to handle nested #VC exceptions
To make this work the entry code is implemented to pretend it doesn't
use an IST stack. When entered from user-mode or early SYSCALL entry
path it switches to the task stack, if entered from kernel-mode it
tries to switch back to the previous stack in the IRET frame.
The stack found in the IRET frame is validated first, and if it is not
safe to use it for the #VC handler, the code will switch to a
fall-back stack (the #VC2 IST stack). From there it can cause nested
exceptions again.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 175 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d2a00c97e53f..4168d9cd95c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64)
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2) /* pt_regs->sp */
@@ -448,6 +450,82 @@ _ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
.endm
+/**
+ * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
+ * @vector: Vector number
+ * @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point
+ * @cfunc: C function to be called
+ *
+ * The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for #VC. The #VC handler
+ * runs on an IST stack and needs to be able to cause nested #VC exceptions.
+ *
+ * To make this work the #VC entry code tries its best to pretend it doesn't use
+ * an IST stack by switching to the task stack if coming from user-space (which
+ * includes early SYSCALL entry path) or back to the stack in the IRET frame if
+ * entered from kernel-mode.
+ *
+ * If entered from kernel-mode the return stack is validated first, and if it is
+ * not safe to use (e.g. because it points to the entry stack) the #VC handler
+ * will switch to a fall-back stack (VC2) and call a special handler function.
+ *
+ * The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to extend it in the
+ * future for the #HV exception.
+ */
+.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc
+SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
+ UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
+ ASM_CLAC
+
+ /*
+ * If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as
+ * a normal entry.
+ */
+ testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+ jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
+
+ /*
+ * paranoid_entry returns SWAPGS flag for paranoid_exit in EBX.
+ * EBX == 0 -> SWAPGS, EBX == 1 -> no SWAPGS
+ */
+ call paranoid_entry
+
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
+ /*
+ * Switch off the IST stack to make it free for nested exceptions. The
+ * vc_switch_off_ist() function will switch back to the interrupted
+ * stack if it is safe to do so. If not it switches to the VC fall-back
+ * stack.
+ */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
+ call vc_switch_off_ist
+ movq %rax, %rsp /* Switch to new stack */
+
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
+ /* Update pt_regs */
+ movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/
+ movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
+
+ movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
+
+ call \cfunc
+
+ /*
+ * No need to switch back to the IST stack. The current stack is either
+ * identical to the stack in the IRET frame or the VC fall-back stack,
+ * so it is definitly mapped even with PTI enabled.
+ */
+ jmp paranoid_exit
+
+ /* Switch to the regular task stack */
+.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
+ idtentry_body safe_stack_\cfunc, has_error_code=1
+
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
+SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
+.endm
+
/*
* Double fault entry. Straight paranoid. No checks from which context
* this comes because for the espfix induced #DF this would do the wrong
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index eeac6dc2adaa..c38494b2bb54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -312,6 +312,18 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(vector, func); \
__visible void noist_##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
+/**
+ * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC - Declare functions for the VC entry point
+ * @vector: Vector number (ignored for C)
+ * @func: Function name of the entry point
+ *
+ * Maps to DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE, but declares also the
+ * safe_stack C handler.
+ */
+#define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(vector, func) \
+ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(vector, func); \
+ __visible noinstr void safe_stack_##func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+
/**
* DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IST - Emit code for IST entry points
* @func: Function name of the entry point
@@ -351,6 +363,35 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DF(func) \
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(func)
+/**
+ * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK - Emit code for VMM communication handler
+ which runs on a safe stack.
+ * @func: Function name of the entry point
+ *
+ * Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE
+ */
+#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(func) \
+ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(safe_stack_##func)
+
+/**
+ * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_IST - Emit code for VMM communication handler
+ which runs on the VC fall-back stack
+ * @func: Function name of the entry point
+ *
+ * Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE
+ */
+#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_IST(func) \
+ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(ist_##func)
+
+/**
+ * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC - Emit code for VMM communication handler
+ * @func: Function name of the entry point
+ *
+ * Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE
+ */
+#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC(func) \
+ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(func)
+
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/**
@@ -437,6 +478,9 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \
# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(vector, func) \
DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
+# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(vector, func) \
+ idtentry_vc vector asm_##func func
+
#else
# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_MCE(vector, func) \
DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
index 6e81788a30c1..40f1f0cb73d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ void syscall_init(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
void entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
+void entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack(void);
long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 6a308355ea29..1b86bb3abc56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs);
asmlinkage __visible notrace
struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
void __init trap_init(void);
+asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 59d17e541df9..c43b12f3f339 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/text-patching.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -676,6 +677,56 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
return regs;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs)
+{
+ unsigned long sp, *stack;
+ struct stack_info info;
+ struct pt_regs *regs;
+
+ /*
+ * In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't
+ * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack
+ */
+ if (eregs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64 &&
+ eregs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack) {
+ sp = this_cpu_read(cpu_current_top_of_stack);
+ goto sync;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * From here on the the RSP value is trusted - more RSP sanity checks
+ * need to happen above.
+ *
+ * Check whether entry happened from a safe stack.
+ */
+ sp = eregs->sp;
+ stack = (unsigned long *)sp;
+ get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't sync to entry stack or other unknown stacks - use the fall-back
+ * stack instead.
+ */
+ if (info.type == STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN || info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY ||
+ info.type >= STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST)
+ sp = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2);
+
+sync:
+ /*
+ * Found a safe stack - switch to it as if the entry didn't happen via
+ * IST stack. The code below only copies pt_regs, the real switch happens
+ * in assembly code.
+ */
+ sp = ALIGN_DOWN(sp, 8) - sizeof(*regs);
+
+ regs = (struct pt_regs *)sp;
+ *regs = *eregs;
+
+ return regs;
+}
+#endif
+
struct bad_iret_stack {
void *error_entry_ret;
struct pt_regs regs;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 48/75] x86/sev-es: Add Runtime #VC Exception Handler
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 47/75] x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 49/75] x86/sev-es: Wire up existing #VC exit-code handlers Joerg Roedel
` (27 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Add the handlers for #VC exceptions invoked at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 11 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 231 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index c38494b2bb54..1e25c7b5d5e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -614,6 +614,11 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_DB, xenpv_exc_debug);
/* #DF */
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_DF(X86_TRAP_DF, exc_double_fault);
+/* #VC */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC, exc_vmm_communication);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_hypervisor_callback);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index d3f0c8133300..f5242c6b5a43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -229,11 +229,14 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data early_pf_idts[] = {
* cpu_init() when the TSS has been initialized.
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data ist_idts[] = {
- ISTG(X86_TRAP_DB, asm_exc_debug, IST_INDEX_DB),
- ISTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, asm_exc_nmi, IST_INDEX_NMI),
- ISTG(X86_TRAP_DF, asm_exc_double_fault, IST_INDEX_DF),
+ ISTG(X86_TRAP_DB, asm_exc_debug, IST_INDEX_DB),
+ ISTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, asm_exc_nmi, IST_INDEX_NMI),
+ ISTG(X86_TRAP_DF, asm_exc_double_fault, IST_INDEX_DF),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
- ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),
+ ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ ISTG(X86_TRAP_VC, asm_exc_vmm_communication, IST_INDEX_VC),
#endif
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 2a7cc72db1d5..156914d8e103 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@
* Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-ES: " fmt
+
#include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -22,8 +25,7 @@
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
-#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
@@ -48,10 +50,42 @@ struct sev_es_runtime_data {
* interrupted stack in the #VC entry code.
*/
char fallback_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve one page per CPU as backup storage for the unencrypted GHCB.
+ * It is needed when an NMI happens while the #VC handler uses the real
+ * GHCB, and the NMI handler itself is causing another #VC exception. In
+ * that case the GHCB content of the first handler needs to be backed up
+ * and restored.
+ */
+ struct ghcb backup_ghcb;
+
+ /*
+ * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions.
+ * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to
+ * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe
+ * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write.
+ *
+ * This is necessary for example in the #VC->NMI->#VC case when the NMI
+ * happens while the first #VC handler uses the GHCB. When the NMI code
+ * raises a second #VC handler it might overwrite the contents of the
+ * GHCB written by the first handler. To avoid this the content of the
+ * GHCB is saved and restored when the GHCB is detected to be in use
+ * already.
+ */
+ bool ghcb_active;
+ bool backup_ghcb_active;
+};
+
+struct ghcb_state {
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
+/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
+void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
+
static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -139,8 +173,52 @@ void noinstr sev_es_ist_exit(void)
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *p);
}
-/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
-void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
+static __always_inline struct ghcb *sev_es_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+ /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+ if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+ state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+ /* Backup GHCB content */
+ *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+ } else {
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ data->ghcb_active = true;
+ }
+
+ return ghcb;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void sev_es_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (state->ghcb) {
+ /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
+ *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ } else {
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ }
+}
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
@@ -332,6 +410,9 @@ static void __init sev_es_init_ghcb(int cpu)
panic("Can not map GHCBs unencrypted");
memset(&data->ghcb_page, 0, sizeof(data->ghcb_page));
+
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
}
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
@@ -379,6 +460,148 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return result;
}
+static __always_inline void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ long error_code = ctxt->fi.error_code;
+ int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector;
+
+ ctxt->regs->orig_ax = ctxt->fi.error_code;
+
+ switch (trapnr) {
+ case X86_TRAP_GP:
+ exc_general_protection(ctxt->regs, error_code);
+ break;
+ case X86_TRAP_UD:
+ exc_invalid_op(ctxt->regs);
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_emerg("Unsupported exception in #VC instruction emulation - can't continue\n");
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool on_vc_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)regs;
+
+ return (sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bot_va(VC2) && sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2));
+}
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result result;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ /*
+ * This is invoked through an interrupt gate, so IRQs are disabled. The
+ * code below might walk page-tables for user or kernel addresses, so
+ * keep the IRQs disabled to protect us against concurrent TLB flushes.
+ */
+
+ ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
+ if (!ghcb) {
+ /*
+ * Mark GHCBs inactive so that panic() is able to print the
+ * message.
+ */
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+ panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+ }
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ result = vc_init_em_ctxt(&ctxt, regs, error_code);
+
+ if (result == ES_OK)
+ result = vc_handle_exitcode(&ctxt, ghcb, error_code);
+
+ sev_es_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ /* Done - now check the result */
+ switch (result) {
+ case ES_OK:
+ vc_finish_insn(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_UNSUPPORTED:
+ pr_err_ratelimited("Unsupported exit-code 0x%02lx in early #VC exception (IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ error_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_VMM_ERROR:
+ pr_err_ratelimited("Failure in communication with VMM (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ error_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_DECODE_FAILED:
+ pr_err_ratelimited("Failed to decode instruction (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ error_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_EXCEPTION:
+ vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_RETRY:
+ /* Nothing to do */
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_emerg("Unknown result in %s():%d\n", __func__, result);
+ /*
+ * Emulating the instruction which caused the #VC exception
+ * failed - can't continue so print debug information
+ */
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return;
+
+fail:
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ /*
+ * Do not kill the machine if user-space triggered the
+ * exception. Send SIGBUS instead and let user-space deal with
+ * it.
+ */
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, (void __user *)0);
+ } else {
+ pr_emerg("PANIC: Unhandled #VC exception in kernel space (result=%d)\n",
+ result);
+
+ /* Show some debug info */
+ show_regs(regs);
+
+ /* Ask hypervisor to sev_es_terminate */
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+
+ /* If that fails and we get here - just panic */
+ panic("Returned from Terminate-Request to Hypervisor\n");
+ }
+
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/* This handler runs on the #VC fall-back stack. It can cause further #VC exceptions */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_IST(exc_vmm_communication)
+{
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ panic("Can't handle #VC exception from unsupported context\n");
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC(exc_vmm_communication)
+{
+ if (likely(!on_vc_fallback_stack(regs)))
+ safe_stack_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
+ else
+ ist_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
+}
+
bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long exit_code = regs->orig_ax;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 49/75] x86/sev-es: Wire up existing #VC exit-code handlers
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 48/75] x86/sev-es: Add Runtime #VC Exception Handler Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 50/75] x86/sev-es: Handle instruction fetches from user-space Joerg Roedel
` (26 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Re-use the handlers for CPUID and IOIO caused #VC exceptions in the
early boot handler.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 7 +++----
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 4153b1b1048f..59884926fae5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -325,8 +325,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_ioio_exitinfo(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u64 *exitinfo)
return ES_OK;
}
-static enum es_result __maybe_unused
-vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u64 exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
@@ -434,8 +433,8 @@ vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return ret;
}
-static enum es_result __maybe_unused vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
- struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 156914d8e103..e04a1868905b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -450,6 +450,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
enum es_result result;
switch (exit_code) {
+ case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
+ result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+ result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
default:
/*
* Unexpected #VC exception
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 50/75] x86/sev-es: Handle instruction fetches from user-space
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 49/75] x86/sev-es: Wire up existing #VC exit-code handlers Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events Joerg Roedel
` (25 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When a #VC exception is triggered by user-space the instruction decoder
needs to read the instruction bytes from user addresses. Enhance
vc_decode_insn() to safely fetch kernel and user instructions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index e04a1868905b..08b66fd5ae9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -247,17 +247,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
enum es_result ret;
int res;
- res = vc_fetch_insn_kernel(ctxt, buffer);
- if (unlikely(res == -EFAULT)) {
- ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
- ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
- ctxt->fi.cr2 = ctxt->regs->ip;
- return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ if (user_mode(ctxt->regs)) {
+ res = insn_fetch_from_user(ctxt->regs, buffer);
+ if (!res) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_USER;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = ctxt->regs->ip;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ if (!insn_decode(&ctxt->insn, ctxt->regs, buffer, res))
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+ } else {
+ res = vc_fetch_insn_kernel(ctxt, buffer);
+ if (res) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = X86_PF_INSTR;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = ctxt->regs->ip;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ insn_init(&ctxt->insn, buffer, MAX_INSN_SIZE - res, 1);
+ insn_get_length(&ctxt->insn);
}
- insn_init(&ctxt->insn, buffer, MAX_INSN_SIZE - res, 1);
- insn_get_length(&ctxt->insn);
-
ret = ctxt->insn.immediate.got ? ES_OK : ES_DECODE_FAILED;
return ret;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 50/75] x86/sev-es: Handle instruction fetches from user-space Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-21 21:01 ` Mike Stunes
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 52/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO String Instructions Joerg Roedel
` (24 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Add handler for VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
bits set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 224 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index c68d1618c9b0..8f36ae021a7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI 0x401
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS 0x402
+/* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
+
#define SVM_EXIT_ERR -1
#define SVM_EXIT_REASONS \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 08b66fd5ae9a..44995c3ad17e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -374,6 +374,36 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
+{
+ unsigned long va = (unsigned long)vaddr;
+ unsigned int level;
+ phys_addr_t pa;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+ pte_t *pte;
+
+ pgd = pgd_offset(current->active_mm, va);
+ pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, va, &level);
+ if (!pte) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ ctxt->fi.cr2 = vaddr;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+
+ if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
+ ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pa = (phys_addr_t)pte_pfn(*pte) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pa |= va & ~page_level_mask(level);
+
+ *paddr = pa;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-es-shared.c"
@@ -456,6 +486,192 @@ static void __init vc_early_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
do_early_exception(ctxt->regs, trapnr);
}
+static long *vc_insn_get_reg(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ long *reg_array;
+ int offset;
+
+ reg_array = (long *)ctxt->regs;
+ offset = insn_get_modrm_reg_off(&ctxt->insn, ctxt->regs);
+
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ offset /= sizeof(long);
+
+ return reg_array + offset;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned int bytes, bool read)
+{
+ u64 exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
+ unsigned long ghcb_pa = __pa(ghcb);
+ phys_addr_t paddr;
+ void __user *ref;
+
+ ref = insn_get_addr_ref(&ctxt->insn, ctxt->regs);
+ if (ref == (void __user *)-1L)
+ return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ exit_code = read ? SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ : SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE;
+
+ if (!vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr)) {
+ if (!read)
+ ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_WRITE;
+
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ exit_info_1 = paddr;
+ exit_info_2 = bytes; /* Can never be greater than 8 */
+
+ ghcb->save.sw_scratch = ghcb_pa + offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
+
+ return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
+ unsigned int bytes = 0;
+ enum es_result ret;
+ int sign_byte;
+ long *reg_data;
+
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
+ /* MMIO Read w/ zero-extension */
+ case 0xb6:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0xb7:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = 2;
+
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ /* Zero extend based on operand size */
+ reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
+ if (!reg_data)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ memset(reg_data, 0, insn->opnd_bytes);
+
+ memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
+ break;
+
+ /* MMIO Read w/ sign-extension */
+ case 0xbe:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0xbf:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = 2;
+
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ /* Sign extend based on operand size */
+ reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
+ if (!reg_data)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ if (bytes == 1) {
+ u8 *val = (u8 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+
+ sign_byte = (*val & 0x80) ? 0xff : 0x00;
+ } else {
+ u16 *val = (u16 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+
+ sign_byte = (*val & 0x8000) ? 0xff : 0x00;
+ }
+ memset(reg_data, sign_byte, insn->opnd_bytes);
+
+ memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
+ unsigned int bytes = 0;
+ enum es_result ret;
+ long *reg_data;
+
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
+ /* MMIO Write */
+ case 0x88:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0x89:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+
+ reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
+ if (!reg_data)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, reg_data, bytes);
+
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);
+ break;
+
+ case 0xc6:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0xc7:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, insn->immediate1.bytes, bytes);
+
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);
+ break;
+
+ /* MMIO Read */
+ case 0x8a:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0x8b:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
+ if (!reg_data)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ if (bytes == 4)
+ *reg_data = 0; /* Zero-extend for 32-bit operation */
+
+ memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
+ break;
+
+ /* Two-Byte Opcodes */
+ case 0x0f:
+ ret = vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -469,6 +685,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
+ result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
default:
/*
* Unexpected #VC exception
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-21 21:01 ` Mike Stunes
2020-07-22 7:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-22 8:05 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 2 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Mike Stunes @ 2020-07-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Joerg,
Thanks for the new patch-set!
> On Jul 14, 2020, at 5:08 AM, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> wrote:
>
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Add handler for VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
> intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
> bits set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> [ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
> Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> <snip>
I’m running into an MMIO-related bug when I try testing this on our hypervisor.
During boot, probe_roms (arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c) uses romchecksum over the video ROM and extension ROM regions. In my test VM, the video ROM romchecksum starts at virtual address 0xffff8880000c0000 and has length 65536. But, at address 0xffff8880000c4000, we switch from being video-ROM-backed to being unbacked by anything.
With SEV-ES enabled, our platform handles reads and writes to unbacked memory by treating them as MMIO. So, the read from 0xffff8880000c4000 causes a #VC, which is handled by do_early_exception.
In handling the #VC, vc_slow_virt_to_phys fails for that address. My understanding is that the #VC handler should then add an entry to the page tables and retry the faulting access. Somehow, that isn’t happening. From the hypervisor side, it looks like the guest is looping somehow. (I think the VCPU is mostly unhalted and making progress, but the guest never gets past that romchecksum.) The guest never actually makes an MMIO vmgexit for that address.
If I remove the call to probe_roms from setup_arch, or remove the calls to romchecksum from probe_roms, this kernel boots normally.
Please let me know of other tests I should run or data that I can collect. Thanks!
Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-21 21:01 ` Mike Stunes
@ 2020-07-22 7:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-22 8:05 ` Joerg Roedel
1 sibling, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-22 7:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Stunes
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Mike,
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:01:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> I’m running into an MMIO-related bug when I try testing this on our hypervisor.
>
> During boot, probe_roms (arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c) uses
> romchecksum over the video ROM and extension ROM regions. In my test
> VM, the video ROM romchecksum starts at virtual address
> 0xffff8880000c0000 and has length 65536. But, at address
> 0xffff8880000c4000, we switch from being video-ROM-backed to being
> unbacked by anything.
>
> With SEV-ES enabled, our platform handles reads and writes to unbacked
> memory by treating them as MMIO. So, the read from 0xffff8880000c4000
> causes a #VC, which is handled by do_early_exception.
>
> In handling the #VC, vc_slow_virt_to_phys fails for that address. My
> understanding is that the #VC handler should then add an entry to the
> page tables and retry the faulting access. Somehow, that isn’t
> happening. From the hypervisor side, it looks like the guest is
> looping somehow. (I think the VCPU is mostly unhalted and making
> progress, but the guest never gets past that romchecksum.) The guest
> never actually makes an MMIO vmgexit for that address.
That sounds like your guest is in a page-fault loop, but I can't yet
explain why. Can you please find out the instruction which is causing
the #VC exception?
If a page-fault happens during #VC emulation it is forwared to the
page-fault handler, so this should work. But somehow this isn't
happening or the page-fault handler can't map the faulting address.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-21 21:01 ` Mike Stunes
2020-07-22 7:55 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-22 8:05 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-22 22:53 ` Mike Stunes
1 sibling, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-22 8:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Stunes
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hmm, I have a theory ...
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:01:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> If I remove the call to probe_roms from setup_arch, or remove the calls to romchecksum from probe_roms, this kernel boots normally.
>
> Please let me know of other tests I should run or data that I can collect. Thanks!
... can you please try the attached diff?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 251d0aabc55a..e1fea7a38019 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -389,7 +389,8 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
pgd_t *pgd;
pte_t *pte;
- pgd = pgd_offset(current->active_mm, va);
+ pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
+ pgd = &pgd[pgd_index(va)];
pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, va, &level);
if (!pte) {
ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-22 8:05 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-22 22:53 ` Mike Stunes
2020-07-23 7:21 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Mike Stunes @ 2020-07-22 22:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
> On Jul 22, 2020, at 1:05 AM, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> wrote:
>
> Hmm, I have a theory ...
>
> On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:01:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
>> If I remove the call to probe_roms from setup_arch, or remove the calls to romchecksum from probe_roms, this kernel boots normally.
>>
>> Please let me know of other tests I should run or data that I can collect. Thanks!
>
> ... can you please try the attached diff?
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> index 251d0aabc55a..e1fea7a38019 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> @@ -389,7 +389,8 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
> pgd_t *pgd;
> pte_t *pte;
>
> - pgd = pgd_offset(current->active_mm, va);
> + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> + pgd = &pgd[pgd_index(va)];
> pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, va, &level);
> if (!pte) {
> ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
Thanks Joerg! With that change in place, this kernel boots normally. What was the problem?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
2020-07-22 22:53 ` Mike Stunes
@ 2020-07-23 7:21 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-23 7:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Stunes
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Mike,
On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 10:53:02PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> Thanks Joerg! With that change in place, this kernel boots normally.
> What was the problem?
The problem was that the code got its page-table from
current->active_mm. But these pointers are not set up during early boot,
so that the #VC handler can't walk the page-table and propagates a
page-fault every time. This loops forever.
Getting the page-table from CR3 instead works at all stages of the
systems runtime.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 52/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO String Instructions
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 53/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events Joerg Roedel
` (23 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add handling for emulation the MOVS instruction on MMIO regions, as done
by the memcpy_toio() and memcpy_fromio() functions.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 44995c3ad17e..bbd839a9d9a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -601,6 +601,73 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * The MOVS instruction has two memory operands, which raises the
+ * problem that it is not known whether the access to the source or the
+ * destination caused the #VC exception (and hence whether an MMIO read
+ * or write operation needs to be emulated).
+ *
+ * Instead of playing games with walking page-tables and trying to guess
+ * whether the source or destination is an MMIO range, split the move
+ * into two operations, a read and a write with only one memory operand.
+ * This will cause a nested #VC exception on the MMIO address which can
+ * then be handled.
+ *
+ * This implementation has the benefit that it also supports MOVS where
+ * source _and_ destination are MMIO regions.
+ *
+ * It will slow MOVS on MMIO down a lot, but in SEV-ES guests it is a
+ * rare operation. If it turns out to be a performance problem the split
+ * operations can be moved to memcpy_fromio() and memcpy_toio().
+ */
+static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_movs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned int bytes)
+{
+ unsigned long ds_base, es_base;
+ unsigned char *src, *dst;
+ unsigned char buffer[8];
+ enum es_result ret;
+ bool rep;
+ int off;
+
+ ds_base = insn_get_seg_base(ctxt->regs, INAT_SEG_REG_DS);
+ es_base = insn_get_seg_base(ctxt->regs, INAT_SEG_REG_ES);
+
+ if (ds_base == -1L || es_base == -1L) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ src = ds_base + (unsigned char *)ctxt->regs->si;
+ dst = es_base + (unsigned char *)ctxt->regs->di;
+
+ ret = vc_read_mem(ctxt, src, buffer, bytes);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = vc_write_mem(ctxt, dst, buffer, bytes);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (ctxt->regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_DF)
+ off = -bytes;
+ else
+ off = bytes;
+
+ ctxt->regs->si += off;
+ ctxt->regs->di += off;
+
+ rep = insn_has_rep_prefix(&ctxt->insn);
+ if (rep)
+ ctxt->regs->cx -= 1;
+
+ if (!rep || ctxt->regs->cx == 0)
+ return ES_OK;
+ else
+ return ES_RETRY;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb,
struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
@@ -661,6 +728,16 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb,
memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
break;
+ /* MOVS instruction */
+ case 0xa4:
+ bytes = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0xa5:
+ if (!bytes)
+ bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+
+ ret = vc_handle_mmio_movs(ctxt, bytes);
+ break;
/* Two-Byte Opcodes */
case 0x0f:
ret = vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(ghcb, ctxt);
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 53/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 52/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO String Instructions Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 54/75] x86/sev-es: Handle DR7 read/write events Joerg Roedel
` (22 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by RDMSR/WRMSR
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index bbd839a9d9a1..cbe158091f18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -407,6 +407,31 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-es-shared.c"
+static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
+ enum es_result ret;
+ u64 exit_info_1;
+
+ /* Is it a WRMSR? */
+ exit_info_1 = (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
+ if (exit_info_1) {
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);
+ ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx);
+ }
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MSR, exit_info_1, 0);
+
+ if ((ret == ES_OK) && (!exit_info_1)) {
+ regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* This function runs on the first #VC exception after the kernel
* switched to virtual addresses.
@@ -762,6 +787,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+ result = vc_handle_msr(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 54/75] x86/sev-es: Handle DR7 read/write events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 53/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 55/75] x86/sev-es: Handle WBINVD Events Joerg Roedel
` (21 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Add code to handle #VC exceptions on DR7 register reads and writes.
This is needed early because show_regs() reads DR7 to print it out.
Under SEV-ES there is currently no support for saving/restoring the
DRx registers, but software expects to be able to write to the DR7
register. For now, cache the value written to DR7 and return it on
read attempts, but do not touch the real hardware DR7.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapt to #VC handling framework
- Support early usage ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index cbe158091f18..09738d6fe55e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
+#define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400
+
/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -75,6 +77,13 @@ struct sev_es_runtime_data {
*/
bool ghcb_active;
bool backup_ghcb_active;
+
+ /*
+ * Cached DR7 value - write it on DR7 writes and return it on reads.
+ * That value will never make it to the real hardware DR7 as debugging
+ * is currently unsupported in SEV-ES guests.
+ */
+ unsigned long dr7;
};
struct ghcb_state {
@@ -527,6 +536,21 @@ static long *vc_insn_get_reg(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return reg_array + offset;
}
+static long *vc_insn_get_rm(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ long *reg_array;
+ int offset;
+
+ reg_array = (long *)ctxt->regs;
+ offset = insn_get_modrm_rm_off(&ctxt->insn, ctxt->regs);
+
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ offset /= sizeof(long);
+
+ return reg_array + offset;
+}
static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned int bytes, bool read)
{
@@ -774,6 +798,61 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ret;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_dr7_write(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ long val, *reg = vc_insn_get_rm(ctxt);
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ if (!reg)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ val = *reg;
+
+ /* Upper 32 bits must be written as zeroes */
+ if (val >> 32) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear out other reserved bits and set bit 10 */
+ val = (val & 0xffff23ffL) | BIT(10);
+
+ /* Early non-zero writes to DR7 are not supported */
+ if (!data && (val & ~DR7_RESET_VALUE))
+ return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ /* Using a value of 0 for ExitInfo1 means RAX holds the value */
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, val);
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (data)
+ data->dr7 = val;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_dr7_read(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ long *reg = vc_insn_get_rm(ctxt);
+
+ if (!reg)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+
+ if (data)
+ *reg = data->dr7;
+ else
+ *reg = DR7_RESET_VALUE;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -781,6 +860,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
enum es_result result;
switch (exit_code) {
+ case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
+ result = vc_handle_dr7_read(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
+ result = vc_handle_dr7_write(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 55/75] x86/sev-es: Handle WBINVD Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 54/75] x86/sev-es: Handle DR7 read/write events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 56/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events Joerg Roedel
` (20 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by WBINVD instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 09738d6fe55e..aa117004fc2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -853,6 +853,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_dr7_read(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_OK;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_wbinvd(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_WBINVD, 0, 0);
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -875,6 +881,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
result = vc_handle_msr(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
+ result = vc_handle_wbinvd(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 56/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 55/75] x86/sev-es: Handle WBINVD Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 57/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events Joerg Roedel
` (19 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by RDTSC and RDTSCP
instructions. Also make it available in the pre-decompression stage
because the KASLR code used RDTSC/RDTSCP to gather entropy and some
hypervisors intercept these instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure
- Make it available early ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index 851d7af29d79..1ce144e0ddc3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
goto finish;
switch (exit_code) {
+ case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
+ case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
+ result = vc_handle_rdtsc(boot_ghcb, &ctxt, exit_code);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
result = vc_handle_ioio(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 59884926fae5..608f76d0d088 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -467,3 +467,26 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_OK;
}
+
+static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ bool rdtscp = (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP);
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!(ghcb_is_valid_rax(ghcb) && ghcb_is_valid_rdx(ghcb) &&
+ (!rdtscp || ghcb_is_valid_rcx(ghcb))))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
+ ctxt->regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ ctxt->regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+ if (rdtscp)
+ ctxt->regs->cx = ghcb->save.rcx;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index aa117004fc2e..0e69d498f008 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -872,6 +872,10 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
result = vc_handle_dr7_write(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
+ case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
+ result = vc_handle_rdtsc(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 57/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 56/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 58/75] x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events Joerg Roedel
` (18 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by RDPMC instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 0e69d498f008..6258bc8074fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -859,6 +859,25 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_wbinvd(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_WBINVD, 0, 0);
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_rdpmc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_RDPMC, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!(ghcb_is_valid_rax(ghcb) && ghcb_is_valid_rdx(ghcb)))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
+ ctxt->regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ ctxt->regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -876,6 +895,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
result = vc_handle_rdtsc(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
+ result = vc_handle_rdpmc(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 58/75] x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:08 ` [PATCH v4 57/75] x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events Joerg Roedel
` (17 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by INVD instructions.
Since Linux should never use INVD, just mark it as unsupported.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 6258bc8074fd..30d6161deada 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
result = vc_handle_rdpmc(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
+ pr_err_ratelimited("#VC exception for INVD??? Seriously???\n");
+ result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 58/75] x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 60/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events Joerg Roedel
` (16 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MONITOR and MONITORX
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 30d6161deada..c0977bdc400e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -878,6 +878,16 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdpmc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt
return ES_OK;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Treat it as a NOP and do not leak a physical address to the
+ * hypervisor
+ */
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -914,6 +924,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
result = vc_handle_wbinvd(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
+ result = vc_handle_monitor(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 60/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 61/75] x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events Joerg Roedel
` (15 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MWAIT and MWAITX
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index c0977bdc400e..541f8994eb21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -888,6 +888,13 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_OK;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_mwait(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ /* Treat the same as MONITOR/MONITORX */
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -927,6 +934,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
result = vc_handle_monitor(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
+ result = vc_handle_mwait(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 61/75] x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 60/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 62/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events Joerg Roedel
` (14 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by VMMCALL instructions.
This patch is only a starting point, VMMCALL emulation under SEV-ES
needs further hypervisor-specific changes to provide additional state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 541f8994eb21..013dcdfeb613 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -895,6 +895,26 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mwait(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_OK;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_vmmcall(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ enum es_result ret;
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
+ ghcb_set_cpl(ghcb, user_mode(ctxt->regs) ? 3 : 0);
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!ghcb_is_valid_rax(ghcb))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
+ ctxt->regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -928,6 +948,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
result = vc_handle_msr(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
+ result = vc_handle_vmmcall(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
result = vc_handle_wbinvd(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 62/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 61/75] x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events Joerg Roedel
` (13 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by #AC exceptions. The #AC
exception is just forwarded to do_alignment_check() and not pushed down
to the hypervisor, as requested by the SEV-ES GHCB Standardization
Specification.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 013dcdfeb613..8f275e5d1ce7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -915,6 +915,19 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_vmmcall(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_OK;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Calling ecx_alignment_check() directly does not work, because it
+ * enables IRQs and the GHCB is active. Forward the exception and call
+ * it later from vc_forward_exception().
+ */
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_AC;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -928,6 +941,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
result = vc_handle_dr7_write(ghcb, ctxt);
break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_AC:
+ result = vc_handle_trap_ac(ghcb, ctxt);
+ break;
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
result = vc_handle_rdtsc(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code);
@@ -987,6 +1003,9 @@ static __always_inline void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
case X86_TRAP_UD:
exc_invalid_op(ctxt->regs);
break;
+ case X86_TRAP_AC:
+ exc_alignment_check(ctxt->regs, error_code);
+ break;
default:
pr_emerg("Unsupported exception in #VC instruction emulation - can't continue\n");
BUG();
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 62/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 64/75] x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES Joerg Roedel
` (12 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Handle #VC exceptions caused by #DB exceptions in the guest. Those
must be handled outside of instrumentation_begin()/end() so that the
handler will not be raised recursivly.
Handle them by calling the kernels debug exception handler.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 8f275e5d1ce7..b0f08d9669f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -928,6 +928,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+static __always_inline void vc_handle_trap_db(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ noist_exc_debug(regs);
+ else
+ exc_debug(regs);
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
struct ghcb *ghcb;
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+ /*
+ * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
+ * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
+ */
+ if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
+ vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
+ return;
+ }
+
instrumentation_begin();
/*
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 9:13 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 8:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Cfir Cohen, x86, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
virtualization, Martin Radev, Joerg Roedel, Masami Hiramatsu,
Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas, David Rientjes, Dan Williams,
Jiri Slaby
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:09:05PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
> struct ghcb *ghcb;
>
> lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> +
> + /*
> + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> + */
> + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> instrumentation_begin();
Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-15 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 9:13 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 9:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 10:47:52AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:09:05PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>
> > @@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
> > struct ghcb *ghcb;
> >
> > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> > + */
> > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > instrumentation_begin();
>
> Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before
instrumentation_begin(), which is necessary here because a break-point
in the #VC handler might cause recursive #VC-exceptions when #DB is
intercepted.
Maybe you can elaborate on why this makes no sense?
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-15 9:13 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 10:08 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 9:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:13:37AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 10:47:52AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:09:05PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> >
> > > @@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
> > > struct ghcb *ghcb;
> > >
> > > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> > > + */
> > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> > > + return;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > instrumentation_begin();
> >
> > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
>
> Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
> that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before
> instrumentation_begin(), which is necessary here because a break-point
> in the #VC handler might cause recursive #VC-exceptions when #DB is
> intercepted.
> Maybe you can elaborate on why this makes no sense?
Kernel avoids breakpoints in any noinstr text, irrespective of
instrumentation_begin().
instrumentation_begin() merely allows one to call !noinstr functions.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-15 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 10:08 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 10:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 10:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:51:36AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:13:37AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
> > that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before
> > instrumentation_begin(), which is necessary here because a break-point
> > in the #VC handler might cause recursive #VC-exceptions when #DB is
> > intercepted.
> > Maybe you can elaborate on why this makes no sense?
>
> Kernel avoids breakpoints in any noinstr text, irrespective of
> instrumentation_begin().
>
> instrumentation_begin() merely allows one to call !noinstr functions.
Right, but the handler calls into various other functions. I actually
started to annotate them all with noinstr, but that was a can of worms
when calling into generic kernel functions. And the only problem with
intrumentation in the #VC handler is the #VC-for-#DB exit-code, so I
decided to only handle this one with instrumentation forbidden and allow
it for the rest of the handler.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-15 10:08 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 10:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 10:31 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 10:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 12:08:08PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:51:36AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:13:37AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > > Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
> > > that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before
> > > instrumentation_begin(), which is necessary here because a break-point
> > > in the #VC handler might cause recursive #VC-exceptions when #DB is
> > > intercepted.
> > > Maybe you can elaborate on why this makes no sense?
> >
> > Kernel avoids breakpoints in any noinstr text, irrespective of
> > instrumentation_begin().
> >
> > instrumentation_begin() merely allows one to call !noinstr functions.
>
> Right, but the handler calls into various other functions. I actually
> started to annotate them all with noinstr, but that was a can of worms
> when calling into generic kernel functions. And the only problem with
> intrumentation in the #VC handler is the #VC-for-#DB exit-code, so I
> decided to only handle this one with instrumentation forbidden and allow
> it for the rest of the handler.
OK, then maybe change the comment to something like:
/*
* Handle #DB before calling any !noinstr code to avoid
* recursive #DB.
*/
?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
2020-07-15 10:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 10:31 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 12:13:10PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 12:08:08PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > Right, but the handler calls into various other functions. I actually
> > started to annotate them all with noinstr, but that was a can of worms
> > when calling into generic kernel functions. And the only problem with
> > intrumentation in the #VC handler is the #VC-for-#DB exit-code, so I
> > decided to only handle this one with instrumentation forbidden and allow
> > it for the rest of the handler.
>
> OK, then maybe change the comment to something like:
>
> /*
> * Handle #DB before calling any !noinstr code to avoid
> * recursive #DB.
> */
Sounds good, will do.
Thanks,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 64/75] x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 65/75] x86/kvm: Add KVM " Joerg Roedel
` (11 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add two new paravirt callbacks to provide hypervisor specific processor
state in the GHCB and to copy state from the hypervisor back to the
processor.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 16 +++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index 6807153c0410..0304e2931cd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+struct ghcb;
struct mpc_bus;
struct mpc_cpu;
+struct pt_regs;
struct mpc_table;
struct cpuinfo_x86;
@@ -236,10 +238,22 @@ struct x86_legacy_features {
/**
* struct x86_hyper_runtime - x86 hypervisor specific runtime callbacks
*
- * @pin_vcpu: pin current vcpu to specified physical cpu (run rarely)
+ * @pin_vcpu: pin current vcpu to specified physical
+ * cpu (run rarely)
+ * @sev_es_hcall_prepare: Load additional hypervisor-specific
+ * state into the GHCB when doing a VMMCALL under
+ * SEV-ES. Called from the #VC exception handler.
+ * @sev_es_hcall_finish: Copies state from the GHCB back into the
+ * processor (or pt_regs). Also runs checks on the
+ * state returned from the hypervisor after a
+ * VMMCALL under SEV-ES. Needs to return 'false'
+ * if the checks fail. Called from the #VC
+ * exception handler.
*/
struct x86_hyper_runtime {
void (*pin_vcpu)(int cpu);
+ void (*sev_es_hcall_prepare)(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs);
+ bool (*sev_es_hcall_finish)(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs);
};
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index b0f08d9669f1..76104c71fc85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -903,6 +903,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_vmmcall(struct ghcb *ghcb,
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
ghcb_set_cpl(ghcb, user_mode(ctxt->regs) ? 3 : 0);
+ if (x86_platform.hyper.sev_es_hcall_prepare)
+ x86_platform.hyper.sev_es_hcall_prepare(ghcb, ctxt->regs);
+
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL, 0, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
@@ -912,6 +915,15 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_vmmcall(struct ghcb *ghcb,
ctxt->regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ /*
+ * Call sev_es_hcall_finish() after regs->ax is already set.
+ * This allows the hypervisor handler to overwrite it again if
+ * necessary.
+ */
+ if (x86_platform.hyper.sev_es_hcall_finish &&
+ !x86_platform.hyper.sev_es_hcall_finish(ghcb, ctxt->regs))
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
return ES_OK;
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 65/75] x86/kvm: Add KVM specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 64/75] x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 66/75] x86/vmware: Add VMware specific handling for VMMCALL " Joerg Roedel
` (10 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Implement the callbacks to copy the processor state required by KVM to
the GHCB.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Split out of a larger patch
- Adapt to different callback functions ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index df63786e7bfa..553d6b4eeaa2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
#include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kvm_async_pf_enabled);
@@ -729,13 +731,34 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init;
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+static void kvm_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /* RAX and CPL are already in the GHCB */
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, regs->bx);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
+ ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx);
+ ghcb_set_rsi(ghcb, regs->si);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_sev_es_hcall_finish(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /* No checking of the return state needed */
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_kvm = {
- .name = "KVM",
- .detect = kvm_detect,
- .type = X86_HYPER_KVM,
- .init.guest_late_init = kvm_guest_init,
- .init.x2apic_available = kvm_para_available,
- .init.init_platform = kvm_init_platform,
+ .name = "KVM",
+ .detect = kvm_detect,
+ .type = X86_HYPER_KVM,
+ .init.guest_late_init = kvm_guest_init,
+ .init.x2apic_available = kvm_para_available,
+ .init.init_platform = kvm_init_platform,
+#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare = kvm_sev_es_hcall_prepare,
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish = kvm_sev_es_hcall_finish,
+#endif
};
static __init int activate_jump_labels(void)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 66/75] x86/vmware: Add VMware specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 65/75] x86/kvm: Add KVM " Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 67/75] x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point Joerg Roedel
` (9 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Doug Covelli, Tom Lendacky, hpa,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes,
Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes,
Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm,
virtualization
From: Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
Add VMware specific handling for #VC faults caused by VMMCALL
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapt to different paravirt interface ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c
index 9b6fafa69be9..d2129d5e8373 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/vmware.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "vmware: " fmt
@@ -476,10 +477,49 @@ static bool __init vmware_legacy_x2apic_available(void)
(eax & (1 << VMWARE_CMD_LEGACY_X2APIC)) != 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+static void vmware_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /* Copy VMWARE specific Hypercall parameters to the GHCB */
+ ghcb_set_rip(ghcb, regs->ip);
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, regs->bx);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
+ ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx);
+ ghcb_set_rsi(ghcb, regs->si);
+ ghcb_set_rdi(ghcb, regs->di);
+ ghcb_set_rbp(ghcb, regs->bp);
+}
+
+static bool vmware_sev_es_hcall_finish(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (!(ghcb_is_valid_rbx(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rcx(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rdx(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rsi(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rdi(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_is_valid_rbp(ghcb)))
+ return false;
+
+ regs->bx = ghcb->save.rbx;
+ regs->cx = ghcb->save.rcx;
+ regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+ regs->si = ghcb->save.rsi;
+ regs->di = ghcb->save.rdi;
+ regs->bp = ghcb->save.rbp;
+
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_vmware = {
- .name = "VMware",
- .detect = vmware_platform,
- .type = X86_HYPER_VMWARE,
- .init.init_platform = vmware_platform_setup,
- .init.x2apic_available = vmware_legacy_x2apic_available,
+ .name = "VMware",
+ .detect = vmware_platform,
+ .type = X86_HYPER_VMWARE,
+ .init.init_platform = vmware_platform_setup,
+ .init.x2apic_available = vmware_legacy_x2apic_available,
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare = vmware_sev_es_hcall_prepare,
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish = vmware_sev_es_hcall_finish,
+#endif
};
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 67/75] x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 66/75] x86/vmware: Add VMware specific handling for VMMCALL " Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 68/75] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table Joerg Roedel
` (8 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The code at the trampoline entry point is executed in real-mode. In
real-mode #VC exceptions can't be handled, so anything that might cause
such an exception must be avoided.
In the standard trampoline entry code this is the WBINVD instruction and
the call to verify_cpu(), which are both not needed anyway when running
as an SEV-ES guest.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 3 +++
| 3 +++
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index b35030eeec36..6590394af309 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ struct real_mode_header {
/* SMP trampoline */
u32 trampoline_start;
u32 trampoline_header;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ u32 sev_es_trampoline_start;
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
u32 trampoline_pgd;
#endif
--git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
index af04512c02d9..8c1db5bf5d78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
/* SMP trampoline */
.long pa_trampoline_start
.long pa_trampoline_header
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ .long pa_sev_es_trampoline_start
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
.long pa_trampoline_pgd;
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
index 251758ed7443..84c5d1b33d10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_start)
testl %eax, %eax # Check for return code
jnz no_longmode
+.Lswitch_to_protected:
/*
* GDT tables in non default location kernel can be beyond 16MB and
* lgdt will not be able to load the address as in real mode default
@@ -80,6 +81,25 @@ no_longmode:
jmp no_longmode
SYM_CODE_END(trampoline_start)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+/* SEV-ES supports non-zero IP for entry points - no alignment needed */
+SYM_CODE_START(sev_es_trampoline_start)
+ cli # We should be safe anyway
+
+ LJMPW_RM(1f)
+1:
+ mov %cs, %ax # Code and data in the same place
+ mov %ax, %ds
+ mov %ax, %es
+ mov %ax, %ss
+
+ # Setup stack
+ movl $rm_stack_end, %esp
+
+ jmp .Lswitch_to_protected
+SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
#include "../kernel/verify_cpu.S"
.section ".text32","ax"
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 68/75] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 67/75] x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 69/75] x86/head/64: Setup TSS early for secondary CPUs Joerg Roedel
` (7 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
As part of the GHCB specification, the booting of APs under SEV-ES
requires an AP jump table when transitioning from one layer of code to
another (e.g. when going from UEFI to the OS). As a result, each layer
that parks an AP must provide the physical address of an AP jump table
to the next layer via the hypervisor.
Upon booting of the kernel, read the AP jump table address from the
hypervisor. Under SEV-ES, APs are started using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI
sequence. Before issuing the first SIPI request for an AP, the start
CS and IP is programmed into the AP jump table. Upon issuing the SIPI
request, the AP will awaken and jump to that start CS:IP address.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapted to different code base
- Moved AP table setup from SIPI sending path to
real-mode setup code
- Fix sparse warnings ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 5 +++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 18 ++++++++-
4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index 330140a189be..25ab44f977db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
return (val & mask);
}
+struct real_mode_header;
+enum stack_type;
+
/* Early IDT entry points for #VC handler */
extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
@@ -80,9 +83,11 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
extern void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void sev_es_ist_exit(void);
+extern int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
+static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 8f36ae021a7f..a19ce9681ec2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
/* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
#define SVM_EXIT_ERR -1
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 76104c71fc85..370cf9bf2c88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
+#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
+#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
@@ -229,6 +231,9 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
}
}
+/* Needed in vc_early_vc_forward_exception */
+void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
+
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
return native_read_msr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
@@ -416,6 +421,69 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-es-shared.c"
+static u64 sev_es_get_jump_table_addr(void)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ if (!ghcb_is_valid_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) ||
+ !ghcb_is_valid_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb))
+ ret = 0;
+
+ ret = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+
+ sev_es_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
+{
+ u16 startup_cs, startup_ip;
+ phys_addr_t jump_table_pa;
+ u64 jump_table_addr;
+ u16 __iomem *jump_table;
+
+ jump_table_addr = sev_es_get_jump_table_addr();
+
+ /* Check if AP Jump Table is non-zero and page-aligned */
+ if (!jump_table_addr || jump_table_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ return 0;
+
+ jump_table_pa = jump_table_addr & PAGE_MASK;
+
+ startup_cs = (u16)(rmh->trampoline_start >> 4);
+ startup_ip = (u16)(rmh->sev_es_trampoline_start -
+ rmh->trampoline_start);
+
+ jump_table = ioremap_encrypted(jump_table_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!jump_table)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ writew(startup_ip, &jump_table[0]);
+ writew(startup_cs, &jump_table[1]);
+
+ iounmap(jump_table);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 1ed1208931e0..61a52b925d15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/crash.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
struct real_mode_header *real_mode_header;
u32 *trampoline_cr4_features;
@@ -38,6 +39,19 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
crash_reserve_low_1M();
}
+static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ if (sme_active())
+ th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
+
+ if (sev_es_active()) {
+ if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header))
+ panic("Failed to update SEV-ES AP Jump Table");
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
{
u16 real_mode_seg;
@@ -104,13 +118,13 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
trampoline_header->flags = 0;
- if (sme_active())
- trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
trampoline_pgd[511] = init_top_pgt[511].pgd;
#endif
+
+ sme_sev_setup_real_mode(trampoline_header);
}
/*
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 69/75] x86/head/64: Setup TSS early for secondary CPUs
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 68/75] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs Joerg Roedel
` (6 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The #VC exception will trigger very early in head_64.S, when the first
CPUID instruction is executed. When secondary CPUs boot, they already
load the real system IDT, which has the #VC handler configured to use an
IST stack. IST stacks require a TSS to be loaded, so set up the TSS
early for bringing up the secondary CPUs. Use the read-write version of
the per-CPU TSS struct early, until cpu_init() switches to the read-only
mapping.
On the boot CPU the TSS will also be loaded early, but not used as the
the early boot #VC handlers do not use IST stacks.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 23d492091f3b..f57eefb1e4ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -545,6 +545,19 @@ void __head early_idt_setup_early_handler(unsigned long descr_addr, unsigned lon
}
}
+void __head early_load_tss(void)
+{
+ struct desc_struct *gdt = (struct desc_struct *)boot_gdt;
+ struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw);
+ tss_desc tss_desc;
+
+ set_tssldt_descriptor(&tss_desc, (unsigned long)tss, DESC_TSS,
+ __KERNEL_TSS_LIMIT);
+ native_write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, &tss_desc, DESC_TSS);
+
+ asm volatile("ltr %w0"::"q" (GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8));
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
static void __head set_early_idt_handler(gate_desc *idt, int n, void *handler)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 3bd4c36d1d36..5b577d6bce7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -235,6 +235,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
*/
movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
+ /* Setup a TSS for early IST handlers - needs %gs to be set up */
+ pushq %rsi
+ call early_load_tss
+ popq %rsi
+
/* Load IDT */
lidt idt_descr(%rip)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 69/75] x86/head/64: Setup TSS early for secondary CPUs Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 1:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 71/75] x86/head/64: Rename start_cpu0 Joerg Roedel
` (5 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The APs are not ready to handle exceptions when verify_cpu() is called
in secondary_startup_64.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 1 +
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index 6590394af309..5c97807c38a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern unsigned char startup_32_smp[];
extern unsigned char boot_gdt[];
#else
extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64[];
+extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64_no_verify[];
#endif
static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 5b577d6bce7a..8b43ed0592e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
/*
* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
* added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 61a52b925d15..df701f87ddef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
if (sev_es_active()) {
+ /*
+ * Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
+ * will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
+ */
+ th->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
+
if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header))
panic("Failed to update SEV-ES AP Jump Table");
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 1:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 9:26 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:09:12PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
>
> The APs are not ready to handle exceptions when verify_cpu() is called
> in secondary_startup_64.
Eek, no. MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE needs to be cleared very early
during CPU startup; this can't just be skipped.
Also, is UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY needed for the new target?
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 1 +
> arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 6 ++++++
> 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> index 6590394af309..5c97807c38a4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern unsigned char startup_32_smp[];
> extern unsigned char boot_gdt[];
> #else
> extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64[];
> +extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64_no_verify[];
> #endif
>
> static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> index 5b577d6bce7a..8b43ed0592e8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
> @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
> /* Sanitize CPU configuration */
> call verify_cpu
>
> +SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
> /*
> * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
> * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> index 61a52b925d15..df701f87ddef 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> @@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
> th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
>
> if (sev_es_active()) {
> + /*
> + * Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
> + * will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
> + */
> + th->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
> +
> if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header))
> panic("Failed to update SEV-ES AP Jump Table");
> }
> --
> 2.27.0
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-15 1:40 ` Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-15 9:26 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 15:26 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 9:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Kees,
thanks for your reviews!
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 06:40:30PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Eek, no. MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE needs to be cleared very early
> during CPU startup; this can't just be skipped.
That MSR is Intel-only, right? The boot-path installed here is only used
for SEV-ES guests, running on AMD systems, so this MSR is not even
accessed during boot on those VMs.
The alternative is to set up exception handling prior to calling
verify_cpu, including segments, stack and IDT. Given that verify_cpu()
does not add much value to SEV-ES guests, I'd like to avoid adding this
complexity.
> Also, is UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY needed for the new target?
Yes, I think it is, will add it in the next version.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-15 9:26 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 15:48 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:26:38AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
> thanks for your reviews!
>
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 06:40:30PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Eek, no. MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE needs to be cleared very early
> > during CPU startup; this can't just be skipped.
>
> That MSR is Intel-only, right? The boot-path installed here is only used
> for SEV-ES guests, running on AMD systems, so this MSR is not even
> accessed during boot on those VMs.
Oh, hrm, yes, that's true. If other x86 maintainers are comfortable with
this, then okay. My sense is that changing the early CPU startup paths
will cause trouble down the line.
> The alternative is to set up exception handling prior to calling
> verify_cpu, including segments, stack and IDT. Given that verify_cpu()
> does not add much value to SEV-ES guests, I'd like to avoid adding this
> complexity.
So, going back to the requirements here ... what things in verify_cpu()
can cause exceptions? AFAICT, cpuid is safely handled (i.e. it is
detected and only run in a way to avoid exceptions and the MSR
reads/writes are similarly bound by CPU family/id range checks). I must
be missing something. :)
>
> > Also, is UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY needed for the new target?
>
> Yes, I think it is, will add it in the next version.
>
> Regards,
>
> Joerg
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-15 15:26 ` Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-15 15:48 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 19:49 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 15:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Kees,
as a general note: With SEV-ES the guest kernel will get #VC exceptions
for events that, without SEV-ES, would just cause a #VMEXIT to the
hypervisor.
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 08:26:14AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:26:38AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > That MSR is Intel-only, right? The boot-path installed here is only used
> > for SEV-ES guests, running on AMD systems, so this MSR is not even
> > accessed during boot on those VMs.
>
> Oh, hrm, yes, that's true. If other x86 maintainers are comfortable with
> this, then okay. My sense is that changing the early CPU startup paths
> will cause trouble down the line.
The AP startup path does not change for non SEV-ES guests. But under
SEV-ES everything that might cause a #VC exception must be avoided until
the kernel is ready to handle them. With the current patches this
happens when the AP runs in 64bit long-mode and loaded TSS and IDT.
Therefore a slightly different AP boot-path is needed for SEV-ES guests.
> So, going back to the requirements here ... what things in verify_cpu()
> can cause exceptions? AFAICT, cpuid is safely handled (i.e. it is
> detected and only run in a way to avoid exceptions and the MSR
> reads/writes are similarly bound by CPU family/id range checks). I must
> be missing something. :)
It is actually the CPUID instructions that cause #VC exceptions. The
MSRs that are accessed on AMD processors are not intercepted in the
hypervisors this code has been tested on, so these will not cause #VC
exceptions.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-15 15:48 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 19:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-20 15:29 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-15 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 05:48:56PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> It is actually the CPUID instructions that cause #VC exceptions. The
> MSRs that are accessed on AMD processors are not intercepted in the
> hypervisors this code has been tested on, so these will not cause #VC
> exceptions.
Aaah. I see. Thanks for the details there. So ... can you add a bunch
more comments about why/when the new entry path is being used? I really
don't want to accidentally discover some unrelated refactoring down
the road (in months, years, unrelated to SEV, etc) starts to also skip
verify_cpu() on Intel systems. There had been a lot of BIOSes that set
this MSR to disable NX, and I don't want to repeat that pain: Linux must
never start an Intel CPU with that MSR set. :P
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
2020-07-15 19:49 ` Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-20 15:29 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-20 15:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 12:49:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Aaah. I see. Thanks for the details there. So ... can you add a bunch
> more comments about why/when the new entry path is being used? I really
> don't want to accidentally discover some unrelated refactoring down
> the road (in months, years, unrelated to SEV, etc) starts to also skip
> verify_cpu() on Intel systems. There had been a lot of BIOSes that set
> this MSR to disable NX, and I don't want to repeat that pain: Linux must
> never start an Intel CPU with that MSR set. :P
Understood :)
I added a comment above the label explaining why it is only used for
SEV-ES guests and pointing out the importance of running verify_cpu() on
all other systems, especially if they are Intel based.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 71/75] x86/head/64: Rename start_cpu0
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 70/75] x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 72/75] x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online Joerg Roedel
` (4 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
For SEV-ES this entry point will be used for restarting APs after they
have been offlined. Remove the '0' from the name to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
index da78ccbd493b..1536b607971f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct x86_cpu {
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
extern int arch_register_cpu(int num);
extern void arch_unregister_cpu(int);
-extern void start_cpu0(void);
+extern void start_cpu(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0
extern int _debug_hotplug_cpu(int cpu, int action);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index f66a6b90f954..aad62c677486 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ SYM_CODE_END(startup_32)
* up already except stack. We just set up stack here. Then call
* start_secondary().
*/
-SYM_FUNC_START(start_cpu0)
+SYM_FUNC_START(start_cpu)
movl initial_stack, %ecx
movl %ecx, %esp
call *(initial_code)
1: jmp 1b
-SYM_FUNC_END(start_cpu0)
+SYM_FUNC_END(start_cpu)
#endif
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 8b43ed0592e8..12d1e407461c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -319,15 +319,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64)
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
/*
- * Boot CPU0 entry point. It's called from play_dead(). Everything has been set
+ * CPU entry point. It's called from play_dead(). Everything has been set
* up already except stack. We just set up stack here. Then call
* start_secondary() via .Ljump_to_C_code.
*/
-SYM_CODE_START(start_cpu0)
+SYM_CODE_START(start_cpu)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
jmp .Ljump_to_C_code
-SYM_CODE_END(start_cpu0)
+SYM_CODE_END(start_cpu)
#endif
/* Both SMP bootup and ACPI suspend change these variables */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index ffbd9a3d78d8..5a173459759d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void)
* If NMI wants to wake up CPU0, start CPU0.
*/
if (wakeup_cpu0())
- start_cpu0();
+ start_cpu();
}
}
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ void hlt_play_dead(void)
* If NMI wants to wake up CPU0, start CPU0.
*/
if (wakeup_cpu0())
- start_cpu0();
+ start_cpu();
}
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 72/75] x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 71/75] x86/head/64: Rename start_cpu0 Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 73/75] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State Joerg Roedel
` (3 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Add a play_dead handler when running under SEV-ES. This is needed
because the hypervisor can't deliver an SIPI request to restart the AP.
Instead the kernel has to issue a VMGEXIT to halt the VCPU until the
hypervisor wakes it up again.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index a19ce9681ec2..20a05839dd9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
/* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP 0x80000004
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 1
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 370cf9bf2c88..b147d97856c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
#define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400
@@ -531,6 +533,66 @@ static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
return true;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
+static void sev_es_ap_hlt_loop(void)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+ while (true) {
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ /* Wakeup signal? */
+ if (ghcb_is_valid_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sev_es_put_ghcb(&state);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Play_dead handler when running under SEV-ES. This is needed because
+ * the hypervisor can't deliver an SIPI request to restart the AP.
+ * Instead the kernel has to issue a VMGEXIT to halt the VCPU until the
+ * hypervisor wakes it up again.
+ */
+static void sev_es_play_dead(void)
+{
+ play_dead_common();
+
+ /* IRQs now disabled */
+
+ sev_es_ap_hlt_loop();
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here, the VCPU was woken up again. Jump to CPU
+ * startup code to get it back online.
+ */
+
+ start_cpu();
+}
+#else /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
+#define sev_es_play_dead native_play_dead
+#endif /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+static void __init sev_es_setup_play_dead(void)
+{
+ smp_ops.play_dead = sev_es_play_dead;
+}
+#else
+static inline void sev_es_setup_play_dead(void) { }
+#endif
+
static void __init sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(int cpu)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -575,6 +637,8 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
sev_es_init_ghcb(cpu);
sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(cpu);
}
+
+ sev_es_setup_play_dead();
}
static void __init vc_early_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 73/75] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 72/75] x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 74/75] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active Joerg Roedel
` (2 subsequent siblings)
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When running under SEV-ES the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to
open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with
an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor.
Add code to the kernels NMI handler to send this message right at the
beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index 25ab44f977db..de4d3f63fdf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -84,10 +84,12 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void sev_es_ist_exit(void);
extern int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh);
+extern void sev_es_nmi_complete(void);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
+static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 20a05839dd9a..0f837339db66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
/* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE 0x80000003
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP 0x80000004
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index d94a5bb0bebc..2d60220bf6d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -479,6 +479,12 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, nmi_dr7);
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
{
+ /*
+ * Re-enable NMIs right here when running as an SEV-ES guest. This might
+ * cause nested NMIs, but those can be handled safely.
+ */
+ sev_es_nmi_complete();
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && arch_cpu_is_offline(smp_processor_id()))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index b147d97856c3..ff440b6e5e78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -423,6 +423,27 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-es-shared.c"
+void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ if (!sev_es_active())
+ return;
+
+ ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ sev_es_put_ghcb(&state);
+}
+
static u64 sev_es_get_jump_table_addr(void)
{
struct ghcb_state state;
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 74/75] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 73/75] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 75/75] x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Peter Zijlstra
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Tom Lendacky, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson,
Martin Radev, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Calling down to EFI runtime services can result in the firmware performing
VMGEXIT calls. The firmware is likely to use the GHCB of the OS (e.g., for
setting EFI variables), so each GHCB in the system needs to be identity
mapped in the EFI page tables, as unencrypted, to avoid page faults.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ jroedel@suse.de: Moved GHCB mapping loop to sev-es.c ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 10 ++++++++++
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index 1ce144e0ddc3..b522c18c0588 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include "misc.h"
+#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index de4d3f63fdf8..03e114c727c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -85,11 +85,13 @@ extern void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void sev_es_ist_exit(void);
extern int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh);
extern void sev_es_nmi_complete(void);
+extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
+static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index ff440b6e5e78..61308f9c8138 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -507,6 +507,36 @@ int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * This is needed by the OVMF UEFI firmware which will use whatever it finds in
+ * the GHCB MSR as its GHCB to talk to the hypervisor. So make sure the per-cpu
+ * runtime GHCBs used by the kernel are also mapped in the EFI page-table.
+ */
+int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ unsigned long address, pflags;
+ int cpu;
+ u64 pfn;
+
+ if (!sev_es_active())
+ return 0;
+
+ pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
+
+ address = __pa(&data->ghcb_page);
+ pfn = address >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, address, 1, pflags))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 8e364c4c6768..42e0628c45ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
/*
* We allocate runtime services regions top-down, starting from -4G, i.e.
@@ -238,6 +239,15 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
return 1;
}
+ /*
+ * When SEV-ES is active, the GHCB as set by the kernel will be used
+ * by firmware. Create a 1:1 unencrypted mapping for each GHCB.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the GHCBs!\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/*
* When making calls to the firmware everything needs to be 1:1
* mapped and addressable with 32-bit pointers. Map the kernel
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 75/75] x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 74/75] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-14 12:09 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Peter Zijlstra
75 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-14 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86
Cc: Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel, Martin Radev, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams,
Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes,
Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes,
Sean Christopherson, linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
From: Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>
Make sure the machine supports RDRAND, otherwise there is no trusted
source of of randomness in the system.
Signed-off-by: Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index b522c18c0588..eb1a8b5cc753 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
if (!boot_ghcb)
return;
+ if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
+ error("SEV-ES CPU Features missing.");
+
/*
* GHCB Page must be flushed from the cache and mapped encrypted again.
* Otherwise the running kernel will see strange cache effects when
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 608f76d0d088..56de70cb80d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -9,6 +9,21 @@
* and is included directly into both code-bases.
*/
+#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
+#define error(v) pr_err(v)
+#define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f)
+#endif
+
+static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
+{
+ if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
+ error("RDRAND instruction not supported - no trusted source of randomness available\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason)
{
u64 val = GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 61308f9c8138..481ea00c58b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -682,6 +682,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
if (!sev_es_active())
return;
+ if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
+ panic("SEV-ES CPU Features missing");
+
/* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(cpu);
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-14 12:08 [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-14 12:09 ` [PATCH v4 75/75] x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 9:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 9:34 ` Joerg Roedel
75 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 9:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: x86, Joerg Roedel, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:02PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> The #VC entry code now tries to pretend that the #VC handler does not
> use an IST stack by switching to the task stack if entered from
> user-mode or the SYSCALL entry path. When it is entered from
> kernel-mode it is doing its best to switch back to the interrupted
> stack. This is only possible if it is entered from a known and safe
> kernel stack (e.g. not the entry stack). If the previous stack is not
> safe to use the #VC handler switches to a fall-back stack and calls a
> special handler function which, as of now, just panics the system. For
> now this is safe as #VC exceptions only happen at know places which
> use a safe stack.
>
> The use of the fall-back stack is necessary so that the special
> handler function can safely raise nested #VC exceptions, for
> example to print a panic message.
Can we get some more words -- preferably in actual code comments, on
when exactly #VC happens?
Because the only thing I remember is that #VC could happen on any memop,
but I also have vague memories of that being a later extention.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-15 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 9:34 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-15 9:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 9:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:24:56AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Can we get some more words -- preferably in actual code comments, on
> when exactly #VC happens?
Sure, will add this as a comment before the actual runtime VC handler.
> Because the only thing I remember is that #VC could happen on any memop,
> but I also have vague memories of that being a later extention.
Currently it is only raised when something happens that the hypervisor
intercepts, for example on a couple of instructions like CPUID,
RD/WRMSR, ..., or on MMIO/IOIO accesses.
With Secure Nested Paging (SNP), which needs additional enablement, a #VC can
happen on any memory access. I wrote the IST handling entry code for #VC
with that in mind, but do not actually enable it. This is the reason why
the #VC handler just panics the system when it ends up on the fall-back
(VC2) stack, with SNP enabled it needs to handle the SNP exit-codes in
that path.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-15 9:34 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-15 9:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-15 10:10 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2020-07-15 9:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, Erdem Aktas,
David Rientjes, Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:34:26AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:24:56AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > Can we get some more words -- preferably in actual code comments, on
> > when exactly #VC happens?
>
> Sure, will add this as a comment before the actual runtime VC handler.
Thanks!
> > Because the only thing I remember is that #VC could happen on any memop,
> > but I also have vague memories of that being a later extention.
>
> Currently it is only raised when something happens that the hypervisor
> intercepts, for example on a couple of instructions like CPUID,
> RD/WRMSR, ..., or on MMIO/IOIO accesses.
>
> With Secure Nested Paging (SNP), which needs additional enablement, a #VC can
> happen on any memory access. I wrote the IST handling entry code for #VC
> with that in mind, but do not actually enable it. This is the reason why
> the #VC handler just panics the system when it ends up on the fall-back
> (VC2) stack, with SNP enabled it needs to handle the SNP exit-codes in
> that path.
And recursive #VC was instant death, right? Because there's no way to
avoid IST stack corruption in that case.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-15 9:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
@ 2020-07-15 10:10 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-21 1:09 ` Erdem Aktas
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-15 10:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby,
Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky, Juergen Gross, Kees Cook,
David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen, Erdem Aktas, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev, linux-kernel,
kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:55:56AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> And recursive #VC was instant death, right? Because there's no way to
> avoid IST stack corruption in that case.
Right, a #VC exception while still on the IST stack must instantly kill
the VM. That needs an additional check which is not implemented yet, as
it only becomes necessary with SNP.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-15 10:10 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-21 1:09 ` Erdem Aktas
2020-07-21 12:49 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Erdem Aktas @ 2020-07-21 1:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi,
It looks like there is an expectation that the bootloader will start
from the 64bit entry point in header_64.S. With the current patch
series, it will not boot up if the bootloader jumps to the startup_32
entry, which might break some default distro images.
What are supported bootloaders and configurations?
I am using grub ( 2.02-2ubuntu8.15) and it fails to boot because of
this reason. I am not a grub expert, so I would appreciate any
pointers on this.
Also, it would be nice to put some error code in the GHCB MSR if the
guest dies for some reason in real mode. Currently, it just dies with
no information provided.
PS: sorry for sending twice due to the wrong email body type.
Regards
-Erdem
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 3:10 AM Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:55:56AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > And recursive #VC was instant death, right? Because there's no way to
> > avoid IST stack corruption in that case.
>
> Right, a #VC exception while still on the IST stack must instantly kill
> the VM. That needs an additional check which is not implemented yet, as
> it only becomes necessary with SNP.
>
> Regards,
>
> Joerg
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-21 1:09 ` Erdem Aktas
@ 2020-07-21 12:49 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-21 16:48 ` Erdem Aktas
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-21 12:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Erdem Aktas
Cc: Juergen Gross, Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Mike Stunes, Kees Cook,
kvm, Peter Zijlstra, Cfir Cohen, Joerg Roedel, x86, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, virtualization, Martin Radev,
Masami Hiramatsu, Andy Lutomirski, hpa, David Rientjes,
Dan Williams, Jiri Slaby
Hi,
On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 06:09:19PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> It looks like there is an expectation that the bootloader will start
> from the 64bit entry point in header_64.S. With the current patch
> series, it will not boot up if the bootloader jumps to the startup_32
> entry, which might break some default distro images.
> What are supported bootloaders and configurations?
> I am using grub ( 2.02-2ubuntu8.15) and it fails to boot because of
> this reason. I am not a grub expert, so I would appreciate any
> pointers on this.
This is right, the only supported boot path is via the 64bit EFI entry
point. The reason is that SEV-ES requires support in the firmware too,
and currently only OVMF is supported in that regard. The firmware needs
to setup the AP jump-table, for example.
Other boot-paths have not been implemented. Booting via startup_32 would
require exception handling in the 32bit-part of the boot-strap code,
because verify_cpu is called there. Also an AMD specific MSR can't be
accessed there because this would #GP on non-AMD/SEV-ES machines and,
as I said, there is no way yet to handle them.
How did you get into the startup_32 entry-point, do you have an SEV-ES
BIOS supporting this? If it is really needed it could be implemented at
a later point.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-21 12:49 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-21 16:48 ` Erdem Aktas
2020-07-22 9:04 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Erdem Aktas @ 2020-07-21 16:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Yes, I am using OVMF with SEV-ES (sev-es-v12 patches applied). I am
running Ubuntu 18.04 distro. My grub target is x86_64-efi. I also
tried installing the grub-efi-amd64 package. In all cases, the grub is
running in 64bit but enters the startup_32 in 32 bit mode. I think
there should be a 32bit #VC handler just something very similar in the
OVMF patches to handle the cpuid when the CPU is still in 32bit mode.
As it is now, it will be a huge problem to support different distro images.
I wonder if I am the only one having this problem.
-Erdem
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 5:50 AM Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 06:09:19PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> > It looks like there is an expectation that the bootloader will start
> > from the 64bit entry point in header_64.S. With the current patch
> > series, it will not boot up if the bootloader jumps to the startup_32
> > entry, which might break some default distro images.
> > What are supported bootloaders and configurations?
> > I am using grub ( 2.02-2ubuntu8.15) and it fails to boot because of
> > this reason. I am not a grub expert, so I would appreciate any
> > pointers on this.
>
> This is right, the only supported boot path is via the 64bit EFI entry
> point. The reason is that SEV-ES requires support in the firmware too,
> and currently only OVMF is supported in that regard. The firmware needs
> to setup the AP jump-table, for example.
>
> Other boot-paths have not been implemented. Booting via startup_32 would
> require exception handling in the 32bit-part of the boot-strap code,
> because verify_cpu is called there. Also an AMD specific MSR can't be
> accessed there because this would #GP on non-AMD/SEV-ES machines and,
> as I said, there is no way yet to handle them.
>
> How did you get into the startup_32 entry-point, do you have an SEV-ES
> BIOS supporting this? If it is really needed it could be implemented at
> a later point.
>
> Regards,
>
> Joerg
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-21 16:48 ` Erdem Aktas
@ 2020-07-22 9:04 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-22 16:54 ` Erdem Aktas
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-22 9:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Erdem Aktas
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
Hi Erdem,
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:48:51AM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> Yes, I am using OVMF with SEV-ES (sev-es-v12 patches applied). I am
> running Ubuntu 18.04 distro. My grub target is x86_64-efi. I also
> tried installing the grub-efi-amd64 package. In all cases, the grub is
> running in 64bit but enters the startup_32 in 32 bit mode. I think
> there should be a 32bit #VC handler just something very similar in the
> OVMF patches to handle the cpuid when the CPU is still in 32bit mode.
> As it is now, it will be a huge problem to support different distro images.
> I wonder if I am the only one having this problem.
I havn't heard from anyone else that the startup_32 boot-path is being
used for SEV-ES. What OVMF binary do you use for your guest?
In general it is not that difficult to support that boot-path too, but
I'd like to keep that as a future addition, as the patch-set is already
quite large. In the startup_32 path there is already a GDT set up, so
whats needed is an IDT and a 32-bit #VC handler using the MRS-based
protocol (and hoping that there will only be CPUID intercepts until it
reaches long-mode).
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-22 9:04 ` Joerg Roedel
@ 2020-07-22 16:54 ` Erdem Aktas
2020-07-22 17:45 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 118+ messages in thread
From: Erdem Aktas @ 2020-07-22 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
I am using a custom, optimized and stripped down version, OVMF build.
Do you think it is because of the OVMF or grub?
In my case, there are 2 places where the CPUID is called: the first
one is to decide if long mode is supported, along with few other
features like SSE support and the second one is to retrieve the
encryption bit location.
-Erdem
On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 2:04 AM Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> wrote:
>
> Hi Erdem,
>
> On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:48:51AM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> > Yes, I am using OVMF with SEV-ES (sev-es-v12 patches applied). I am
> > running Ubuntu 18.04 distro. My grub target is x86_64-efi. I also
> > tried installing the grub-efi-amd64 package. In all cases, the grub is
> > running in 64bit but enters the startup_32 in 32 bit mode. I think
> > there should be a 32bit #VC handler just something very similar in the
> > OVMF patches to handle the cpuid when the CPU is still in 32bit mode.
> > As it is now, it will be a huge problem to support different distro images.
> > I wonder if I am the only one having this problem.
>
> I havn't heard from anyone else that the startup_32 boot-path is being
> used for SEV-ES. What OVMF binary do you use for your guest?
>
> In general it is not that difficult to support that boot-path too, but
> I'd like to keep that as a future addition, as the patch-set is already
> quite large. In the startup_32 path there is already a GDT set up, so
> whats needed is an IDT and a 32-bit #VC handler using the MRS-based
> protocol (and hoping that there will only be CPUID intercepts until it
> reaches long-mode).
>
> Regards,
>
> Joerg
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
2020-07-22 16:54 ` Erdem Aktas
@ 2020-07-22 17:45 ` Joerg Roedel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 118+ messages in thread
From: Joerg Roedel @ 2020-07-22 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Erdem Aktas
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, x86, hpa, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Jiri Slaby, Dan Williams, Tom Lendacky,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, David Rientjes, Cfir Cohen,
Masami Hiramatsu, Mike Stunes, Sean Christopherson, Martin Radev,
linux-kernel, kvm, virtualization
On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 09:54:40AM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> I am using a custom, optimized and stripped down version, OVMF build.
> Do you think it is because of the OVMF or grub?
Not sure, I havn't looked into how grub decides which entry point to
use.
> In my case, there are 2 places where the CPUID is called: the first
> one is to decide if long mode is supported, along with few other
> features like SSE support and the second one is to retrieve the
> encryption bit location.
Yes, it is basically the verify_cpu() function that is causing the
trouble. If you want to work around it you can comment it out in that
path for testing purposes.
Regards,
Joerg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 118+ messages in thread