From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3657C56202 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 19:54:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2605246BC for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 19:54:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726297AbgKRTyI (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Nov 2020 14:54:08 -0500 Received: from outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu ([18.9.28.11]:51051 "EHLO outgoing.mit.edu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725710AbgKRTyI (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Nov 2020 14:54:08 -0500 Received: from callcc.thunk.org (pool-72-74-133-215.bstnma.fios.verizon.net [72.74.133.215]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 0AIJrdnU020080 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 18 Nov 2020 14:53:39 -0500 Received: by callcc.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id DE69A420107; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 14:53:38 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 14:53:38 -0500 From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" To: Evan Rudford Cc: Steven Rostedt , workflows@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: Is the Linux kernel underfunded? Lack of quality and security? Message-ID: <20201118195338.GD538542@mit.edu> References: <20200105081550.GB1667342@kroah.com> <20201118131322.7bae7622@gandalf.local.home> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: workflows@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 08:30:48PM +0100, Evan Rudford wrote: > I believe that Spectre and Meltdown are kind of orthogonal to many > other security threats. > Yes, I fully agree that Spectre and Meltdown need to be addressed, but > I still consider arbitrary buffer overflows in parsing libraries as > more dangerous than "typical" Spectre/Meltdown threats. You do realize that the kernel does very little parsing, and doesn't use any parsing libraries, right? In any cases, do you have a specific proposal you'd like to make? Or do you have something specific you'd be interested in doing, yourself, to help make things better? - Ted