From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Ian Jackson" <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>,
"Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] xen: Drop XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 11:53:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813105352.32412-2-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190813105352.32412-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This functionality is obsolete. It was introduced by c/s 39407bed9c0 into
Xend, but never exposed in libxl.
While not explicitly limited to PV guests, this is PV-only by virtue of its
position in the pagefault handler.
Looking though the XenServer templates, this was used to work around bugs in
the 32bit RHEL/CentOS 4.{5..7} kernels (fixed in 4.8). RHEL 4 as a major
version when out if support in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
CC: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 3 ---
tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 12 ------------
tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 22 ----------------------
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 4 ----
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 14 --------------
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 3 ---
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 7 +------
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 -
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 3 +--
9 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 0ff6ed9e70..a36896034a 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1787,9 +1787,6 @@ int xc_domain_set_machine_address_size(xc_interface *xch,
int xc_domain_get_machine_address_size(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid);
-int xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t domid);
-
/* Set the target domain */
int xc_domain_set_target(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 05d771f2ce..64ca513aae 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -2190,18 +2190,6 @@ int xc_domain_get_machine_address_size(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid)
return rc == 0 ? domctl.u.address_size.size : rc;
}
-int xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(xc_interface *xc, uint32_t domid)
-{
- DECLARE_DOMCTL;
-
- memset(&domctl, 0, sizeof(domctl));
- domctl.domain = domid;
- domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults;
-
- return do_domctl(xc, &domctl);
-
-}
-
int xc_domain_debug_control(xc_interface *xc, uint32_t domid, uint32_t sop, uint32_t vcpu)
{
DECLARE_DOMCTL;
diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
index 188bfa34da..7e831a26a7 100644
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
@@ -786,22 +786,6 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_dom_set_machine_address_size(XcObject *self,
Py_INCREF(zero);
return zero;
}
-
-static PyObject *pyxc_dom_suppress_spurious_page_faults(XcObject *self,
- PyObject *args,
- PyObject *kwds)
-{
- uint32_t dom;
-
- if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i", &dom))
- return NULL;
-
- if (xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(self->xc_handle, dom) != 0)
- return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle);
-
- Py_INCREF(zero);
- return zero;
-}
#endif /* __i386__ || __x86_64__ */
static PyObject *pyxc_gnttab_hvm_seed(XcObject *self,
@@ -2436,12 +2420,6 @@ static PyMethodDef pyxc_methods[] = {
"Set maximum machine address size for this domain.\n"
" dom [int]: Identifier of domain.\n"
" width [int]: Maximum machine address width.\n" },
-
- { "domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults",
- (PyCFunction)pyxc_dom_suppress_spurious_page_faults,
- METH_VARARGS, "\n"
- "Do not propagate spurious page faults to this guest.\n"
- " dom [int]: Identifier of domain.\n" },
#endif
{ "dom_set_memshr",
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 2d45e5b8a8..34a6f88b8a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -988,10 +988,6 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
}
break;
- case XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
- d->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults = 1;
- break;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
case XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op:
{
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 23069e25ec..350903add5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1452,20 +1452,6 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
error_code, _p(addr));
}
- if ( unlikely(current->domain->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults) )
- {
- pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
- if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault))
- {
- printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pv fatal SM%cP violation\n",
- current, (pf_type == smep_fault) ? 'E' : 'A');
-
- domain_crash(current->domain);
- }
- if ( pf_type != real_fault )
- return;
- }
-
if ( unlikely(regs->error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit) )
reserved_bit_page_fault(addr, regs);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index 933b85901f..8523c3f5e0 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -339,9 +339,6 @@ struct arch_domain
/* Is shared-info page in 32-bit format? */
bool_t has_32bit_shinfo;
- /* Domain cannot handle spurious page faults? */
- bool_t suppress_spurious_page_faults;
-
/* Is PHYSDEVOP_eoi to automatically unmask the event channel? */
bool_t auto_unmask;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 19486d5e32..726ce675e8 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -698,11 +698,6 @@ struct xen_domctl_subscribe {
/* XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size */
/* XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size */
-/*
- * Do not inject spurious page faults into this domain.
- */
-/* XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults */
-
/* XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op */
#define XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF 0
#define XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON 1
@@ -1172,7 +1167,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
#define XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group 50
#define XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size 51
#define XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size 52
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults 53
+/* #define XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults 53 - Obsolete */
#define XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op 54
#define XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext_partial 55
#define XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op 56
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 791c1f66af..fd5ec992cf 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -712,7 +712,6 @@ static int flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
case XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
case XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate:
- case XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__SET_MISC_INFO);
case XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler:
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index 194d743a71..c9ebd0f37e 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -176,8 +176,7 @@ class domain
getpodtarget
# XENMEM_set_pod_target
setpodtarget
-# XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe, XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate,
-# XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults
+# XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe, XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate
set_misc_info
# XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler
set_virq_handler
--
2.11.0
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-13 10:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-13 10:53 [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/2] xen: Drop obsolete DOMCTLs Andrew Cooper
2019-08-13 10:53 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2019-08-13 18:58 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] xen: Drop XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2019-08-27 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2019-08-28 14:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-08-13 10:53 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] xen: Drop XEN_DOMCTL_{get, set}_machine_address_size Andrew Cooper
2019-08-13 18:59 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2019-08-14 12:15 ` Christian Lindig
2019-08-27 15:47 ` Jan Beulich
2019-08-14 12:16 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/2] xen: Drop obsolete DOMCTLs Wei Liu
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