[Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Alexandru Stefan ISAILA]

This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.

Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
---
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
Changes since V7:
	- Make use of array_access_nospec() over
array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m).
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 21 ++++++++++---------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c    |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c        | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
index 320b9fe621..31ff826393 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
@@ -366,11 +366,12 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
     if ( altp2m_idx )
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
@@ -425,11 +426,12 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
     if ( altp2m_idx )
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
@@ -491,11 +493,12 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, xenmem_access_t *access,
     }
     else if ( altp2m_idx ) /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
index b5517769c9..b078a9a59e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
@@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ void setup_ept_dump(void)
 
 void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i)
 {
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i];
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, i);
     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
     struct ept_data *ept;
 
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i)
     p2m->max_mapped_pfn = p2m->max_remapped_gfn = 0;
     ept = &p2m->ept;
     ept->mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m));
-    d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] = ept->eptp;
+    d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(i, MAX_EPTP)] = ept->eptp;
 }
 
 unsigned int p2m_find_altp2m_by_eptp(struct domain *d, uint64_t eptp)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 3119269073..00b24342fc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2502,7 +2502,7 @@ static void p2m_reset_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx,
     struct p2m_domain *p2m;
 
     ASSERT(idx < MAX_ALTP2M);
-    p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx];
+    p2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, idx);
 
     p2m_lock(p2m);
 
@@ -2543,7 +2543,7 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 
     ASSERT(idx < MAX_ALTP2M);
 
-    p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx];
+    p2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, idx);
     hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
 
     p2m_lock(p2m);
@@ -2574,12 +2574,13 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
 
-    if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M )
+    if ( idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) )
         return rc;
 
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
-    if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+    if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+         mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
         rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx);
 
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
@@ -2615,7 +2616,7 @@ int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
     struct p2m_domain *p2m;
     int rc = -EBUSY;
 
-    if ( !idx || idx >= MAX_ALTP2M )
+    if ( !idx || idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) )
         return rc;
 
     rc = domain_pause_except_self(d);
@@ -2625,14 +2626,16 @@ int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
     rc = -EBUSY;
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
-    if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+    if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] !=
+         mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
     {
-        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx];
+        p2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, idx);
 
         if ( !_atomic_read(p2m->active_vcpus) )
         {
             p2m_reset_altp2m(d, idx, ALTP2M_DEACTIVATE);
-            d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+            d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] =
+            mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
             rc = 0;
         }
     }
@@ -2689,11 +2692,13 @@ int p2m_change_altp2m_gfn(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx,
     mfn_t mfn;
     int rc = -EINVAL;
 
-    if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+    if ( idx >=  min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+         d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+         mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
         return rc;
 
     hp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-    ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx];
+    ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, idx);
 
     p2m_lock(hp2m);
     p2m_lock(ap2m);
@@ -3032,11 +3037,12 @@ int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
 
     if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
     }
     else
         p2m = host_p2m;
@@ -3075,11 +3081,12 @@ int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve,
 
     if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
     }
     else
         p2m = host_p2m;
-- 
2.17.1

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[Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[Alexandru Stefan ISAILA]

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in case
of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
preemption on large ranges.
The gfn of the first error is stored in
xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code is
stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
If no error occurred the values will be 0.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>

---
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
Changes since V7:
	- Fix commit message
	- Move all in values in the sve initializer
	- Drop sve.first_error check.
---
 tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h   |  4 ++
 tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c         | 33 +++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          | 20 +++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 13 ++++++
 xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  3 ++
 6 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 75f191ae3a..cc4eb1e3d3 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1923,6 +1923,10 @@ int xc_altp2m_switch_to_view(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                              uint16_t view_id);
 int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                               uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool sve);
+int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
+                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
+                                   xen_pfn_t *error_gfn, int32_t *error_code);
 int xc_altp2m_get_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                               uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool *sve);
 int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c b/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
index 09dad0355e..46fb725806 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
@@ -234,6 +234,39 @@ int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
     return rc;
 }
 
+int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
+                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
+                                   xen_pfn_t *error_gfn, int32_t *error_code)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t, arg);
+
+    arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(handle, arg, sizeof(*arg));
+    if ( arg == NULL )
+        return -1;
+
+    arg->version = HVMOP_ALTP2M_INTERFACE_VERSION;
+    arg->cmd = HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi;
+    arg->domain = domid;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.view = view_id;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_gfn = first_gfn;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn = last_gfn;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.suppress_ve = sve;
+
+    rc = xencall2(handle->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, HVMOP_altp2m,
+                  HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg));
+
+    if ( arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error )
+    {
+        *error_gfn = arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn;
+        *error_code = arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error;
+    }
+
+    xc_hypercall_buffer_free(handle, arg);
+    return rc;
+}
+
 int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                              uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn,
                              xenmem_access_t access)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 4723f5d09c..4d79b4934e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4520,6 +4520,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
     case HVMOP_altp2m_destroy_p2m:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_switch_p2m:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve:
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi:
@@ -4678,6 +4679,25 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
         }
         break;
 
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+    {
+        uint64_t max_phys_addr = (1UL << d->arch.cpuid->extd.maxphysaddr) - 1;
+
+        a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn = min(a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn,
+                                             max_phys_addr);
+
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 ||
+             a.u.suppress_ve_multi.first_gfn > a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+            if ( (!rc || rc == -ERESTART) && __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
         if ( a.u.suppress_ve.pad1 || a.u.suppress_ve.pad2 )
             rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 00b24342fc..3a2929c365 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -3026,44 +3026,83 @@ out:
  */
 int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx)
+{
+    int rc;
+    struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi sve = {
+        altp2m_idx, suppress_ve, 0, 0, gfn_x(gfn), gfn_x(gfn), 0
+    };
+
+    if ( !(rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &sve)) )
+        rc = sve.first_error;
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for multiple pages.  Only available on VMX.
+ */
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *sve)
 {
     struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
     struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
-    mfn_t mfn;
-    p2m_access_t a;
-    p2m_type_t t;
-    int rc;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = host_p2m;
+    uint64_t start = sve->first_gfn;
+    int rc = 0;
 
-    if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
+    if ( sve->view > 0 )
     {
-        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
+        if ( sve->view >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(sve->view, MAX_EPTP)] ==
              mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
+        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, sve->view);
     }
-    else
-        p2m = host_p2m;
 
-    gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0);
+    p2m_lock(host_p2m);
 
     if ( ap2m )
         p2m_lock(ap2m);
 
-    rc = altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, gfn, &mfn, &t, &a, AP2MGET_query);
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )
+    {
+        p2m_access_t a;
+        p2m_type_t t;
+        mfn_t mfn;
+        int err = 0;
 
-    if ( rc )
-        goto out;
+        if ( (err = altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), &mfn, &t, &a,
+                                               AP2MGET_query)) &&
+             !sve->first_error )
+        {
+            sve->first_error_gfn = start; /* Save the gfn of the first error */
+            sve->first_error = err; /* Save the first error code */
+        }
 
-    rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, suppress_ve);
+        if ( !err && (err = p2m->set_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), mfn,
+                                           PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
+                                           sve->suppress_ve)) &&
+             !sve->first_error )
+        {
+            sve->first_error_gfn = start; /* Save the gfn of the first error */
+            sve->first_error = err; /* Save the first error code */
+        }
+
+        /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
+        if ( sve->last_gfn >= ++start && hypercall_preempt_check() )
+        {
+            rc = -ERESTART;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sve->first_gfn = start;
 
-out:
     if ( ap2m )
         p2m_unlock(ap2m);
 
-    gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0);
+    p2m_unlock(host_p2m);
 
     return rc;
 }
diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
index 353f8034d9..d344606864 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
@@ -46,6 +46,16 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
     uint64_t gfn;
 };
 
+struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
+    uint16_t view;
+    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
+    uint8_t pad1;
+    int32_t first_error; /* Should be set to 0. */
+    uint64_t first_gfn; /* Value may be updated. */
+    uint64_t last_gfn;
+    uint64_t first_error_gfn; /* Gfn of the first error. */
+};
+
 #if __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ < 0x00040900
 
 /* Set the logical level of one of a domain's PCI INTx wires. */
@@ -339,6 +349,8 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  13
 /* Get the active vcpu p2m index */
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_get_p2m_idx          14
+/* Set the "Supress #VE" bit for a range of pages */
+#define HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi 15
     domid_t domain;
     uint16_t pad1;
     uint32_t pad2;
@@ -353,6 +365,7 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_change_gfn           change_gfn;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi set_mem_access_multi;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve          suppress_ve;
+        struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi    suppress_ve_multi;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  disable_notify;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx     get_vcpu_p2m_idx;
         uint8_t pad[64];
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
index e4d24502e0..00e594a0ad 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
 int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx);
 
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *suppress_ve);
+
 int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx);
 
-- 
2.17.1

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[Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 3/4] x86/mm: Pull vendor-independent altp2m code out of p2m-ept.c and into p2m.c

[Alexandru Stefan ISAILA]

No functional changes.

Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

---
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 6 ------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c     | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
index b078a9a59e..05a5526e08 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
@@ -1357,13 +1357,7 @@ void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i)
     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
     struct ept_data *ept;
 
-    p2m->default_access = hostp2m->default_access;
-    p2m->domain = hostp2m->domain;
-
-    p2m->global_logdirty = hostp2m->global_logdirty;
     p2m->ept.ad = hostp2m->ept.ad;
-    p2m->min_remapped_gfn = gfn_x(INVALID_GFN);
-    p2m->max_mapped_pfn = p2m->max_remapped_gfn = 0;
     ept = &p2m->ept;
     ept->mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m));
     d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(i, MAX_EPTP)] = ept->eptp;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 3a2929c365..696946697a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2562,6 +2562,12 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
         goto out;
     }
 
+    p2m->default_access = hostp2m->default_access;
+    p2m->domain = hostp2m->domain;
+    p2m->global_logdirty = hostp2m->global_logdirty;
+    p2m->min_remapped_gfn = gfn_x(INVALID_GFN);
+    p2m->max_mapped_pfn = p2m->max_remapped_gfn = 0;
+
     p2m_init_altp2m_ept(d, idx);
 
  out:
-- 
2.17.1

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[Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 4/4] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

[Alexandru Stefan ISAILA]

At this moment the default_access param from xc_altp2m_create_view is
not used.

This patch assigns default_access to p2m->default_access at the time of
initializing a new altp2m view.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
Changes since V6:
	- Remove the NULL check for p2m in xenmem_access_to_p2m_access()
	- Use hostp2m for default access in p2m_init_next_altp2m()
	- Remove the artifact line from p2m_init_next_altp2m().
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          |  3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c    |  6 +++---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h       |  3 ++-
 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h |  2 --
 xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 4d79b4934e..b96fafed65 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4654,7 +4654,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
     }
 
     case HVMOP_altp2m_create_p2m:
-        if ( !(rc = p2m_init_next_altp2m(d, &a.u.view.view)) )
+        if ( !(rc = p2m_init_next_altp2m(d, &a.u.view.view,
+                                         a.u.view.hvmmem_default_access)) )
             rc = __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) ? -EFAULT : 0;
         break;
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
index 31ff826393..d16540a9aa 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static int set_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
     return rc;
 }
 
-static bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
-                                        p2m_access_t *paccess)
+bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(const struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                 xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                 p2m_access_t *paccess)
 {
     static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
 #define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 696946697a..4599a0bc24 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 
 #include <xen/guest_access.h> /* copy_from_guest() */
 #include <xen/iommu.h>
+#include <xen/mem_access.h>
 #include <xen/vm_event.h>
 #include <xen/event.h>
 #include <public/vm_event.h>
@@ -2536,7 +2537,8 @@ void p2m_flush_altp2m(struct domain *d)
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
 }
 
-static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
+static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx,
+                               p2m_access_t hvmmem_default_access)
 {
     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m, *p2m;
     int rc;
@@ -2562,7 +2564,7 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
         goto out;
     }
 
-    p2m->default_access = hostp2m->default_access;
+    p2m->default_access = hvmmem_default_access;
     p2m->domain = hostp2m->domain;
     p2m->global_logdirty = hostp2m->global_logdirty;
     p2m->min_remapped_gfn = gfn_x(INVALID_GFN);
@@ -2579,6 +2581,7 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
+    struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
 
     if ( idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) )
         return rc;
@@ -2587,16 +2590,23 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 
     if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
          mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx);
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx, hostp2m->default_access);
 
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
     return rc;
 }
 
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         xenmem_access_t hvmmem_default_access)
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
     unsigned int i;
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+
+    if ( hvmmem_default_access > XENMEM_access_default ||
+         !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(hostp2m, hvmmem_default_access, &a) )
+        return rc;
 
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
@@ -2605,7 +2615,7 @@ int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
         if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             continue;
 
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i);
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i, a);
 
         if ( !rc )
             *idx = i;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
index 94285db1b4..ac2d2787f4 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -884,7 +884,8 @@ bool p2m_altp2m_get_or_propagate(struct p2m_domain *ap2m, unsigned long gfn_l,
 int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx);
 
 /* Find an available alternate p2m and make it valid */
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx);
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         xenmem_access_t hvmmem_default_access);
 
 /* Make a specific alternate p2m invalid */
 int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx);
diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
index d344606864..610e020a62 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
@@ -251,8 +251,6 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify_t);
 struct xen_hvm_altp2m_view {
     /* IN/OUT variable */
     uint16_t view;
-    /* Create view only: default access type
-     * NOTE: currently ignored */
     uint16_t hvmmem_default_access; /* xenmem_access_t */
 };
 typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_view xen_hvm_altp2m_view_t;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
index 00e594a0ad..5d53fb8ce4 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ typedef enum {
     /* NOTE: Assumed to be only 4 bits right now on x86. */
 } p2m_access_t;
 
+bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(const struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                 xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                 p2m_access_t *paccess);
+
 /*
  * Set access type for a region of gfns.
  * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
-- 
2.17.1

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[Jan Beulich]

On 17.01.2020 14:31, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> By default the sve bits are not set.
> This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
> to set a range of sve bits.
> The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in case
> of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
> given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
> preemption on large ranges.
> The gfn of the first error is stored in
> xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code is
> stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
> If no error occurred the values will be 0.

I'm sorry for being nitpicky here, but this still isn't fully in
line with ...

> --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,16 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
>      uint64_t gfn;
>  };
>  
> +struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
> +    uint16_t view;
> +    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
> +    uint8_t pad1;
> +    int32_t first_error; /* Should be set to 0. */
> +    uint64_t first_gfn; /* Value may be updated. */
> +    uint64_t last_gfn;
> +    uint64_t first_error_gfn; /* Gfn of the first error. */
> +};

... this: There's nothing said here about zeroing first_error_gfn
(and FAOD there doesn't need to be), and even first_error correctly
says only "should". Hence the values will be non-zero when there
was no error only if the caller had set them to zero. Anyway, this
alone surely is no reason for a v9, so take it just as a benign
(for the moment) remark.

Jan

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Jan Beulich]

On 17.01.2020 14:31, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
> values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.
> 
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 4/4] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

[Tamas K Lengyel]

On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 6:31 AM Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
<aisaila@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> At this moment the default_access param from xc_altp2m_create_view is
> not used.
>
> This patch assigns default_access to p2m->default_access at the time of
> initializing a new altp2m view.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

For the mem_access bits:
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU]

On Fri, 2020-01-17 at 15:31 +0200, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
> values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.
> 
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
> 
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 4/4] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

[Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU]

On Fri, 2020-01-17 at 15:31 +0200, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> At this moment the default_access param from xc_altp2m_create_view is
> not used.
> 
> This patch assigns default_access to p2m->default_access at the time
> of
> initializing a new altp2m view.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> 
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU]

On Fri, 2020-01-17 at 15:31 +0200, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> By default the sve bits are not set.
> This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
> to set a range of sve bits.
> The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in
> case
> of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
> given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
> preemption on large ranges.
> The gfn of the first error is stored in
> xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code
> is
> stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
> If no error occurred the values will be 0.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> 
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 3/4] x86/mm: Pull vendor-independent altp2m code out of p2m-ept.c and into p2m.c

[Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU]

On Fri, 2020-01-17 at 13:31 +0000, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> No functional changes.
> 
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> 
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[Alexandru Stefan ISAILA]

Hi George,

This is a kind reminder, when you have the time, can you take a look at 
this series?

Regards,
Alex

On 17.01.2020 15:31, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> By default the sve bits are not set.
> This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
> to set a range of sve bits.
> The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in case
> of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
> given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
> preemption on large ranges.
> The gfn of the first error is stored in
> xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code is
> stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
> If no error occurred the values will be 0.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> 
> ---
> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> CC: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
> CC: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> ---
> Changes since V7:
> 	- Fix commit message
> 	- Move all in values in the sve initializer
> 	- Drop sve.first_error check.
> ---
>   tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h   |  4 ++
>   tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c         | 33 +++++++++++++++
>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          | 20 +++++++++
>   xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>   xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 13 ++++++
>   xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  3 ++
>   6 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> index 75f191ae3a..cc4eb1e3d3 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> @@ -1923,6 +1923,10 @@ int xc_altp2m_switch_to_view(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
>                                uint16_t view_id);
>   int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
>                                 uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool sve);
> +int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
> +                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
> +                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
> +                                   xen_pfn_t *error_gfn, int32_t *error_code);
>   int xc_altp2m_get_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
>                                 uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool *sve);
>   int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c b/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
> index 09dad0355e..46fb725806 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c
> @@ -234,6 +234,39 @@ int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
>       return rc;
>   }
>   
> +int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
> +                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
> +                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
> +                                   xen_pfn_t *error_gfn, int32_t *error_code)
> +{
> +    int rc;
> +    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t, arg);
> +
> +    arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(handle, arg, sizeof(*arg));
> +    if ( arg == NULL )
> +        return -1;
> +
> +    arg->version = HVMOP_ALTP2M_INTERFACE_VERSION;
> +    arg->cmd = HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi;
> +    arg->domain = domid;
> +    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.view = view_id;
> +    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_gfn = first_gfn;
> +    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn = last_gfn;
> +    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.suppress_ve = sve;
> +
> +    rc = xencall2(handle->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, HVMOP_altp2m,
> +                  HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg));
> +
> +    if ( arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error )
> +    {
> +        *error_gfn = arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn;
> +        *error_code = arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error;
> +    }
> +
> +    xc_hypercall_buffer_free(handle, arg);
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +
>   int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
>                                uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn,
>                                xenmem_access_t access)
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index 4723f5d09c..4d79b4934e 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -4520,6 +4520,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_destroy_p2m:
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_switch_p2m:
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve:
> +    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access:
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi:
> @@ -4678,6 +4679,25 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
>           }
>           break;
>   
> +    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
> +    {
> +        uint64_t max_phys_addr = (1UL << d->arch.cpuid->extd.maxphysaddr) - 1;
> +
> +        a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn = min(a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn,
> +                                             max_phys_addr);
> +
> +        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 ||
> +             a.u.suppress_ve_multi.first_gfn > a.u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn )
> +            rc = -EINVAL;
> +        else
> +        {
> +            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
> +            if ( (!rc || rc == -ERESTART) && __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
> +                rc = -EFAULT;
> +        }
> +        break;
> +    }
> +
>       case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
>           if ( a.u.suppress_ve.pad1 || a.u.suppress_ve.pad2 )
>               rc = -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> index 00b24342fc..3a2929c365 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> @@ -3026,44 +3026,83 @@ out:
>    */
>   int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
>                           unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> +    int rc;
> +    struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi sve = {
> +        altp2m_idx, suppress_ve, 0, 0, gfn_x(gfn), gfn_x(gfn), 0
> +    };
> +
> +    if ( !(rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &sve)) )
> +        rc = sve.first_error;
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for multiple pages.  Only available on VMX.
> + */
> +int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *sve)
>   {
>       struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
>       struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
> -    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
> -    mfn_t mfn;
> -    p2m_access_t a;
> -    p2m_type_t t;
> -    int rc;
> +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = host_p2m;
> +    uint64_t start = sve->first_gfn;
> +    int rc = 0;
>   
> -    if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
> +    if ( sve->view > 0 )
>       {
> -        if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
> -             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] ==
> +        if ( sve->view >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) ||
> +             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(sve->view, MAX_EPTP)] ==
>                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
>               return -EINVAL;
>   
> -        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, altp2m_idx);
> +        p2m = ap2m = array_access_nospec(d->arch.altp2m_p2m, sve->view);
>       }
> -    else
> -        p2m = host_p2m;
>   
> -    gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0);
> +    p2m_lock(host_p2m);
>   
>       if ( ap2m )
>           p2m_lock(ap2m);
>   
> -    rc = altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, gfn, &mfn, &t, &a, AP2MGET_query);
> +    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )
> +    {
> +        p2m_access_t a;
> +        p2m_type_t t;
> +        mfn_t mfn;
> +        int err = 0;
>   
> -    if ( rc )
> -        goto out;
> +        if ( (err = altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), &mfn, &t, &a,
> +                                               AP2MGET_query)) &&
> +             !sve->first_error )
> +        {
> +            sve->first_error_gfn = start; /* Save the gfn of the first error */
> +            sve->first_error = err; /* Save the first error code */
> +        }
>   
> -    rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, suppress_ve);
> +        if ( !err && (err = p2m->set_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), mfn,
> +                                           PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
> +                                           sve->suppress_ve)) &&
> +             !sve->first_error )
> +        {
> +            sve->first_error_gfn = start; /* Save the gfn of the first error */
> +            sve->first_error = err; /* Save the first error code */
> +        }
> +
> +        /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
> +        if ( sve->last_gfn >= ++start && hypercall_preempt_check() )
> +        {
> +            rc = -ERESTART;
> +            break;
> +        }
> +    }
> +
> +    sve->first_gfn = start;
>   
> -out:
>       if ( ap2m )
>           p2m_unlock(ap2m);
>   
> -    gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0);
> +    p2m_unlock(host_p2m);
>   
>       return rc;
>   }
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> index 353f8034d9..d344606864 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,16 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
>       uint64_t gfn;
>   };
>   
> +struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
> +    uint16_t view;
> +    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
> +    uint8_t pad1;
> +    int32_t first_error; /* Should be set to 0. */
> +    uint64_t first_gfn; /* Value may be updated. */
> +    uint64_t last_gfn;
> +    uint64_t first_error_gfn; /* Gfn of the first error. */
> +};
> +
>   #if __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ < 0x00040900
>   
>   /* Set the logical level of one of a domain's PCI INTx wires. */
> @@ -339,6 +349,8 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
>   #define HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  13
>   /* Get the active vcpu p2m index */
>   #define HVMOP_altp2m_get_p2m_idx          14
> +/* Set the "Supress #VE" bit for a range of pages */
> +#define HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi 15
>       domid_t domain;
>       uint16_t pad1;
>       uint32_t pad2;
> @@ -353,6 +365,7 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
>           struct xen_hvm_altp2m_change_gfn           change_gfn;
>           struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi set_mem_access_multi;
>           struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve          suppress_ve;
> +        struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi    suppress_ve_multi;
>           struct xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  disable_notify;
>           struct xen_hvm_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx     get_vcpu_p2m_idx;
>           uint8_t pad[64];
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> index e4d24502e0..00e594a0ad 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
>   int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
>                           unsigned int altp2m_idx);
>   
> +int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *suppress_ve);
> +
>   int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve,
>                           unsigned int altp2m_idx);
>   
> 
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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[George Dunlap]

On 1/21/20 3:09 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> Hi George,
> 
> This is a kind reminder, when you have the time, can you take a look at 
> this series?

It's on the top of my list of things to review.  :-) I should be able to
get to it Thursday.

 -George

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[George Dunlap]

On 1/17/20 1:31 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
> values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.
> 
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>

Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 2/4] x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

[George Dunlap]

On 1/17/20 1:31 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> By default the sve bits are not set.
> This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
> to set a range of sve bits.
> The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in case
> of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
> given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
> preemption on large ranges.
> The gfn of the first error is stored in
> xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code is
> stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
> If no error occurred the values will be 0.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>

Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 3/4] x86/mm: Pull vendor-independent altp2m code out of p2m-ept.c and into p2m.c

[George Dunlap]

On 1/17/20 1:31 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> No functional changes.
> 
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 4/4] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

[George Dunlap]

On 1/17/20 1:31 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> At this moment the default_access param from xc_altp2m_create_view is
> not used.
> 
> This patch assigns default_access to p2m->default_access at the time of
> initializing a new altp2m view.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Andrew Cooper]

On 17/01/2020 13:31, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
> values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.
>
> Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>

Something in this series broke the ARM build.  Sorry, but I don't have
any further time to investigate.

gcc -DBUILD_ID -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu99 -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes
-Wdeclaration-after-statement -Wno-unused-but-set-variable
-Wno-unused-local-typedefs -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -nostdinc
-fno-builtin -fno-common -Werror -Wredundant-decls -Wno-pointer-arith
-Wvla -pipe -D__XEN__ -include
/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/config.h
'-D__OBJECT_FILE__="asm-offsets.s"' -Wa,--strip-local-absolute -g -MMD
-MF ./.asm-offsets.s.d -mcpu=generic -mgeneral-regs-only
-I/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include -fno-stack-protector
-fno-exceptions -Wnested-externs -DGCC_HAS_VISIBILITY_ATTRIBUTE -S -o
asm-offsets.s arm64/asm-offsets.c
In file included from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/asm/p2m.h:7,
                 from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/asm/domain.h:7,
                 from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/domain.h:8,
                 from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/sched.h:11,
                 from arm64/asm-offsets.c:9:
/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h:61:47: error:
'struct p2m_domain' declared inside parameter list will not be visible
outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
 bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(const struct p2m_domain *p2m,
                                               ^~~~~~~~~~
/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h:83:38: error:
'struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi' declared inside parameter list
will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
                               struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi
*suppress_ve);
                                      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
make[3]: *** [Makefile:124: asm-offsets.s] Error 1
make[3]: Leaving directory '/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/arch/arm'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:146: /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/xen] Error 2
make[2]: Leaving directory '/builds/xen-project/xen/xen'
make[1]: *** [Makefile:50: install] Error 2
make[1]: Leaving directory '/builds/xen-project/xen/xen'
make: *** [Makefile:130: install-xen] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Full logs: https://gitlab.com/xen-project/xen/-/jobs/412893448

~Andrew

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V8 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

[Tamas K Lengyel]

On Thu, Jan 23, 2020 at 11:45 AM Andrew Cooper
<andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>
> On 17/01/2020 13:31, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> > This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
> > values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.
> >
> > Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> > Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
>
> Something in this series broke the ARM build.  Sorry, but I don't have
> any further time to investigate.
>
> gcc -DBUILD_ID -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu99 -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes
> -Wdeclaration-after-statement -Wno-unused-but-set-variable
> -Wno-unused-local-typedefs -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -nostdinc
> -fno-builtin -fno-common -Werror -Wredundant-decls -Wno-pointer-arith
> -Wvla -pipe -D__XEN__ -include
> /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/config.h
> '-D__OBJECT_FILE__="asm-offsets.s"' -Wa,--strip-local-absolute -g -MMD
> -MF ./.asm-offsets.s.d -mcpu=generic -mgeneral-regs-only
> -I/builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include -fno-stack-protector
> -fno-exceptions -Wnested-externs -DGCC_HAS_VISIBILITY_ATTRIBUTE -S -o
> asm-offsets.s arm64/asm-offsets.c
> In file included from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/asm/p2m.h:7,
>                  from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/asm/domain.h:7,
>                  from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/domain.h:8,
>                  from /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/sched.h:11,
>                  from arm64/asm-offsets.c:9:
> /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h:61:47: error:
> 'struct p2m_domain' declared inside parameter list will not be visible
> outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
>  bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(const struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>                                                ^~~~~~~~~~
> /builds/xen-project/xen/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h:83:38: error:
> 'struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi' declared inside parameter list

Looks like we need an explicit include for asm/p2m.h and
public/hvm/hvm_op.h in the mem_access.h header (both of which end up
being included prior to mem_access.h on an x86 build). Although from
the looks of it wrapping the _ve functions in #ifdef CONFIG_X86 ..
#endif would be even better.

Tamas

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