From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
"Jun Nakajima" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
"Kevin Tian" <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 16:09:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201009150948.31063-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken, and
would allow arbitrary non-canonical values to be loaded into %rip. This was
fixed after the embargo by c/s 81d3a0b26c1 "x86emul: limit-check branch
targets".
However, in a demonstration that off-by-one errors really are one of the
hardest programming issues we face, everyone involved with XSA-170, myself
included, mistook the statement in the SDM which says:
If the processor supports N < 64 linear-address bits, bits 63:N must be identical
to mean "must be canonical". A real canonical check is bits 63:N-1.
VMEntries really do tolerate a not-quite-canonical %rip, specifically to cater
to the boundary condition at 0x0000800000000000.
Now that the emulator has been fixed, revert the XSA-170 change to fix
architectural behaviour at the boundary case. The XTF test case for XSA-170
exercises this corner case, and still passes.
Fixes: ffbbfda377 ("x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 34 +---------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 86b8916a5d..28d09c1ca0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3650,7 +3650,7 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification, exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0;
- unsigned int vector = 0, mode;
+ unsigned int vector = 0;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct domain *currd = v->domain;
@@ -4280,38 +4280,6 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
out:
if ( nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) )
nvmx_idtv_handling();
-
- /*
- * VM entry will fail (causing the guest to get crashed) if rIP (and
- * rFLAGS, but we don't have an issue there) doesn't meet certain
- * criteria. As we must not allow less than fully privileged mode to have
- * such an effect on the domain, we correct rIP in that case (accepting
- * this not being architecturally correct behavior, as the injected #GP
- * fault will then not see the correct [invalid] return address).
- * And since we know the guest will crash, we crash it right away if it
- * already is in most privileged mode.
- */
- mode = vmx_guest_x86_mode(v);
- if ( mode == 8 ? !is_canonical_address(regs->rip)
- : regs->rip != regs->eip )
- {
- gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad rIP %lx for mode %u\n", regs->rip, mode);
-
- if ( vmx_get_cpl() )
- {
- __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, &intr_info);
- if ( !(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
- hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
- /* Need to fix rIP nevertheless. */
- if ( mode == 8 )
- regs->rip = (long)(regs->rip << (64 - VADDR_BITS)) >>
- (64 - VADDR_BITS);
- else
- regs->rip = regs->eip;
- }
- else
- domain_crash(v->domain);
- }
}
static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
--
2.11.0
next reply other threads:[~2020-10-09 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-09 15:09 Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-10-13 15:58 ` [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest" Jan Beulich
2020-10-14 13:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-15 8:01 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-16 15:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-19 9:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-19 16:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-20 8:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-23 6:14 ` Tian, Kevin
2023-04-05 21:52 Andrew Cooper
2023-04-06 7:10 ` Jan Beulich
2023-08-23 11:15 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-08-23 11:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-23 13:31 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-08-23 14:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-24 4:26 ` Tian, Kevin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20201009150948.31063-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
--cc=jun.nakajima@intel.com \
--cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
--cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
--cc=wl@xen.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).