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From: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
To: <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	"Norbert Manthey" <nmanthey@amazon.de>,
	"Ian Jackson" <iwj@xenproject.org>
Subject: [PATCH HVM v2 1/1] hvm: refactor set param
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 21:39:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210205203905.8824-1-nmanthey@amazon.de> (raw)

To prevent leaking HVM params via L1TF and similar issues on a
hyperthread pair, let's load values of domains as late as possible.

Furthermore, speculative barriers are re-arranged to make sure we do not
allow guests running on co-located VCPUs to leak hvm parameter values of
other domains.

This is part of the speculative hardening effort.

Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
Reported-by: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@amazon.co.uk>

---
v2: Add another speculative blocker, which protects the return code check
    of the function hvm_allow_set_param.


 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4060,7 +4060,7 @@ static int hvm_allow_set_param(struct domain *d,
                                uint32_t index,
                                uint64_t new_value)
 {
-    uint64_t value = d->arch.hvm.params[index];
+    uint64_t value;
     int rc;
 
     rc = xsm_hvm_param(XSM_TARGET, d, HVMOP_set_param);
@@ -4108,6 +4108,13 @@ static int hvm_allow_set_param(struct domain *d,
     if ( rc )
         return rc;
 
+    if ( index >= HVM_NR_PARAMS )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    /* Make sure we evaluate permissions before loading data of domains. */
+    block_speculation();
+
+    value = d->arch.hvm.params[index];
     switch ( index )
     {
     /* The following parameters should only be changed once. */
@@ -4141,6 +4148,9 @@ static int hvm_set_param(struct domain *d, uint32_t index, uint64_t value)
     if ( rc )
         return rc;
 
+    /* Make sure we evaluate permissions before loading data of domains. */
+    block_speculation();
+
     switch ( index )
     {
     case HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_IRQ:
@@ -4388,6 +4398,10 @@ int hvm_get_param(struct domain *d, uint32_t index, uint64_t *value)
     if ( rc )
         return rc;
 
+    /* Make sure the index bound check in hvm_get_param is respected, as well as
+       the above domain permissions. */
+    block_speculation();
+
     switch ( index )
     {
     case HVM_PARAM_ACPI_S_STATE:
@@ -4428,9 +4442,6 @@ static int hvmop_get_param(
     if ( a.index >= HVM_NR_PARAMS )
         return -EINVAL;
 
-    /* Make sure the above bound check is not bypassed during speculation. */
-    block_speculation();
-
     d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(a.domid);
     if ( d == NULL )
         return -ESRCH;
-- 
2.17.1




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879





             reply	other threads:[~2021-02-05 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-05 20:39 Norbert Manthey [this message]
2021-02-08 14:21 ` [PATCH HVM v2 1/1] hvm: refactor set param Jan Beulich
2021-02-08 19:47   ` Norbert Manthey
2021-02-08 20:00     ` [PATCH HVM v3 " Norbert Manthey
2021-02-09 10:06       ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09  9:40     ` [PATCH HVM v2 " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:41       ` Norbert Manthey
2021-02-09 13:45         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:56           ` Norbert Manthey
2021-02-09 14:21             ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11 20:46               ` Norbert Manthey
2021-02-12 10:04                 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 12:28                   ` Norbert Manthey
2021-02-18 15:01                     ` [PATCH HVM v4 " Norbert Manthey
2021-02-19 13:44                       ` Jan Beulich

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