* [PATCH v3 1/8] xen/events: reset affinity of 2-level event when tearing it down
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending Juergen Gross
` (7 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable,
Julien Grall, Julien Grall
When creating a new event channel with 2-level events the affinity
needs to be reset initially in order to avoid using an old affinity
from earlier usage of the event channel port. So when tearing an event
channel down reset all affinity bits.
The same applies to the affinity when onlining a vcpu: all old
affinity settings for this vcpu must be reset. As percpu events get
initialized before the percpu event channel hook is called,
resetting of the affinities happens after offlining a vcpu (this is
working, as initial percpu memory is zeroed out).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
---
V2:
- reset affinity when tearing down the event (Julien Grall)
---
drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 1 +
drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
index da87f3a1e351..a7f413c5c190 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ static unsigned evtchn_2l_max_channels(void)
return EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS;
}
+static void evtchn_2l_remove(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ clear_bit(evtchn, BM(per_cpu(cpu_evtchn_mask, cpu)));
+}
+
static void evtchn_2l_bind_to_cpu(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int cpu,
unsigned int old_cpu)
{
@@ -355,9 +360,18 @@ static void evtchn_2l_resume(void)
EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS/BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD);
}
+static int evtchn_2l_percpu_deinit(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ memset(per_cpu(cpu_evtchn_mask, cpu), 0, sizeof(xen_ulong_t) *
+ EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS/BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_2l = {
.max_channels = evtchn_2l_max_channels,
.nr_channels = evtchn_2l_max_channels,
+ .remove = evtchn_2l_remove,
.bind_to_cpu = evtchn_2l_bind_to_cpu,
.clear_pending = evtchn_2l_clear_pending,
.set_pending = evtchn_2l_set_pending,
@@ -367,6 +381,7 @@ static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_2l = {
.unmask = evtchn_2l_unmask,
.handle_events = evtchn_2l_handle_events,
.resume = evtchn_2l_resume,
+ .percpu_deinit = evtchn_2l_percpu_deinit,
};
void __init xen_evtchn_2l_init(void)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index e850f79351cb..6c539db81f8f 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ static int xen_irq_info_pirq_setup(unsigned irq,
static void xen_irq_info_cleanup(struct irq_info *info)
{
set_evtchn_to_irq(info->evtchn, -1);
+ xen_evtchn_port_remove(info->evtchn, info->cpu);
info->evtchn = 0;
channels_on_cpu_dec(info);
}
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
index 0a97c0549db7..18a4090d0709 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct evtchn_ops {
unsigned (*nr_channels)(void);
int (*setup)(evtchn_port_t port);
+ void (*remove)(evtchn_port_t port, unsigned int cpu);
void (*bind_to_cpu)(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int cpu,
unsigned int old_cpu);
@@ -54,6 +55,13 @@ static inline int xen_evtchn_port_setup(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
return 0;
}
+static inline void xen_evtchn_port_remove(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (evtchn_ops->remove)
+ evtchn_ops->remove(evtchn, cpu);
+}
+
static inline void xen_evtchn_port_bind_to_cpu(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
unsigned int cpu,
unsigned int old_cpu)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] xen/events: reset affinity of 2-level event when tearing it down Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-20 12:10 ` Julien Grall
2021-02-23 9:26 ` Ross Lagerwall
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time Juergen Gross
` (6 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable, Julien Grall
An event channel should be kept masked when an eoi is pending for it.
When being migrated to another cpu it might be unmasked, though.
In order to avoid this keep three different flags for each event channel
to be able to distinguish "normal" masking/unmasking from eoi related
masking/unmasking and temporary masking. The event channel should only
be able to generate an interrupt if all flags are cleared.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 54c9de89895e0a36047 ("xen/events: add a new late EOI evtchn framework")
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- introduce a lock around masking/unmasking
- merge patch 3 into this one (Jan Beulich)
---
drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c | 7 --
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++------
drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c | 7 --
drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h | 6 --
4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
index a7f413c5c190..b8f2f971c2f0 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
@@ -77,12 +77,6 @@ static bool evtchn_2l_is_pending(evtchn_port_t port)
return sync_test_bit(port, BM(&s->evtchn_pending[0]));
}
-static bool evtchn_2l_test_and_set_mask(evtchn_port_t port)
-{
- struct shared_info *s = HYPERVISOR_shared_info;
- return sync_test_and_set_bit(port, BM(&s->evtchn_mask[0]));
-}
-
static void evtchn_2l_mask(evtchn_port_t port)
{
struct shared_info *s = HYPERVISOR_shared_info;
@@ -376,7 +370,6 @@ static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_2l = {
.clear_pending = evtchn_2l_clear_pending,
.set_pending = evtchn_2l_set_pending,
.is_pending = evtchn_2l_is_pending,
- .test_and_set_mask = evtchn_2l_test_and_set_mask,
.mask = evtchn_2l_mask,
.unmask = evtchn_2l_unmask,
.handle_events = evtchn_2l_handle_events,
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index 6c539db81f8f..e157e7506830 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -97,13 +97,18 @@ struct irq_info {
short refcnt;
u8 spurious_cnt;
u8 is_accounted;
- enum xen_irq_type type; /* type */
+ short type; /* type: IRQT_* */
+ u8 mask_reason; /* Why is event channel masked */
+#define EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT 0x01
+#define EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY 0x02
+#define EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING 0x04
unsigned irq;
evtchn_port_t evtchn; /* event channel */
unsigned short cpu; /* cpu bound */
unsigned short eoi_cpu; /* EOI must happen on this cpu-1 */
unsigned int irq_epoch; /* If eoi_cpu valid: irq_epoch of event */
u64 eoi_time; /* Time in jiffies when to EOI. */
+ spinlock_t lock;
union {
unsigned short virq;
@@ -152,6 +157,7 @@ static DEFINE_RWLOCK(evtchn_rwlock);
* evtchn_rwlock
* IRQ-desc lock
* percpu eoi_list_lock
+ * irq_info->lock
*/
static LIST_HEAD(xen_irq_list_head);
@@ -302,6 +308,8 @@ static int xen_irq_info_common_setup(struct irq_info *info,
info->irq = irq;
info->evtchn = evtchn;
info->cpu = cpu;
+ info->mask_reason = EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT;
+ spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
ret = set_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn, irq);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -450,6 +458,34 @@ unsigned int cpu_from_evtchn(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
return ret;
}
+static void do_mask(struct irq_info *info, u8 reason)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&info->lock, flags);
+
+ if (!info->mask_reason)
+ mask_evtchn(info->evtchn);
+
+ info->mask_reason |= reason;
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void do_unmask(struct irq_info *info, u8 reason)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&info->lock, flags);
+
+ info->mask_reason &= ~reason;
+
+ if (!info->mask_reason)
+ unmask_evtchn(info->evtchn);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->lock, flags);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
static bool pirq_check_eoi_map(unsigned irq)
{
@@ -586,7 +622,7 @@ static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info, bool spurious)
}
info->eoi_time = 0;
- unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
}
static void xen_irq_lateeoi_worker(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -831,7 +867,8 @@ static unsigned int __startup_pirq(unsigned int irq)
goto err;
out:
- unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT);
+
eoi_pirq(irq_get_irq_data(irq));
return 0;
@@ -858,7 +895,7 @@ static void shutdown_pirq(struct irq_data *data)
if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
return;
- mask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT);
xen_evtchn_close(evtchn);
xen_irq_info_cleanup(info);
}
@@ -1691,10 +1728,10 @@ void rebind_evtchn_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn, int irq)
}
/* Rebind an evtchn so that it gets delivered to a specific cpu */
-static int xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int tcpu)
+static int xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(struct irq_info *info, unsigned int tcpu)
{
struct evtchn_bind_vcpu bind_vcpu;
- int masked;
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
return -1;
@@ -1710,7 +1747,7 @@ static int xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int tcpu)
* Mask the event while changing the VCPU binding to prevent
* it being delivered on an unexpected VCPU.
*/
- masked = test_and_set_mask(evtchn);
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY);
/*
* If this fails, it usually just indicates that we're dealing with a
@@ -1720,8 +1757,7 @@ static int xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn_port_t evtchn, unsigned int tcpu)
if (HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_bind_vcpu, &bind_vcpu) >= 0)
bind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn, tcpu, false);
- if (!masked)
- unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY);
return 0;
}
@@ -1760,7 +1796,7 @@ static int set_affinity_irq(struct irq_data *data, const struct cpumask *dest,
unsigned int tcpu = select_target_cpu(dest);
int ret;
- ret = xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn_from_irq(data->irq), tcpu);
+ ret = xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(info_for_irq(data->irq), tcpu);
if (!ret)
irq_data_update_effective_affinity(data, cpumask_of(tcpu));
@@ -1769,18 +1805,20 @@ static int set_affinity_irq(struct irq_data *data, const struct cpumask *dest,
static void enable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
- unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT);
}
static void disable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
- mask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT);
}
static void ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
@@ -1799,18 +1837,40 @@ static void mask_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
ack_dynirq(data);
}
+static void lateeoi_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
+{
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
+
+ if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
+ clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ }
+}
+
+static void lateeoi_mask_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
+{
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
+
+ if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT |
+ EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
+ clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ }
+}
+
static int retrigger_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
- int masked;
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
return 0;
- masked = test_and_set_mask(evtchn);
+ do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY);
set_evtchn(evtchn);
- if (!masked)
- unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+ do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY);
return 1;
}
@@ -2024,8 +2084,8 @@ static struct irq_chip xen_lateeoi_chip __read_mostly = {
.irq_mask = disable_dynirq,
.irq_unmask = enable_dynirq,
- .irq_ack = mask_ack_dynirq,
- .irq_mask_ack = mask_ack_dynirq,
+ .irq_ack = lateeoi_ack_dynirq,
+ .irq_mask_ack = lateeoi_mask_ack_dynirq,
.irq_set_affinity = set_affinity_irq,
.irq_retrigger = retrigger_dynirq,
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
index b234f1766810..ad9fe51d3fb3 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
@@ -209,12 +209,6 @@ static bool evtchn_fifo_is_pending(evtchn_port_t port)
return sync_test_bit(EVTCHN_FIFO_BIT(PENDING, word), BM(word));
}
-static bool evtchn_fifo_test_and_set_mask(evtchn_port_t port)
-{
- event_word_t *word = event_word_from_port(port);
- return sync_test_and_set_bit(EVTCHN_FIFO_BIT(MASKED, word), BM(word));
-}
-
static void evtchn_fifo_mask(evtchn_port_t port)
{
event_word_t *word = event_word_from_port(port);
@@ -423,7 +417,6 @@ static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_fifo = {
.clear_pending = evtchn_fifo_clear_pending,
.set_pending = evtchn_fifo_set_pending,
.is_pending = evtchn_fifo_is_pending,
- .test_and_set_mask = evtchn_fifo_test_and_set_mask,
.mask = evtchn_fifo_mask,
.unmask = evtchn_fifo_unmask,
.handle_events = evtchn_fifo_handle_events,
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
index 18a4090d0709..4d3398eff9cd 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ struct evtchn_ops {
void (*clear_pending)(evtchn_port_t port);
void (*set_pending)(evtchn_port_t port);
bool (*is_pending)(evtchn_port_t port);
- bool (*test_and_set_mask)(evtchn_port_t port);
void (*mask)(evtchn_port_t port);
void (*unmask)(evtchn_port_t port);
@@ -84,11 +83,6 @@ static inline bool test_evtchn(evtchn_port_t port)
return evtchn_ops->is_pending(port);
}
-static inline bool test_and_set_mask(evtchn_port_t port)
-{
- return evtchn_ops->test_and_set_mask(port);
-}
-
static inline void mask_evtchn(evtchn_port_t port)
{
return evtchn_ops->mask(port);
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-20 12:10 ` Julien Grall
2021-02-23 9:26 ` Ross Lagerwall
1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2021-02-20 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross, xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable
Hi Juergen,
On 19/02/2021 15:40, Juergen Gross wrote:
> An event channel should be kept masked when an eoi is pending for it.
> When being migrated to another cpu it might be unmasked, though.
>
> In order to avoid this keep three different flags for each event channel
> to be able to distinguish "normal" masking/unmasking from eoi related
> masking/unmasking and temporary masking. The event channel should only
> be able to generate an interrupt if all flags are cleared.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 54c9de89895e0a36047 ("xen/events: add a new late EOI evtchn framework")
> Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending Juergen Gross
2021-02-20 12:10 ` Julien Grall
@ 2021-02-23 9:26 ` Ross Lagerwall
2021-03-05 10:53 ` Jürgen Groß
2021-03-06 16:18 ` Jürgen Groß
1 sibling, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ross Lagerwall @ 2021-02-23 9:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross, xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable, Julien Grall
On 2021-02-19 15:40, Juergen Gross wrote:
> An event channel should be kept masked when an eoi is pending for it.
> When being migrated to another cpu it might be unmasked, though.
>
> In order to avoid this keep three different flags for each event channel
> to be able to distinguish "normal" masking/unmasking from eoi related
> masking/unmasking and temporary masking. The event channel should only
> be able to generate an interrupt if all flags are cleared.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 54c9de89895e0a36047 ("xen/events: add a new late EOI evtchn framework")
> Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
I tested this patch series backported to a 4.19 kernel and found that
when doing a reboot loop of Windows with PV drivers, occasionally it will
end up in a state with some event channels pending and masked in dom0
which breaks networking in the guest.
The issue seems to have been introduced with this patch, though at first
glance it appears correct. I haven't yet looked into why it is happening.
Have you seen anything like this with this patch?
Thanks,
Ross
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
2021-02-23 9:26 ` Ross Lagerwall
@ 2021-03-05 10:53 ` Jürgen Groß
2021-03-06 16:18 ` Jürgen Groß
1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jürgen Groß @ 2021-03-05 10:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ross Lagerwall, xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable, Julien Grall
[-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1428 bytes --]
On 23.02.21 10:26, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
> On 2021-02-19 15:40, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> An event channel should be kept masked when an eoi is pending for it.
>> When being migrated to another cpu it might be unmasked, though.
>>
>> In order to avoid this keep three different flags for each event channel
>> to be able to distinguish "normal" masking/unmasking from eoi related
>> masking/unmasking and temporary masking. The event channel should only
>> be able to generate an interrupt if all flags are cleared.
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Fixes: 54c9de89895e0a36047 ("xen/events: add a new late EOI evtchn framework")
>> Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>
> I tested this patch series backported to a 4.19 kernel and found that
> when doing a reboot loop of Windows with PV drivers, occasionally it will
> end up in a state with some event channels pending and masked in dom0
> which breaks networking in the guest.
>
> The issue seems to have been introduced with this patch, though at first
> glance it appears correct. I haven't yet looked into why it is happening.
> Have you seen anything like this with this patch?
Sorry it took so long, but now I was able to look into this issue.
I have managed to reproduce it with a pv Linux guest. I'm now adding
some debug code to understand what is happening there.
Juergen
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
2021-02-23 9:26 ` Ross Lagerwall
2021-03-05 10:53 ` Jürgen Groß
@ 2021-03-06 16:18 ` Jürgen Groß
1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jürgen Groß @ 2021-03-06 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ross Lagerwall, xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable, Julien Grall
[-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1488 bytes --]
On 23.02.21 10:26, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
> On 2021-02-19 15:40, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> An event channel should be kept masked when an eoi is pending for it.
>> When being migrated to another cpu it might be unmasked, though.
>>
>> In order to avoid this keep three different flags for each event channel
>> to be able to distinguish "normal" masking/unmasking from eoi related
>> masking/unmasking and temporary masking. The event channel should only
>> be able to generate an interrupt if all flags are cleared.
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Fixes: 54c9de89895e0a36047 ("xen/events: add a new late EOI evtchn framework")
>> Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>
> I tested this patch series backported to a 4.19 kernel and found that
> when doing a reboot loop of Windows with PV drivers, occasionally it will
> end up in a state with some event channels pending and masked in dom0
> which breaks networking in the guest.
>
> The issue seems to have been introduced with this patch, though at first
> glance it appears correct. I haven't yet looked into why it is happening.
> Have you seen anything like this with this patch?
I have found the issue. lateeoi_mask_ack_dynirq() must not set the "eoi"
mask reason flag, as this callback will be called when the handler will
not be called later, so there will never be a call of xen_irq_lateeoi()
to unmask the event channel again.
Juergen
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 3/8] xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] xen/events: reset affinity of 2-level event when tearing it down Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-20 12:12 ` Julien Grall
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] xen/netback: fix spurious event detection for common event case Juergen Gross
` (5 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable, Julien Grall
When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that
(with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled on the old
and the new cpu at the same time.
Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the per-event data and
call the handler only if this flag isn't set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- new patch
V3:
- use common helper for end of handler action (Julien Grall)
- move setting is_active to 0 for lateeoi (Boris Ostrovsky)
---
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index e157e7506830..9d7ba7623510 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct irq_info {
#define EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT 0x01
#define EVT_MASK_REASON_TEMPORARY 0x02
#define EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING 0x04
+ u8 is_active; /* Is event just being handled? */
unsigned irq;
evtchn_port_t evtchn; /* event channel */
unsigned short cpu; /* cpu bound */
@@ -791,6 +792,12 @@ static void xen_evtchn_close(evtchn_port_t port)
BUG();
}
+static void event_handler_exit(struct irq_info *info)
+{
+ smp_store_release(&info->is_active, 0);
+ clear_evtchn(info->evtchn);
+}
+
static void pirq_query_unmask(int irq)
{
struct physdev_irq_status_query irq_status;
@@ -809,14 +816,15 @@ static void pirq_query_unmask(int irq)
static void eoi_pirq(struct irq_data *data)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
struct physdev_eoi eoi = { .irq = pirq_from_irq(data->irq) };
int rc = 0;
if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
return;
- clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ event_handler_exit(info);
if (pirq_needs_eoi(data->irq)) {
rc = HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_eoi, &eoi);
@@ -1640,6 +1648,8 @@ void handle_irq_for_port(evtchn_port_t port, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
}
info = info_for_irq(irq);
+ if (xchg_acquire(&info->is_active, 1))
+ return;
if (ctrl->defer_eoi) {
info->eoi_cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -1823,12 +1833,11 @@ static void disable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
static void ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
-
- if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
- return;
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(data->irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
- clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+ event_handler_exit(info);
}
static void mask_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
@@ -1844,7 +1853,7 @@ static void lateeoi_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
- clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ event_handler_exit(info);
}
}
@@ -1856,7 +1865,7 @@ static void lateeoi_mask_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EXPLICIT |
EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
- clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ event_handler_exit(info);
}
}
@@ -1969,10 +1978,11 @@ static void restore_cpu_ipis(unsigned int cpu)
/* Clear an irq's pending state, in preparation for polling on it */
void xen_clear_irq_pending(int irq)
{
- evtchn_port_t evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(irq);
+ struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(irq);
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn = info ? info->evtchn : 0;
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
- clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+ event_handler_exit(info);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xen_clear_irq_pending);
void xen_set_irq_pending(int irq)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-20 12:12 ` Julien Grall
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2021-02-20 12:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross, xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini, stable
Hi Juergen,
On 19/02/2021 15:40, Juergen Gross wrote:
> When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that
> (with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled on the old
> and the new cpu at the same time.
>
> Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the per-event data and
> call the handler only if this flag isn't set.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 4/8] xen/netback: fix spurious event detection for common event case
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device Juergen Gross
` (4 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Wei Liu, Paul Durrant, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, stable, Jan Beulich, Wei Liu
In case of a common event for rx and tx queue the event should be
regarded to be spurious if no rx and no tx requests are pending.
Unfortunately the condition for testing that is wrong causing to
decide a event being spurious if no rx OR no tx requests are
pending.
Fix that plus using local variables for rx/tx pending indicators in
order to split function calls and if condition.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 23025393dbeb3b ("xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
V2:
- new patch, fixing FreeBSD performance issue
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index acb786d8b1d8..e02a4fbb74de 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -162,13 +162,15 @@ irqreturn_t xenvif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct xenvif_queue *queue = dev_id;
int old;
+ bool has_rx, has_tx;
old = atomic_fetch_or(NETBK_COMMON_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
WARN(old, "Interrupt while EOI pending\n");
- /* Use bitwise or as we need to call both functions. */
- if ((!xenvif_handle_tx_interrupt(queue) |
- !xenvif_handle_rx_interrupt(queue))) {
+ has_tx = xenvif_handle_tx_interrupt(queue);
+ has_rx = xenvif_handle_rx_interrupt(queue);
+
+ if (!has_rx && !has_tx) {
atomic_andnot(NETBK_COMMON_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
}
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 5/8] xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] xen/netback: fix spurious event detection for common event case Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-22 14:50 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] xen/events: add per-xenbus device event statistics and settings Juergen Gross
` (3 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-block, linux-kernel, netdev, linux-scsi
Cc: Juergen Gross, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Roger Pau Monné,
Jens Axboe, Wei Liu, Paul Durrant, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini
In order to support the possibility of per-device event channel
settings (e.g. lateeoi spurious event thresholds) add a xenbus device
pointer to struct irq_info() and modify the related event channel
binding interfaces to take the pointer to the xenbus device as a
parameter instead of the domain id of the other side.
While at it remove the stale prototype of bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi().
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
---
drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 16 +++++------
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++------------
drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c | 4 +--
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c | 2 +-
drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c | 2 +-
include/xen/events.h | 7 ++---
7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
index 9860d4842f36..c2aaf690352c 100644
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int xen_blkif_map(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, grant_ref_t *gref,
if (req_prod - rsp_prod > size)
goto fail;
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(blkif->domid,
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(blkif->be->dev,
evtchn, xen_blkif_be_int, 0, "blkif-backend", ring);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index e02a4fbb74de..50a94e58c150 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -630,13 +630,13 @@ int xenvif_connect_ctrl(struct xenvif *vif, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
unsigned int evtchn)
{
struct net_device *dev = vif->dev;
+ struct xenbus_device *xendev = xenvif_to_xenbus_device(vif);
void *addr;
struct xen_netif_ctrl_sring *shared;
RING_IDX rsp_prod, req_prod;
int err;
- err = xenbus_map_ring_valloc(xenvif_to_xenbus_device(vif),
- &ring_ref, 1, &addr);
+ err = xenbus_map_ring_valloc(xendev, &ring_ref, 1, &addr);
if (err)
goto err;
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_ctrl(struct xenvif *vif, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
if (req_prod - rsp_prod > RING_SIZE(&vif->ctrl))
goto err_unmap;
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(vif->domid, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(xendev, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto err_unmap;
@@ -673,8 +673,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_ctrl(struct xenvif *vif, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
vif->ctrl_irq = 0;
err_unmap:
- xenbus_unmap_ring_vfree(xenvif_to_xenbus_device(vif),
- vif->ctrl.sring);
+ xenbus_unmap_ring_vfree(xendev, vif->ctrl.sring);
vif->ctrl.sring = NULL;
err:
@@ -719,6 +718,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
unsigned int tx_evtchn,
unsigned int rx_evtchn)
{
+ struct xenbus_device *dev = xenvif_to_xenbus_device(queue->vif);
struct task_struct *task;
int err;
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
if (tx_evtchn == rx_evtchn) {
/* feature-split-event-channels == 0 */
err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
- queue->vif->domid, tx_evtchn, xenvif_interrupt, 0,
+ dev, tx_evtchn, xenvif_interrupt, 0,
queue->name, queue);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
snprintf(queue->tx_irq_name, sizeof(queue->tx_irq_name),
"%s-tx", queue->name);
err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
- queue->vif->domid, tx_evtchn, xenvif_tx_interrupt, 0,
+ dev, tx_evtchn, xenvif_tx_interrupt, 0,
queue->tx_irq_name, queue);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
snprintf(queue->rx_irq_name, sizeof(queue->rx_irq_name),
"%s-rx", queue->name);
err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
- queue->vif->domid, rx_evtchn, xenvif_rx_interrupt, 0,
+ dev, rx_evtchn, xenvif_rx_interrupt, 0,
queue->rx_irq_name, queue);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index 9d7ba7623510..b60df189ecbc 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <xen/interface/physdev.h>
#include <xen/interface/sched.h>
#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
+#include <xen/xenbus.h>
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
#include "events_internal.h"
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ struct irq_info {
unsigned char flags;
uint16_t domid;
} pirq;
+ struct xenbus_device *interdomain;
} u;
};
@@ -322,11 +324,16 @@ static int xen_irq_info_common_setup(struct irq_info *info,
}
static int xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(unsigned irq,
- evtchn_port_t evtchn)
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ struct xenbus_device *dev)
{
struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(irq);
+ int ret;
- return xen_irq_info_common_setup(info, irq, IRQT_EVTCHN, evtchn, 0);
+ ret = xen_irq_info_common_setup(info, irq, IRQT_EVTCHN, evtchn, 0);
+ info->u.interdomain = dev;
+
+ return ret;
}
static int xen_irq_info_ipi_setup(unsigned cpu,
@@ -1162,7 +1169,8 @@ int xen_pirq_from_irq(unsigned irq)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_pirq_from_irq);
-static int bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn, struct irq_chip *chip)
+static int bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn, struct irq_chip *chip,
+ struct xenbus_device *dev)
{
int irq;
int ret;
@@ -1182,7 +1190,7 @@ static int bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn, struct irq_chip *chip)
irq_set_chip_and_handler_name(irq, chip,
handle_edge_irq, "event");
- ret = xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(irq, evtchn);
+ ret = xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(irq, evtchn, dev);
if (ret < 0) {
__unbind_from_irq(irq);
irq = ret;
@@ -1209,7 +1217,7 @@ static int bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn, struct irq_chip *chip)
int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
{
- return bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, &xen_dynamic_chip);
+ return bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, &xen_dynamic_chip, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irq);
@@ -1258,27 +1266,27 @@ static int bind_ipi_to_irq(unsigned int ipi, unsigned int cpu)
return irq;
}
-static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(unsigned int remote_domain,
+static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(struct xenbus_device *dev,
evtchn_port_t remote_port,
struct irq_chip *chip)
{
struct evtchn_bind_interdomain bind_interdomain;
int err;
- bind_interdomain.remote_dom = remote_domain;
+ bind_interdomain.remote_dom = dev->otherend_id;
bind_interdomain.remote_port = remote_port;
err = HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_bind_interdomain,
&bind_interdomain);
return err ? : bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(bind_interdomain.local_port,
- chip);
+ chip, dev);
}
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(struct xenbus_device *dev,
evtchn_port_t remote_port)
{
- return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(remote_domain, remote_port,
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(dev, remote_port,
&xen_lateeoi_chip);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi);
@@ -1391,7 +1399,7 @@ static int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
{
int irq, retval;
- irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, chip);
+ irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, chip, NULL);
if (irq < 0)
return irq;
retval = request_irq(irq, handler, irqflags, devname, dev_id);
@@ -1426,14 +1434,13 @@ int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi);
static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(
- unsigned int remote_domain, evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ struct xenbus_device *dev, evtchn_port_t remote_port,
irq_handler_t handler, unsigned long irqflags,
const char *devname, void *dev_id, struct irq_chip *chip)
{
int irq, retval;
- irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(remote_domain, remote_port,
- chip);
+ irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(dev, remote_port, chip);
if (irq < 0)
return irq;
@@ -1446,14 +1453,14 @@ static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(
return irq;
}
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(struct xenbus_device *dev,
evtchn_port_t remote_port,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags,
const char *devname,
void *dev_id)
{
- return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(remote_domain,
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(dev,
remote_port, handler, irqflags, devname,
dev_id, &xen_lateeoi_chip);
}
@@ -1727,7 +1734,7 @@ void rebind_evtchn_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn, int irq)
so there should be a proper type */
BUG_ON(info->type == IRQT_UNBOUND);
- (void)xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(irq, evtchn);
+ (void)xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(irq, evtchn, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&irq_mapping_update_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
index a7d293fa8d14..b47fd8435061 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static struct sock_mapping *pvcalls_new_active_socket(
map->bytes = page;
ret = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
- fedata->dev->otherend_id, evtchn,
+ fedata->dev, evtchn,
pvcalls_back_conn_event, 0, "pvcalls-backend", map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static int backend_connect(struct xenbus_device *dev)
goto error;
}
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev->otherend_id, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
fedata->irq = err;
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
index e7c692cfb2cf..5188f02e75fb 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int xen_pcibk_do_attach(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev, int gnt_ref,
pdev->sh_info = vaddr;
err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
- pdev->xdev->otherend_id, remote_evtchn, xen_pcibk_handle_event,
+ pdev->xdev, remote_evtchn, xen_pcibk_handle_event,
0, DRV_NAME, pdev);
if (err < 0) {
xenbus_dev_fatal(pdev->xdev, err,
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
index 862162dca33c..8b59897b2df9 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static int scsiback_init_sring(struct vscsibk_info *info, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
sring = (struct vscsiif_sring *)area;
BACK_RING_INIT(&info->ring, sring, PAGE_SIZE);
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->domid, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->dev, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto unmap_page;
diff --git a/include/xen/events.h b/include/xen/events.h
index 8ec418e30c7f..c204262d9fc2 100644
--- a/include/xen/events.h
+++ b/include/xen/events.h
@@ -12,10 +12,11 @@
#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
#include <asm/xen/events.h>
+struct xenbus_device;
+
unsigned xen_evtchn_nr_channels(void);
int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
-int bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags, const char *devname,
@@ -35,9 +36,9 @@ int bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(enum ipi_vector ipi,
unsigned long irqflags,
const char *devname,
void *dev_id);
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(struct xenbus_device *dev,
evtchn_port_t remote_port);
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(struct xenbus_device *dev,
evtchn_port_t remote_port,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags,
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 5/8] xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-22 14:50 ` Roger Pau Monné
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2021-02-22 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross
Cc: xen-devel, linux-block, linux-kernel, netdev, linux-scsi,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Jens Axboe, Wei Liu, Paul Durrant,
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Boris Ostrovsky,
Stefano Stabellini
On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 04:40:27PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> In order to support the possibility of per-device event channel
> settings (e.g. lateeoi spurious event thresholds) add a xenbus device
> pointer to struct irq_info() and modify the related event channel
> binding interfaces to take the pointer to the xenbus device as a
> parameter instead of the domain id of the other side.
>
> While at it remove the stale prototype of bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi().
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
> ---
> drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 2 +-
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Thanks, Roger.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 6/8] xen/events: add per-xenbus device event statistics and settings
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] xen/evtchn: use smp barriers for user event ring Juergen Gross
` (2 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini
Add syfs nodes for each xenbus device showing event statistics (number
of events and spurious events, number of associated event channels)
and for setting a spurious event threshold in case a frontend is
sending too many events without being rogue on purpose.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
---
V2:
- add documentation (Boris Ostrovsky)
---
.../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-xenbus | 41 ++++++++++++
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 27 +++++++-
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++
include/xen/xenbus.h | 7 ++
4 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-xenbus
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-xenbus b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-xenbus
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fd796cb4f315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-xenbus
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+What: /sys/devices/*/xenbus/event_channels
+Date: February 2021
+Contact: Xen Developers mailing list <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:
+ Number of Xen event channels associated with a kernel based
+ paravirtualized device frontend or backend.
+
+What: /sys/devices/*/xenbus/events
+Date: February 2021
+Contact: Xen Developers mailing list <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:
+ Total number of Xen events received for a Xen pv device
+ frontend or backend.
+
+What: /sys/devices/*/xenbus/jiffies_eoi_delayed
+Date: February 2021
+Contact: Xen Developers mailing list <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:
+ Summed up time in jiffies the EOI of an interrupt for a Xen
+ pv device has been delayed in order to avoid stalls due to
+ event storms. This value rising is a first sign for a rogue
+ other end of the pv device.
+
+What: /sys/devices/*/xenbus/spurious_events
+Date: February 2021
+Contact: Xen Developers mailing list <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:
+ Number of events received for a Xen pv device which did not
+ require any action. Too many spurious events in a row will
+ trigger delayed EOI processing.
+
+What: /sys/devices/*/xenbus/spurious_threshold
+Date: February 2021
+Contact: Xen Developers mailing list <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:
+ Controls the tolerated number of subsequent spurious events
+ before delayed EOI processing is triggered for a Xen pv
+ device. Default is 1. This can be modified in case the other
+ end of the pv device is issuing spurious events on a regular
+ basis and is known not to be malicious on purpose. Raising
+ the value for such cases can improve pv device performance.
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index b60df189ecbc..a3636fb03417 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ static int xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(unsigned irq,
ret = xen_irq_info_common_setup(info, irq, IRQT_EVTCHN, evtchn, 0);
info->u.interdomain = dev;
+ if (dev)
+ atomic_inc(&dev->event_channels);
return ret;
}
@@ -606,18 +608,28 @@ static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info, bool spurious)
return;
if (spurious) {
+ struct xenbus_device *dev = info->u.interdomain;
+ unsigned int threshold = 1;
+
+ if (dev && dev->spurious_threshold)
+ threshold = dev->spurious_threshold;
+
if ((1 << info->spurious_cnt) < (HZ << 2)) {
if (info->spurious_cnt != 0xFF)
info->spurious_cnt++;
}
- if (info->spurious_cnt > 1) {
- delay = 1 << (info->spurious_cnt - 2);
+ if (info->spurious_cnt > threshold) {
+ delay = 1 << (info->spurious_cnt - 1 - threshold);
if (delay > HZ)
delay = HZ;
if (!info->eoi_time)
info->eoi_cpu = smp_processor_id();
info->eoi_time = get_jiffies_64() + delay;
+ if (dev)
+ atomic_add(delay, &dev->jiffies_eoi_delayed);
}
+ if (dev)
+ atomic_inc(&dev->spurious_events);
} else {
info->spurious_cnt = 0;
}
@@ -954,6 +966,7 @@ static void __unbind_from_irq(unsigned int irq)
if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
unsigned int cpu = cpu_from_irq(irq);
+ struct xenbus_device *dev;
xen_evtchn_close(evtchn);
@@ -964,6 +977,11 @@ static void __unbind_from_irq(unsigned int irq)
case IRQT_IPI:
per_cpu(ipi_to_irq, cpu)[ipi_from_irq(irq)] = -1;
break;
+ case IRQT_EVTCHN:
+ dev = info->u.interdomain;
+ if (dev)
+ atomic_dec(&dev->event_channels);
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -1627,6 +1645,7 @@ void handle_irq_for_port(evtchn_port_t port, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
{
int irq;
struct irq_info *info;
+ struct xenbus_device *dev;
irq = get_evtchn_to_irq(port);
if (irq == -1)
@@ -1658,6 +1677,10 @@ void handle_irq_for_port(evtchn_port_t port, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
if (xchg_acquire(&info->is_active, 1))
return;
+ dev = (info->type == IRQT_EVTCHN) ? info->u.interdomain : NULL;
+ if (dev)
+ atomic_inc(&dev->events);
+
if (ctrl->defer_eoi) {
info->eoi_cpu = smp_processor_id();
info->irq_epoch = __this_cpu_read(irq_epoch);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c
index 8a75092bb148..97f0d234482d 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c
@@ -206,6 +206,65 @@ void xenbus_otherend_changed(struct xenbus_watch *watch,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_otherend_changed);
+#define XENBUS_SHOW_STAT(name) \
+static ssize_t show_##name(struct device *_dev, \
+ struct device_attribute *attr, \
+ char *buf) \
+{ \
+ struct xenbus_device *dev = to_xenbus_device(_dev); \
+ \
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", atomic_read(&dev->name)); \
+} \
+static DEVICE_ATTR(name, 0444, show_##name, NULL)
+
+XENBUS_SHOW_STAT(event_channels);
+XENBUS_SHOW_STAT(events);
+XENBUS_SHOW_STAT(spurious_events);
+XENBUS_SHOW_STAT(jiffies_eoi_delayed);
+
+static ssize_t show_spurious_threshold(struct device *_dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ struct xenbus_device *dev = to_xenbus_device(_dev);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", dev->spurious_threshold);
+}
+
+static ssize_t set_spurious_threshold(struct device *_dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct xenbus_device *dev = to_xenbus_device(_dev);
+ unsigned int val;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtouint(buf, 0, &val);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ dev->spurious_threshold = val;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spurious_threshold, 0644, show_spurious_threshold,
+ set_spurious_threshold);
+
+static struct attribute *xenbus_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_event_channels.attr,
+ &dev_attr_events.attr,
+ &dev_attr_spurious_events.attr,
+ &dev_attr_jiffies_eoi_delayed.attr,
+ &dev_attr_spurious_threshold.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group xenbus_group = {
+ .name = "xenbus",
+ .attrs = xenbus_attrs,
+};
+
int xenbus_dev_probe(struct device *_dev)
{
struct xenbus_device *dev = to_xenbus_device(_dev);
@@ -253,6 +312,11 @@ int xenbus_dev_probe(struct device *_dev)
return err;
}
+ dev->spurious_threshold = 1;
+ if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->dev.kobj, &xenbus_group))
+ dev_warn(&dev->dev, "sysfs_create_group on %s failed.\n",
+ dev->nodename);
+
return 0;
fail_put:
module_put(drv->driver.owner);
@@ -269,6 +333,8 @@ int xenbus_dev_remove(struct device *_dev)
DPRINTK("%s", dev->nodename);
+ sysfs_remove_group(&dev->dev.kobj, &xenbus_group);
+
free_otherend_watch(dev);
if (drv->remove) {
diff --git a/include/xen/xenbus.h b/include/xen/xenbus.h
index bf3cfc7c35d0..0b1386073d49 100644
--- a/include/xen/xenbus.h
+++ b/include/xen/xenbus.h
@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ struct xenbus_device {
struct completion down;
struct work_struct work;
struct semaphore reclaim_sem;
+
+ /* Event channel based statistics and settings. */
+ atomic_t event_channels;
+ atomic_t events;
+ atomic_t spurious_events;
+ atomic_t jiffies_eoi_delayed;
+ unsigned int spurious_threshold;
};
static inline struct xenbus_device *to_xenbus_device(struct device *dev)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 7/8] xen/evtchn: use smp barriers for user event ring
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] xen/events: add per-xenbus device event statistics and settings Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] xen/evtchn: use READ/WRITE_ONCE() for accessing ring indices Juergen Gross
2021-02-23 15:44 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Boris Ostrovsky
8 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini,
Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich
The ring buffer for user events is local to the given kernel instance,
so smp barriers are fine for ensuring consistency.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
drivers/xen/evtchn.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
index a7a85719a8c8..421382c73d88 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static irqreturn_t evtchn_interrupt(int irq, void *data)
if ((u->ring_prod - u->ring_cons) < u->ring_size) {
*evtchn_ring_entry(u, u->ring_prod) = evtchn->port;
- wmb(); /* Ensure ring contents visible */
+ smp_wmb(); /* Ensure ring contents visible */
if (u->ring_cons == u->ring_prod++) {
wake_up_interruptible(&u->evtchn_wait);
kill_fasync(&u->evtchn_async_queue,
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static ssize_t evtchn_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
}
rc = -EFAULT;
- rmb(); /* Ensure that we see the port before we copy it. */
+ smp_rmb(); /* Ensure that we see the port before we copy it. */
if (copy_to_user(buf, evtchn_ring_entry(u, c), bytes1) ||
((bytes2 != 0) &&
copy_to_user(&buf[bytes1], &u->ring[0], bytes2)))
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 8/8] xen/evtchn: use READ/WRITE_ONCE() for accessing ring indices
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] xen/evtchn: use smp barriers for user event ring Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-19 15:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-02-20 20:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2021-02-23 15:44 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Boris Ostrovsky
8 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2021-02-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky, Stefano Stabellini
For avoiding read- and write-tearing by the compiler use READ_ONCE()
and WRITE_ONCE() for accessing the ring indices in evtchn.c.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- modify all accesses (Julien Grall)
V3:
- fix incrementing producer index (Ross Lagerwall)
---
drivers/xen/evtchn.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
index 421382c73d88..c99415a70051 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static irqreturn_t evtchn_interrupt(int irq, void *data)
{
struct user_evtchn *evtchn = data;
struct per_user_data *u = evtchn->user;
+ unsigned int prod, cons;
WARN(!evtchn->enabled,
"Interrupt for port %u, but apparently not enabled; per-user %p\n",
@@ -171,10 +172,14 @@ static irqreturn_t evtchn_interrupt(int irq, void *data)
spin_lock(&u->ring_prod_lock);
- if ((u->ring_prod - u->ring_cons) < u->ring_size) {
- *evtchn_ring_entry(u, u->ring_prod) = evtchn->port;
+ prod = READ_ONCE(u->ring_prod);
+ cons = READ_ONCE(u->ring_cons);
+
+ if ((prod - cons) < u->ring_size) {
+ *evtchn_ring_entry(u, prod) = evtchn->port;
smp_wmb(); /* Ensure ring contents visible */
- if (u->ring_cons == u->ring_prod++) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->ring_prod, prod + 1);
+ if (cons == prod) {
wake_up_interruptible(&u->evtchn_wait);
kill_fasync(&u->evtchn_async_queue,
SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -210,8 +215,8 @@ static ssize_t evtchn_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
if (u->ring_overflow)
goto unlock_out;
- c = u->ring_cons;
- p = u->ring_prod;
+ c = READ_ONCE(u->ring_cons);
+ p = READ_ONCE(u->ring_prod);
if (c != p)
break;
@@ -221,7 +226,7 @@ static ssize_t evtchn_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
return -EAGAIN;
rc = wait_event_interruptible(u->evtchn_wait,
- u->ring_cons != u->ring_prod);
+ READ_ONCE(u->ring_cons) != READ_ONCE(u->ring_prod));
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -251,7 +256,7 @@ static ssize_t evtchn_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
copy_to_user(&buf[bytes1], &u->ring[0], bytes2)))
goto unlock_out;
- u->ring_cons += (bytes1 + bytes2) / sizeof(evtchn_port_t);
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->ring_cons, c + (bytes1 + bytes2) / sizeof(evtchn_port_t));
rc = bytes1 + bytes2;
unlock_out:
@@ -552,7 +557,9 @@ static long evtchn_ioctl(struct file *file,
/* Initialise the ring to empty. Clear errors. */
mutex_lock(&u->ring_cons_mutex);
spin_lock_irq(&u->ring_prod_lock);
- u->ring_cons = u->ring_prod = u->ring_overflow = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->ring_cons, 0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->ring_prod, 0);
+ u->ring_overflow = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&u->ring_prod_lock);
mutex_unlock(&u->ring_cons_mutex);
rc = 0;
@@ -595,7 +602,7 @@ static __poll_t evtchn_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
struct per_user_data *u = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &u->evtchn_wait, wait);
- if (u->ring_cons != u->ring_prod)
+ if (READ_ONCE(u->ring_cons) != READ_ONCE(u->ring_prod))
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
if (u->ring_overflow)
mask = EPOLLERR;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids
2021-02-19 15:40 [PATCH v3 0/8] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids Juergen Gross
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] xen/evtchn: use READ/WRITE_ONCE() for accessing ring indices Juergen Gross
@ 2021-02-23 15:44 ` Boris Ostrovsky
8 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Boris Ostrovsky @ 2021-02-23 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross, xen-devel, linux-kernel, netdev, linux-block, linux-scsi
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, stable, Wei Liu, Paul Durrant,
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Roger Pau Monné,
Jens Axboe
On 2/19/21 10:40 AM, Juergen Gross wrote:
> The first four patches are fixes for XSA-332. The avoid WARN splats
> and a performance issue with interdomain events.
>
> Patches 5 and 6 are some additions to event handling in order to add
> some per pv-device statistics to sysfs and the ability to have a per
> backend device spurious event delay control.
>
> Patches 7 and 8 are minor fixes I had lying around.
>
> Juergen Gross (8):
> xen/events: reset affinity of 2-level event when tearing it down
> xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending
> xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time
> xen/netback: fix spurious event detection for common event case
> xen/events: link interdomain events to associated xenbus device
> xen/events: add per-xenbus device event statistics and settings
> xen/evtchn: use smp barriers for user event ring
> xen/evtchn: use READ/WRITE_ONCE() for accessing ring indices
>
I am going to pick up the last 3 patches since Ross appears to be having some issues with #2 (and 4 and 5 went in via netdev tree)
-boris
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