From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2021 15:14:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <49aa4ddb-ca58-e0df-0675-daa72866d3db@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c33d7570-d986-749d-1e4f-85829a11babb@suse.com>
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On 08.07.21 15:11, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 08.07.2021 14:43, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> Today blkfront will trust the backend to send only sane response data.
>> In order to avoid privilege escalations or crashes in case of malicious
>> backends verify the data to be within expected limits. Especially make
>> sure that the response always references an outstanding request.
>>
>> Introduce a new state of the ring BLKIF_STATE_ERROR which will be
>> switched to in case an inconsistency is being detected. Recovering from
>> this state is possible only via removing and adding the virtual device
>> again (e.g. via a suspend/resume cycle).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> albeit ...
>
>> @@ -1602,7 +1628,8 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
>> case BLKIF_OP_DISCARD:
>> if (unlikely(bret.status == BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP)) {
>> struct request_queue *rq = info->rq;
>> - printk(KERN_WARNING "blkfront: %s: %s op failed\n",
>> +
>> + pr_warn_ratelimited("blkfront: %s: %s op failed\n",
>> info->gd->disk_name, op_name(bret.operation));
>> blkif_req(req)->error = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP;
>> info->feature_discard = 0;
>> @@ -1614,13 +1641,13 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
>> case BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE:
>> case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER:
>> if (unlikely(bret.status == BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP)) {
>> - printk(KERN_WARNING "blkfront: %s: %s op failed\n",
>> + pr_warn_ratelimited("blkfront: %s: %s op failed\n",
>> info->gd->disk_name, op_name(bret.operation));
>> blkif_req(req)->error = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(bret.status == BLKIF_RSP_ERROR &&
>> rinfo->shadow[id].req.u.rw.nr_segments == 0)) {
>> - printk(KERN_WARNING "blkfront: %s: empty %s op failed\n",
>> + pr_warn_ratelimited("blkfront: %s: empty %s op failed\n",
>> info->gd->disk_name, op_name(bret.operation));
>> blkif_req(req)->error = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP;
>> }
>> @@ -1635,8 +1662,8 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
>> case BLKIF_OP_READ:
>> case BLKIF_OP_WRITE:
>> if (unlikely(bret.status != BLKIF_RSP_OKAY))
>> - dev_dbg(&info->xbdev->dev, "Bad return from blkdev data "
>> - "request: %x\n", bret.status);
>> + dev_dbg_ratelimited(&info->xbdev->dev,
>> + "Bad return from blkdev data request: %x\n", bret.status);
>>
>> break;
>> default:
>
> ... all of these look kind of unrelated to the topic of the patch,
> and the conversion also isn't mentioned as on-purpose in the
> description.
Hmm, yes, I'll add a sentence to the commit message.
Juergen
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-08 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-08 12:43 [PATCH v2 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 12:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-07-09 8:33 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-07-08 12:43 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-07-09 8:55 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-07-09 13:54 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 12:43 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 13:11 ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08 13:14 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2021-07-09 9:42 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-07-09 13:58 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-09 11:09 ` kernel test robot
2021-07-30 10:08 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-30 10:31 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 14:22 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-07-08 14:39 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-10 1:18 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
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