From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Subject: Re: Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 11:50:29 +0300
Message-ID: <55A37BD5.2070508@bitdefender.com>
References: <55A36D67.3050203@bitdefender.com> <55A37285.3050304@citrix.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Return-path: <xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org>
In-Reply-To: <55A37285.3050304@citrix.com>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.xen.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/xen-devel>,
	<mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xen.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Post: <mailto:xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
List-Help: <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xen.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.xen.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>,
	<mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xen.org?subject=subscribe>
Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org
Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, "xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>, Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org

On 07/13/2015 11:10 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 13/07/2015 08:48, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm battling the following hypervisor crash with current staging:
>>
>> (d2) Invoking ROMBIOS ...
>> (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d2v0 entering stdvga and caching modes
>> (d2) VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert Exp $
>> (XEN) Watchdog timer detects that CPU7 is stuck!
>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable  x86_64  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
>> (XEN) CPU:    7
>> (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000202   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d2v0)
>> (XEN) rax: 000000000000c11d   rbx: ffff83041e687970   rcx: 000000000000c11e
>> (XEN) rdx: ffff83041e687970   rsi: 000000000000c11e   rdi: ffff83041e687978
>> (XEN) rbp: ffff83040eb37208   rsp: ffff83040eb37200   r8:  0000000000000000
>> (XEN) r9:  0000000000000000   r10: ffff82d08028c3c0   r11: 0000000000000000
>> (XEN) r12: ffff83041e687000   r13: ffff83041e687970   r14: ffff83040eb37278
>> (XEN) r15: 00000000000c253f   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4: 00000000001526e0
>> (XEN) cr3: 00000004054a0000   cr2: 0000000000000000
>> (XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: 0000   cs: e008
>> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83040eb37200:
>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37278 ffff83040eb37238 ffff82d0801d09b6 0000000000000282
>> (XEN)    0000000000000008 ffff830403791bf0 ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37268
>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb23a 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 0000000000000001
>> (XEN)    00000000000000c2 ffff83040eb37298 ffff82d0801cb410 00000000000c253f
>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0100000000000000 ffff83040eb37328
>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801c2403 ffff83040eb37394 ffff83040eb30000 0000000000000000
>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37360 00000000000000c2 ffff8304054cb000 000000000000053f
>> (XEN)    0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb373f4 00000000000000c2
>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff82d08028c620
>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37338 ffff82d0801c3e5d ffff83040eb37398
>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb107 000000010eb37394 ffff830403791bf0 ffff830403791bf0
>> (XEN)    ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37398 ffff830403791bf0 0000000000000001
>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000001 00000000000c253f ffff83040eb373c8
>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb291 ffff83040eb37b30 ffff8300d85fc000 0000000000000001
>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37428 ffff82d0801bb440 00000000000a0001
>> (XEN)    00000000000c253f 0000000100000001 0111000000000000 ffff83040eb37478
>> (XEN)    0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
>> (XEN)    0000000000000001 ffff83040eb374a8 ffff82d0801bc0b9 0000000000000001
>> (XEN)    00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 00000000000a0001 0100000000000000
>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37728 ffff82e00819dc60 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb374c8
>> (XEN) Xen call trace:
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801d09b6>] stdvga_mem_accept+0x3b/0x125
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb23a>] hvm_find_io_handler+0x68/0x8a
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb410>] hvm_mmio_internal+0x37/0x67
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c2403>] __hvm_copy+0xe9/0x37d
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c3e5d>] hvm_copy_from_guest_phys+0x14/0x16
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb107>] hvm_process_io_intercept+0x10b/0x1d6
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb291>] hvm_io_intercept+0x35/0x5b
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bb440>] hvmemul_do_io+0x1ff/0x2c1
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc0b9>] hvmemul_do_io_addr+0x117/0x163
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc129>] hvmemul_do_mmio_addr+0x24/0x26
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bcbb5>] hvmemul_rep_movs+0x1ef/0x335
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d080198b49>] x86_emulate+0x56c9/0x13088
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bbd26>] _hvm_emulate_one+0x186/0x281
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc1e8>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb63e>] handle_mmio+0x54/0xd2
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb700>] handle_mmio_with_translation+0x44/0x46
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c27f6>] hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x15f/0x589
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801e9741>] vmx_vmexit_handler+0x150e/0x188d
>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801ee7d1>] vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0x41/0xc0
>> (XEN)
>> (XEN)
>> (XEN) ****************************************
>> (XEN) Panic on CPU 7:
>> (XEN) FATAL TRAP: vector = 2 (nmi)
>> (XEN) [error_code=0000]
>> (XEN) ****************************************
>>
>> At first I thought it was caused by V5 of the vm_event-based
>> introspection series, but I've rolled it back enough to apply V4 on top
>> of it (which has been thoroughly tested on Thursday), and it still
>> happens, so this would at least appear to be unrelated at this point
>> (other than the fact that our use case is maybe somewhat unusual with
>> heavy emulation).
>>
>> I'll keep digging, but since this is a busy time for Xen I thought I'd
>> issue a heads-up here as soon as possible, in case the problem is
>> obvious for somebody and it helps getting it fixed sooner.
> 
> In c/s 3bbaaec09b1b942f5624dee176da6e416d31f982 there is now a
> deliberate split between stdvga_mem_accept() and stdvga_mem_complete()
> about locking and unlocking the stdvga lock.
> 
> At a guess, the previous chain of execution accidentally omitted the
> stdvga_mem_complete() call.

Thanks, I've reverted that patch and the crash is gone. I'll be happy to
test a fix if one is provided, but I don't know enough about that code
to go mess with it...


Thanks,
Razvan