* [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
` (16 more replies)
0 siblings, 17 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
v11:
* Rebase on staging
* Patch #6: hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
To find the lowest RMRR the _end_ of which is higher than base;
Refine some code implementations;
* Patch #7: hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
To check/sync memory_map.map[] before copy them into e820 since
ultimately this can make sure hvm_info, memory_map.map[] and e820
are on the same page;
Refine some code implementations;
* Patch #11: tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
Use GCNEW_ARRAY to replace libxl__malloc();
#define pfn_to_paddrk is missing safety () around x, and
move this into libxl_internal.h;
Rename set_rdm_entries() to add_rdm_entry() and put the
increment at the end so that the assignments are
to ->rdms[d_config->num_rdms];
"Simply make it so that if there are any rdms specified
in the domain config, they are used instead of the
automatically gathered information (from strategy and
devices)." So just return if d_config->rmds is valid;
Shorten some code comments.
v10:
* Patch #6: hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
This is from George' draft patch which implements an acceptable
solution in current cycle. Here I just implemented check_overlap_all() and
some cleanups.
* Patch #7: hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
Instead of correcting e820, I'd like to correct memory_map.map[]
and then copy them into e820 directly. I think this can make sure
hvm_info, memory_map.map[] and e820 are on the same page.
v9:
* Patch #3: xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy
Correct one check condition of XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED
* Patch #5: hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[]
Correct the patch head description:
[RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END]
-> [RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END);
Merge two if{} as one if{};
* Patch #6: hvmloader/pci: disable all pci devices conflicting with rdm
A little improvement to code implementation but again, its still argued
about this solution. Myself prefer to take a look at v7 if possible.
* Patch #7: hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
Refine that chunk of codes to check/modify highmem
* Patch #15: xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr
Correct one indentation issue
v8:
* Patch #3: xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy
Force to pass "0"(strict) when add or move a device in hardware domain,
and improve some associated code comments.
* Patch #5: hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[]
Actually we should check this range started from
RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, not RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START - 1.
So correct this and sync the patch head description.
* Patch #6: hvmloader/pci: disable all pci devices conflicting
We have a big change to this patch:
Based on current discussion its hard to reshape the original mmio
allocation mechanism but we haven't a good and simple way to in short term.
So instead, we don't bring more complicated to intervene that process but
still check any conflicts to disable all associated devices.
I know this is still argumented but I'd like to discuss this based on this
revision and thanks for your time.
* Patch #7: hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
define low_mem_end as uint32_t;
Correct those two wrong loops, memory_map.nr_map -> nr
when we're trying to revise low/high memory e820 entries;
Improve code comments and the patch head description;
Add one check if highmem is just populated by hvmloader itself
* Patch #11: tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
Introduce pfn_to_paddr(x) -> ((uint64_t)x << XC_PAGE_SHIFT)
and set_rdm_entries() to factor out current codes.
* Patch #13: libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest
make that core construction function as arch-specific to make sure
we don't break ARM at this point.
* Patch #15: xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr
Merge two if{} as one if{};
Add to print RMRR range info when stop assign a group device
* Some minimal code style changes
v7:
* Need to rename some parameters:
In the xl rdm config parsing, `reserve=' should be `policy='.
In the xl pci config parsing, `rdm_reserve=' should be `rdm_policy='.
The type `libxl_rdm_reserve_flag' should be `libxl_rdm_policy'.
The field name `reserve' in `libxl_rdm_reserve' should be `policy'.
* Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters above.
Note I also mask patch #10 Acked by Wei Liu, Ian Jackson and Ian
Campbell. ( If I'm wrong just let me know at this point. ) And
as we discussed I'd further improve something as next step after
this round of review.
v6:
* Inside patch #01, add a comments to the nr_entries field inside
xen_reserved_device_memory_map. Note this is from Jan.
* Inside patch #10, we need rename something to make our policy reasonable
"type" -> "strategy"
"none" -> "ignore"
and based on our discussion, we won't expose "ignore" in xl level and just
keep that as a default, and then sync docs and the patch head description
* Inside patch #10, we fix some code stypes and especially we refine
libxl__xc_device_get_rdm()
* Inside patch #16, we need to sync those renames introduced by patch #10.
v5:
* Fold our original patch #2 and #3 as this new, and here
introduce a new, clear_identity_p2m_entry, which can wrapper
guest_physmap_remove_page(). And we use this to clean our
identity mapping.
* Just leave one bit XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED as our policy flag, so
now "0" means "strict" and "1" means "relaxed", and also make DT device
ignore the flag field simply. And then correct all associated code
comments.
* Just make sure the per-device plicy always override the global policy,
and so cleanup some associated comments and the patch head description.
* Improve some descriptions in doc.
* Make all rdm variables specific to .hvm
* Inside patch #6, we're trying to rename that field, is_64bar, inside struct
bars with flag, and then extend to also indicate if this bar is already
allocated.
* Inside patch 11, Rename xc_device_get_rdm() with libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(),
and then replace malloc() with libxl__malloc(), and finally cleanup this fallout.
libxl__xc_device_get_rdm() should return proper libxl error code, ERROR_FAIL.
Then instead, the allocated RDM entries would be returned with an out parameter.
* The original patch #13 is sent out separately since actually this is not related
to RMRR.
v4:
* Change one condition inside patch #2, "xen/x86/p2m: introduce
set_identity_p2m_entry",
if ( p2mt == p2m_invalid || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm )
to make sure we just catch our requirement.
* Inside patch #3, "xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping",
Instead of intel_iommu_unmap_page(), we should use
guest_physmap_remove_page() to unmap rmrr mapping correctly. And drop
iommu_map_page() since actually ept_set_entry() can do this
internally.
* Inside patch #4, "xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm
reservation policy", add code comments to describer why we fix to set a
policy flag in some cases like adding a device to hwdomain, and removing
a device from user domain. And fix one judging condition
domctl->u.assign_device.flag == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM
-> domctl->u.assign_device.flag != XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM
Additionally, also add to range check the flag passed to make future
extensions possible (and to avoid ambiguity on what out of range values
would mean).
* Inside patch #6, "hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[]", we
move some codes related to e820 to that specific file, e820.c, and consolidate
"printf()+BUG()" and "BUG_ON()", and also avoid another fixed width type for
the parameter of get_mem_mapping_layout()
* Inside patch #7, "hvmloader/pci: skip reserved ranges"
We have to re-design this as follows:
#1. Goal
MMIO region should exclude all reserved device memory
#2. Requirements
#2.1 Still need to make sure MMIO region is fit all pci devices as before
#2.2 Accommodate the not aligned reserved memory regions
If I'm missing something let me know.
#3. How to
#3.1 Address #2.1
We need to either of populating more RAM, or of expanding more highmem. But
we should know just 64bit-bar can work with highmem, and as you mentioned we
also should avoid expanding highmem as possible. So my implementation is to
allocate 32bit-bar and 64bit-bar orderly.
1>. The first allocation round just to 32bit-bar
If we can finish allocating all 32bit-bar, we just go to allocate 64bit-bar
with all remaining resources including low pci memory.
If not, we need to calculate how much RAM should be populated to allocate the
remaining 32bit-bars, then populate sufficient RAM as exp_mem_resource to go
to the second allocation round 2>.
2>. The second allocation round to the remaining 32bit-bar
We should can finish allocating all 32bit-bar in theory, then go to the third
allocation round 3>.
3>. The third allocation round to 64bit-bar
We'll try to first allocate from the remaining low memory resource. If that
isn't enough, we try to expand highmem to allocate for 64bit-bar. This process
should be same as the original.
#3.2 Address #2.2
I'm trying to accommodate the not aligned reserved memory regions:
We should skip all reserved device memory, but we also need to check if other
smaller bars can be allocated if a mmio hole exists between resource->base and
reserved device memory. If a hole exists between base and reserved device
memory, lets go out simply to try allocate for next bar since all bars are in
descending order of size. If not, we need to move resource->base to reserved_end
just to reallocate this bar
* Inside of patch #8, "hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table", we need to
adjust highmme if lowmem is changed such as hvmloader has to populate more
RAM to allocate bars.
* Inside of patch #11, "tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy",
we don't define init_val for for libxl_rdm_reserve_type since its just zero,
and grab those changes to xl/libxlu to as a final patch.
* Inside of patch #12, "passes rdm reservation policy", fix one typo,
s/unkwon/unknown. And in command description, we should use "[]" to indicate
it's optional for that extended xl command, pci-attach.
* Patch #13 is separated from current patch #14 since this is specific to xc.
* Inside of patch #14, "tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM", and
just unconditionally set *nr_entries to 0. And additionally, we grab to all
stuffs to provide a parameter to set our predefined boundary dynamically to as
a separated patch later
* Inside of patch #16, "tools/libxl: extend XENMEM_set_memory_map", we use
goto style error handling, and instead of NOGC, we shoud use
libxl__malloc(gc,XXX) to allocate local e820.
Overall, we refined several the patch head descriptions and code comments.
v3:
* Rearrange all patches orderly as Wei suggested
* Rebase on the latest tree
* Address some Wei's comments on tools side
* Two changes for runtime cycle
patch #2,xen/x86/p2m: introduce set_identity_p2m_entry, on hypervisor side
a>. Introduce paging_mode_translate()
Otherwise, we'll see this error when boot Xen/Dom0
(XEN) Assertion 'paging_mode_translate(p2m->domain)' failed at p2m-pt.c:702
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
....
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f53db>] p2m_pt_get_entry+0x29/0x558
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f0b5c>] set_identity_p2m_entry+0xfc/0x1f0
(XEN) [<ffff82d08014ebc8>] rmrr_identity_mapping+0x154/0x1ce
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802abb46>] intel_iommu_hwdom_init+0x76/0x158
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802ab169>] iommu_hwdom_init+0x179/0x188
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802cc608>] construct_dom0+0x2fed/0x35d8
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802bdaa0>] __start_xen+0x22d8/0x2381
(XEN) [<ffff82d080100067>] __high_start+0x53/0x55
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) Assertion 'paging_mode_translate(p2m->domain)' failed at p2m-pt.c:702
Note I don't copy all info since I think the above is enough.
b>. Actually we still need to use "mfn_x(mfn) == INVALID_MFN" to confirm
we're getting an invalid mfn.
* Add patch #16 to handle those devices which share same RMRR.
v2:
* Instead of that fixed predefined rdm memory boundary, we'd like to
introduce a parameter, "rdm_mem_boundary", to set this threshold value.
* Remove that existing USB hack.
* Make sure the MMIO regions all fit in the available resource window
* Rename our policy, "force/try" -> "strict/relaxed"
* Indeed, Wei and Jan gave me more and more comments to refine codes
* Code style
* Better and reasonable code implementation
* Correct or improve code comments.
* A little bit to work well with ARM.
Open:
* We should fail assigning device which has a shared RMRR with
another device. We can only do group assignment when RMRR is shared
among devices.
We need more time to figure a good policy/way out because something
is not clear to me.
As you know all devices are owned by Dom0 firstly before we create any
DomU, right? Do we allow Dom0 still own a group device while assign another
device in the same group?
Really appreciate any comments to policy.
v1:
RMRR is an acronym for Reserved Memory Region Reporting, expected to
be used for legacy usages (such as USB, UMA Graphics, etc.) requiring
reserved memory. Special treatment is required in system software to
setup those reserved regions in IOMMU translation structures, otherwise
passing through a device with RMRR reported may not work correctly.
This patch set tries to enhance existing Xen RMRR implementation to fix
various reported and theoretical problems. Most noteworthy changes are
to setup identity mapping in p2m layer and handle possible conflicts between
reported regions and gfn space. Initial proposal can be found at:
http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-01/msg00524.html
and after a long discussion a summarized agreement is here:
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-01/msg01580.html
Below is a key summary of this patch set according to agreed proposal:
1. Use RDM (Reserved Device Memory) name in user space as a general
description instead of using ACPI RMRR name directly.
2. Introduce configuration parameters to allow user control both per-device
and global RDM resources along with desired policies upon a detected conflict.
3. Introduce a new hypercall to query global and per-device RDM resources.
4. Extend libxl to be a central place to manage RDM resources and handle
potential conflicts between reserved regions and gfn space. One simplification
goal is made to keep existing lowmem / mmio / highmem layout which is
passed around various function blocks. So a reasonable assumption
is made, that conflicts falling into below areas are not re-arranged otherwise
it will result in a more scattered layout:
a) in highmem region (>4G)
b) in lowmem region, and below a predefined boundary (default 2G)
a) is a new assumption not discussed before. From VT-d spec this is
possible but no such observation in real-world. So we can make this
reasonable assumption until there's real usage on it.
5. Extend XENMEM_set_memory_map usable for HVM guest, and then have
libxl to use that hypercall to carry RDM information to hvmloader. There
is one difference from original discussion. Previously we discussed to
introduce a new E820 type specifically for RDM entries. After more thought
we think it's OK to just tag them as E820_reserved. Actually hvmloader
doesn't need to know whether the reserved entries come from RDM or
from other purposes.
6. Then in hvmloader the change is generic for XENMEM_memory_map
change. Given a predefined memory layout, hvmloader should avoid
allocating all reserved entries for other usages (opregion, mmio, etc.)
7. Extend existing device passthrough hypercall to carry conflict handling
policy.
8. Setup identity map in p2m layer for RMRRs reported for the given
device. And conflicts are handled according to specified policy in hypercall.
Current patch set contains core enhancements calling for comments.
There are still several tasks not implemented now. We'll include them
in final version after RFC is agreed:
- remove existing USB hack
- detect and fail assigning device which has a shared RMRR with another device
- add a config parameter to configure that memory boundary flexibly
- In the case of hotplug we also need to figure out a way to fix that policy
conflict between the per-pci policy and the global policy but firstly we think
we'd better collect some good or correct ideas to step next in RFC.
So here I made this as RFC to collect your any comments.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jan Beulich (1):
xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
Tiejun Chen (15):
xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping
xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy
xen: enable XENMEM_memory_map in hvm
hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[]
hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
tools/libxc: Expose new hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map
tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy
tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy
tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
tools: introduce a new parameter to set a predefined rdm boundary
libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest
xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment
xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr
tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 | 103 ++++++++
docs/misc/vtd.txt | 24 ++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c | 141 +++++++++-
tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h | 7 +
tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c | 2 +
tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c | 65 +++++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c | 26 ++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h | 12 +
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 11 +-
tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 45 +++-
tools/libxl/libxl.h | 6 +
tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h | 7 +
tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c | 8 +
tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 13 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 16 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 16 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c | 12 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 26 ++
tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c | 83 ++++++
tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c | 92 ++++++-
tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 4 +
tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 16 ++
tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c | 16 +-
tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 30 ++-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 -
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 6 -
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 43 ++-
xen/common/compat/memory.c | 66 +++++
xen/common/memory.c | 64 +++++
xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c | 3 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c | 2 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c | 3 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c | 10 +
xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 15 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c | 32 +++
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h | 1 -
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h | 1 +
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 82 ++++--
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c | 7 -
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 13 +-
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 3 +
xen/include/public/memory.h | 37 ++-
xen/include/xen/iommu.h | 12 +-
xen/include/xen/pci.h | 2 +
xen/include/xlat.lst | 3 +-
46 files changed, 1375 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 02/16] xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping Tiejun Chen
` (15 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 2 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Yang Zhang, Kevin Tian, Jan Beulich
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
v7 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v6:
* Add a comments to the nr_entries field inside xen_reserved_device_memory_map
v5 ~ v4:
* Nothing is changed.
xen/common/compat/memory.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/common/memory.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c | 10 ++++++
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h | 1 +
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 1 +
xen/include/public/memory.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++-
xen/include/xen/iommu.h | 10 ++++++
xen/include/xen/pci.h | 2 ++
xen/include/xlat.lst | 3 +-
10 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
index b258138..b608496 100644
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -17,6 +17,45 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
CHECK_mem_access_op;
CHECK_vmemrange;
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf;
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ sbdf = PCI_SBDF2(grdm->map.seg, grdm->map.bus, grdm->map.devfn);
+ if ( (grdm->map.flag & PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL) || (sbdf == id) )
+ {
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ if ( rdm.start_pfn != start || rdm.nr_pages != nr )
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ if ( __copy_to_compat_offset(grdm->map.buffer,
+ grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm,
+ 1) )
+ {
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
{
int split, op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK;
@@ -303,6 +342,33 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
+ !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( grdm.map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
return compat_arch_memory_op(cmd, compat);
}
diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
index e5d49d8..2fa45d0 100644
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -748,6 +748,43 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservation(
return 0;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf;
+
+ sbdf = PCI_SBDF2(grdm->map.seg, grdm->map.bus, grdm->map.devfn);
+ if ( (grdm->map.flag & PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL) || (sbdf == id) )
+ {
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( __copy_to_guest_offset(grdm->map.buffer,
+ grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm,
+ 1) )
+ {
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
{
struct domain *d;
@@ -1162,6 +1199,33 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, arg, 1) ||
+ !guest_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( grdm.map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
rc = arch_memory_op(cmd, arg);
break;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
index 06cb38f..0b2ef52 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ void iommu_crash_shutdown(void)
iommu_enabled = iommu_intremap = 0;
}
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ const struct iommu_ops *ops = iommu_get_ops();
+
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || !ops->get_reserved_device_memory )
+ return 0;
+
+ return ops->get_reserved_device_memory(func, ctxt);
+}
+
bool_t iommu_has_feature(struct domain *d, enum iommu_feature feature)
{
const struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
index 2672688..3b08bf3 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -914,3 +914,35 @@ int platform_supports_x2apic(void)
unsigned int mask = ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP | ACPI_DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT;
return cpu_has_x2apic && ((dmar_flags & mask) == ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
}
+
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr, *rmrr_cur = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+ u16 bdf;
+
+ for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ {
+ if ( rmrr != rmrr_cur )
+ {
+ rc = func(PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PFN_UP(rmrr->end_address) -
+ PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PCI_SBDF(rmrr->segment, bdf),
+ ctxt);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
+ return rc;
+
+ if ( !rc )
+ continue;
+
+ /* Just go next. */
+ if ( rc == 1 )
+ rmrr_cur = rmrr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
index 5524dba..f9ee9b0 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *);
int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt);
unsigned int io_apic_read_remap_rte(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg);
void io_apic_write_remap_rte(unsigned int apic,
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index a88b5a3..9849d0e 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2490,6 +2490,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = {
.crash_shutdown = vtd_crash_shutdown,
.iotlb_flush = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush,
.iotlb_flush_all = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush_all,
+ .get_reserved_device_memory = intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory,
.dump_p2m_table = vtd_dump_p2m_table,
};
diff --git a/xen/include/public/memory.h b/xen/include/public/memory.h
index 832559a..ac7d3da 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -573,7 +573,42 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
-/* Next available subop number is 27 */
+/*
+ * With some legacy devices, certain guest-physical addresses cannot safely
+ * be used for other purposes, e.g. to map guest RAM. This hypercall
+ * enumerates those regions so the toolstack can avoid using them.
+ */
+#define XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map 27
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory {
+ xen_pfn_t start_pfn;
+ xen_ulong_t nr_pages;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory xen_reserved_device_memory_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t);
+
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
+ /* IN */
+ /* Currently just one bit to indicate checkng all Reserved Device Memory. */
+#define PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL 0x1
+ uint32_t flag;
+ /* IN */
+ uint16_t seg;
+ uint8_t bus;
+ uint8_t devfn;
+ /*
+ * IN/OUT
+ *
+ * Gets set to the required number of entries when too low,
+ * signaled by error code -ERANGE.
+ */
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+ /* OUT */
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t) buffer;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t);
+
+/* Next available subop number is 28 */
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__ */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
index 1d00696..52ed3b7 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl *, struct domain *,
struct page_info;
+/*
+ * Any non-zero value returned from callbacks of this type will cause the
+ * function the callback was handed to terminate its iteration. Assigning
+ * meaning of these non-zero values is left to the top level caller /
+ * callback pair.
+ */
+typedef int iommu_grdm_t(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr, u32 id, void *ctxt);
+
struct iommu_ops {
int (*init)(struct domain *d);
void (*hwdom_init)(struct domain *d);
@@ -156,12 +164,14 @@ struct iommu_ops {
void (*crash_shutdown)(void);
void (*iotlb_flush)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned int page_count);
void (*iotlb_flush_all)(struct domain *d);
+ int (*get_reserved_device_memory)(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void (*dump_p2m_table)(struct domain *d);
};
void iommu_suspend(void);
void iommu_resume(void);
void iommu_crash_shutdown(void);
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void iommu_share_p2m_table(struct domain *d);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
index 3908146..d176e8b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#define PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) ((bdf) & 0xff)
#define PCI_BDF(b,d,f) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | PCI_DEVFN(d,f))
#define PCI_BDF2(b,df) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | ((df) & 0xff))
+#define PCI_SBDF(s,bdf) (((s & 0xffff) << 16) | (bdf & 0xffff))
+#define PCI_SBDF2(s,b,df) (((s & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF2(b,df))
struct pci_dev_info {
bool_t is_extfn;
diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst
index 6fb15bf..8cedee7 100644
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -65,9 +65,10 @@
! memory_exchange memory.h
! memory_map memory.h
! memory_reservation memory.h
-? mem_access_op memory.h
+? mem_access_op memory.h
! pod_target memory.h
! remove_from_physmap memory.h
+! reserved_device_memory_map memory.h
? vmemrange memory.h
! vnuma_topology_info memory.h
? physdev_eoi physdev.h
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 02/16] xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 03/16] xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
` (14 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Andrew Cooper, Tim Deegan, Jan Beulich,
Yang Zhang
RMRR reserved regions must be setup in the pfn space with an identity
mapping to reported mfn. However existing code has problem to setup
correct mapping when VT-d shares EPT page table, so lead to problem
when assigning devices (e.g GPU) with RMRR reported. So instead, this
patch aims to setup identity mapping in p2m layer, regardless of
whether EPT is shared or not. And we still keep creating VT-d table.
And we also need to introduce a pair of helper to create/clear this
sort of identity mapping as follows:
set_identity_p2m_entry():
If the gfn space is unoccupied, we just set the mapping. If space
is already occupied by desired identity mapping, do nothing.
Otherwise, failure is returned.
clear_identity_p2m_entry():
We just define macro to wrapper guest_physmap_remove_page() with
a returning value as necessary.
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v6 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Fold our original patch #2 and #3 as this new
* Introduce a new, clear_identity_p2m_entry, which can wrapper
guest_physmap_remove_page(). And we use this to clean our
identity mapping.
v4:
* Change that orginal condition,
if ( p2mt == p2m_invalid || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm )
to make sure we catch those invalid mfn mapping as we expected.
* To have
if ( !paging_mode_translate(p2m->domain) )
return 0;
at the start, instead of indenting the whole body of the function
in an inner scope.
* extend guest_physmap_remove_page() to return a value as a proper
unmapping helper
* Instead of intel_iommu_unmap_page(), we should use
guest_physmap_remove_page() to unmap rmrr mapping correctly.
* Drop iommu_map_page() since actually ept_set_entry() can do this
internally.
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 5 ++---
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 13 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 6fe6387..1e763dc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -584,14 +584,16 @@ p2m_remove_page(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn,
p2m->default_access);
}
-void
+int
guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
unsigned long mfn, unsigned int page_order)
{
struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+ int rc;
gfn_lock(p2m, gfn, page_order);
- p2m_remove_page(p2m, gfn, mfn, page_order);
+ rc = p2m_remove_page(p2m, gfn, mfn, page_order);
gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, page_order);
+ return rc;
}
int
@@ -898,6 +900,40 @@ int set_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn,
return set_typed_p2m_entry(d, gfn, mfn, p2m_mmio_direct, access);
}
+int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
+ p2m_access_t p2ma)
+{
+ p2m_type_t p2mt;
+ p2m_access_t a;
+ mfn_t mfn;
+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+ int ret;
+
+ if ( !paging_mode_translate(p2m->domain) )
+ return 0;
+
+ gfn_lock(p2m, gfn, 0);
+
+ mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &p2mt, &a, 0, NULL);
+
+ if ( p2mt == p2m_invalid || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm )
+ ret = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(gfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
+ p2m_mmio_direct, p2ma);
+ else if ( mfn_x(mfn) == gfn && p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct && a == p2ma )
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+ "Cannot setup identity map d%d:%lx,"
+ " gfn already mapped to %lx.\n",
+ d->domain_id, gfn, mfn_x(mfn));
+ }
+
+ gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Returns: 0 for success, -errno for failure */
int clear_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn)
{
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index 9849d0e..5aa482f 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
{
- if ( intel_iommu_unmap_page(d, base_pfn) )
+ if ( clear_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, 0) )
ret = -ENXIO;
base_pfn++;
}
@@ -1855,8 +1855,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
{
- int err = intel_iommu_map_page(d, base_pfn, base_pfn,
- IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
+ int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw);
if ( err )
return err;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
index b49c09b..190a286 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -503,9 +503,9 @@ static inline int guest_physmap_add_page(struct domain *d,
}
/* Remove a page from a domain's p2m table */
-void guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
- unsigned long gfn,
- unsigned long mfn, unsigned int page_order);
+int guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+ unsigned long gfn,
+ unsigned long mfn, unsigned int page_order);
/* Set a p2m range as populate-on-demand */
int guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
@@ -543,6 +543,13 @@ int set_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn,
p2m_access_t access);
int clear_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn);
+/* Set identity addresses in the p2m table (for pass-through) */
+int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
+ p2m_access_t p2ma);
+
+#define clear_identity_p2m_entry(d, gfn, page_order) \
+ guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn, gfn, page_order)
+
/* Add foreign mapping to the guest's p2m table. */
int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn,
unsigned long gpfn, domid_t foreign_domid);
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 03/16] xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 02/16] xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 04/16] xen: enable XENMEM_memory_map in hvm Tiejun Chen
` (13 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper, Tim Deegan,
Aravind Gopalakrishnan, Suravee Suthikulpanit, Yang Zhang,
Stefano Stabellini, Ian Campbell
This patch extends the existing hypercall to support rdm reservation policy.
We return error or just throw out a warning message depending on whether
the policy is "strict" or "relaxed" when reserving RDM regions in pfn space.
Note in some special cases, e.g. add a device to hwdomain, and remove a
device from user domain, 'relaxed' is fine enough since this is always safe
to hwdomain.
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
CC: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v10 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v9:
* Correct one check condition of XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED
v8:
* Force to pass "0"(strict) when add or move a device in hardware domain,
and improve some associated code comments.
v6 ~ v7:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Just leave one bit XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED as our flag, so
"0" means "strict" and "1" means "relaxed".
* So make DT device ignore the flag field
* Improve the code comments
v4:
* Add code comments to describer why we fix to set a policy flag in some
cases like adding a device to hwdomain, and removing a device from user domain.
* Avoid using fixed width types for the parameter of set_identity_p2m_entry()
* Fix one judging condition
domctl->u.assign_device.flag == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM
-> domctl->u.assign_device.flag != XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM
* Add to range check the flag passed to make future extensions possible
(and to avoid ambiguity on what out of range values would mean).
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 7 ++++--
xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c | 3 ++-
xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c | 2 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c | 3 ++-
xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 15 ++++++++----
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 2 +-
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 3 +++
xen/include/xen/iommu.h | 2 +-
9 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 1e763dc..89616b7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ int set_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn,
}
int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
- p2m_access_t p2ma)
+ p2m_access_t p2ma, unsigned int flag)
{
p2m_type_t p2mt;
p2m_access_t a;
@@ -923,7 +923,10 @@ int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
ret = 0;
else
{
- ret = -EBUSY;
+ if ( flag & XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED )
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ ret = -EBUSY;
printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
"Cannot setup identity map d%d:%lx,"
" gfn already mapped to %lx.\n",
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
index e83bb35..920b35a 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static int reassign_device(struct domain *source, struct domain *target,
}
static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8 devfn,
- struct pci_dev *pdev)
+ struct pci_dev *pdev,
+ u32 flag)
{
struct ivrs_mappings *ivrs_mappings = get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg);
int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, devfn);
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c
index 6cc4394..9a667e9 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c
@@ -2605,7 +2605,7 @@ static void arm_smmu_destroy_iommu_domain(struct iommu_domain *domain)
}
static int arm_smmu_assign_dev(struct domain *d, u8 devfn,
- struct device *dev)
+ struct device *dev, u32 flag)
{
struct iommu_domain *domain;
struct arm_smmu_xen_domain *xen_domain;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
index 5d3842a..7ff79f8 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int iommu_assign_dt_device(struct domain *d, struct dt_device_node *dev)
goto fail;
}
- rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, 0, dt_to_dev(dev));
+ /* The flag field doesn't matter to DT device. */
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, 0, dt_to_dev(dev), 0);
if ( rc )
goto fail;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
index e30be43..c7bbf6e 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
return pdev ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
-static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
struct pci_dev *pdev;
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
pdev->fault.count = 0;
- if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev))) )
+ if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev), flag)) )
goto done;
for ( ; pdev->phantom_stride; rc = 0 )
@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
break;
- rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev));
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev), flag);
if ( rc )
printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "d%d: assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n",
d->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
@@ -1496,6 +1496,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
{
u16 seg;
u8 bus, devfn;
+ u32 flag;
int ret = 0;
uint32_t machine_sbdf;
@@ -1577,9 +1578,15 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(machine_sbdf);
+ flag = domctl->u.assign_device.flag;
+ if ( flag & ~XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED )
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
ret = device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ?:
- assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn);
+ assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn, flag);
if ( ret == -ERESTART )
ret = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_domctl,
"h", u_domctl);
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index 5aa482f..a2f3a66 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1807,7 +1807,8 @@ static void iommu_set_pgd(struct domain *d)
}
static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
- const struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr)
+ const struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr,
+ u32 flag)
{
unsigned long base_pfn = rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
unsigned long end_pfn = PAGE_ALIGN_4K(rmrr->end_address) >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
@@ -1855,7 +1856,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
{
- int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw);
+ int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw, flag);
if ( err )
return err;
@@ -1898,7 +1899,13 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus &&
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 1, rmrr);
+ /*
+ * iommu_add_device() is only called for the hardware
+ * domain (see xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c:pci_add_device()).
+ * Since RMRRs are always reserved in the e820 map for the hardware
+ * domain, there shouldn't be a conflict.
+ */
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 1, rmrr, 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: RMRR mapping failed\n",
pdev->domain->domain_id);
@@ -1939,7 +1946,11 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) != devfn )
continue;
- rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 0, rmrr);
+ /*
+ * Any flag is nothing to clear these mappings but here
+ * its always safe and strict to set 0.
+ */
+ rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 0, rmrr, 0);
}
return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
@@ -2097,7 +2108,13 @@ static void __hwdom_init setup_hwdom_rmrr(struct domain *d)
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr);
+ /*
+ * Here means we're add a device to the hardware domain.
+ * Since RMRRs are always reserved in the e820 map for the hardware
+ * domain, there shouldn't be a conflict. So its always safe and
+ * strict to set 0.
+ */
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
"IOMMU: mapping reserved region failed\n");
@@ -2240,7 +2257,11 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus &&
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(source, 0, rmrr);
+ /*
+ * Any RMRR flag is always ignored when remove a device,
+ * but its always safe and strict to set 0.
+ */
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(source, 0, rmrr, 0);
if ( ret != -ENOENT )
return ret;
}
@@ -2264,7 +2285,7 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
}
static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
- struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
+ struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev, u32 flag)
{
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
int ret = 0, i;
@@ -2293,7 +2314,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr);
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, flag);
if ( ret )
{
reassign_device_ownership(d, hardware_domain, devfn, pdev);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
index 190a286..68da0a9 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int clear_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn);
/* Set identity addresses in the p2m table (for pass-through) */
int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
- p2m_access_t p2ma);
+ p2m_access_t p2ma, unsigned int flag);
#define clear_identity_p2m_entry(d, gfn, page_order) \
guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn, gfn, page_order)
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 631935a..675f021 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -471,6 +471,9 @@ struct xen_domctl_assign_device {
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* path to the device tree node */
} dt;
} u;
+ /* IN */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED 1
+ uint32_t flag; /* flag of assigned device */
};
typedef struct xen_domctl_assign_device xen_domctl_assign_device_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_assign_device_t);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
index 52ed3b7..1124601 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ struct iommu_ops {
int (*add_device)(u8 devfn, device_t *dev);
int (*enable_device)(device_t *dev);
int (*remove_device)(u8 devfn, device_t *dev);
- int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, device_t *dev);
+ int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, device_t *dev, u32 flag);
int (*reassign_device)(struct domain *s, struct domain *t,
u8 devfn, device_t *dev);
#ifdef HAS_PCI
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 04/16] xen: enable XENMEM_memory_map in hvm
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 03/16] xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 05/16] hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[] Tiejun Chen
` (12 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Keir Fraser, Jan Beulich
This patch enables XENMEM_memory_map in hvm. So hvmloader can
use it to setup the e820 mappings.
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
v5 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v4:
* Just refine the patch head description as Jan commented.
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 --
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 6 ------
2 files changed, 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index c07e3ef..d860579 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4855,7 +4855,6 @@ static long hvm_memory_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
switch ( cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK )
{
- case XENMEM_memory_map:
case XENMEM_machine_memory_map:
case XENMEM_machphys_mapping:
return -ENOSYS;
@@ -4931,7 +4930,6 @@ static long hvm_memory_op_compat32(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
switch ( cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK )
{
- case XENMEM_memory_map:
case XENMEM_machine_memory_map:
case XENMEM_machphys_mapping:
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index 342414f..8c887d8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -4717,12 +4717,6 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
return rc;
}
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- return -EPERM;
- }
-
e820 = xmalloc_array(e820entry_t, fmap.map.nr_entries);
if ( e820 == NULL )
{
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 05/16] hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[]
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 04/16] xen: enable XENMEM_memory_map in hvm Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs Tiejun Chen
` (11 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, Jan Beulich, Wei Liu
Now we get this map layout by call XENMEM_memory_map then
save them into one global variable memory_map[]. It should
include lowmem range, rdm range and highmem range. Note
rdm range and highmem range may not exist in some cases.
And here we need to check if any reserved memory conflicts with
[RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END).
This range is used to allocate memory in hvmloder level, and
we would lead hvmloader failed in case of conflict since its
another rare possibility in real world.
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v10 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v9:
* Correct [RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END]
-> [RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END) in
the patch head description;
Merge two if{} as one if{};
v8:
* Actually we should check this range started from
RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, not RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START - 1.
So correct this and sync the patch head description.
v5 ~ v7:
* Nothing is changed.
v4:
* Move some codes related to e820 to that specific file, e820.c.
* Consolidate "printf()+BUG()" and "BUG_ON()"
* Avoid another fixed width type for the parameter of get_mem_mapping_layout()
tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h | 7 +++++++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c | 2 ++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h | 12 ++++++++++++
5 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
index 2e05e93..7a414ab 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
@@ -23,6 +23,38 @@
#include "config.h"
#include "util.h"
+struct e820map memory_map;
+
+void memory_map_setup(void)
+{
+ unsigned int nr_entries = E820MAX, i;
+ int rc;
+ uint64_t alloc_addr = RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START;
+ uint64_t alloc_size = RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END - alloc_addr;
+
+ rc = get_mem_mapping_layout(memory_map.map, &nr_entries);
+
+ if ( rc || !nr_entries )
+ {
+ printf("Get guest memory maps[%d] failed. (%d)\n", nr_entries, rc);
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ memory_map.nr_map = nr_entries;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ check_overlap(alloc_addr, alloc_size,
+ memory_map.map[i].addr, memory_map.map[i].size) )
+ {
+ printf("Fail to setup memory map due to conflict");
+ printf(" on dynamic reserved memory range.\n");
+ BUG();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
void dump_e820_table(struct e820entry *e820, unsigned int nr)
{
uint64_t last_end = 0, start, end;
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h
index b2ead7f..8b5a9e0 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.h
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ struct e820entry {
uint32_t type;
} __attribute__((packed));
+#define E820MAX 128
+
+struct e820map {
+ unsigned int nr_map;
+ struct e820entry map[E820MAX];
+};
+
#endif /* __HVMLOADER_E820_H__ */
/*
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c
index 25b7f08..84c588c 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.c
@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ int main(void)
init_hypercalls();
+ memory_map_setup();
+
xenbus_setup();
bios = detect_bios();
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c
index 80d822f..122e3fa 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.c
@@ -27,6 +27,17 @@
#include <xen/memory.h>
#include <xen/sched.h>
+/*
+ * Check whether there exists overlap in the specified memory range.
+ * Returns true if exists, else returns false.
+ */
+bool check_overlap(uint64_t start, uint64_t size,
+ uint64_t reserved_start, uint64_t reserved_size)
+{
+ return (start + size > reserved_start) &&
+ (start < reserved_start + reserved_size);
+}
+
void wrmsr(uint32_t idx, uint64_t v)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -368,6 +379,21 @@ uuid_to_string(char *dest, uint8_t *uuid)
*p = '\0';
}
+int get_mem_mapping_layout(struct e820entry entries[], uint32_t *max_entries)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct xen_memory_map memmap = {
+ .nr_entries = *max_entries
+ };
+
+ set_xen_guest_handle(memmap.buffer, entries);
+
+ rc = hypercall_memory_op(XENMEM_memory_map, &memmap);
+ *max_entries = memmap.nr_entries;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
void mem_hole_populate_ram(xen_pfn_t mfn, uint32_t nr_mfns)
{
static int over_allocated;
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h
index f99c0f19..1100a3b 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/util.h
@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <xen/hvm/hvm_info_table.h>
+#include "e820.h"
#define __STR(...) #__VA_ARGS__
#define STR(...) __STR(__VA_ARGS__)
@@ -222,6 +224,9 @@ int hvm_param_set(uint32_t index, uint64_t value);
/* Setup PCI bus */
void pci_setup(void);
+/* Setup memory map */
+void memory_map_setup(void);
+
/* Prepare the 32bit BIOS */
uint32_t rombios_highbios_setup(void);
@@ -249,6 +254,13 @@ void perform_tests(void);
extern char _start[], _end[];
+int get_mem_mapping_layout(struct e820entry entries[],
+ unsigned int *max_entries);
+
+extern struct e820map memory_map;
+bool check_overlap(uint64_t start, uint64_t size,
+ uint64_t reserved_start, uint64_t reserved_size);
+
#endif /* __HVMLOADER_UTIL_H__ */
/*
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 05/16] hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[] Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:43 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:00 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 07/16] hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table Tiejun Chen
` (10 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 2 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, Jan Beulich, Wei Liu
Try to avoid placing PCI BARs over RMRRs:
- If mmio_hole_size is not specified, and the existing MMIO range has
RMRRs in it, and there is space to expand the hole in lowmem without
moving more memory, then make the MMIO hole as large as possible.
- When placing RMRRs, find the next RMRR higher than the current base
in the lowmem mmio hole. If it overlaps, skip ahead of it and find
the next one.
This certainly won't work in all cases, but it should work in a
significant number of cases. Additionally, users should be able to
work around problems by setting mmio_hole_size larger in the guest
config.
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v11:
* To find the lowest RMRR the _end_ of which is higher than base.
* Refine some code implementations
v10:
* This is from George' draft patch which implements an acceptable solution in
current cycle. Here I just implemented check_overlap_all() and some cleanups.
v9:
* A little improvement to code implementation but again, its still argued about
this solution.
v8:
* Based on current discussion its hard to reshape the original mmio
allocation mechanism but we haven't a good and simple way to in short term.
So instead, we don't bring more complicated to intervene that process but
still check any conflicts to disable all associated devices.
v6 ~ v7:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Rename that field, is_64bar, inside struct bars with flag, and
then extend to also indicate if this bar is already allocated.
v4:
* We have to re-design this as follows:
#1. Goal
MMIO region should exclude all reserved device memory
#2. Requirements
#2.1 Still need to make sure MMIO region is fit all pci devices as before
#2.2 Accommodate the not aligned reserved memory regions
If I'm missing something let me know.
#3. How to
#3.1 Address #2.1
We need to either of populating more RAM, or of expanding more highmem. But
we should know just 64bit-bar can work with highmem, and as you mentioned we
also should avoid expanding highmem as possible. So my implementation is to
allocate 32bit-bar and 64bit-bar orderly.
1>. The first allocation round just to 32bit-bar
If we can finish allocating all 32bit-bar, we just go to allocate 64bit-bar
with all remaining resources including low pci memory.
If not, we need to calculate how much RAM should be populated to allocate the
remaining 32bit-bars, then populate sufficient RAM as exp_mem_resource to go
to the second allocation round 2>.
2>. The second allocation round to the remaining 32bit-bar
We should can finish allocating all 32bit-bar in theory, then go to the third
allocation round 3>.
3>. The third allocation round to 64bit-bar
We'll try to first allocate from the remaining low memory resource. If that
isn't enough, we try to expand highmem to allocate for 64bit-bar. This process
should be same as the original.
#3.2 Address #2.2
I'm trying to accommodate the not aligned reserved memory regions:
We should skip all reserved device memory, but we also need to check if other
smaller bars can be allocated if a mmio hole exists between resource->base and
reserved device memory. If a hole exists between base and reserved device
memory, lets go out simply to try allocate for next bar since all bars are in
descending order of size. If not, we need to move resource->base to reserved_end
just to reallocate this bar.
tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 65 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
index 5ff87a7..74fc080 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
@@ -38,6 +38,46 @@ uint64_t pci_hi_mem_start = 0, pci_hi_mem_end = 0;
enum virtual_vga virtual_vga = VGA_none;
unsigned long igd_opregion_pgbase = 0;
+/* Check if the specified range conflicts with any reserved device memory. */
+static bool check_overlap_all(uint64_t start, uint64_t size)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ check_overlap(start, size,
+ memory_map.map[i].addr,
+ memory_map.map[i].size) )
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Find the lowest RMRR higher than base. */
+static int find_next_rmrr(uint32_t base)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int next_rmrr = -1;
+ uint64_t end, min_end = (1ull << 32);
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map ; i++ )
+ {
+ end = memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size;
+
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ end > base &&
+ min_end < min_end )
+ {
+ next_rmrr = i;
+ min_end = end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return next_rmrr;
+}
+
void pci_setup(void)
{
uint8_t is_64bar, using_64bar, bar64_relocate = 0;
@@ -46,6 +86,7 @@ void pci_setup(void)
uint32_t vga_devfn = 256;
uint16_t class, vendor_id, device_id;
unsigned int bar, pin, link, isa_irq;
+ int next_rmrr;
/* Resources assignable to PCI devices via BARs. */
struct resource {
@@ -299,6 +340,15 @@ void pci_setup(void)
|| (((pci_mem_start << 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
>= hvm_info->low_mem_pgend)) )
pci_mem_start <<= 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to accomodate RMRRs in our MMIO region on a best-effort basis.
+ * If we have RMRRs in the range, then make pci_mem_start just after
+ * hvm_info->low_mem_pgend.
+ */
+ if ( pci_mem_start > (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) &&
+ check_overlap_all(pci_mem_start, pci_mem_end-pci_mem_start) )
+ pci_mem_start = hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
if ( mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start) )
@@ -352,6 +402,8 @@ void pci_setup(void)
io_resource.base = 0xc000;
io_resource.max = 0x10000;
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(pci_mem_start);
+
/* Assign iomem and ioport resources in descending order of size. */
for ( i = 0; i < nr_bars; i++ )
{
@@ -407,6 +459,19 @@ void pci_setup(void)
}
base = (resource->base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(uint64_t)(bar_sz - 1);
+
+ /* If we're using mem_resource, check for RMRR conflicts. */
+ while ( resource == &mem_resource &&
+ next_rmrr >= 0 &&
+ check_overlap(base, bar_sz,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size) )
+ {
+ base = memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr + memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size;
+ base = (base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(bar_sz - 1);
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(base);
+ }
+
bar_data |= (uint32_t)base;
bar_data_upper = (uint32_t)(base >> 32);
base += bar_sz;
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 07/16] hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 08/16] tools/libxc: Expose new hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
` (9 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, Jan Beulich, Wei Liu
Now use the hypervisor-supplied memory map to build our final e820 table:
* Add regions for BIOS ranges and other special mappings not in the
hypervisor map
* Add in the hypervisor supplied regions
* Adjust the lowmem and highmem regions if we've had to relocate
memory (adding a highmem region if necessary)
* Sort all the ranges so that they appear in memory order.
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v11:
* To check/sync memory_map.map[] before copy them into e820 since
ultimately this can make sure hvm_info, memory_map.map[] and e820
are on the same page.
* Refine some code implementations
v10:
* Instead of correcting e820, I'd like to correct memory_map.map[]
and then copy them into e820 directly. I think this can make sure
hvm_info, memory_map.map[] and e820 are on the same page.
v9:
* Refine that chunk of codes to check/modify highmem
v8:
* define low_mem_end as uint32_t
* Correct those two wrong loops, memory_map.nr_map -> nr
when we're trying to revise low/high memory e820 entries.
* Improve code comments and the patch head description
* Add one check if highmem is just populated by hvmloader itself
v5 ~ v7:
* Nothing is changed.
v4:
* Rename local variable, low_mem_pgend, to low_mem_end.
* Improve some code comments
* Adjust highmem after lowmem is changed.
tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
index 7a414ab..a6cacdf 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c
@@ -105,7 +105,11 @@ int build_e820_table(struct e820entry *e820,
unsigned int lowmem_reserved_base,
unsigned int bios_image_base)
{
- unsigned int nr = 0;
+ unsigned int nr = 0, i, j;
+ uint32_t low_mem_end = hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ uint32_t add_high_mem = 0;
+ uint64_t high_mem_end = (uint64_t)hvm_info->high_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ uint64_t map_start, map_size, map_end;
if ( !lowmem_reserved_base )
lowmem_reserved_base = 0xA0000;
@@ -149,13 +153,6 @@ int build_e820_table(struct e820entry *e820,
e820[nr].type = E820_RESERVED;
nr++;
- /* Low RAM goes here. Reserve space for special pages. */
- BUG_ON((hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) < (2u << 20));
- e820[nr].addr = 0x100000;
- e820[nr].size = (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) - e820[nr].addr;
- e820[nr].type = E820_RAM;
- nr++;
-
/*
* Explicitly reserve space for special pages.
* This space starts at RESERVED_MEMBASE an extends to cover various
@@ -191,16 +188,102 @@ int build_e820_table(struct e820entry *e820,
nr++;
}
+ /* Low RAM goes here. Reserve space for special pages. */
+ BUG_ON(low_mem_end < (2u << 20));
- if ( hvm_info->high_mem_pgend )
+ /*
+ * Construct E820 table according to recorded memory map.
+ *
+ * The memory map created by toolstack may include,
+ *
+ * #1. Low memory region
+ *
+ * Low RAM starts at least from 1M to make sure all standard regions
+ * of the PC memory map, like BIOS, VGA memory-mapped I/O and vgabios,
+ * have enough space.
+ *
+ * #2. Reserved regions if they exist
+ *
+ * #3. High memory region if it exists
+ *
+ * Note we just have one low memory entry and one high mmeory entry if
+ * exists.
+ *
+ * But we may have relocated RAM to allocate sufficient MMIO previously
+ * so low_mem_pgend would be changed over there. And here memory_map[]
+ * records the original low/high memory, so if low_mem_end is less than
+ * the original we need to revise low/high memory range firstly.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
{
- e820[nr].addr = ((uint64_t)1 << 32);
- e820[nr].size =
- ((uint64_t)hvm_info->high_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) - e820[nr].addr;
- e820[nr].type = E820_RAM;
+ map_start = memory_map.map[i].addr;
+ map_size = memory_map.map[i].size;
+ map_end = map_start + map_size;
+
+ /* If we need to adjust lowmem. */
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RAM &&
+ low_mem_end > map_start && low_mem_end < map_end )
+ {
+ add_high_mem = map_end - low_mem_end;
+ memory_map.map[i].size = low_mem_end - map_start;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we need to adjust highmem. */
+ if ( add_high_mem )
+ {
+ /* Modify the existing highmem region if it exists. */
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
+ {
+ map_start = memory_map.map[i].addr;
+ map_size = memory_map.map[i].size;
+ map_end = map_start + map_size;
+
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RAM &&
+ map_start == ((uint64_t)1 << 32))
+ {
+ memory_map.map[i].size += add_high_mem;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If there was no highmem region, just create one. */
+ if ( i == memory_map.nr_map )
+ {
+ memory_map.map[i].addr = ((uint64_t)1 << 32);
+ memory_map.map[i].size = add_high_mem;
+ memory_map.map[i].type = E820_RAM;
+ memory_map.nr_map++;
+ }
+
+ /* A sanity check if high memory is broken. */
+ BUG_ON( high_mem_end !=
+ memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size);
+ }
+
+ /* Now fill e820. */
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
+ {
+ e820[nr] = memory_map.map[i];
nr++;
}
+ /* Finally we need to sort all e820 entries. */
+ for ( j = 0; j < nr - 1; j++ )
+ {
+ for ( i = j + 1; i < nr; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( e820[j].addr > e820[i].addr )
+ {
+ struct e820entry tmp = e820[j];
+
+ e820[j] = e820[i];
+ e820[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
return nr;
}
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 08/16] tools/libxc: Expose new hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 07/16] hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:29 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
` (8 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
We will introduce the hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map
approach to libxc. This helps us get rdm entry info according to
different parameters. If flag == PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL, all entries
should be exposed. Or we just expose that rdm entry specific to
a SBDF.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v4 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 8 ++++++++
tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index ce9029c..2991333 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1314,6 +1314,14 @@ int xc_domain_set_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
int xc_get_machine_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
struct e820entry entries[],
uint32_t max_entries);
+
+int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
+ uint32_t flag,
+ uint16_t seg,
+ uint8_t bus,
+ uint8_t devfn,
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory entries[],
+ uint32_t *max_entries);
#endif
int xc_domain_set_time_offset(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 6db8d13..298b3b5 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -684,6 +684,42 @@ int xc_domain_set_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
return rc;
}
+
+int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
+ uint32_t flag,
+ uint16_t seg,
+ uint8_t bus,
+ uint8_t devfn,
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory entries[],
+ uint32_t *max_entries)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xrdmmap = {
+ .flag = flag,
+ .seg = seg,
+ .bus = bus,
+ .devfn = devfn,
+ .nr_entries = *max_entries
+ };
+ DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(entries,
+ sizeof(struct xen_reserved_device_memory) *
+ *max_entries, XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_OUT);
+
+ if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, entries) )
+ return -1;
+
+ set_xen_guest_handle(xrdmmap.buffer, entries);
+
+ rc = do_memory_op(xch, XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map,
+ &xrdmmap, sizeof(xrdmmap));
+
+ xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, entries);
+
+ *max_entries = xrdmmap.nr_entries;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
int xc_get_machine_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
struct e820entry entries[],
uint32_t max_entries)
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 08/16] tools/libxc: Expose new hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 13:06 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 10/16] tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy Tiejun Chen
` (7 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Wei Liu, David Scott, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
This patch passes rdm reservation policy to xc_assign_device() so the policy
is checked when assigning devices to a VM.
Note this also bring some fallout to python usage of xc_assign_device().
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v6 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Fix the flag field as "0" to DT device
v4:
* In the patch head description, I add to explain why we need to sync
the xc.c file
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 3 ++-
tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 9 ++++++++-
tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c | 3 ++-
tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 2991333..5c535c4 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -2067,7 +2067,8 @@ int xc_hvm_destroy_ioreq_server(xc_interface *xch,
/* HVM guest pass-through */
int xc_assign_device(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
- uint32_t machine_sbdf);
+ uint32_t machine_sbdf,
+ uint32_t flag);
int xc_get_device_group(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 298b3b5..69e6d8f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -1697,7 +1697,8 @@ int xc_domain_setdebugging(xc_interface *xch,
int xc_assign_device(
xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
- uint32_t machine_sbdf)
+ uint32_t machine_sbdf,
+ uint32_t flag)
{
DECLARE_DOMCTL;
@@ -1705,6 +1706,7 @@ int xc_assign_device(
domctl.domain = domid;
domctl.u.assign_device.dev = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_PCI;
domctl.u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf = machine_sbdf;
+ domctl.u.assign_device.flag = flag;
return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
}
@@ -1792,6 +1794,11 @@ int xc_assign_dt_device(
domctl.u.assign_device.dev = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT;
domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.size = size;
+ /*
+ * DT doesn't own any RDM so actually DT has nothing to do
+ * for any flag and here just fix that as 0.
+ */
+ domctl.u.assign_device.flag = 0;
set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.path, path);
rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
index e0743f8..632c15e 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ static int do_pci_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, i
FILE *f;
unsigned long long start, end, flags, size;
int irq, i, rc, hvm = 0;
+ uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
if (type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_INVALID)
return ERROR_FAIL;
@@ -987,7 +988,7 @@ static int do_pci_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, i
out:
if (!libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, NULL)) {
- rc = xc_assign_device(ctx->xch, domid, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev));
+ rc = xc_assign_device(ctx->xch, domid, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev), flag);
if (rc < 0 && (hvm || errno != ENOSYS)) {
LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_assign_device failed");
return ERROR_FAIL;
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
index 64f1137..b7de615 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
@@ -1172,12 +1172,17 @@ CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_test_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value d
CAMLreturn(Val_bool(ret == 0));
}
-CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value desc)
+static int domain_assign_device_rdm_flag_table[] = {
+ XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED,
+};
+
+CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value desc,
+ value rflag)
{
- CAMLparam3(xch, domid, desc);
+ CAMLparam4(xch, domid, desc, rflag);
int ret;
int domain, bus, dev, func;
- uint32_t sbdf;
+ uint32_t sbdf, flag;
domain = Int_val(Field(desc, 0));
bus = Int_val(Field(desc, 1));
@@ -1185,7 +1190,10 @@ CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value desc)
func = Int_val(Field(desc, 3));
sbdf = encode_sbdf(domain, bus, dev, func);
- ret = xc_assign_device(_H(xch), _D(domid), sbdf);
+ ret = Int_val(Field(rflag, 0));
+ flag = domain_assign_device_rdm_flag_table[ret];
+
+ ret = xc_assign_device(_H(xch), _D(domid), sbdf, flag);
if (ret < 0)
failwith_xc(_H(xch));
diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
index ee3e1d0..c8380d1 100644
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
@@ -592,7 +592,8 @@ static int token_value(char *token)
return strtol(token, NULL, 16);
}
-static int next_bdf(char **str, int *seg, int *bus, int *dev, int *func)
+static int next_bdf(char **str, int *seg, int *bus, int *dev, int *func,
+ int *flag)
{
char *token;
@@ -607,8 +608,17 @@ static int next_bdf(char **str, int *seg, int *bus, int *dev, int *func)
*dev = token_value(token);
token = strchr(token, ',') + 1;
*func = token_value(token);
- token = strchr(token, ',');
- *str = token ? token + 1 : NULL;
+ token = strchr(token, ',') + 1;
+ if ( token ) {
+ *flag = token_value(token);
+ *str = token + 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* O means we take "strict" as our default policy. */
+ *flag = 0;
+ *str = NULL;
+ }
return 1;
}
@@ -620,14 +630,14 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_test_assign_device(XcObject *self,
uint32_t dom;
char *pci_str;
int32_t sbdf = 0;
- int seg, bus, dev, func;
+ int seg, bus, dev, func, flag;
static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "pci", NULL };
if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "is", kwd_list,
&dom, &pci_str) )
return NULL;
- while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func) )
+ while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func, &flag) )
{
sbdf = seg << 16;
sbdf |= (bus & 0xff) << 8;
@@ -653,21 +663,21 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_assign_device(XcObject *self,
uint32_t dom;
char *pci_str;
int32_t sbdf = 0;
- int seg, bus, dev, func;
+ int seg, bus, dev, func, flag;
static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "pci", NULL };
if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "is", kwd_list,
&dom, &pci_str) )
return NULL;
- while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func) )
+ while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func, &flag) )
{
sbdf = seg << 16;
sbdf |= (bus & 0xff) << 8;
sbdf |= (dev & 0x1f) << 3;
sbdf |= (func & 0x7);
- if ( xc_assign_device(self->xc_handle, dom, sbdf) != 0 )
+ if ( xc_assign_device(self->xc_handle, dom, sbdf, flag) != 0 )
{
if (errno == ENOSYS)
sbdf = -1;
@@ -686,14 +696,14 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_deassign_device(XcObject *self,
uint32_t dom;
char *pci_str;
int32_t sbdf = 0;
- int seg, bus, dev, func;
+ int seg, bus, dev, func, flag;
static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "pci", NULL };
if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "is", kwd_list,
&dom, &pci_str) )
return NULL;
- while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func) )
+ while ( next_bdf(&pci_str, &seg, &bus, &dev, &func, &flag) )
{
sbdf = seg << 16;
sbdf |= (bus & 0xff) << 8;
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 10/16] tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
` (6 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
This patch introduces user configurable parameters to specify RDM
resource and according policies,
Global RDM parameter:
rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
Per-device RDM parameter:
pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
Global RDM parameter, "strategy", allows user to specify reserved regions
explicitly, Currently, using 'host' to include all reserved regions reported
on this platform which is good to handle hotplug scenario. In the future
this parameter may be further extended to allow specifying random regions,
e.g. even those belonging to another platform as a preparation for live
migration with passthrough devices. By default this isn't set so we don't
check all rdms. Instead, we just check rdm specific to a given device if
you're assigning this kind of device. Note this option is not recommended
unless you can make sure any conflict does exist.
'strict/relaxed' policy decides how to handle conflict when reserving RDM
regions in pfn space. If conflict exists, 'strict' means an immediate error
so VM can't keep running, while 'relaxed' allows moving forward with a
warning message thrown out.
Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
others.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v9 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v8:
* One minimal code style change
v7:
* Need to rename some parameters:
In the xl rdm config parsing, `reserve=' should be `policy='.
In the xl pci config parsing, `rdm_reserve=' should be `rdm_policy='.
The type `libxl_rdm_reserve_flag' should be `libxl_rdm_policy'.
The field name `reserve' in `libxl_rdm_reserve' should be `policy'.
v6:
* Some rename to make our policy reasonable
"type" -> "strategy"
"none" -> "ignore"
* Don't expose "ignore" in xl level and just keep that as a default.
And then sync docs and the patch head description
v5:
* Just make sure the per-device plicy always override the global policy,
and so cleanup some associated comments and the patch head description.
* A little change to follow one bit, XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED.
* Improve all descriptions in doc.
* Make all rdm variables specific to .hvm
v4:
* No need to define init_val for libxl_rdm_reserve_type since its just zero
* Grab those changes to xl/libxlu to as a final patch
docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
docs/misc/vtd.txt | 24 +++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 7 ++++
tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 2 ++
tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c | 9 +++++
tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 18 ++++++++++
6 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
index 382f30b..e6e0f70 100644
--- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
+++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
@@ -633,6 +633,79 @@ assigned slave device.
=back
+=item B<rdm="RDM_RESERVATION_STRING">
+
+(HVM/x86 only) Specifies information about Reserved Device Memory (RDM),
+which is necessary to enable robust device passthrough. One example of RDM
+is reported through ACPI Reserved Memory Region Reporting (RMRR) structure
+on x86 platform.
+
+B<RDM_RESERVE_STRING> has the form C<[KEY=VALUE,KEY=VALUE,...> where:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<KEY=VALUE>
+
+Possible B<KEY>s are:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<strategy="STRING">
+
+Currently there is only one valid type:
+
+"host" means all reserved device memory on this platform should be checked to
+reserve regions in this VM's guest address space. This global rdm parameter
+allows user to specify reserved regions explicitly, and using "host" includes
+all reserved regions reported on this platform, which is useful when doing
+hotplug.
+
+By default this isn't set so we don't check all rdms. Instead, we just check
+rdm specific to a given device if you're assigning this kind of device. Note
+this option is not recommended unless you can make sure any conflict does exist.
+
+For example, you're trying to set "memory = 2800" to allocate memory to one
+given VM but the platform owns two RDM regions like,
+
+Device A [sbdf_A]: RMRR region_A: base_addr ac6d3000 end_address ac6e6fff
+Device B [sbdf_B]: RMRR region_B: base_addr ad800000 end_address afffffff
+
+In this conflict case,
+
+#1. If B<strategy> is set to "host", for example,
+
+rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict" or rdm = "strategy=host,policy=relaxed"
+
+It means all conflicts will be handled according to the policy
+introduced by B<policy> as described below.
+
+#2. If B<strategy> is not set at all, but
+
+pci = [ 'sbdf_A, rdm_policy=xxxxx' ]
+
+It means only one conflict of region_A will be handled according to the policy
+introduced by B<rdm_policy="STRING"> as described inside pci options.
+
+=item B<policy="STRING">
+
+Specifies how to deal with conflicts when reserving reserved device
+memory in guest address space.
+
+When that conflict is unsolved,
+
+"strict" means VM can't be created, or the associated device can't be
+attached in the case of hotplug.
+
+"relaxed" allows VM to be created but may cause VM to crash if
+pass-through device accesses RDM. For exampl,e Windows IGD GFX driver
+always accessed RDM regions so it leads to VM crash.
+
+Note this may be overridden by rdm_policy option in PCI device configuration.
+
+=back
+
+=back
+
=item B<pci=[ "PCI_SPEC_STRING", "PCI_SPEC_STRING", ... ]>
Specifies the host PCI devices to passthrough to this guest. Each B<PCI_SPEC_STRING>
@@ -695,6 +768,14 @@ dom0 without confirmation. Please use with care.
D0-D3hot power management states for the PCI device. False (0) by
default.
+=item B<rdm_policy="STRING">
+
+(HVM/x86 only) This is same as policy option inside the rdm option but
+just specific to a given device. Therefore the default is "relaxed" as
+same as policy option as well.
+
+Note this would override global B<rdm> option.
+
=back
=back
diff --git a/docs/misc/vtd.txt b/docs/misc/vtd.txt
index 9af0e99..88b2102 100644
--- a/docs/misc/vtd.txt
+++ b/docs/misc/vtd.txt
@@ -111,6 +111,30 @@ in the config file:
To override for a specific device:
pci = [ '01:00.0,msitranslate=0', '03:00.0' ]
+RDM, 'reserved device memory', for PCI Device Passthrough
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+There are some devices the BIOS controls, for e.g. USB devices to perform
+PS2 emulation. The regions of memory used for these devices are marked
+reserved in the e820 map. When we turn on DMA translation, DMA to those
+regions will fail. Hence BIOS uses RMRR to specify these regions along with
+devices that need to access these regions. OS is expected to setup
+identity mappings for these regions for these devices to access these regions.
+
+While creating a VM we should reserve them in advance, and avoid any conflicts.
+So we introduce user configurable parameters to specify RDM resource and
+according policies,
+
+To enable this globally, add "rdm" in the config file:
+
+ rdm = "strategy=host, policy=relaxed" (default policy is "relaxed")
+
+Or just for a specific device:
+
+ pci = [ '01:00.0,rdm_policy=relaxed', '03:00.0,rdm_policy=strict' ]
+
+For all the options available to RDM, see xl.cfg(5).
+
Caveat on Conventional PCI Device Passthrough
---------------------------------------------
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
index a32e3df..7c884c4 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ int libxl__domain_create_info_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc,
return 0;
}
+void libxl__rdm_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_domain_build_info *b_info)
+{
+ if (b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID)
+ b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+}
+
int libxl__domain_build_info_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc,
libxl_domain_build_info *b_info)
{
@@ -332,6 +338,7 @@ int libxl__domain_build_info_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc,
libxl_defbool_setdefault(&b_info->u.hvm.gfx_passthru, false);
+ libxl__rdm_setdefault(gc, b_info);
break;
case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV:
libxl_defbool_setdefault(&b_info->u.pv.e820_host, false);
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
index 3c09668..4bb0f38 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
@@ -1176,6 +1176,8 @@ _hidden int libxl__device_vtpm_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_vtpm *vtpm
_hidden int libxl__device_vfb_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_vfb *vfb);
_hidden int libxl__device_vkb_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_vkb *vkb);
_hidden int libxl__device_pci_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_pci *pci);
+_hidden void libxl__rdm_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_build_info *b_info);
_hidden const char *libxl__device_nic_devname(libxl__gc *gc,
uint32_t domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
index 632c15e..1ebdce7 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
@@ -988,6 +988,12 @@ static int do_pci_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, i
out:
if (!libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, NULL)) {
+ if (pcidev->rdm_policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT) {
+ flag &= ~XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
+ } else if (pcidev->rdm_policy != LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED) {
+ LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "unknown rdm check flag.");
+ return ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
rc = xc_assign_device(ctx->xch, domid, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev), flag);
if (rc < 0 && (hvm || errno != ENOSYS)) {
LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_assign_device failed");
@@ -1040,6 +1046,9 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_reset(libxl__gc *gc, unsigned int domain, unsigned
int libxl__device_pci_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_pci *pci)
{
+ /* We'd like to force reserve rdm specific to a device by default.*/
+ if (pci->rdm_policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID)
+ pci->rdm_policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
index bc0c4ef..db9f75a 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
@@ -77,6 +77,17 @@ libxl_domain_type = Enumeration("domain_type", [
(2, "PV"),
], init_val = "LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_INVALID")
+libxl_rdm_reserve_strategy = Enumeration("rdm_reserve_strategy", [
+ (0, "ignore"),
+ (1, "host"),
+ ])
+
+libxl_rdm_reserve_policy = Enumeration("rdm_reserve_policy", [
+ (-1, "invalid"),
+ (0, "strict"),
+ (1, "relaxed"),
+ ], init_val = "LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID")
+
libxl_channel_connection = Enumeration("channel_connection", [
(0, "UNKNOWN"),
(1, "PTY"),
@@ -387,6 +398,11 @@ libxl_gic_version = Enumeration("gic_version", [
(0x30, "v3")
], init_val = "LIBXL_GIC_VERSION_DEFAULT")
+libxl_rdm_reserve = Struct("rdm_reserve", [
+ ("strategy", libxl_rdm_reserve_strategy),
+ ("policy", libxl_rdm_reserve_policy),
+ ])
+
libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[
("max_vcpus", integer),
("avail_vcpus", libxl_bitmap),
@@ -486,6 +502,7 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[
# See libxl_ms_vm_genid_generate()
("ms_vm_genid", libxl_ms_vm_genid),
("serial_list", libxl_string_list),
+ ("rdm", libxl_rdm_reserve),
])),
("pv", Struct(None, [("kernel", string),
("slack_memkb", MemKB),
@@ -566,6 +583,7 @@ libxl_device_pci = Struct("device_pci", [
("power_mgmt", bool),
("permissive", bool),
("seize", bool),
+ ("rdm_policy", libxl_rdm_reserve_policy),
])
libxl_device_dtdev = Struct("device_dtdev", [
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 10/16] tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
` (2 more replies)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 12/16] tools: introduce a new parameter to set a predefined rdm boundary Tiejun Chen
` (5 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 3 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
While building a VM, HVM domain builder provides struct hvm_info_table{}
to help hvmloader. Currently it includes two fields to construct guest
e820 table by hvmloader, low_mem_pgend and high_mem_pgend. So we should
check them to fix any conflict with RDM.
RMRR can reside in address space beyond 4G theoretically, but we never
see this in real world. So in order to avoid breaking highmem layout
we don't solve highmem conflict. Note this means highmem rmrr could still
be supported if no conflict.
But in the case of lowmem, RMRR probably scatter the whole RAM space.
Especially multiple RMRR entries would worsen this to lead a complicated
memory layout. And then its hard to extend hvm_info_table{} to work
hvmloader out. So here we're trying to figure out a simple solution to
avoid breaking existing layout. So when a conflict occurs,
#1. Above a predefined boundary (2G)
- move lowmem_end below reserved region to solve conflict;
#2. Below a predefined boundary (2G)
- Check strict/relaxed policy.
"strict" policy leads to fail libxl. Note when both policies
are specified on a given region, 'strict' is always preferred.
"relaxed" policy issue a warning message and also mask this entry INVALID
to indicate we shouldn't expose this entry to hvmloader.
Note later we need to provide a parameter to set that predefined boundary
dynamically.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
v11:
* Use GCNEW_ARRAY to replace libxl__malloc()
* #define pfn_to_paddrk is missing safety () around x, and
move this into libxl_internal.h
* Rename set_rdm_entries() to add_rdm_entry() and put the
increment at the end so that the assignments are
to ->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].
* "Simply make it so that if there are any rdms specified
in the domain config, they are used instead of the
automatically gathered information (from strategy and
devices)." So just return if d_config->rmds is valid.
* Shorten some code comments.
v9 ~ v10:
* Nothing is changed.
v8:
* Introduce pfn_to_paddr(x) -> ((uint64_t)x << XC_PAGE_SHIFT)
and set_rdm_entries() to factor out current codes.
v7:
* Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
v6:
* fix some code stypes
* Refine libxl__xc_device_get_rdm()
v5:
* A little change to make sure the per-device policy always override the global
policy and correct its associated code comments.
* Fix one typo in the patch head description
* Rename xc_device_get_rdm() with libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(), and then replace
malloc() with libxl__malloc(), and finally cleanup this fallout.
* libxl__xc_device_get_rdm() should return proper libxl error code, ERROR_FAIL.
Then instead, the allocated RDM entries would be returned with an out parameter.
v4:
* Consistent to use term "RDM".
* Unconditionally set *nr_entries to 0
* Grab to all sutffs to provide a parameter to set our predefined boundary
dynamically to as a separated patch later
tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 2 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 17 ++-
tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 14 ++-
tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 7 ++
5 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
index 7c884c4..5b57062 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ int libxl__domain_build(libxl__gc *gc,
switch (info->type) {
case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM:
- ret = libxl__build_hvm(gc, domid, info, state);
+ ret = libxl__build_hvm(gc, domid, d_config, state);
if (ret)
goto out;
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
index 634b8d2..29476fc 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
@@ -92,6 +92,280 @@ const char *libxl__domain_device_model(libxl__gc *gc,
return dm;
}
+static int
+libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
+ uint32_t flag,
+ uint16_t seg,
+ uint8_t bus,
+ uint8_t devfn,
+ unsigned int *nr_entries,
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory **xrdm)
+{
+ int rc = 0, r;
+
+ /*
+ * We really can't presume how many entries we can get in advance.
+ */
+ *nr_entries = 0;
+ r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flag, seg, bus, devfn,
+ NULL, nr_entries);
+ assert(r <= 0);
+ /* "0" means we have no any rdm entry. */
+ if (!r) goto out;
+
+ if (errno != ENOBUFS) {
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ GCNEW_ARRAY(*xrdm, *nr_entries);
+ r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flag, seg, bus, devfn,
+ *xrdm, nr_entries);
+ if (r)
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+
+ out:
+ if (rc) {
+ *nr_entries = 0;
+ *xrdm = NULL;
+ LOG(ERROR, "Could not get reserved device memory maps.\n");
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there exists rdm hole in the specified memory range.
+ * Returns true if exists, else returns false.
+ */
+static bool overlaps_rdm(uint64_t start, uint64_t memsize,
+ uint64_t rdm_start, uint64_t rdm_size)
+{
+ return (start + memsize > rdm_start) && (start < rdm_start + rdm_size);
+}
+
+static void
+add_rdm_entry(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint64_t rdm_start, uint64_t rdm_size, int rdm_policy)
+{
+ d_config->rdms = libxl__realloc(NOGC, d_config->rdms,
+ (d_config->num_rdms+1) * sizeof(libxl_device_rdm));
+
+ d_config->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].start = rdm_start;
+ d_config->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].size = rdm_size;
+ d_config->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].policy = rdm_policy;
+ d_config->num_rdms++;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check reported RDM regions and handle potential gfn conflicts according
+ * to user preferred policy.
+ *
+ * RDM can reside in address space beyond 4G theoretically, but we never
+ * see this in real world. So in order to avoid breaking highmem layout
+ * we don't solve highmem conflict. Note this means highmem rmrr could
+ * still be supported if no conflict.
+ *
+ * But in the case of lowmem, RDM probably scatter the whole RAM space.
+ * Especially multiple RDM entries would worsen this to lead a complicated
+ * memory layout. And then its hard to extend hvm_info_table{} to work
+ * hvmloader out. So here we're trying to figure out a simple solution to
+ * avoid breaking existing layout. So when a conflict occurs,
+ *
+ * #1. Above a predefined boundary (default 2G)
+ * - Move lowmem_end below reserved region to solve conflict;
+ *
+ * #2. Below a predefined boundary (default 2G)
+ * - Check strict/relaxed policy.
+ * "strict" policy leads to fail libxl.
+ * "relaxed" policy issue a warning message and also mask this entry
+ * INVALID to indicate we shouldn't expose this entry to hvmloader.
+ * Note when both policies are specified on a given region, the per-device
+ * policy should override the global policy.
+ */
+int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint64_t rdm_mem_boundary,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args)
+{
+ int i, j, conflict, rc;
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory *xrdm = NULL;
+ uint32_t strategy = d_config->b_info.u.hvm.rdm.strategy;
+ uint16_t seg;
+ uint8_t bus, devfn;
+ uint64_t rdm_start, rdm_size;
+ uint64_t highmem_end = args->highmem_end ? args->highmem_end : (1ull<<32);
+
+ /*
+ * We just want to construct RDM once since RDM is specific to the
+ * given platform, so this shouldn't change again.
+ */
+ if (d_config->num_rdms)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Might not expose rdm. */
+ if (strategy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_STRATEGY_IGNORE &&
+ !d_config->num_pcidevs)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Query all RDM entries in this platform */
+ if (strategy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_STRATEGY_HOST) {
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+
+ /* Collect all rdm info if exist. */
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ 0, 0, 0, &nr_entries, &xrdm);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (!nr_entries)
+ return 0;
+
+ assert(xrdm);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++)
+ {
+ add_rdm_entry(gc, d_config,
+ pfn_to_paddr(xrdm[i].start_pfn),
+ pfn_to_paddr(xrdm[i].nr_pages),
+ d_config->b_info.u.hvm.rdm.policy);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Query RDM entries per-device */
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_pcidevs; i++) {
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+ bool new = true;
+
+ seg = d_config->pcidevs[i].domain;
+ bus = d_config->pcidevs[i].bus;
+ devfn = PCI_DEVFN(d_config->pcidevs[i].dev,
+ d_config->pcidevs[i].func);
+ nr_entries = 0;
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, ~PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ seg, bus, devfn, &nr_entries, &xrdm);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ /* No RDM to associated with this device. */
+ if (!nr_entries)
+ continue;
+
+ assert(xrdm);
+
+ /*
+ * Need to check whether this entry is already saved in the array.
+ * This could come from two cases:
+ *
+ * - user may configure to get all RDMs in this platform, which
+ * is already queried before this point
+ * - or two assigned devices may share one RDM entry
+ *
+ * Different policies may be configured on the same RDM due to
+ * above two cases. But we don't allow to assign such a group
+ * devies right now so it doesn't come true in our case.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < d_config->num_rdms; j++) {
+ if (d_config->rdms[j].start == pfn_to_paddr(xrdm[0].start_pfn))
+ {
+ /*
+ * So the per-device policy always override the global
+ * policy in this case.
+ */
+ d_config->rdms[j].policy = d_config->pcidevs[i].rdm_policy;
+ new = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (new) {
+ add_rdm_entry(gc, d_config,
+ pfn_to_paddr(xrdm[0].start_pfn),
+ pfn_to_paddr(xrdm[0].nr_pages),
+ d_config->pcidevs[i].rdm_policy);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Next step is to check and avoid potential conflict between RDM
+ * entries and guest RAM. To avoid intrusive impact to existing
+ * memory layout {lowmem, mmio, highmem} which is passed around
+ * various function blocks, below conflicts are not handled which
+ * are rare and handling them would lead to a more scattered
+ * layout:
+ * - RDM in highmem area (>4G)
+ * - RDM lower than a defined memory boundary (e.g. 2G)
+ * Otherwise for conflicts between boundary and 4G, we'll simply
+ * move lowmem end below reserved region to solve conflict.
+ *
+ * If a conflict is detected on a given RDM entry, an error will
+ * be returned if 'strict' policy is specified. Instead, if
+ * 'relaxed' policy specified, this conflict is treated just as a
+ * warning, but we mark this RDM entry as INVALID to indicate that
+ * this entry shouldn't be exposed to hvmloader.
+ *
+ * Firstly we should check the case of rdm < 4G because we may
+ * need to expand highmem_end.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_rdms; i++) {
+ rdm_start = d_config->rdms[i].start;
+ rdm_size = d_config->rdms[i].size;
+ conflict = overlaps_rdm(0, args->lowmem_end, rdm_start, rdm_size);
+
+ if (!conflict)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Just check if RDM > our memory boundary. */
+ if (rdm_start > rdm_mem_boundary) {
+ /*
+ * We will move downwards lowmem_end so we have to expand
+ * highmem_end.
+ */
+ highmem_end += (args->lowmem_end - rdm_start);
+ /* Now move downwards lowmem_end. */
+ args->lowmem_end = rdm_start;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Sync highmem_end. */
+ args->highmem_end = highmem_end;
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we can take same policy to check lowmem(< 2G) and
+ * highmem adjusted above.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_rdms; i++) {
+ rdm_start = d_config->rdms[i].start;
+ rdm_size = d_config->rdms[i].size;
+ /* Does this entry conflict with lowmem? */
+ conflict = overlaps_rdm(0, args->lowmem_end,
+ rdm_start, rdm_size);
+ /* Does this entry conflict with highmem? */
+ conflict |= overlaps_rdm((1ULL<<32),
+ args->highmem_end - (1ULL<<32),
+ rdm_start, rdm_size);
+
+ if (!conflict)
+ continue;
+
+ if (d_config->rdms[i].policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "RDM conflict at 0x%lx.\n", d_config->rdms[i].start);
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ LOG(WARN, "Ignoring RDM conflict at 0x%lx.\n",
+ d_config->rdms[i].start);
+
+ /*
+ * Then mask this INVALID to indicate we shouldn't expose this
+ * to hvmloader.
+ */
+ d_config->rdms[i].policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ out:
+ return ERROR_FAIL;
+}
+
const libxl_vnc_info *libxl__dm_vnc(const libxl_domain_config *guest_config)
{
const libxl_vnc_info *vnc = NULL;
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
index edd7f3f..9af3b21 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -922,13 +922,20 @@ out:
}
int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
- libxl_domain_build_info *info,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
libxl__domain_build_state *state)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {};
int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL;
uint64_t mmio_start, lowmem_end, highmem_end;
+ libxl_domain_build_info *const info = &d_config->b_info;
+ /*
+ * Currently we fix this as 2G to guarantee how to handle
+ * our rdm policy. But we'll provide a parameter to set
+ * this dynamically.
+ */
+ uint64_t rdm_mem_boundary = 0x80000000;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args));
/* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then
@@ -966,6 +973,14 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
args.highmem_end = highmem_end;
args.mmio_start = mmio_start;
+ rc = libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(gc, d_config,
+ rdm_mem_boundary,
+ &args);
+ if (rc) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "checking reserved device memory failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (info->num_vnuma_nodes != 0) {
int i;
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
index 4bb0f38..f2466dc 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@
#endif
/* all of these macros preserve errno (saving and restoring) */
+/* Convert pfn to physical address space. */
+#define pfn_to_paddr(x) ((uint64_t)(x) << XC_PAGE_SHIFT)
+
/* logging */
_hidden void libxl__logv(libxl_ctx *ctx, xentoollog_level msglevel, int errnoval,
const char *file /* may be 0 */, int line /* ignored if !file */,
@@ -1079,7 +1082,7 @@ _hidden int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
_hidden int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
libxl_domain_build_info *info, libxl__domain_build_state *state);
_hidden int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
- libxl_domain_build_info *info,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
libxl__domain_build_state *state);
_hidden int libxl__qemu_traditional_cmd(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
@@ -1587,6 +1590,15 @@ _hidden int libxl__need_xenpv_qemu(libxl__gc *gc,
int nr_channels, libxl_device_channel *channels);
/*
+ * This function will fix reserved device memory conflict
+ * according to user's configuration.
+ */
+_hidden int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint64_t rdm_mem_guard,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args);
+
+/*
* This function will cause the whole libxl process to hang
* if the device model does not respond. It is deprecated.
*
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
index db9f75a..157fa59 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
@@ -586,6 +586,12 @@ libxl_device_pci = Struct("device_pci", [
("rdm_policy", libxl_rdm_reserve_policy),
])
+libxl_device_rdm = Struct("device_rdm", [
+ ("start", uint64),
+ ("size", uint64),
+ ("policy", libxl_rdm_reserve_policy),
+ ])
+
libxl_device_dtdev = Struct("device_dtdev", [
("path", string),
])
@@ -616,6 +622,7 @@ libxl_domain_config = Struct("domain_config", [
("disks", Array(libxl_device_disk, "num_disks")),
("nics", Array(libxl_device_nic, "num_nics")),
("pcidevs", Array(libxl_device_pci, "num_pcidevs")),
+ ("rdms", Array(libxl_device_rdm, "num_rdms")),
("dtdevs", Array(libxl_device_dtdev, "num_dtdevs")),
("vfbs", Array(libxl_device_vfb, "num_vfbs")),
("vkbs", Array(libxl_device_vkb, "num_vkbs")),
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 12/16] tools: introduce a new parameter to set a predefined rdm boundary
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 13/16] libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest Tiejun Chen
` (4 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
Previously we always fix that predefined boundary as 2G to handle
conflict between memory and rdm, but now this predefined boundar
can be changes with the parameter "rdm_mem_boundary" in .cfg file.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v8 ~ v10:
* Nothing is changed.
v7:
* Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
v6:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Make this variable "rdm_mem_boundary_memkb" specific to .hvm
v4:
* Separated from the previous patch to provide a parameter to set that
predefined boundary dynamically.
docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxl.h | 6 ++++++
tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 4 ++++
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 8 +-------
tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 1 +
tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 3 +++
6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
index e6e0f70..ce7ce85 100644
--- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
+++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
@@ -845,6 +845,28 @@ More information about Xen gfx_passthru feature is available
on the XenVGAPassthrough L<http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/XenVGAPassthrough>
wiki page.
+=item B<rdm_mem_boundary=MBYTES>
+
+Number of megabytes to set a boundary for checking rdm conflict.
+
+When RDM conflicts with RAM, RDM probably scatter the whole RAM space.
+Especially multiple RDM entries would worsen this to lead a complicated
+memory layout. So here we're trying to figure out a simple solution to
+avoid breaking existing layout. So when a conflict occurs,
+
+ #1. Above a predefined boundary
+ - move lowmem_end below reserved region to solve conflict;
+
+ #2. Below a predefined boundary
+ - Check strict/relaxed policy.
+ "strict" policy leads to fail libxl. Note when both policies
+ are specified on a given region, 'strict' is always preferred.
+ "relaxed" policy issue a warning message and also mask this
+ entry INVALID to indicate we shouldn't expose this entry to
+ hvmloader.
+
+Here the default is 2G.
+
=item B<dtdev=[ "DTDEV_PATH", "DTDEV_PATH", ... ]>
Specifies the host device tree nodes to passthrough to this guest. Each
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl.h b/tools/libxl/libxl.h
index 5a7308d..927b2d8 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl.h
@@ -909,6 +909,12 @@ const char *libxl_defbool_to_string(libxl_defbool b);
#define LIBXL_TIMER_MODE_DEFAULT -1
#define LIBXL_MEMKB_DEFAULT ~0ULL
+/*
+ * We'd like to set a memory boundary to determine if we need to check
+ * any overlap with reserved device memory.
+ */
+#define LIBXL_RDM_MEM_BOUNDARY_MEMKB_DEFAULT (2048 * 1024)
+
#define LIBXL_MS_VM_GENID_LEN 16
typedef struct {
uint8_t bytes[LIBXL_MS_VM_GENID_LEN];
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
index 5b57062..b27c53a 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ void libxl__rdm_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_domain_build_info *b_info)
{
if (b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID)
b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+
+ if (b_info->u.hvm.rdm_mem_boundary_memkb == LIBXL_MEMKB_DEFAULT)
+ b_info->u.hvm.rdm_mem_boundary_memkb =
+ LIBXL_RDM_MEM_BOUNDARY_MEMKB_DEFAULT;
}
int libxl__domain_build_info_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
index 9af3b21..0b7c39d 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -930,12 +930,6 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL;
uint64_t mmio_start, lowmem_end, highmem_end;
libxl_domain_build_info *const info = &d_config->b_info;
- /*
- * Currently we fix this as 2G to guarantee how to handle
- * our rdm policy. But we'll provide a parameter to set
- * this dynamically.
- */
- uint64_t rdm_mem_boundary = 0x80000000;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args));
/* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then
@@ -974,7 +968,7 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
args.mmio_start = mmio_start;
rc = libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(gc, d_config,
- rdm_mem_boundary,
+ info->u.hvm.rdm_mem_boundary_memkb*1024,
&args);
if (rc) {
LOG(ERROR, "checking reserved device memory failed");
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
index 157fa59..9caaf44 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[
("ms_vm_genid", libxl_ms_vm_genid),
("serial_list", libxl_string_list),
("rdm", libxl_rdm_reserve),
+ ("rdm_mem_boundary_memkb", MemKB),
])),
("pv", Struct(None, [("kernel", string),
("slack_memkb", MemKB),
diff --git a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
index 5c6d1b0..615b78b 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
@@ -1581,6 +1581,9 @@ static void parse_config_data(const char *config_source,
exit(1);
}
}
+
+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_long (config, "rdm_mem_boundary", &l, 0))
+ b_info->u.hvm.rdm_mem_boundary_memkb = l * 1024;
break;
case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV:
{
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 13/16] libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 12/16] tools: introduce a new parameter to set a predefined rdm boundary Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 14/16] xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment Tiejun Chen
` (3 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
Here we'll construct a basic guest e820 table via
XENMEM_set_memory_map. This table includes lowmem, highmem
and RDMs if they exist, and hvmloader would need this info
later.
Note this guest e820 table would be same as before if the
platform has no any RDM or we disable RDM (by default).
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v8 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v7:
* Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
v6:
* Nothing is changed.
v5:
* Make this variable "rdm_mem_boundary_memkb" specific to .hvm
v4:
* Separated from the previous patch to provide a parameter to set that
predefined boundary dynamically.
tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h | 7 ++++
tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c | 8 +++++
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 5 +++
tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 103 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h
index 9a80d43..bd030b6 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_arch.h
@@ -55,4 +55,11 @@ int libxl__arch_vnuma_build_vmemrange(libxl__gc *gc,
_hidden
int libxl__arch_domain_map_irq(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, int irq);
+/* arch specific to construct memory mapping function */
+_hidden
+int libxl__arch_domain_construct_memmap(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args);
+
#endif
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c
index d306905..42ab6d8 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_arm.c
@@ -969,6 +969,14 @@ int libxl__arch_domain_map_irq(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, int irq)
return xc_domain_bind_pt_spi_irq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, irq);
}
+int libxl__arch_domain_construct_memmap(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
index 0b7c39d..a76d4b3 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -1012,6 +1012,11 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
goto out;
}
+ if (libxl__arch_domain_construct_memmap(gc, d_config, domid, &args)) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "setting domain memory map failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ret = hvm_build_set_params(ctx->xch, domid, info, state->store_port,
&state->store_mfn, state->console_port,
&state->console_mfn, state->store_domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c
index 8cd15ca..b3cf3e2 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_x86.c
@@ -445,6 +445,89 @@ int libxl__arch_domain_map_irq(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, int irq)
}
/*
+ * Here we're just trying to set these kinds of e820 mappings:
+ *
+ * #1. Low memory region
+ *
+ * Low RAM starts at least from 1M to make sure all standard regions
+ * of the PC memory map, like BIOS, VGA memory-mapped I/O and vgabios,
+ * have enough space.
+ * Note: Those stuffs below 1M are still constructed with multiple
+ * e820 entries by hvmloader. At this point we don't change anything.
+ *
+ * #2. RDM region if it exists
+ *
+ * #3. High memory region if it exists
+ *
+ * Note: these regions are not overlapping since we already check
+ * to adjust them. Please refer to libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm().
+ */
+#define GUEST_LOW_MEM_START_DEFAULT 0x100000
+int libxl__arch_domain_construct_memmap(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_config *d_config,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int nr = 0, i;
+ /* We always own at least one lowmem entry. */
+ unsigned int e820_entries = 1;
+ struct e820entry *e820 = NULL;
+ uint64_t highmem_size =
+ args->highmem_end ? args->highmem_end - (1ull << 32) : 0;
+
+ /* Add all rdm entries. */
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_rdms; i++)
+ if (d_config->rdms[i].policy != LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID)
+ e820_entries++;
+
+
+ /* If we should have a highmem range. */
+ if (highmem_size)
+ e820_entries++;
+
+ if (e820_entries >= E820MAX) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "Ooops! Too many entries in the memory map!\n");
+ rc = ERROR_INVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ e820 = libxl__malloc(gc, sizeof(struct e820entry) * e820_entries);
+
+ /* Low memory */
+ e820[nr].addr = GUEST_LOW_MEM_START_DEFAULT;
+ e820[nr].size = args->lowmem_end - GUEST_LOW_MEM_START_DEFAULT;
+ e820[nr].type = E820_RAM;
+ nr++;
+
+ /* RDM mapping */
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_rdms; i++) {
+ if (d_config->rdms[i].policy == LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_INVALID)
+ continue;
+
+ e820[nr].addr = d_config->rdms[i].start;
+ e820[nr].size = d_config->rdms[i].size;
+ e820[nr].type = E820_RESERVED;
+ nr++;
+ }
+
+ /* High memory */
+ if (highmem_size) {
+ e820[nr].addr = ((uint64_t)1 << 32);
+ e820[nr].size = highmem_size;
+ e820[nr].type = E820_RAM;
+ }
+
+ if (xc_domain_set_memory_map(CTX->xch, domid, e820, e820_entries) != 0) {
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
* c-basic-offset: 4
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 14/16] xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 13/16] libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 15/16] xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr Tiejun Chen
` (2 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Yang Zhang, Kevin Tian
USB RMRR may conflict with guest BIOS region. In such case, identity
mapping setup is simply skipped in previous implementation. Now we
can handle this scenario cleanly with new policy mechanism so previous
hack code can be removed now.
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
v5 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v4:
* Refine the patch head description
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h | 1 -
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 11 ++---------
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c | 7 -------
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
index af1feef..af205f5 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ do { \
int vtd_hw_check(void);
void disable_pmr(struct iommu *iommu);
-int is_usb_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd);
#endif /* _DMAR_H_ */
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index a2f3a66..8a8d763 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2242,11 +2242,9 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
/*
* If the device belongs to the hardware domain, and it has RMRR, don't
* remove it from the hardware domain, because BIOS may use RMRR at
- * booting time. Also account for the special casing of USB below (in
- * intel_iommu_assign_device()).
+ * booting time.
*/
- if ( !is_hardware_domain(source) &&
- !is_usb_device(pdev->seg, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn) )
+ if ( !is_hardware_domain(source) )
{
const struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
u16 bdf;
@@ -2299,13 +2297,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
if ( ret )
return ret;
- /* FIXME: Because USB RMRR conflicts with guest bios region,
- * ignore USB RMRR temporarily.
- */
seg = pdev->seg;
bus = pdev->bus;
- if ( is_usb_device(seg, bus, pdev->devfn) )
- return 0;
/* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c
index bd14c02..b8a077f 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c
@@ -29,13 +29,6 @@
#include "extern.h"
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
-int is_usb_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-{
- u16 class = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
- PCI_CLASS_DEVICE);
- return (class == 0xc03);
-}
-
/* Disable vt-d protected memory registers. */
void disable_pmr(struct iommu *iommu)
{
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 15/16] xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 14/16] xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 12:38 ` [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Wei Liu
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Yang Zhang, Kevin Tian
Currently we're intending to cover this kind of devices
with shared RMRR simply since the case of shared RMRR is
a rare case according to our previous experiences. But
late we can group these devices which shared rmrr, and
then allow all devices within a group to be assigned to
same domain.
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
v10 ~ v11:
* Noting is changed.
v9:
* Correct one indentation issue
v8:
* Merge two if{} as one if{}
* Add to print RMRR range info when stop assign a group device
v5 ~ v7:
* Nothing is changed.
v4:
* Refine one code comment.
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index 8a8d763..ce5c295 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2293,13 +2293,37 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
return -ENODEV;
+ seg = pdev->seg;
+ bus = pdev->bus;
+ /*
+ * In rare cases one given rmrr is shared by multiple devices but
+ * obviously this would put the security of a system at risk. So
+ * we should prevent from this sort of device assignment.
+ *
+ * TODO: in the future we can introduce group device assignment
+ * interface to make sure devices sharing RMRR are assigned to the
+ * same domain together.
+ */
+ for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ {
+ if ( rmrr->segment == seg &&
+ PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
+ PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn &&
+ rmrr->scope.devices_cnt > 1 )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR VTDPREFIX
+ " cannot assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u"
+ " with shared RMRR at %"PRIx64" for Dom%d.\n",
+ seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ rmrr->base_address, d->domain_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = reassign_device_ownership(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
return ret;
- seg = pdev->seg;
- bus = pdev->bus;
-
/* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
{
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 15/16] xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 1:30 ` Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 14:09 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 12:38 ` [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Wei Liu
16 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Tiejun Chen @ 2015-07-22 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
This patch parses to enable user configurable parameters to specify
RDM resource and according policies which are defined previously,
Global RDM parameter:
rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
Per-device RDM parameter:
pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
others.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
v9 ~ v11:
* Nothing is changed.
v8:
* Clean some codes style issues.
v7:
* Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
v6:
* Just sync those renames introduced by patch #10.
v5:
* Need a rebase after we make all rdm variables specific to .hvm.
* Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
the global policy by default.
v4:
* Separated from current patch #11 to parse/enable our rdm policy parameters
since its make a lot sense and these stuffs are specific to xl/libxlu.
tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 4 +++
tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 13 +++++++
3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
index 26fb143..026413b 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int pcidev_struct_fill(libxl_device_pci *pcidev, unsigned int domain,
#define STATE_OPTIONS_K 6
#define STATE_OPTIONS_V 7
#define STATE_TERMINAL 8
+#define STATE_TYPE 9
+#define STATE_RDM_STRATEGY 10
+#define STATE_RESERVE_POLICY 11
int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str)
{
unsigned state = STATE_DOMAIN;
@@ -143,7 +146,18 @@ int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str
pcidev->permissive = atoi(tok);
}else if ( !strcmp(optkey, "seize") ) {
pcidev->seize = atoi(tok);
- }else{
+ } else if (!strcmp(optkey, "rdm_policy")) {
+ if (!strcmp(tok, "strict")) {
+ pcidev->rdm_policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT;
+ } else if (!strcmp(tok, "relaxed")) {
+ pcidev->rdm_policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+ } else {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "%s is not an valid PCI RDM property"
+ " policy: 'strict' or 'relaxed'.",
+ tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ } else {
XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown PCI BDF option: %s", optkey);
}
tok = ptr + 1;
@@ -167,6 +181,82 @@ parse_error:
return ERROR_INVAL;
}
+int xlu_rdm_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_rdm_reserve *rdm, const char *str)
+{
+ unsigned state = STATE_TYPE;
+ char *buf2, *tok, *ptr, *end;
+
+ if (NULL == (buf2 = ptr = strdup(str)))
+ return ERROR_NOMEM;
+
+ for (tok = ptr, end = ptr + strlen(ptr) + 1; ptr < end; ptr++) {
+ switch(state) {
+ case STATE_TYPE:
+ if (*ptr == '=') {
+ state = STATE_RDM_STRATEGY;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(tok, "strategy")) {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM state option: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case STATE_RDM_STRATEGY:
+ if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr == ',') {
+ state = STATE_RESERVE_POLICY;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (!strcmp(tok, "host")) {
+ rdm->strategy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_STRATEGY_HOST;
+ } else {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM strategy option: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case STATE_RESERVE_POLICY:
+ if (*ptr == '=') {
+ state = STATE_OPTIONS_V;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(tok, "policy")) {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM property value: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case STATE_OPTIONS_V:
+ if (*ptr == ',' || *ptr == '\0') {
+ state = STATE_TERMINAL;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (!strcmp(tok, "strict")) {
+ rdm->policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT;
+ } else if (!strcmp(tok, "relaxed")) {
+ rdm->policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+ } else {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM property policy value: %s",
+ tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(buf2);
+
+ if (tok != ptr || state != STATE_TERMINAL)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+ return ERROR_INVAL;
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h b/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
index 989605a..e81b644 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ int xlu_disk_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, int nspecs, const char *const *specs,
*/
int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str);
+/*
+ * RDM parsing
+ */
+int xlu_rdm_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_rdm_reserve *rdm, const char *str);
/*
* Vif rate parsing.
diff --git a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
index 615b78b..d102439 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
@@ -1980,6 +1980,14 @@ skip_vfb:
xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "e820_host", &b_info->u.pv.e820_host, 0);
}
+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_string(config, "rdm", &buf, 0)) {
+ libxl_rdm_reserve rdm;
+ if (!xlu_rdm_parse(config, &rdm, buf)) {
+ b_info->u.hvm.rdm.strategy = rdm.strategy;
+ b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy = rdm.policy;
+ }
+ }
+
if (!xlu_cfg_get_list (config, "pci", &pcis, 0, 0)) {
d_config->num_pcidevs = 0;
d_config->pcidevs = NULL;
@@ -1993,6 +2001,11 @@ skip_vfb:
pcidev->power_mgmt = pci_power_mgmt;
pcidev->permissive = pci_permissive;
pcidev->seize = pci_seize;
+ /*
+ * Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
+ * the global policy by default.
+ */
+ pcidev->rdm_policy = b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy;
e = xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr,
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 8:52 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 10:04 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 13:24 ` Ian Jackson
2 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 8:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen
Cc: Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:30, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> ---
> v11:
>
> * Use GCNEW_ARRAY to replace libxl__malloc()
>
> * #define pfn_to_paddrk is missing safety () around x, and
> move this into libxl_internal.h
>
> * Rename set_rdm_entries() to add_rdm_entry() and put the
> increment at the end so that the assignments are
> to ->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].
>
> * "Simply make it so that if there are any rdms specified
> in the domain config, they are used instead of the
> automatically gathered information (from strategy and
> devices)." So just return if d_config->rmds is valid.
>
> * Shorten some code comments.
I think it is not the first time that we're pointing out to you that
when you make not just cosmetic changes, review and ack tags
should be dropped.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 8:43 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:00 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 8:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen
Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Keir Fraser
>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:29, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> --- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
> +++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,46 @@ uint64_t pci_hi_mem_start = 0, pci_hi_mem_end = 0;
> enum virtual_vga virtual_vga = VGA_none;
> unsigned long igd_opregion_pgbase = 0;
>
> +/* Check if the specified range conflicts with any reserved device memory. */
> +static bool check_overlap_all(uint64_t start, uint64_t size)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
> + {
> + if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
> + check_overlap(start, size,
> + memory_map.map[i].addr,
> + memory_map.map[i].size) )
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* Find the lowest RMRR higher than base. */
This comment should have been updated; I'm doing this for you in
anticipation of this going in later today.
> +static int find_next_rmrr(uint32_t base)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
> + int next_rmrr = -1;
> + uint64_t end, min_end = (1ull << 32);
> +
> + for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map ; i++ )
> + {
> + end = memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size;
> +
> + if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
> + end > base &&
> + min_end < min_end )
Surely "end < min_end"?
Or really I think this part should be concerned about the start of
the region, albeit it probably doesn't matter much since right
below 4G there shouldn't be an RMRR anyway. Just to be on the
safe side I'll at least make it "end <= min_end".
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 8:52 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 10:12 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:54 ` George Dunlap
0 siblings, 2 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
On 2015/7/22 16:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:30, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
>> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
>> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>> ---
>> v11:
>>
>> * Use GCNEW_ARRAY to replace libxl__malloc()
>>
>> * #define pfn_to_paddrk is missing safety () around x, and
>> move this into libxl_internal.h
>>
>> * Rename set_rdm_entries() to add_rdm_entry() and put the
>> increment at the end so that the assignments are
>> to ->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].
>>
>> * "Simply make it so that if there are any rdms specified
>> in the domain config, they are used instead of the
>> automatically gathered information (from strategy and
>> devices)." So just return if d_config->rmds is valid.
>>
>> * Shorten some code comments.
>
> I think it is not the first time that we're pointing out to you that
> when you make not just cosmetic changes, review and ack tags
> should be dropped.
I don't recall this sort of requirement was mentioned. Instead, this is
new to me. So where can I found this warning you said previously?
Furthermore, you ask me to drop Reviewed-by/Acked-by in this revision,
what's next? Just to this example,
No.1 revision:
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
No.2 revision:
I addressed some comments raised by Jackson. But you mean
Reviewed-by/Acked-by should be dropped.
No.3 revision:
I assume Jackson Ack or Review to this so I should leave one line like this,
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
without two previous Acked-by/Reviewed-by, right? So looks like the
latter always override the former, right?
And I also can't understand why we should drop Reviewed-by/Acked-by from
other guys. And, all new comments I addressed don't conflict with our
previous revision so why?
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 9:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: Yang Zhang, Kevin Tian, xen-devel
>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:29, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>
> This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
> to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
> RMRRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
You not stating what you did to the patch made me always assume
that you didn't do more than some cosmetic adjustments, if any.
Now that I'm preparing to get the initial part of this series in I find
that you altered it quite a bit, so I'm afraid I'm going to need to
undo some of the adjustments you did.
> @@ -303,6 +342,33 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
> break;
> }
>
> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
> + {
> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
> +
> + if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
> + !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + grdm.used_entries = 0;
> + rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
> + &grdm);
> +
> + if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
> + rc = -ENOBUFS;
> +
> + grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
> + if ( grdm.map.nr_entries )
This conditional appears to be a bug: How would the caller know,
upon successful return, that there are no reserved regions?
> @@ -1162,6 +1199,33 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
> break;
> }
>
> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
> + {
> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
> +
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
> --- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
> @@ -573,7 +573,42 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
> typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
> DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
>
> -/* Next available subop number is 27 */
> +/*
> + * With some legacy devices, certain guest-physical addresses cannot safely
> + * be used for other purposes, e.g. to map guest RAM. This hypercall
> + * enumerates those regions so the toolstack can avoid using them.
> + */
> +#define XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map 27
> +struct xen_reserved_device_memory {
> + xen_pfn_t start_pfn;
> + xen_ulong_t nr_pages;
> +};
> +typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory xen_reserved_device_memory_t;
> +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t);
> +
> +struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
> + /* IN */
> + /* Currently just one bit to indicate checkng all Reserved Device Memory. */
> +#define PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL 0x1
> + uint32_t flag;
> + /* IN */
> + uint16_t seg;
> + uint8_t bus;
> + uint8_t devfn;
This makes a mem-op PCI specific. For one, this should therefore be
put in a union, so that non-PCI uses remain possible in the future
without breaking by then existing users of the interface. And with
that I wonder whether this shouldn't use struct physdev_pci_device.
> --- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
> #define PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) ((bdf) & 0xff)
> #define PCI_BDF(b,d,f) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | PCI_DEVFN(d,f))
> #define PCI_BDF2(b,df) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | ((df) & 0xff))
> +#define PCI_SBDF(s,bdf) (((s & 0xffff) << 16) | (bdf & 0xffff))
> +#define PCI_SBDF2(s,b,df) (((s & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF2(b,df))
The natural thing for PCI_SBDF() would be
#define PCI_SBDF(s,b,d,f) ...
See for instance
http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-07/msg02554.html
I'm going to produce an updated patch, to be sent out later today.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 10:04 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 16:05 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:24 ` Ian Jackson
2 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 10:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
> While building a VM, HVM domain builder provides struct hvm_info_table{}
> to help hvmloader. Currently it includes two fields to construct guest
> e820 table by hvmloader, low_mem_pgend and high_mem_pgend. So we should
> check them to fix any conflict with RDM.
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 8:52 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 10:12 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:54 ` George Dunlap
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 10:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen
Cc: Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
>>> On 22.07.15 at 10:52, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> On 2015/7/22 16:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:30, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>>> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
>>> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
>>> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>>> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>>> ---
>>> v11:
>>>
>>> * Use GCNEW_ARRAY to replace libxl__malloc()
>>>
>>> * #define pfn_to_paddrk is missing safety () around x, and
>>> move this into libxl_internal.h
>>>
>>> * Rename set_rdm_entries() to add_rdm_entry() and put the
>>> increment at the end so that the assignments are
>>> to ->rdms[d_config->num_rdms].
>>>
>>> * "Simply make it so that if there are any rdms specified
>>> in the domain config, they are used instead of the
>>> automatically gathered information (from strategy and
>>> devices)." So just return if d_config->rmds is valid.
>>>
>>> * Shorten some code comments.
>>
>> I think it is not the first time that we're pointing out to you that
>> when you make not just cosmetic changes, review and ack tags
>> should be dropped.
>
> I don't recall this sort of requirement was mentioned. Instead, this is
> new to me. So where can I found this warning you said previously?
Even if I misremember and didn't send such a request your way, if
you read xen-devel you'd have seen this quite a number of times.
> Furthermore, you ask me to drop Reviewed-by/Acked-by in this revision,
> what's next? Just to this example,
>
> No.1 revision:
>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>
> No.2 revision:
>
> I addressed some comments raised by Jackson. But you mean
> Reviewed-by/Acked-by should be dropped.
Not unilaterally - it depends on the nature of the changes and
the area of code the tag was offered for (I'd tend to say that
reviews normally cover the whole patch, but acks may have
limited meaning and hence may be retained in a wider set of
cases).
> No.3 revision:
>
> I assume Jackson Ack or Review to this so I should leave one line like this,
>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
>
> without two previous Acked-by/Reviewed-by, right? So looks like the
> latter always override the former, right?
>
> And I also can't understand why we should drop Reviewed-by/Acked-by from
> other guys. And, all new comments I addressed don't conflict with our
> previous revision so why?
In the case at hand you even had to adjust the algorithm (whether
and how to honor incoming data). I.e. the question isn't whether
there's a conflict, but whether there's any adjustment that may,
from an abstract pov, result in the person having offered such a
tag to now possibly have a different opinion. You have to face it -
(s)he may be of the opinion that the change was wrong (reviewers
make mistakes just like contributors do) or the suggestion wrongly
carried out.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 10:42 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
` (4 more replies)
1 sibling, 5 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 10:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen, xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell,
Yang Z Zhang
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
---
v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version, fixing
a few issues that got introduced after handing it over. Unionize
new public memop interface structure to allow for non-PCI to be
supported later on. Check flags to have all currently undefined
flags clear. Refine adjustments to xen/pci.h.
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -17,6 +17,42 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
CHECK_mem_access_op;
CHECK_vmemrange;
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( rdm.start_pfn != start || rdm.nr_pages != nr )
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ if ( __copy_to_compat_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
{
int split, op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK;
@@ -303,6 +339,35 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, X
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
+ !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
return compat_arch_memory_op(cmd, compat);
}
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -748,6 +748,39 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat
return 0;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( __copy_to_guest_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
{
struct domain *d;
@@ -1162,6 +1195,35 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, arg, 1) ||
+ !guest_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
rc = arch_memory_op(cmd, arg);
break;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ void iommu_crash_shutdown(void)
iommu_enabled = iommu_intremap = 0;
}
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ const struct iommu_ops *ops = iommu_get_ops();
+
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || !ops->get_reserved_device_memory )
+ return 0;
+
+ return ops->get_reserved_device_memory(func, ctxt);
+}
+
bool_t iommu_has_feature(struct domain *d, enum iommu_feature feature)
{
const struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -914,3 +914,30 @@ int platform_supports_x2apic(void)
unsigned int mask = ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP | ACPI_DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT;
return cpu_has_x2apic && ((dmar_flags & mask) == ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
}
+
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr, *rmrr_cur = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ u16 bdf;
+
+ for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ {
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( rmrr == rmrr_cur )
+ continue;
+
+ rc = func(PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PFN_UP(rmrr->end_address) - PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PCI_SBDF2(rmrr->segment, bdf), ctxt);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
+ return rc;
+
+ if ( rc )
+ rmrr_cur = rmrr;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(struct do
u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *);
int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt);
unsigned int io_apic_read_remap_rte(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg);
void io_apic_write_remap_rte(unsigned int apic,
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2490,6 +2490,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops =
.crash_shutdown = vtd_crash_shutdown,
.iotlb_flush = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush,
.iotlb_flush_all = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush_all,
+ .get_reserved_device_memory = intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory,
.dump_p2m_table = vtd_dump_p2m_table,
};
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__
#include "xen.h"
+#include "physdev.h"
/*
* Increase or decrease the specified domain's memory reservation. Returns the
@@ -573,7 +574,40 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
-/* Next available subop number is 27 */
+/*
+ * With some legacy devices, certain guest-physical addresses cannot safely
+ * be used for other purposes, e.g. to map guest RAM. This hypercall
+ * enumerates those regions so the toolstack can avoid using them.
+ */
+#define XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map 27
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory {
+ xen_pfn_t start_pfn;
+ xen_ulong_t nr_pages;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory xen_reserved_device_memory_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t);
+
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
+#define XENMEM_RDM_ALL 1 /* Request all regions (ignore dev union). */
+ /* IN */
+ uint32_t flags;
+ union {
+ struct physdev_pci_device pci;
+ } dev;
+ /*
+ * IN/OUT
+ *
+ * Gets set to the required number of entries when too low,
+ * signaled by error code -ERANGE.
+ */
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+ /* OUT */
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t) buffer;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t);
+
+/* Next available subop number is 28 */
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
struct page_info;
+/*
+ * Any non-zero value returned from callbacks of this type will cause the
+ * function the callback was handed to terminate its iteration. Assigning
+ * meaning of these non-zero values is left to the top level caller /
+ * callback pair.
+ */
+typedef int iommu_grdm_t(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr, u32 id, void *ctxt);
+
struct iommu_ops {
int (*init)(struct domain *d);
void (*hwdom_init)(struct domain *d);
@@ -156,12 +164,14 @@ struct iommu_ops {
void (*crash_shutdown)(void);
void (*iotlb_flush)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned int page_count);
void (*iotlb_flush_all)(struct domain *d);
+ int (*get_reserved_device_memory)(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void (*dump_p2m_table)(struct domain *d);
};
void iommu_suspend(void);
void iommu_resume(void);
void iommu_crash_shutdown(void);
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void iommu_share_p2m_table(struct domain *d);
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
* 7:3 = slot
* 2:0 = function
*/
+#define PCI_SEG(sbdf) (((sbdf) >> 16) & 0xffff)
#define PCI_BUS(bdf) (((bdf) >> 8) & 0xff)
#define PCI_SLOT(bdf) (((bdf) >> 3) & 0x1f)
#define PCI_FUNC(bdf) ((bdf) & 0x07)
@@ -33,6 +34,9 @@
#define PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) ((bdf) & 0xff)
#define PCI_BDF(b,d,f) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | PCI_DEVFN(d,f))
#define PCI_BDF2(b,df) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | ((df) & 0xff))
+#define PCI_SBDF(s,b,d,f) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF(b,d,f))
+#define PCI_SBDF2(s,bdf) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | ((bdf) & 0xffff))
+#define PCI_SBDF3(s,b,df) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF2(b, df))
struct pci_dev_info {
bool_t is_extfn;
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -65,9 +65,10 @@
! memory_exchange memory.h
! memory_map memory.h
! memory_reservation memory.h
-? mem_access_op memory.h
+? mem_access_op memory.h
! pod_target memory.h
! remove_from_physmap memory.h
+! reserved_device_memory_map memory.h
? vmemrange memory.h
! vnuma_topology_info memory.h
? physdev_eoi physdev.h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 8:52 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 10:12 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 10:54 ` George Dunlap
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: George Dunlap @ 2015-07-22 10:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chen, Tiejun
Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Ian Jackson,
xen-devel, Jan Beulich
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Chen, Tiejun <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> And I also can't understand why we should drop Reviewed-by/Acked-by from
> other guys. And, all new comments I addressed don't conflict with our
> previous revision so why?
You must remove Reviewed-by / Acked-by *for a given patch* *when you
change that patch in a significant way*.
"Acked-by: John Smith" is saying that John Smith is OK with the patch
the way that it is. But just because John Smith was OK with the patch
before you made changes doesn't mean he's OK with the patch after you
made changes.
Very small changes -- like shifting whitespace or fixing typos -- are
usually OK to keep the Ack. But if you make anything more substantial
-- even if you just reword a comment significantly -- then you have to
drop the Acked-by or Reviewed-by, and get them again. (Usually if the
changes really are minor then it's fairly quick to get them again.)
-George
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
2015-07-22 12:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:52 ` Ian Campbell
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2015-07-22 12:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Tiejun Chen, xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan, Ian Campbell,
Yang Z Zhang
Hi Jan,
On 22/07/15 11:42, Jan Beulich wrote:
> This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
> to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
> RMRRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> ---
> v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version, fixing
> a few issues that got introduced after handing it over. Unionize
> new public memop interface structure to allow for non-PCI to be
> supported later on. Check flags to have all currently undefined
> flags clear. Refine adjustments to xen/pci.h.
[..]
> +struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
> +#define XENMEM_RDM_ALL 1 /* Request all regions (ignore dev union). */
> + /* IN */
> + uint32_t flags;
> + union {
> + struct physdev_pci_device pci;
> + } dev;
The size of physdev_pci_device is 4 bytes. So the maximum size of the
union would be 4 bytes as we can't change the layout of the hypercall
(IIRC, memory hypercall should be stable).
Let's say we want to add support for device describe in the device tree.
The only way to find a device is a path, so it means that we at least
need a size field and a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE for the path.
That won't fit in the union and we won't even be able to specify a
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE to point to another structure.
Would it be possible to either make sure that the union is at least the
size of a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and/or move the union at the end of the
structure?
> + /*
> + * IN/OUT
> + *
> + * Gets set to the required number of entries when too low,
> + * signaled by error code -ERANGE.
> + */
> + unsigned int nr_entries;
> + /* OUT */
> + XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t) buffer;
> +};
> +typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t;
> +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t);
> +
> +/* Next available subop number is 28 */
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
@ 2015-07-22 12:28 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 12:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Ian Campbell, Yang Z Zhang, Tiejun Chen
>>> On 22.07.15 at 14:17, <julien.grall@citrix.com> wrote:
> On 22/07/15 11:42, Jan Beulich wrote:
>
>> +struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
>> +#define XENMEM_RDM_ALL 1 /* Request all regions (ignore dev union). */
>> + /* IN */
>> + uint32_t flags;
>> + union {
>> + struct physdev_pci_device pci;
>> + } dev;
>
> The size of physdev_pci_device is 4 bytes. So the maximum size of the
> union would be 4 bytes as we can't change the layout of the hypercall
> (IIRC, memory hypercall should be stable).
>
> Let's say we want to add support for device describe in the device tree.
> The only way to find a device is a path, so it means that we at least
> need a size field and a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE for the path.
>
> That won't fit in the union and we won't even be able to specify a
> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE to point to another structure.
>
> Would it be possible to either make sure that the union is at least the
> size of a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and/or move the union at the end of the
> structure?
Very good point! Yes, I'll move it to the end. Whether to also add
a dummy handle right away I'm not sure. While not doing so now
will require a bit more care when extending the structure, it keeps
the interface uncluttered (and we don't really know at this point
whether we'd want a handle or a bigger union member or both or
yet something else).
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 12:38 ` Wei Liu
16 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2015-07-22 12:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: wei.liu2, xen-devel
I can see this series has gathered all acks except for the first patch.
On the condition that the first patch also gets an ack:
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
@ 2015-07-22 12:52 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:55 ` Chen, Tiejun
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2015-07-22 12:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Tiejun Chen, xen-devel
Cc: Yang Z Zhang, Keir Fraser, Kevin Tian, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan
On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 04:42 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests'
> P2M
> to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
> RMRRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> ---
> v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version,
Looking through the older comments, it seems like there was a
conclusion to have an XSM check here, which isn't present here?
It looks like Tim and Ian's comments have been addressed (so far as
they were agreed to at the time).
WRT the comments Julien raised: at some point (early on) you said this
was only intended to be used by the toolstack. In which case can it not
be done in one of the unstable interfaces (e.g. sysctl I suppose is the
obvious one)?
If not then perhaps just adding a type field with only one option (PCI)
would introduce sufficient extensibility?
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
2015-07-22 12:52 ` Ian Campbell
@ 2015-07-22 12:55 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 13:03 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:46 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 14:22 ` [PATCH v12a] " Jan Beulich
4 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell,
Yang Z Zhang
> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
> + {
> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
> +
> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
> + return -ENOSYS;
> +
> + if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
> + !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + grdm.used_entries = 0;
> + rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
> + &grdm);
> +
Just as you asked me previously,
Here if RDM doesn't exist, so
grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries = 0, and rc = 0, right?
> + if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
> + rc = -ENOBUFS;
> + grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
> + if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
So can we still do this copy here?
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:43 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 13:00 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson
Cc: Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, Andrew Cooper,
xen-devel, Tiejun Chen, Keir Fraser
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6287 bytes --]
>>> On 22.07.15 at 10:43, wrote:
>>>> On 22.07.15 at 03:29, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> > --- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
> > +++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
> > @@ -38,6 +38,46 @@ uint64_t pci_hi_mem_start = 0, pci_hi_mem_end = 0;
> > enum virtual_vga virtual_vga = VGA_none;
> > unsigned long igd_opregion_pgbase = 0;
> >
> > +/* Check if the specified range conflicts with any reserved device memory.
> */
> > +static bool check_overlap_all(uint64_t start, uint64_t size)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int i;
> > +
> > + for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
> > + {
> > + if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
> > + check_overlap(start, size,
> > + memory_map.map[i].addr,
> > + memory_map.map[i].size) )
> > + return true;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Find the lowest RMRR higher than base. */
>
> This comment should have been updated; I'm doing this for you in
> anticipation of this going in later today.
>
> > +static int find_next_rmrr(uint32_t base)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int i;
> > + int next_rmrr = -1;
> > + uint64_t end, min_end = (1ull << 32);
> > +
> > + for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map ; i++ )
> > + {
> > + end = memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size;
> > +
> > + if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
> > + end > base &&
> > + min_end < min_end )
>
> Surely "end < min_end"?
>
> Or really I think this part should be concerned about the start of
> the region, albeit it probably doesn't matter much since right
> below 4G there shouldn't be an RMRR anyway. Just to be on the
> safe side I'll at least make it "end <= min_end".
I.e like the below (also attached, just in case); I hope/think I didn't
do any other edits to further patches.
Jan
hvmloader/pci: try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
Try to avoid placing PCI BARs over RMRRs:
- If mmio_hole_size is not specified, and the existing MMIO range has
RMRRs in it, and there is space to expand the hole in lowmem without
moving more memory, then make the MMIO hole as large as possible.
- When placing RMRRs, find the next RMRR higher than the current base
in the lowmem mmio hole. If it overlaps, skip ahead of it and find
the next one.
This certainly won't work in all cases, but it should work in a
significant number of cases. Additionally, users should be able to
work around problems by setting mmio_hole_size larger in the guest
config.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
@@ -38,6 +38,45 @@ uint64_t pci_hi_mem_start = 0, pci_hi_mem_end = 0;
enum virtual_vga virtual_vga = VGA_none;
unsigned long igd_opregion_pgbase = 0;
+/* Check if the specified range conflicts with any reserved device memory. */
+static bool check_overlap_all(uint64_t start, uint64_t size)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ check_overlap(start, size,
+ memory_map.map[i].addr,
+ memory_map.map[i].size) )
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Find the lowest RMRR ending above base but below 4G. */
+static int find_next_rmrr(uint32_t base)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int next_rmrr = -1;
+ uint64_t end, min_end = 1ULL << 32;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map ; i++ )
+ {
+ end = memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size;
+
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ end > base && end <= min_end )
+ {
+ next_rmrr = i;
+ min_end = end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return next_rmrr;
+}
+
void pci_setup(void)
{
uint8_t is_64bar, using_64bar, bar64_relocate = 0;
@@ -46,6 +85,7 @@ void pci_setup(void)
uint32_t vga_devfn = 256;
uint16_t class, vendor_id, device_id;
unsigned int bar, pin, link, isa_irq;
+ int next_rmrr;
/* Resources assignable to PCI devices via BARs. */
struct resource {
@@ -299,6 +339,15 @@ void pci_setup(void)
|| (((pci_mem_start << 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
>= hvm_info->low_mem_pgend)) )
pci_mem_start <<= 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to accommodate RMRRs in our MMIO region on a best-effort basis.
+ * If we have RMRRs in the range, then make pci_mem_start just after
+ * hvm_info->low_mem_pgend.
+ */
+ if ( pci_mem_start > (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) &&
+ check_overlap_all(pci_mem_start, pci_mem_end-pci_mem_start) )
+ pci_mem_start = hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
if ( mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start) )
@@ -352,6 +401,8 @@ void pci_setup(void)
io_resource.base = 0xc000;
io_resource.max = 0x10000;
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(pci_mem_start);
+
/* Assign iomem and ioport resources in descending order of size. */
for ( i = 0; i < nr_bars; i++ )
{
@@ -407,6 +459,18 @@ void pci_setup(void)
}
base = (resource->base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(uint64_t)(bar_sz - 1);
+
+ /* If we're using mem_resource, check for RMRR conflicts. */
+ while ( resource == &mem_resource &&
+ next_rmrr >= 0 &&
+ check_overlap(base, bar_sz,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size) )
+ {
+ base = memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr + memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size;
+ base = (base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(bar_sz - 1);
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(base);
+ }
+
bar_data |= (uint32_t)base;
bar_data_upper = (uint32_t)(base >> 32);
base += bar_sz;
[-- Attachment #2: xen-staging-RMRR-6.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 4331 bytes --]
hvmloader/pci: try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs
Try to avoid placing PCI BARs over RMRRs:
- If mmio_hole_size is not specified, and the existing MMIO range has
RMRRs in it, and there is space to expand the hole in lowmem without
moving more memory, then make the MMIO hole as large as possible.
- When placing RMRRs, find the next RMRR higher than the current base
in the lowmem mmio hole. If it overlaps, skip ahead of it and find
the next one.
This certainly won't work in all cases, but it should work in a
significant number of cases. Additionally, users should be able to
work around problems by setting mmio_hole_size larger in the guest
config.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
@@ -38,6 +38,45 @@ uint64_t pci_hi_mem_start = 0, pci_hi_mem_end = 0;
enum virtual_vga virtual_vga = VGA_none;
unsigned long igd_opregion_pgbase = 0;
+/* Check if the specified range conflicts with any reserved device memory. */
+static bool check_overlap_all(uint64_t start, uint64_t size)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ check_overlap(start, size,
+ memory_map.map[i].addr,
+ memory_map.map[i].size) )
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Find the lowest RMRR ending above base but below 4G. */
+static int find_next_rmrr(uint32_t base)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int next_rmrr = -1;
+ uint64_t end, min_end = 1ULL << 32;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < memory_map.nr_map ; i++ )
+ {
+ end = memory_map.map[i].addr + memory_map.map[i].size;
+
+ if ( memory_map.map[i].type == E820_RESERVED &&
+ end > base && end <= min_end )
+ {
+ next_rmrr = i;
+ min_end = end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return next_rmrr;
+}
+
void pci_setup(void)
{
uint8_t is_64bar, using_64bar, bar64_relocate = 0;
@@ -46,6 +85,7 @@ void pci_setup(void)
uint32_t vga_devfn = 256;
uint16_t class, vendor_id, device_id;
unsigned int bar, pin, link, isa_irq;
+ int next_rmrr;
/* Resources assignable to PCI devices via BARs. */
struct resource {
@@ -299,6 +339,15 @@ void pci_setup(void)
|| (((pci_mem_start << 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
>= hvm_info->low_mem_pgend)) )
pci_mem_start <<= 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to accommodate RMRRs in our MMIO region on a best-effort basis.
+ * If we have RMRRs in the range, then make pci_mem_start just after
+ * hvm_info->low_mem_pgend.
+ */
+ if ( pci_mem_start > (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) &&
+ check_overlap_all(pci_mem_start, pci_mem_end-pci_mem_start) )
+ pci_mem_start = hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
if ( mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start) )
@@ -352,6 +401,8 @@ void pci_setup(void)
io_resource.base = 0xc000;
io_resource.max = 0x10000;
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(pci_mem_start);
+
/* Assign iomem and ioport resources in descending order of size. */
for ( i = 0; i < nr_bars; i++ )
{
@@ -407,6 +459,18 @@ void pci_setup(void)
}
base = (resource->base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(uint64_t)(bar_sz - 1);
+
+ /* If we're using mem_resource, check for RMRR conflicts. */
+ while ( resource == &mem_resource &&
+ next_rmrr >= 0 &&
+ check_overlap(base, bar_sz,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr,
+ memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size) )
+ {
+ base = memory_map.map[next_rmrr].addr + memory_map.map[next_rmrr].size;
+ base = (base + bar_sz - 1) & ~(bar_sz - 1);
+ next_rmrr = find_next_rmrr(base);
+ }
+
bar_data |= (uint32_t)base;
bar_data_upper = (uint32_t)(base >> 32);
base += bar_sz;
[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 12:55 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 13:03 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:20 ` Chen, Tiejun
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 13:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Ian Campbell, Yang Z Zhang
>>> On 22.07.15 at 14:55, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
>> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
>> + {
>> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
>> +
>> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
>> + return -ENOSYS;
>> +
>> + if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
>> + !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries)
> )
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + grdm.used_entries = 0;
>> + rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
>> + &grdm);
>> +
>
> Just as you asked me previously,
>
> Here if RDM doesn't exist, so
>
> grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries = 0, and rc = 0, right?
No, grdm.map.nr_entries still holds whatever the caller passed.
>> + if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
>> + rc = -ENOBUFS;
>> + grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
>> + if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
>
> So can we still do this copy here?
We not only can, we need to. The only case where we might skip it
is when the incoming grdm.map.nr_entries is unchanged.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 13:06 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:01 ` Wei Liu
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 13:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, David Scott, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy"):
> This patch passes rdm reservation policy to xc_assign_device() so the policy
> is checked when assigning devices to a VM.
Wei, as you know, I am double-checking the acks on this series.
You acked v4. But v11 is slightly different. Your ack was retained
and my subject line search did not turn up any authority for that.
The v* message by the submitter says:
> v5:
>
> * Fix the flag field as "0" to DT device
Below is the diff between
* staging (bc299d01) + Jan's v12 + v11 02.. + the relevant patch from v4
* staging (bc299d01) + Jan's v12 + v11 02.. + the relevant patch from v8
Please ack/nack.
Thanks,
Ian.
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 1dfadb0..69e6d8f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -1794,8 +1794,11 @@ int xc_assign_dt_device(
domctl.u.assign_device.dev = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT;
domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.size = size;
- /* DT doesn't own any RDM. */
- domctl.u.assign_device.flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM;
+ /*
+ * DT doesn't own any RDM so actually DT has nothing to do
+ * for any flag and here just fix that as 0.
+ */
+ domctl.u.assign_device.flag = 0;
set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.path, path);
rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
index 317bf75..b7de615 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
@@ -1173,9 +1173,7 @@ CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_test_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value d
}
static int domain_assign_device_rdm_flag_table[] = {
- XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM,
XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED,
- XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_STRICT,
};
CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value desc,
diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
index ff4adb3..c8380d1 100644
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
@@ -615,7 +615,8 @@ static int next_bdf(char **str, int *seg, int *bus, int *dev, int *func,
}
else
{
- *flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_STRICT;
+ /* O means we take "strict" as our default policy. */
+ *flag = 0;
*str = NULL;
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 12:52 ` Ian Campbell
@ 2015-07-22 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:19 ` Ian Campbell
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 13:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Campbell
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Yang Z Zhang, Tiejun Chen
>>> On 22.07.15 at 14:52, <ian.campbell@citrix.com> wrote:
> Looking through the older comments, it seems like there was a
> conclusion to have an XSM check here, which isn't present here?
Hmm, did I lose track of such a request?
> It looks like Tim and Ian's comments have been addressed (so far as
> they were agreed to at the time).
>
> WRT the comments Julien raised: at some point (early on) you said this
> was only intended to be used by the toolstack. In which case can it not
> be done in one of the unstable interfaces (e.g. sysctl I suppose is the
> obvious one)?
Oh, indeed. There was so much back and forth here - I thought
hvmloader is to use this interface (and it was doing so at some
point), but that's not the case. So yes, we don't really need to
guarantee stability (but we'd need to move the definitions into
a suitable block then). Still I think the altered layout with the
union at the end is preferable (if only to reduce churn).
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 13:19 ` Ian Campbell
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2015-07-22 13:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Yang Z Zhang, Tiejun Chen
On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 07:14 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >
> > > > On 22.07.15 at 14:52, <ian.campbell@citrix.com> wrote:
> > Looking through the older comments, it seems like there was a
> > conclusion to have an XSM check here, which isn't present here?
>
> Hmm, did I lose track of such a request?
You asked Daniel in <548584C9020000780004DAB2@mail.emea.novell.com> and
there was a short thread until you said "Right, in that case we
definitely would need a check." in
<5485E5DB020000780004DE0B@mail.emea.novell.com>.
That was from "[v8][PATCH 03/17] introduce
XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map".
> > It looks like Tim and Ian's comments have been addressed (so far as
> > they were agreed to at the time).
> >
> > WRT the comments Julien raised: at some point (early on) you said
> > this
> > was only intended to be used by the toolstack. In which case can it
> > not
> > be done in one of the unstable interfaces (e.g. sysctl I suppose is
> > the
> > obvious one)?
>
> Oh, indeed. There was so much back and forth here - I thought
> hvmloader is to use this interface (and it was doing so at some
> point), but that's not the case. So yes, we don't really need to
> guarantee stability (but we'd need to move the definitions into
> a suitable block then).
Ah, I hadn't realised that some of XENMEM was tools only. Yes this
should certainly be moved in there.
> Still I think the altered layout with the
> union at the end is preferable (if only to reduce churn).
Agreed.
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 13:03 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2015-07-22 13:20 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 13:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Ian Campbell, Yang Z Zhang
On 2015/7/22 21:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 22.07.15 at 14:55, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>>> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
>>> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
>>> + {
>>> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
>>> +
>>> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
>>> + return -ENOSYS;
>>> +
>>> + if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
>>> + !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries)
>> )
>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> + if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + grdm.used_entries = 0;
>>> + rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
>>> + &grdm);
>>> +
>>
>> Just as you asked me previously,
>>
>> Here if RDM doesn't exist, so
>>
>> grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries = 0, and rc = 0, right?
>
> No, grdm.map.nr_entries still holds whatever the caller passed.
What if the caller pass "0" like raising an inquiry? Indeed, this is
what we did in patch #11. I think this is reasonable since the caller
always doesn't know how much buffers should be allocated beforehand, so
instead, the caller prefer to make this sort of inquiry without any
buffers.
>
>>> + if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
>>> + rc = -ENOBUFS;
>>> + grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
>>> + if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
>>
>> So can we still do this copy here?
>
> We not only can, we need to. The only case where we might skip it
> is when the incoming grdm.map.nr_entries is unchanged.
If what I'm saying above is right, __copy_to_guest() would return a
error in this case, right? I don't think this make sense.
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:04 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 13:24 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 13:33 ` Chen, Tiejun
2 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 13:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
I have dropped Wei's ack on this from my git branch, as it was clearly
inappropriate to retain it. (v11 was acked by me, so there is no need
for a re-review by Wei unless he feels it would be useful.)
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 13:20 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 13:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Ian Campbell, Yang Z Zhang
>>> On 22.07.15 at 15:20, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
> On 2015/7/22 21:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 22.07.15 at 14:55, <tiejun.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>>>> +#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
>>>> + case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
>>>> + {
>>>> + struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
>>>> + return -ENOSYS;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
>>>> + !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries)
>>> )
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + grdm.used_entries = 0;
>>>> + rc =
> iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
>>>> + &grdm);
>>>> +
>>>
>>> Just as you asked me previously,
>>>
>>> Here if RDM doesn't exist, so
>>>
>>> grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries = 0, and rc = 0, right?
>>
>> No, grdm.map.nr_entries still holds whatever the caller passed.
>
> What if the caller pass "0" like raising an inquiry? Indeed, this is
> what we did in patch #11. I think this is reasonable since the caller
> always doesn't know how much buffers should be allocated beforehand, so
> instead, the caller prefer to make this sort of inquiry without any
> buffers.
If the callers passes in 0, then we return back the actual count.
I don't think I see what problem you're seeing.
>>>> + if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
>>>> + rc = -ENOBUFS;
>>>> + grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
>>>> + if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
>>>
>>> So can we still do this copy here?
>>
>> We not only can, we need to. The only case where we might skip it
>> is when the incoming grdm.map.nr_entries is unchanged.
>
> If what I'm saying above is right, __copy_to_guest() would return a
> error in this case, right?
Why would it? Are you mixing it up with copying to the actual
array (indirected through the handle inside the structure)?
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 13:24 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 13:33 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 14:04 ` Ian Jackson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
On 2015/7/22 21:24, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>
> I have dropped Wei's ack on this from my git branch, as it was clearly
> inappropriate to retain it. (v11 was acked by me, so there is no need
> for a re-review by Wei unless he feels it would be useful.)
Ian,
Sounds you start to merge them into your tree?
But now Jan is trying to update patch #1 as you see. I think something
needs to be synced on tool sides. Although that is not finished, at
least three changes exist:
#1. PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL -> XENMEM_RDM_ALL
#2. new public memop interface structure
#2.1
+ union {
+ struct physdev_pci_device pci;
+ } dev;
#2.2 flag -> flags
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 12:55 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 13:46 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 14:22 ` [PATCH v12a] " Jan Beulich
4 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2015-07-22 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Tiejun Chen, xen-devel
Cc: Yang Z Zhang, Keir Fraser, Kevin Tian, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan
On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 04:42 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests'
> P2M
> to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
> RMRRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
You explained on IRC that you had misinterpreted Daniel's response
about XSM and in fact such a check is not needed.
So I think the only pending changes are to move the union to the end of
xen_reserved_device_memory_map and to move the entire interface
definition under a #if defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__).
All of the actual code here looks good to me and with those two changes
I would:
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 13:33 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 14:04 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:00 ` Chen, Tiejun
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 14:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chen, Tiejun; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Chen, Tiejun writes ("Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
> Sounds you start to merge them into your tree?
>
> But now Jan is trying to update patch #1 as you see. I think something
> needs to be synced on tool sides. Although that is not finished, at
> least three changes exist:
Thanks. I am negotiating with Jan et al on IRC.
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters Tiejun Chen
@ 2015-07-22 14:09 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 14:40 ` Wei Liu
0 siblings, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 14:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tiejun Chen; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters"):
> This patch parses to enable user configurable parameters to specify
> RDM resource and according policies which are defined previously,
>
> Global RDM parameter:
> rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
> Per-device RDM parameter:
> pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
>
> Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
> 'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
> others.
>
> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Wei, as you know, I am double-checking the acks on this series.
You acked v4. But v11 is somewhat different. Your ack was retained
and my subject line search did not turn up any authority for that.
The v* message by the submitter says:
> v8:
>
> * Clean some codes style issues.
>
> v7:
>
> * Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
>
> v6:
>
> * Just sync those renames introduced by patch #10.
>
> v5:
>
> * Need a rebase after we make all rdm variables specific to .hvm.
> * Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
> the global policy by default.
v4 does not apply in the context of the current series.
Below is the interdiff between v4 and v11, generated with `diff -b'.
(Sorry for handing you an interdiff.)
Please ack/nack.
Thanks,
Ian.
(wearing committer hat)
--- /u/iwj/mail/t 2015-07-22 15:01:34.483483917 +0100
+++ ../d/0016-tools-parse-to-enable-new-rdm-policy-parameters.patch 2015-07-22 13:56:44.286133093 +0100
@@ -1,41 +1,34 @@
+From 2e8335644daf6d3f081aaa9aaf55597c6a245f36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
-To: <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
-CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>, Stefano Stabellini
- <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>, Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
- Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Subject: [v4][PATCH 19/19] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
-Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2015 17:57:30 +0800
+Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 01:39:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
This patch parses to enable user configurable parameters to specify
-RDM resource and according policies,
+RDM resource and according policies which are defined previously,
Global RDM parameter:
- rdm = "type=none/host,reserve=strict/relaxed"
+ rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
Per-device RDM parameter:
- pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_reserve=strict/relaxed' ]
+ pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
-Default per-device RDM policy is 'strict', while default global RDM policy
-is 'relaxed'. When both policies are specified on a given region, 'strict' is
-always preferred.
+Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
+'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
+others.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
---
-v4:
-
-* Separated from current patch #11 to parse/enable our rdm policy parameters
- since its make a lot sense and these stuffs are specific to xl/libxlu.
-
- tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 4 +++
- tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 10 ++++++
- 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
+ tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 4 ++
+ tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 13 +++++++
+ 3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
-index 26fb143..9255878 100644
+index 26fb143..026413b 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int pcidev_struct_fill(libxl_device_pci *pcidev, unsigned int domain,
@@ -43,30 +36,32 @@
#define STATE_OPTIONS_V 7
#define STATE_TERMINAL 8
+#define STATE_TYPE 9
-+#define STATE_RDM_TYPE 10
-+#define STATE_RESERVE_FLAG 11
++#define STATE_RDM_STRATEGY 10
++#define STATE_RESERVE_POLICY 11
int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str)
{
unsigned state = STATE_DOMAIN;
-@@ -143,6 +146,17 @@ int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str
+@@ -143,7 +146,18 @@ int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci *pcidev, const char *str
pcidev->permissive = atoi(tok);
}else if ( !strcmp(optkey, "seize") ) {
pcidev->seize = atoi(tok);
-+ }else if ( !strcmp(optkey, "rdm_reserve") ) {
-+ if ( !strcmp(tok, "strict") ) {
-+ pcidev->rdm_reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_STRICT;
-+ } else if ( !strcmp(tok, "relaxed") ) {
-+ pcidev->rdm_reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_RELAXED;
+- }else{
++ } else if (!strcmp(optkey, "rdm_policy")) {
++ if (!strcmp(tok, "strict")) {
++ pcidev->rdm_policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT;
++ } else if (!strcmp(tok, "relaxed")) {
++ pcidev->rdm_policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+ } else {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "%s is not an valid PCI RDM property"
-+ " flag: 'strict' or 'relaxed'.",
++ " policy: 'strict' or 'relaxed'.",
+ tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
- }else{
++ } else {
XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown PCI BDF option: %s", optkey);
}
-@@ -167,6 +181,84 @@ parse_error:
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+@@ -167,6 +181,82 @@ parse_error:
return ERROR_INVAL;
}
@@ -82,35 +77,33 @@
+ switch(state) {
+ case STATE_TYPE:
+ if (*ptr == '=') {
-+ state = STATE_RDM_TYPE;
++ state = STATE_RDM_STRATEGY;
+ *ptr = '\0';
-+ if (strcmp(tok, "type")) {
++ if (strcmp(tok, "strategy")) {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM state option: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
-+ case STATE_RDM_TYPE:
++ case STATE_RDM_STRATEGY:
+ if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr == ',') {
-+ state = STATE_RESERVE_FLAG;
++ state = STATE_RESERVE_POLICY;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (!strcmp(tok, "host")) {
-+ rdm->type = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_TYPE_HOST;
-+ } else if (!strcmp(tok, "none")) {
-+ rdm->type = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_TYPE_NONE;
++ rdm->strategy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_STRATEGY_HOST;
+ } else {
-+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM type option: %s", tok);
++ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM strategy option: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ tok = ptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
-+ case STATE_RESERVE_FLAG:
++ case STATE_RESERVE_POLICY:
+ if (*ptr == '=') {
+ state = STATE_OPTIONS_V;
+ *ptr = '\0';
-+ if (strcmp(tok, "reserve")) {
++ if (strcmp(tok, "policy")) {
+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM property value: %s", tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
@@ -122,11 +115,11 @@
+ state = STATE_TERMINAL;
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ if (!strcmp(tok, "strict")) {
-+ rdm->reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_STRICT;
++ rdm->policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_STRICT;
+ } else if (!strcmp(tok, "relaxed")) {
-+ rdm->reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_RELAXED;
++ rdm->policy = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_POLICY_RELAXED;
+ } else {
-+ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM property flag value: %s",
++ XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown RDM property policy value: %s",
+ tok);
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
@@ -167,34 +160,36 @@
/*
* Vif rate parsing.
diff --git a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
-index c7a12b1..85d74fd 100644
+index 615b78b..d102439 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
-@@ -1923,6 +1923,14 @@ skip_vfb:
+@@ -1980,6 +1980,14 @@ skip_vfb:
xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "e820_host", &b_info->u.pv.e820_host, 0);
}
+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_string(config, "rdm", &buf, 0)) {
+ libxl_rdm_reserve rdm;
+ if (!xlu_rdm_parse(config, &rdm, buf)) {
-+ b_info->rdm.type = rdm.type;
-+ b_info->rdm.reserve = rdm.reserve;
++ b_info->u.hvm.rdm.strategy = rdm.strategy;
++ b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy = rdm.policy;
+ }
+ }
+
if (!xlu_cfg_get_list (config, "pci", &pcis, 0, 0)) {
d_config->num_pcidevs = 0;
d_config->pcidevs = NULL;
-@@ -1937,6 +1945,8 @@ skip_vfb:
+@@ -1993,6 +2001,11 @@ skip_vfb:
pcidev->power_mgmt = pci_power_mgmt;
pcidev->permissive = pci_permissive;
pcidev->seize = pci_seize;
-+ /* We'd like to force reserve rdm specific to a device by default.*/
-+ pcidev->rdm_reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_STRICT;
- if (!xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf))
- d_config->num_pcidevs++;
- }
++ /*
++ * Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
++ * the global policy by default.
++ */
++ pcidev->rdm_policy = b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy;
+ e = xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf);
+ if (e) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
--
-1.9.1
-
+1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v12a] introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2015-07-22 13:46 ` Ian Campbell
@ 2015-07-22 14:22 ` Jan Beulich
4 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 14:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson, xen-devel
Cc: Kevin Tian, Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Campbell, Yang Z Zhang,
Tiejun Chen
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 12338 bytes --]
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
v12a: Move interface structure union member to the end, while moving
the whole public header block into a __XEN__ / __XEN_TOOLS__
conditional block.
v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version, fixing
a few issues that got introduced after handing it over. Unionize
new public memop interface structure to allow for non-PCI to be
supported later on. Check flags to have all currently undefined
flags clear. Refine adjustments to xen/pci.h.
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -17,6 +17,42 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
CHECK_mem_access_op;
CHECK_vmemrange;
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( rdm.start_pfn != start || rdm.nr_pages != nr )
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ if ( __copy_to_compat_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
{
int split, op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK;
@@ -303,6 +339,35 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, X
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
+ !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
return compat_arch_memory_op(cmd, compat);
}
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -748,6 +748,39 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat
return 0;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( __copy_to_guest_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
{
struct domain *d;
@@ -1162,6 +1195,35 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, arg, 1) ||
+ !guest_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
rc = arch_memory_op(cmd, arg);
break;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ void iommu_crash_shutdown(void)
iommu_enabled = iommu_intremap = 0;
}
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ const struct iommu_ops *ops = iommu_get_ops();
+
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || !ops->get_reserved_device_memory )
+ return 0;
+
+ return ops->get_reserved_device_memory(func, ctxt);
+}
+
bool_t iommu_has_feature(struct domain *d, enum iommu_feature feature)
{
const struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -914,3 +914,30 @@ int platform_supports_x2apic(void)
unsigned int mask = ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP | ACPI_DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT;
return cpu_has_x2apic && ((dmar_flags & mask) == ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
}
+
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr, *rmrr_cur = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ u16 bdf;
+
+ for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ {
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( rmrr == rmrr_cur )
+ continue;
+
+ rc = func(PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PFN_UP(rmrr->end_address) - PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PCI_SBDF2(rmrr->segment, bdf), ctxt);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
+ return rc;
+
+ if ( rc )
+ rmrr_cur = rmrr;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(struct do
u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *);
int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt);
unsigned int io_apic_read_remap_rte(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg);
void io_apic_write_remap_rte(unsigned int apic,
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2490,6 +2490,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops =
.crash_shutdown = vtd_crash_shutdown,
.iotlb_flush = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush,
.iotlb_flush_all = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush_all,
+ .get_reserved_device_memory = intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory,
.dump_p2m_table = vtd_dump_p2m_table,
};
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__
#include "xen.h"
+#include "physdev.h"
/*
* Increase or decrease the specified domain's memory reservation. Returns the
@@ -522,6 +523,40 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_sharing_
* The zero value is appropiate.
*/
+/*
+ * With some legacy devices, certain guest-physical addresses cannot safely
+ * be used for other purposes, e.g. to map guest RAM. This hypercall
+ * enumerates those regions so the toolstack can avoid using them.
+ */
+#define XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map 27
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory {
+ xen_pfn_t start_pfn;
+ xen_ulong_t nr_pages;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory xen_reserved_device_memory_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t);
+
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
+#define XENMEM_RDM_ALL 1 /* Request all regions (ignore dev union). */
+ /* IN */
+ uint32_t flags;
+ /*
+ * IN/OUT
+ *
+ * Gets set to the required number of entries when too low,
+ * signaled by error code -ERANGE.
+ */
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+ /* OUT */
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t) buffer;
+ /* IN */
+ union {
+ struct physdev_pci_device pci;
+ } dev;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t);
+
#endif /* defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) */
/*
@@ -573,7 +608,7 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
-/* Next available subop number is 27 */
+/* Next available subop number is 28 */
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
struct page_info;
+/*
+ * Any non-zero value returned from callbacks of this type will cause the
+ * function the callback was handed to terminate its iteration. Assigning
+ * meaning of these non-zero values is left to the top level caller /
+ * callback pair.
+ */
+typedef int iommu_grdm_t(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr, u32 id, void *ctxt);
+
struct iommu_ops {
int (*init)(struct domain *d);
void (*hwdom_init)(struct domain *d);
@@ -156,12 +164,14 @@ struct iommu_ops {
void (*crash_shutdown)(void);
void (*iotlb_flush)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned int page_count);
void (*iotlb_flush_all)(struct domain *d);
+ int (*get_reserved_device_memory)(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void (*dump_p2m_table)(struct domain *d);
};
void iommu_suspend(void);
void iommu_resume(void);
void iommu_crash_shutdown(void);
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void iommu_share_p2m_table(struct domain *d);
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
* 7:3 = slot
* 2:0 = function
*/
+#define PCI_SEG(sbdf) (((sbdf) >> 16) & 0xffff)
#define PCI_BUS(bdf) (((bdf) >> 8) & 0xff)
#define PCI_SLOT(bdf) (((bdf) >> 3) & 0x1f)
#define PCI_FUNC(bdf) ((bdf) & 0x07)
@@ -33,6 +34,9 @@
#define PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) ((bdf) & 0xff)
#define PCI_BDF(b,d,f) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | PCI_DEVFN(d,f))
#define PCI_BDF2(b,df) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | ((df) & 0xff))
+#define PCI_SBDF(s,b,d,f) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF(b,d,f))
+#define PCI_SBDF2(s,bdf) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | ((bdf) & 0xffff))
+#define PCI_SBDF3(s,b,df) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF2(b, df))
struct pci_dev_info {
bool_t is_extfn;
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -65,9 +65,10 @@
! memory_exchange memory.h
! memory_map memory.h
! memory_reservation memory.h
-? mem_access_op memory.h
+? mem_access_op memory.h
! pod_target memory.h
! remove_from_physmap memory.h
+! reserved_device_memory_map memory.h
? vmemrange memory.h
! vnuma_topology_info memory.h
? physdev_eoi physdev.h
[-- Attachment #2: get-reserved-device-memory.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 12381 bytes --]
introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
v12a: Move interface structure union member to the end, while moving
the whole public header block into a __XEN__ / __XEN_TOOLS__
conditional block.
v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version, fixing
a few issues that got introduced after handing it over. Unionize
new public memop interface structure to allow for non-PCI to be
supported later on. Check flags to have all currently undefined
flags clear. Refine adjustments to xen/pci.h.
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -17,6 +17,42 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
CHECK_mem_access_op;
CHECK_vmemrange;
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct compat_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( rdm.start_pfn != start || rdm.nr_pages != nr )
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ if ( __copy_to_compat_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
{
int split, op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK;
@@ -303,6 +339,35 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, X
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, compat, 1) ||
+ !compat_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(compat, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
return compat_arch_memory_op(cmd, compat);
}
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -748,6 +748,39 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat
return 0;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+struct get_reserved_device_memory {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map map;
+ unsigned int used_entries;
+};
+
+static int get_reserved_device_memory(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr,
+ u32 id, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory *grdm = ctxt;
+ u32 sbdf = PCI_SBDF3(grdm->map.dev.pci.seg, grdm->map.dev.pci.bus,
+ grdm->map.dev.pci.devfn);
+
+ if ( !(grdm->map.flags & XENMEM_RDM_ALL) && (sbdf != id) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( grdm->used_entries < grdm->map.nr_entries )
+ {
+ struct xen_reserved_device_memory rdm = {
+ .start_pfn = start, .nr_pages = nr
+ };
+
+ if ( __copy_to_guest_offset(grdm->map.buffer, grdm->used_entries,
+ &rdm, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ++grdm->used_entries;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
{
struct domain *d;
@@ -1162,6 +1195,35 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN
break;
}
+#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+ case XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map:
+ {
+ struct get_reserved_device_memory grdm;
+
+ if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&grdm.map, arg, 1) ||
+ !guest_handle_okay(grdm.map.buffer, grdm.map.nr_entries) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( grdm.map.flags & ~XENMEM_RDM_ALL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ grdm.used_entries = 0;
+ rc = iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(get_reserved_device_memory,
+ &grdm);
+
+ if ( !rc && grdm.map.nr_entries < grdm.used_entries )
+ rc = -ENOBUFS;
+ grdm.map.nr_entries = grdm.used_entries;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &grdm.map, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
default:
rc = arch_memory_op(cmd, arg);
break;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ void iommu_crash_shutdown(void)
iommu_enabled = iommu_intremap = 0;
}
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ const struct iommu_ops *ops = iommu_get_ops();
+
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || !ops->get_reserved_device_memory )
+ return 0;
+
+ return ops->get_reserved_device_memory(func, ctxt);
+}
+
bool_t iommu_has_feature(struct domain *d, enum iommu_feature feature)
{
const struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -914,3 +914,30 @@ int platform_supports_x2apic(void)
unsigned int mask = ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP | ACPI_DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT;
return cpu_has_x2apic && ((dmar_flags & mask) == ACPI_DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
}
+
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr, *rmrr_cur = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ u16 bdf;
+
+ for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ {
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( rmrr == rmrr_cur )
+ continue;
+
+ rc = func(PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PFN_UP(rmrr->end_address) - PFN_DOWN(rmrr->base_address),
+ PCI_SBDF2(rmrr->segment, bdf), ctxt);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
+ return rc;
+
+ if ( rc )
+ rmrr_cur = rmrr;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(struct do
u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *);
int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt);
unsigned int io_apic_read_remap_rte(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg);
void io_apic_write_remap_rte(unsigned int apic,
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2490,6 +2490,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops =
.crash_shutdown = vtd_crash_shutdown,
.iotlb_flush = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush,
.iotlb_flush_all = intel_iommu_iotlb_flush_all,
+ .get_reserved_device_memory = intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory,
.dump_p2m_table = vtd_dump_p2m_table,
};
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__
#include "xen.h"
+#include "physdev.h"
/*
* Increase or decrease the specified domain's memory reservation. Returns the
@@ -522,6 +523,40 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_sharing_
* The zero value is appropiate.
*/
+/*
+ * With some legacy devices, certain guest-physical addresses cannot safely
+ * be used for other purposes, e.g. to map guest RAM. This hypercall
+ * enumerates those regions so the toolstack can avoid using them.
+ */
+#define XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map 27
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory {
+ xen_pfn_t start_pfn;
+ xen_ulong_t nr_pages;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory xen_reserved_device_memory_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t);
+
+struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map {
+#define XENMEM_RDM_ALL 1 /* Request all regions (ignore dev union). */
+ /* IN */
+ uint32_t flags;
+ /*
+ * IN/OUT
+ *
+ * Gets set to the required number of entries when too low,
+ * signaled by error code -ERANGE.
+ */
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+ /* OUT */
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_t) buffer;
+ /* IN */
+ union {
+ struct physdev_pci_device pci;
+ } dev;
+};
+typedef struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_reserved_device_memory_map_t);
+
#endif /* defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) */
/*
@@ -573,7 +608,7 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
-/* Next available subop number is 27 */
+/* Next available subop number is 28 */
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
struct page_info;
+/*
+ * Any non-zero value returned from callbacks of this type will cause the
+ * function the callback was handed to terminate its iteration. Assigning
+ * meaning of these non-zero values is left to the top level caller /
+ * callback pair.
+ */
+typedef int iommu_grdm_t(xen_pfn_t start, xen_ulong_t nr, u32 id, void *ctxt);
+
struct iommu_ops {
int (*init)(struct domain *d);
void (*hwdom_init)(struct domain *d);
@@ -156,12 +164,14 @@ struct iommu_ops {
void (*crash_shutdown)(void);
void (*iotlb_flush)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned int page_count);
void (*iotlb_flush_all)(struct domain *d);
+ int (*get_reserved_device_memory)(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void (*dump_p2m_table)(struct domain *d);
};
void iommu_suspend(void);
void iommu_resume(void);
void iommu_crash_shutdown(void);
+int iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *, void *);
void iommu_share_p2m_table(struct domain *d);
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
* 7:3 = slot
* 2:0 = function
*/
+#define PCI_SEG(sbdf) (((sbdf) >> 16) & 0xffff)
#define PCI_BUS(bdf) (((bdf) >> 8) & 0xff)
#define PCI_SLOT(bdf) (((bdf) >> 3) & 0x1f)
#define PCI_FUNC(bdf) ((bdf) & 0x07)
@@ -33,6 +34,9 @@
#define PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) ((bdf) & 0xff)
#define PCI_BDF(b,d,f) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | PCI_DEVFN(d,f))
#define PCI_BDF2(b,df) ((((b) & 0xff) << 8) | ((df) & 0xff))
+#define PCI_SBDF(s,b,d,f) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF(b,d,f))
+#define PCI_SBDF2(s,bdf) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | ((bdf) & 0xffff))
+#define PCI_SBDF3(s,b,df) ((((s) & 0xffff) << 16) | PCI_BDF2(b, df))
struct pci_dev_info {
bool_t is_extfn;
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -65,9 +65,10 @@
! memory_exchange memory.h
! memory_map memory.h
! memory_reservation memory.h
-? mem_access_op memory.h
+? mem_access_op memory.h
! pod_target memory.h
! remove_from_physmap memory.h
+! reserved_device_memory_map memory.h
? vmemrange memory.h
! vnuma_topology_info memory.h
? physdev_eoi physdev.h
[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters
2015-07-22 14:09 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 14:40 ` Wei Liu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2015-07-22 14:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson
Cc: Tiejun Chen, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 03:09:55PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters"):
> > This patch parses to enable user configurable parameters to specify
> > RDM resource and according policies which are defined previously,
> >
> > Global RDM parameter:
> > rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
> > Per-device RDM parameter:
> > pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
> >
> > Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
> > 'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
> > others.
> >
> > CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
> > CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> > CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> > CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> > Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>
> Wei, as you know, I am double-checking the acks on this series.
>
> You acked v4. But v11 is somewhat different. Your ack was retained
> and my subject line search did not turn up any authority for that.
>
> The v* message by the submitter says:
>
> > v8:
> >
> > * Clean some codes style issues.
> >
> > v7:
> >
> > * Just sync with the fallout of renaming parameters from patch #10.
> >
> > v6:
> >
> > * Just sync those renames introduced by patch #10.
> >
> > v5:
> >
> > * Need a rebase after we make all rdm variables specific to .hvm.
> > * Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
> > the global policy by default.
>
> v4 does not apply in the context of the current series.
>
> Below is the interdiff between v4 and v11, generated with `diff -b'.
> (Sorry for handing you an interdiff.)
>
> Please ack/nack.
>
> Thanks,
> Ian.
> (wearing committer hat)
Apart from the renaming and minor style fixes. The most notable hunk is
> pcidev->seize = pci_seize;
> -+ /* We'd like to force reserve rdm specific to a device by default.*/
> -+ pcidev->rdm_reserve = LIBXL_RDM_RESERVE_FLAG_STRICT;
> - if (!xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf))
> - d_config->num_pcidevs++;
> - }
> ++ /*
> ++ * Like other pci option, the per-device policy always follows
> ++ * the global policy by default.
> ++ */
> ++ pcidev->rdm_policy = b_info->u.hvm.rdm.policy;
> + e = xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf);
> + if (e) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
The default behaviour is changed but it's indeed mentioned in v5 change
log and in line with what Jan and George suggested.
So:
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
on v11
> --
> -1.9.1
> -
> +1.7.10.4
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 14:04 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 15:00 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Ian Jackson
0 siblings, 2 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
On 2015/7/22 22:04, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Chen, Tiejun writes ("Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
>> Sounds you start to merge them into your tree?
>>
>> But now Jan is trying to update patch #1 as you see. I think something
>> needs to be synced on tool sides. Although that is not finished, at
>> least three changes exist:
>
> Thanks. I am negotiating with Jan et al on IRC.
>
We just need to sync two patches:
#1. To patch #8:
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 2991333..9c5ef8b 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ int xc_get_machine_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t max_entries);
int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t flag,
+ uint32_t flags,
uint16_t seg,
uint8_t bus,
uint8_t devfn,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 298b3b5..1b074b7 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int xc_domain_set_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
}
int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t flag,
+ uint32_t flags,
uint16_t seg,
uint8_t bus,
uint8_t devfn,
@@ -695,11 +695,11 @@ int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
{
int rc;
struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xrdmmap = {
- .flag = flag,
- .seg = seg,
- .bus = bus,
- .devfn = devfn,
- .nr_entries = *max_entries
+ .flags = flags,
+ .nr_entries = *max_entries,
+ .dev.pci.seg = seg,
+ .dev.pci.bus = bus,
+ .dev.pci.devfn = devfn,
};
DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(entries,
sizeof(struct xen_reserved_device_memory) *
#2. To patch #11:
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
index 29476fc..40b2bba 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
unsigned int nr_entries;
/* Collect all rdm info if exist. */
- rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, XENMEM_RDM_ALL,
0, 0, 0, &nr_entries, &xrdm);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
devfn = PCI_DEVFN(d_config->pcidevs[i].dev,
d_config->pcidevs[i].func);
nr_entries = 0;
- rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, ~PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, 0,
seg, bus, devfn, &nr_entries,
&xrdm);
if (rc)
goto out;
Note I just compiled with these changes since right now I can't access
any machine to test.
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy
2015-07-22 13:06 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 15:01 ` Wei Liu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2015-07-22 15:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson
Cc: wei.liu2, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel,
Tiejun Chen, David Scott
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 02:06:46PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy"):
> > This patch passes rdm reservation policy to xc_assign_device() so the policy
> > is checked when assigning devices to a VM.
>
> Wei, as you know, I am double-checking the acks on this series.
>
> You acked v4. But v11 is slightly different. Your ack was retained
> and my subject line search did not turn up any authority for that.
>
> The v* message by the submitter says:
>
> > v5:
> >
> > * Fix the flag field as "0" to DT device
>
> Below is the diff between
> * staging (bc299d01) + Jan's v12 + v11 02.. + the relevant patch from v4
> * staging (bc299d01) + Jan's v12 + v11 02.. + the relevant patch from v8
>
> Please ack/nack.
>
> Thanks,
> Ian.
>
The changes below are due to change in prerequisite patch
xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy
deleted some two #defines.
Jan was happy with that change so I'm happy with this change.
In any case, this is a domctl. We have the liberty of fixing it up
whenever we like. So
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> index 1dfadb0..69e6d8f 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> @@ -1794,8 +1794,11 @@ int xc_assign_dt_device(
>
> domctl.u.assign_device.dev = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT;
> domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.size = size;
> - /* DT doesn't own any RDM. */
> - domctl.u.assign_device.flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM;
> + /*
> + * DT doesn't own any RDM so actually DT has nothing to do
> + * for any flag and here just fix that as 0.
> + */
> + domctl.u.assign_device.flag = 0;
> set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.assign_device.u.dt.path, path);
>
> rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
> diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
> index 317bf75..b7de615 100644
> --- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
> +++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
> @@ -1173,9 +1173,7 @@ CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_test_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value d
> }
>
> static int domain_assign_device_rdm_flag_table[] = {
> - XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_NO_RDM,
> XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED,
> - XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_STRICT,
> };
>
> CAMLprim value stub_xc_domain_assign_device(value xch, value domid, value desc,
> diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> index ff4adb3..c8380d1 100644
> --- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> +++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> @@ -615,7 +615,8 @@ static int next_bdf(char **str, int *seg, int *bus, int *dev, int *func,
> }
> else
> {
> - *flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_STRICT;
> + /* O means we take "strict" as our default policy. */
> + *flag = 0;
> *str = NULL;
> }
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 15:00 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 15:09 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Ian Jackson
1 sibling, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson; +Cc: xen-devel, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
OOPS! Please refer to this version: (One miss changing flag to flags in
patch #11 although we can compile successfully.)
#1. To patch #8
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 2991333..9c5ef8b 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ int xc_get_machine_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t max_entries);
int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t flag,
+ uint32_t flags,
uint16_t seg,
uint8_t bus,
uint8_t devfn,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
index 298b3b5..1b074b7 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int xc_domain_set_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
}
int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t flag,
+ uint32_t flags,
uint16_t seg,
uint8_t bus,
uint8_t devfn,
@@ -695,11 +695,11 @@ int xc_reserved_device_memory_map(xc_interface *xch,
{
int rc;
struct xen_reserved_device_memory_map xrdmmap = {
- .flag = flag,
- .seg = seg,
- .bus = bus,
- .devfn = devfn,
- .nr_entries = *max_entries
+ .flags = flags,
+ .nr_entries = *max_entries,
+ .dev.pci.seg = seg,
+ .dev.pci.bus = bus,
+ .dev.pci.devfn = devfn,
};
DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(entries,
sizeof(struct xen_reserved_device_memory) *
#2. To patch #11
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
index 29476fc..8d103c3 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ const char *libxl__domain_device_model(libxl__gc *gc,
static int
libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
- uint32_t flag,
+ uint32_t flags,
uint16_t seg,
uint8_t bus,
uint8_t devfn,
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
* We really can't presume how many entries we can get in advance.
*/
*nr_entries = 0;
- r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flag, seg, bus, devfn,
+ r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flags, seg, bus, devfn,
NULL, nr_entries);
assert(r <= 0);
/* "0" means we have no any rdm entry. */
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
}
GCNEW_ARRAY(*xrdm, *nr_entries);
- r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flag, seg, bus, devfn,
+ r = xc_reserved_device_memory_map(CTX->xch, flags, seg, bus, devfn,
*xrdm, nr_entries);
if (r)
rc = ERROR_FAIL;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
unsigned int nr_entries;
/* Collect all rdm info if exist. */
- rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, XENMEM_RDM_ALL,
0, 0, 0, &nr_entries, &xrdm);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ int libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(libxl__gc *gc,
devfn = PCI_DEVFN(d_config->pcidevs[i].dev,
d_config->pcidevs[i].func);
nr_entries = 0;
- rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, ~PCI_DEV_RDM_ALL,
+ rc = libxl__xc_device_get_rdm(gc, 0,
seg, bus, devfn, &nr_entries,
&xrdm);
if (rc)
goto out;
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 15:00 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Chen, Tiejun
@ 2015-07-22 15:09 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:21 ` Chen, Tiejun
1 sibling, 1 reply; 50+ messages in thread
From: Ian Jackson @ 2015-07-22 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chen, Tiejun; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
Chen, Tiejun writes ("Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM"):
> We just need to sync two patches:
Thanks.
> Note I just compiled with these changes since right now I can't access
> any machine to test.
I intend to produce a git branch RSN.
Ian.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 15:21 ` Chen, Tiejun
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Chen, Tiejun @ 2015-07-22 15:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson; +Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
> I intend to produce a git branch RSN.
>
On the staging? Tomorrow I can pull to check/test this.
Thanks
Tiejun
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
* Re: [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM
2015-07-22 10:04 ` Ian Jackson
@ 2015-07-22 16:05 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 50+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2015-07-22 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Jackson
Cc: Tiejun Chen, xen-devel, Wei Liu, Ian Campbell, Stefano Stabellini
>>> On 22.07.15 at 12:04, <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> wrote:
> Tiejun Chen writes ("[v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid
> conflicts with RDM"):
>> While building a VM, HVM domain builder provides struct hvm_info_table{}
>> to help hvmloader. Currently it includes two fields to construct guest
>> e820 table by hvmloader, low_mem_pgend and high_mem_pgend. So we should
>> check them to fix any conflict with RDM.
>
> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Did you intentionally not move this forward to the v13 you just sent?
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 50+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2015-07-22 16:05 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2015-07-22 1:29 [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 01/16] xen: introduce XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:42 ` [PATCH v12] " Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:17 ` Julien Grall
2015-07-22 12:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 12:52 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:19 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 12:55 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 13:03 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:20 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:46 ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-22 14:22 ` [PATCH v12a] " Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 02/16] xen/vtd: create RMRR mapping Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 03/16] xen/passthrough: extend hypercall to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 04/16] xen: enable XENMEM_memory_map in hvm Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 05/16] hvmloader: get guest memory map into memory_map[] Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 06/16] hvmloader/pci: Try to avoid placing BARs in RMRRs Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:43 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:00 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 07/16] hvmloader/e820: construct guest e820 table Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:29 ` [v11][PATCH 08/16] tools/libxc: Expose new hypercall xc_reserved_device_memory_map Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 09/16] tools: extend xc_assign_device() to support rdm reservation policy Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 13:06 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:01 ` Wei Liu
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 10/16] tools: introduce some new parameters to set rdm policy Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 11/16] tools/libxl: detect and avoid conflicts with RDM Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 8:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 8:52 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 10:12 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 10:54 ` George Dunlap
2015-07-22 10:04 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 16:05 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-22 13:24 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 13:33 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 14:04 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:00 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 15:09 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 15:21 ` Chen, Tiejun
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 12/16] tools: introduce a new parameter to set a predefined rdm boundary Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 13/16] libxl: construct e820 map with RDM information for HVM guest Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 14/16] xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 15/16] xen/vtd: prevent from assign the device with shared rmrr Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 1:30 ` [v11][PATCH 16/16] tools: parse to enable new rdm policy parameters Tiejun Chen
2015-07-22 14:09 ` Ian Jackson
2015-07-22 14:40 ` Wei Liu
2015-07-22 12:38 ` [v11][PATCH 00/16] Fix RMRR Wei Liu
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