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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Sergey Dyasli" <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Ian Jackson" <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/8] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 10:06:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c6a368c-4409-dc6b-9b73-6e93b8fbd6e7@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190911200504.5693-4-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 11.09.2019 22:04, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
> @@ -229,6 +229,55 @@ int xc_get_domain_cpu_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
>      return ret;
>  }
>  
> +int xc_set_domain_cpu_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
> +                             uint32_t nr_leaves, xen_cpuid_leaf_t *leaves,
> +                             uint32_t nr_msrs, xen_msr_entry_t *msrs,
> +                             uint32_t *err_leaf_p, uint32_t *err_subleaf_p,
> +                             uint32_t *err_msr_idx_p)
> +{
> +    DECLARE_DOMCTL;
> +    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(leaves,
> +                             nr_leaves * sizeof(*leaves),
> +                             XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
> +    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(msrs,
> +                             nr_msrs * sizeof(*msrs),
> +                             XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);

With both being IN, the respective function parameters should imo
be pointers to const.

> +    int ret;
> +
> +    if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, leaves) )
> +        return -1;
> +
> +    if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, msrs) )
> +        return -1;
> +
> +    domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpu_policy;
> +    domctl.domain = domid;
> +    domctl.u.cpu_policy.nr_leaves = nr_leaves;
> +    set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.cpu_policy.cpuid_policy, leaves);
> +    domctl.u.cpu_policy.nr_msrs = nr_msrs;
> +    set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.cpu_policy.msr_policy, msrs);
> +    domctl.u.cpu_policy.err_leaf = ~0;
> +    domctl.u.cpu_policy.err_subleaf = ~0;
> +    domctl.u.cpu_policy.err_msr_idx = ~0;

The fields are marked OUT only in the public header, which implies
no initialization should be needed here, as the hypercall would
overwrite the fields in any event.

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> @@ -294,6 +294,65 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int update_domain_cpu_policy(struct domain *d,
> +                                    xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t *xdpc)
> +{
> +    struct cpu_policy new = {};
> +    const struct cpu_policy *sys = is_pv_domain(d)
> +        ? &system_policies[XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_pv_max]
> +        : &system_policies[XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_hvm_max];
> +    struct cpu_policy_errors err = INIT_CPU_POLICY_ERRORS;
> +    int ret = -ENOMEM;
> +
> +    /* Start by copying the domain's existing policies. */
> +    if ( !(new.cpuid = xmemdup(d->arch.cpuid)) ||
> +         !(new.msr   = xmemdup(d->arch.msr)) )

To avoid the redundant initialization, this could as well be the
initializer of the variable.

> @@ -1476,6 +1535,27 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
>          copyback = true;
>          break;
>  
> +    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpu_policy:
> +        if ( d == currd ) /* No domain_pause() */
> +        {
> +            ret = -EINVAL;
> +            break;
> +        }
> +
> +        domain_pause(d);
> +
> +        if ( d->creation_finished )
> +            ret = -EEXIST; /* No changing once the domain is running. */
> +        else
> +        {
> +            ret = update_domain_cpu_policy(d, &domctl->u.cpu_policy);
> +            if ( ret ) /* Copy domctl->u.cpu_policy.err_* to guest. */
> +                copyback = true;

Due to the OUT in the public header I think it would be better to
always copy this back (making sure the invalid markers are in place
in case of success). But I guess we're not very consistent with
honoring OUT like this.

> --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> @@ -658,17 +658,23 @@ struct xen_domctl_cpuid {
>  };
>  
>  /*
> - * XEN_DOMCTL_get_cpu_policy (x86 specific)
> + * XEN_DOMCTL_{get,set}_cpu_policy (x86 specific)
>   *
> - * Query the CPUID and MSR policies for a specific domain.
> + * Query or set the CPUID and MSR policies for a specific domain.
>   */
>  struct xen_domctl_cpu_policy {
>      uint32_t nr_leaves; /* IN/OUT: Number of leaves in/written to
>                           * 'cpuid_policy'. */
>      uint32_t nr_msrs;   /* IN/OUT: Number of MSRs in/written to
>                           * 'msr_domain_policy' */
> -    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_cpuid_leaf_t) cpuid_policy; /* OUT */
> -    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_msr_entry_t) msr_policy;    /* OUT */
> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_cpuid_leaf_t) cpuid_policy; /* IN/OUT */
> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_msr_entry_t) msr_policy;    /* IN/OUT */
> +    uint32_t err_leaf, err_subleaf; /* OUT, set_policy only.  If not ~0,
> +                                     * indicates the leaf/subleaf which
> +                                     * auditing objected to. */
> +    uint32_t err_msr_idx;           /* OUT, set_policy only.  If not ~0,
> +                                     * indicates the MSR idx which
> +                                     * auditing objected to. */
>  };
>  typedef struct xen_domctl_cpu_policy xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t;
>  DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t);

I know you're not liking the concept, but XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION
hasn't been bumped in this release cycle yet, and hence a binary
incompatible change like this one needs to. With at least this last
aspect taken care of, hypervisor parts
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Jan

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  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-12  8:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-11 20:04 [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/8] x86/cpuid: Switch to using XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:04 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/8] libx86: Introduce x86_cpu_policies_are_compatible() Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  7:43   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  7:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  8:22       ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12 11:41         ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:04 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/8] x86/cpuid: Split update_domain_cpuid_info() in half Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  7:52   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  8:07     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:04 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/8] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  8:06   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2019-09-12 13:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12 13:20       ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12 16:34       ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:05 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/8] tools/libxc: Pre-cleanup for xc_cpuid_{set, apply_policy}() Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  8:09   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  8:17   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  8:38     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:05 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/8] tools/libxc: Rework xc_cpuid_set() to use {get, set}_cpu_policy() Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  8:19   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  8:36     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  9:11       ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12 13:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:05 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 6/8] tools/libxc: Rework xc_cpuid_apply_policy() " Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  9:02   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12 13:47     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-11 20:05 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 7/8] x86/domctl: Drop XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpuid Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  9:04   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-11 20:05 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 8/8] x86/cpuid: Enable CPUID Faulting for the control domain Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12  9:07   ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-12  9:28     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12 18:55   ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/cpuid: Enable CPUID Faulting for the control domain by default Andrew Cooper
2019-09-13  6:38     ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-13 14:56       ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-12 18:55 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 0.5/8] libx86: Proactively initialise error pointers Andrew Cooper
2019-09-13  6:20   ` Jan Beulich

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