From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6880DC433E0 for ; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1CBFB64DFD for ; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:22 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1CBFB64DFD Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from list by lists.xenproject.org with outflank-mailman.87875.165109 (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lE8Qr-0000pf-L8; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:13 +0000 X-Outflank-Mailman: Message body and most headers restored to incoming version Received: by outflank-mailman (output) from mailman id 87875.165109; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:13 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lE8Qr-0000pX-I5; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:13 +0000 Received: by outflank-mailman (input) for mailman id 87875; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:12 +0000 Received: from us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com ([172.99.69.81]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lE8Qq-0000ou-Lz for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:12 +0000 Received: from mx2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.15]) by us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 05a3259d-4d45-4e23-8f82-424dc12342b6; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0106CB147; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:27:08 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: 05a3259d-4d45-4e23-8f82-424dc12342b6 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1613989628; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=nMp/VPdudPdDiFUQUULeKoVRWd0Od4PCLUKJPHYG6fk=; b=hPYXqNvBBrOAQ48+OrAeAVdVa866aqD63kHfRuwyPnoqOd3x8Hw6P5ZZJp9kLiP+vLz/ti S+PYeqgA8w6gJHwzHEtS8TyaYKt/IxpTTFAct6Vkozm/Rvh4OGr4cIbPPBVtsA1V+EyODa NoOlCuN79EXbqMI1fFvVAEAmdZxyCmg= To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" Cc: Andrew Cooper , Wei Liu , =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=c3=a9?= , Ian Jackson From: Jan Beulich Subject: [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV Message-ID: Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 11:27:07 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.7.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Now that we guard the entire Xen VA space against speculative abuse through hypervisor accesses to guest memory, the argument translation area's VA also needs to live outside this range, at least for 32-bit PV guests. To avoid extra is_hvm_*() conditionals, use the alternative VA uniformly. While this could be conditionalized upon CONFIG_PV32 && CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS, omitting such extra conditionals keeps the code more legible imo. Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -1727,6 +1727,11 @@ void init_xen_l4_slots(l4_pgentry_t *l4t (ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT + slots - l4_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)) * sizeof(*l4t)); } + + /* Slot 511: Per-domain mappings mirror. */ + if ( !is_pv_64bit_domain(d) ) + l4t[l4_table_offset(PERDOMAIN2_VIRT_START)] = + l4e_from_page(d->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW); } bool fill_ro_mpt(mfn_t mfn) --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h @@ -159,11 +159,11 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128] * 1:1 direct mapping of all physical memory. #endif * 0xffff880000000000 - 0xffffffffffffffff [120TB, PML4:272-511] - * PV: Guest-defined use. + * PV (64-bit): Guest-defined use. * 0xffff880000000000 - 0xffffff7fffffffff [119.5TB, PML4:272-510] * HVM/idle: continuation of 1:1 mapping * 0xffffff8000000000 - 0xffffffffffffffff [512GB, 2^39 bytes PML4:511] - * HVM/idle: unused + * HVM / 32-bit PV: Secondary per-domain mappings. * * Compatibility guest area layout: * 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00000000f57fffff [3928MB, PML4:0] @@ -242,6 +242,9 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128] #endif #define DIRECTMAP_VIRT_END (DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START + DIRECTMAP_SIZE) +/* Slot 511: secondary per-domain mappings (for compat xlat area accesses). */ +#define PERDOMAIN2_VIRT_START (PML4_ADDR(511)) + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #ifdef CONFIG_PV32 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ #ifndef __X86_64_UACCESS_H #define __X86_64_UACCESS_H -#define COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_VIRT_BASE ((void *)ARG_XLAT_START(current)) +/* + * With CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS (apparent) PV guest accesses + * are prohibited to touch the Xen private VA range. The compat argument + * translation area, therefore, can't live within this range. Domains + * (potentially) in need of argument translation (32-bit PV, possibly HVM) get + * a secondary mapping installed, which needs to be used for such accesses in + * the PV case, and will also be used for HVM to avoid extra conditionals. + */ +#define COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_VIRT_BASE ((void *)ARG_XLAT_START(current) + \ + (PERDOMAIN2_VIRT_START - \ + PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)) #define COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_SIZE (2*PAGE_SIZE) struct vcpu; int setup_compat_arg_xlat(struct vcpu *v);