From: Paul Durrant <xadimgnik@gmail.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] IOMMU: make DMA containment of quarantined devices optional
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 12:43:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c4293a9b-14f0-2fc5-6e04-988cfef2deda@xen.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e1f30ef7-6631-609d-6948-e9b1f3fa3b37@suse.com>
On 26/05/2021 09:19, Jan Beulich wrote:
> IOMMU: make DMA containment of quarantined devices optional
>
> Containing still in flight DMA was introduced to work around certain
> devices / systems hanging hard upon hitting a "not-present" IOMMU fault.
> Passing through (such) devices (on such systems) is inherently insecure
> (as guests could easily arrange for IOMMU faults of any kind to occur).
> Defaulting to a mode where admins may not even become aware of issues
> with devices can be considered undesirable. Therefore convert this mode
> of operation to an optional one, not one enabled by default.
>
> This involves resurrecting code commit ea38867831da ("x86 / iommu: set
> up a scratch page in the quarantine domain") did remove, in a slightly
> extended and abstracted fashion. Here, instead of reintroducing a pretty
> pointless use of "goto" in domain_context_unmap(), and instead of making
> the function (at least temporarily) inconsistent, take the opportunity
> and replace the other similarly pointless "goto" as well.
>
> In order to key the re-instated bypasses off of there (not) being a root
> page table this further requires moving the allocate_domain_resources()
> invocation from reassign_device() to amd_iommu_setup_domain_device() (or
> else reassign_device() would allocate a root page table anyway); this is
> benign to the second caller of the latter function.
>
> In VT-d's domain_context_unmap(), instead of adding yet another
> "goto out" when all that's wanted is a "return", eliminate the "out"
> label at the same time.
>
> Take the opportunity and also limit the control to builds supporting
> PCI.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-06 11:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-26 8:19 [PATCH v5] IOMMU: make DMA containment of quarantined devices optional Jan Beulich
2021-07-06 7:43 ` Ping: " Jan Beulich
2021-07-07 1:34 ` Tian, Kevin
2021-07-06 11:43 ` Paul Durrant [this message]
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