From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com
Subject:
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 19:50:07 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378252218-18798-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
relax the restrictions.
However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
the existing restrictions useless.
This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
guarantee of kernel integrity.
V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
Subject: (unknown)
Subject:
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 19:50:07 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378252218-18798-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
relax the restrictions.
However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
the existing restrictions useless.
This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
guarantee of kernel integrity.
V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp.
next reply other threads:[~2013-09-03 23:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-03 23:50 Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-09-03 23:50 ` (unknown), Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 01/11] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris
2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 18:58 ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris
2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 07/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann
2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann-VXdhtT5mjnY
2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 09/11] uswsusp: Disable when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris
2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 10/11] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris
2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 3:13 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 15:53 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-04 15:53 ` Re: Kees Cook
2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer
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