[PATCH v3 1/2] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id_alloc()

* [PATCH v3 1/2] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id_alloc()
@ 2018-01-16  9:31 Kirill Tkhai
  2018-01-16  9:31 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] net: Remove spinlock from get_net_ns_by_id() Kirill Tkhai
  2018-01-17 20:43 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id_alloc() David Miller
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kirill Tkhai @ 2018-01-16  9:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev; +Cc: davem, eric.dumazet, ebiederm, ktkhai

peernet2id_alloc() is racy without rtnl_lock() as refcount_read(&peer->count)
under net->nsid_lock does not guarantee, peer is alive:

rcu_read_lock()
peernet2id_alloc()                            ..
  spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock)               ..
  refcount_read(&peer->count) (!= 0)          ..
  ..                                          put_net()
  ..                                            cleanup_net()
  ..                                              for_each_net(tmp)
  ..                                                spin_lock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock)
  ..                                                __peernet2id(tmp, net) == -1
  ..                                                    ..
  ..                                                    ..
    __peernet2id_alloc(alloc == true)                   ..
  ..                                                    ..
rcu_read_unlock()                                       ..
..                                                synchronize_rcu()
..                                                kmem_cache_free(net)

After the above situation, net::netns_id contains id pointing to freed memory,
and any other dereferencing by the id will operate with this freed memory.

Currently, peernet2id_alloc() is used under rtnl_lock() everywhere except
ovs_vport_cmd_fill_info(), and this race can't occur. But peernet2id_alloc()
is generic interface, and better we fix it before someone really starts
use it in wrong context.

v2: Don't place refcount_read(&net->count) under net->nsid_lock
    as suggested by Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
v3: Rebase on top of net-next

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
---
 net/core/net_namespace.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 2213d45fcafd..3c77d84ad60d 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -221,17 +221,26 @@ static void rtnl_net_notifyid(struct net *net, int cmd, int id);
  */
 int peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer)
 {
-	bool alloc;
+	bool alloc = false, alive = false;
 	int id;
 
 	if (refcount_read(&net->count) == 0)
 		return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
 	spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
-	alloc = refcount_read(&peer->count) == 0 ? false : true;
+	/*
+	 * When peer is obtained from RCU lists, we may race with
+	 * its cleanup. Check whether it's alive, and this guarantees
+	 * we never hash a peer back to net->netns_ids, after it has
+	 * just been idr_remove()'d from there in cleanup_net().
+	 */
+	if (maybe_get_net(peer))
+		alive = alloc = true;
 	id = __peernet2id_alloc(net, peer, &alloc);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
 	if (alloc && id >= 0)
 		rtnl_net_notifyid(net, RTM_NEWNSID, id);
+	if (alive)
+		put_net(peer);
 	return id;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(peernet2id_alloc);

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