From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleix ner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 22:38:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1F6A73CF-158A-4261-AA6C-1F5C77F4F326@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208211326.GV242749@kernel.org>
> Am 08.02.2021 um 22:13 schrieb Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>:
>
> On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 10:27:18AM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 08.02.21 09:49, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>
>> Some questions (and request to document the answers) as we now allow to have
>> unmovable allocations all over the place and I don't see a single comment
>> regarding that in the cover letter:
>>
>> 1. How will the issue of plenty of unmovable allocations for user space be
>> tackled in the future?
>>
>> 2. How has this issue been documented? E.g., interaction with ZONE_MOVABLE
>> and CMA, alloc_conig_range()/alloc_contig_pages?.
>
> Secretmem sets the mappings gfp mask to GFP_HIGHUSER, so it does not
> allocate movable pages at the first place.
That is not the point. Secretmem cannot go on CMA / ZONE_MOVABLE memory and behaves like long-term pinnings in that sense. This is a real issue when using a lot of sectremem.
Please have a look at what Pavel documents regarding long term pinnings and ZONE_MOVABLE in his patches currently on the list.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 22:38:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1F6A73CF-158A-4261-AA6C-1F5C77F4F326@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208211326.GV242749@kernel.org>
> Am 08.02.2021 um 22:13 schrieb Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>:
>
> On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 10:27:18AM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 08.02.21 09:49, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>
>> Some questions (and request to document the answers) as we now allow to have
>> unmovable allocations all over the place and I don't see a single comment
>> regarding that in the cover letter:
>>
>> 1. How will the issue of plenty of unmovable allocations for user space be
>> tackled in the future?
>>
>> 2. How has this issue been documented? E.g., interaction with ZONE_MOVABLE
>> and CMA, alloc_conig_range()/alloc_contig_pages?.
>
> Secretmem sets the mappings gfp mask to GFP_HIGHUSER, so it does not
> allocate movable pages at the first place.
That is not the point. Secretmem cannot go on CMA / ZONE_MOVABLE memory and behaves like long-term pinnings in that sense. This is a real issue when using a lot of sectremem.
Please have a look at what Pavel documents regarding long term pinnings and ZONE_MOVABLE in his patches currently on the list.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 22:38:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1F6A73CF-158A-4261-AA6C-1F5C77F4F326@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208211326.GV242749@kernel.org>
> Am 08.02.2021 um 22:13 schrieb Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>:
>
> On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 10:27:18AM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 08.02.21 09:49, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>
>> Some questions (and request to document the answers) as we now allow to have
>> unmovable allocations all over the place and I don't see a single comment
>> regarding that in the cover letter:
>>
>> 1. How will the issue of plenty of unmovable allocations for user space be
>> tackled in the future?
>>
>> 2. How has this issue been documented? E.g., interaction with ZONE_MOVABLE
>> and CMA, alloc_conig_range()/alloc_contig_pages?.
>
> Secretmem sets the mappings gfp mask to GFP_HIGHUSER, so it does not
> allocate movable pages at the first place.
That is not the point. Secretmem cannot go on CMA / ZONE_MOVABLE memory and behaves like long-term pinnings in that sense. This is a real issue when using a lot of sectremem.
Please have a look at what Pavel documents regarding long term pinnings and ZONE_MOVABLE in his patches currently on the list.
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 22:38:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1F6A73CF-158A-4261-AA6C-1F5C77F4F326@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208211326.GV242749@kernel.org>
> Am 08.02.2021 um 22:13 schrieb Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>:
>
> On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 10:27:18AM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 08.02.21 09:49, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>
>> Some questions (and request to document the answers) as we now allow to have
>> unmovable allocations all over the place and I don't see a single comment
>> regarding that in the cover letter:
>>
>> 1. How will the issue of plenty of unmovable allocations for user space be
>> tackled in the future?
>>
>> 2. How has this issue been documented? E.g., interaction with ZONE_MOVABLE
>> and CMA, alloc_conig_range()/alloc_contig_pages?.
>
> Secretmem sets the mappings gfp mask to GFP_HIGHUSER, so it does not
> allocate movable pages at the first place.
That is not the point. Secretmem cannot go on CMA / ZONE_MOVABLE memory and behaves like long-term pinnings in that sense. This is a real issue when using a lot of sectremem.
Please have a look at what Pavel documents regarding long term pinnings and ZONE_MOVABLE in his patches currently on the list.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-08 21:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 293+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-08 8:49 [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 03/10] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 04/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 05/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 06/10] arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 21:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 8:47 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:47 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:47 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:47 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 9:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 9:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 9:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 9:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 13:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 8:39 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 8:39 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 8:39 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 8:39 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 9:01 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:01 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:01 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:01 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:38 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 9:38 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 9:38 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 9:38 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 9:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 9:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 11:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 23:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12 9:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12 9:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12 9:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12 9:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 9:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14 9:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14 9:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14 9:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14 9:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 9:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 9:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 9:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 9:13 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 9:13 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 9:13 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 9:13 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 18:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 19:20 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 17:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-17 16:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 9:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 9:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 9:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 9:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 11:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:30 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 22:59 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12 9:02 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12 9:02 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12 9:02 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12 9:02 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:18 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:32 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:57 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 11:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 12:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 7:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 7:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 7:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 7:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 10:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 19:17 ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17 ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17 ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17 ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17 ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` [PATCH v17 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 9:27 ` [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:38 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-02-08 21:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 8:59 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:59 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:59 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 8:59 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 9:15 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 9:15 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 9:15 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 9:15 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 9:53 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 9:53 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 9:53 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 9:53 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 10:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 13:25 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 16:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 20:08 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08 ` Michal Hocko
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1F6A73CF-158A-4261-AA6C-1F5C77F4F326@redhat.com \
--to=david@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
--cc=guro@fb.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org \
--cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
--cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
--cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=shakeelb@google.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=tycho@tycho.ws \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.