From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 12:37:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161001103728.GM14666@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUBmsoUK5Shkjwo6n=BGaHFtZhhUZ=2uOcAzWUend-BXg@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1091 bytes --]
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 07:01:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On an unrelated note, can we please lock down all the silly historical
> *userspace* info leaks in /proc? Nasty ones include: net, cmdline (at
> the very least, only argv[0] should be visible if the reader lacks
> ptrace access).
>
> Less nasty ones include: limits, sched, autogroup, comm, wchan,
> schedstat, cpuset, cgroup, oom_*, sessionid, coredump_filter
If that doesn't break stuff, I'm very much in favor of it.
> uid_map, gid_map, etc are just screwed up. They should be per
> *namespace* somewhere, and they should require creds on the namespace.
What do you have in mind? Something like
/proc/namespaces/user:123456/{uid_map,gid_map,setgroups,parent_ns},
with jumped fake symlinks to the directory and its entries in /proc/$pid/?
> timerslack is totally fscked up -- it allows ugo to write and it
> checks the wrong creds. Jann, does your series fix that?
Nope. Never noticed that thing so far, probably because it was only
added a few months ago. :/ Will add it to my series.
[-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 819 bytes --]
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jann Horn <jann-XZ1E9jl8jIdeoWH0uzbU5w@public.gmane.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
X86 ML <x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
Linux API <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Linus Torvalds
<torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel-1yMVhJb1mP/7nzcFbJAaVXf5DAMn2ifp@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 12:37:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161001103728.GM14666@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUBmsoUK5Shkjwo6n=BGaHFtZhhUZ=2uOcAzWUend-BXg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1091 bytes --]
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 07:01:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On an unrelated note, can we please lock down all the silly historical
> *userspace* info leaks in /proc? Nasty ones include: net, cmdline (at
> the very least, only argv[0] should be visible if the reader lacks
> ptrace access).
>
> Less nasty ones include: limits, sched, autogroup, comm, wchan,
> schedstat, cpuset, cgroup, oom_*, sessionid, coredump_filter
If that doesn't break stuff, I'm very much in favor of it.
> uid_map, gid_map, etc are just screwed up. They should be per
> *namespace* somewhere, and they should require creds on the namespace.
What do you have in mind? Something like
/proc/namespaces/user:123456/{uid_map,gid_map,setgroups,parent_ns},
with jumped fake symlinks to the directory and its entries in /proc/$pid/?
> timerslack is totally fscked up -- it allows ugo to write and it
> checks the wrong creds. Jann, does your series fix that?
Nope. Never noticed that thing so far, probably because it was only
added a few months ago. :/ Will add it to my series.
[-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 819 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-01 10:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-30 17:58 [PATCH 0/3] ABI CHANGE!!! Remove questionable remote SP reads Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 17:58 ` [PATCH 1/3] proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 18:56 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 18:56 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-01 2:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-01 2:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-01 4:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-10-01 4:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-10-01 10:37 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-10-01 10:37 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-14 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-14 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-14 20:01 ` Tycho Andersen
2016-10-20 11:13 ` [tip:mm/urgent] fs/proc: " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-01 14:36 ` [4.9-rc3] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc900144dfc60 Tetsuo Handa
2016-11-01 23:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-11-02 10:50 ` Tetsuo Handa
2016-11-02 14:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-02 14:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-02 14:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-11-03 6:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-03 7:09 ` [tip:sched/urgent] sched/core: Fix oops in sched_show_task() tip-bot for Tetsuo Handa
2016-11-03 7:10 ` [tip:sched/urgent] sched/core: Remove pointless printout " tip-bot for Linus Torvalds
2016-09-30 17:58 ` [PATCH 2/3] proc: Stop trying to report thread stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-20 11:13 ` [tip:mm/urgent] fs/proc: " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 17:58 ` [PATCH 3/3] mm: Change vm_is_stack_for_task() to vm_is_stack_for_current() Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-30 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-20 11:14 ` [tip:mm/urgent] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:08 ` [PATCH 0/3] ABI CHANGE!!! Remove questionable remote SP reads Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-10-03 23:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-10-04 7:06 ` Raymond Jennings
2016-10-04 7:06 ` Raymond Jennings
2016-10-14 18:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-14 18:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20161001103728.GM14666@pc.thejh.net \
--to=jann@thejh.net \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=brgerst@gmail.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=tycho.andersen@canonical.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.