From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> To: <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Wenwei Tao <wenwei.tww@alibaba-inc.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Subject: [PATCH] mm, oom: fix potential data corruption when oom_reaper races with writer Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 15:59:02 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170803135902.31977-1-mhocko@kernel.org> (raw) From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Wenwei Tao has noticed that our current assumption that the oom victim is dying and never doing any visible changes after it dies is not entirely true. __task_will_free_mem consider a task dying when SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT is set but do_group_exit sends SIGKILL to all threads _after_ the flag is set. So there is a race window when some threads won't have fatal_signal_pending while the oom_reaper could start unmapping the address space. generic_perform_write could then write zero page to the page cache and corrupt data. The race window is rather small and close to impossible to happen but it would be better to have it covered. Fix this by extending the existing MMF_UNSTABLE check in handle_mm_fault and segfault on any page fault after the oom reaper started its work. This means that nobody will ever observe a potentially corrupted content. Formerly we cared only about use_mm users because those can outlive the oom victim quite easily but having the process itself protected sounds like a reasonable thing to do as well. There doesn't seem to be any real life bug report so this is merely a fix of a theoretical bug. Noticed-by: Wenwei Tao <wenwei.tww@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> --- Hi, Wenwei has contacted me off list and this is a result of the dicussion. I do not think this would be serious enough to warrant a stable backport even though the description might sound scary. The race is highly unlikely. mm/memory.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 0e517be91a89..3d8bfeaca38a 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -3874,13 +3874,9 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, /* * This mm has been already reaped by the oom reaper and so the * refault cannot be trusted in general. Anonymous refaults would - * lose data and give a zero page instead e.g. This is especially - * problem for use_mm() because regular tasks will just die and - * the corrupted data will not be visible anywhere while kthread - * will outlive the oom victim and potentially propagate the date - * further. + * lose data and give a zero page instead e.g. */ - if (unlikely((current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) && !(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) + if (unlikely(!(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) && test_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &vma->vm_mm->flags))) ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; -- 2.13.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> To: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Wenwei Tao <wenwei.tww@alibaba-inc.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Subject: [PATCH] mm, oom: fix potential data corruption when oom_reaper races with writer Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 15:59:02 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170803135902.31977-1-mhocko@kernel.org> (raw) From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Wenwei Tao has noticed that our current assumption that the oom victim is dying and never doing any visible changes after it dies is not entirely true. __task_will_free_mem consider a task dying when SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT is set but do_group_exit sends SIGKILL to all threads _after_ the flag is set. So there is a race window when some threads won't have fatal_signal_pending while the oom_reaper could start unmapping the address space. generic_perform_write could then write zero page to the page cache and corrupt data. The race window is rather small and close to impossible to happen but it would be better to have it covered. Fix this by extending the existing MMF_UNSTABLE check in handle_mm_fault and segfault on any page fault after the oom reaper started its work. This means that nobody will ever observe a potentially corrupted content. Formerly we cared only about use_mm users because those can outlive the oom victim quite easily but having the process itself protected sounds like a reasonable thing to do as well. There doesn't seem to be any real life bug report so this is merely a fix of a theoretical bug. Noticed-by: Wenwei Tao <wenwei.tww@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> --- Hi, Wenwei has contacted me off list and this is a result of the dicussion. I do not think this would be serious enough to warrant a stable backport even though the description might sound scary. The race is highly unlikely. mm/memory.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 0e517be91a89..3d8bfeaca38a 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -3874,13 +3874,9 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, /* * This mm has been already reaped by the oom reaper and so the * refault cannot be trusted in general. Anonymous refaults would - * lose data and give a zero page instead e.g. This is especially - * problem for use_mm() because regular tasks will just die and - * the corrupted data will not be visible anywhere while kthread - * will outlive the oom victim and potentially propagate the date - * further. + * lose data and give a zero page instead e.g. */ - if (unlikely((current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) && !(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) + if (unlikely(!(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) && test_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &vma->vm_mm->flags))) ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; -- 2.13.2 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next reply other threads:[~2017-08-03 13:59 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-08-03 13:59 Michal Hocko [this message] 2017-08-03 13:59 ` [PATCH] mm, oom: fix potential data corruption when oom_reaper races with writer Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 6:46 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-04 7:42 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 7:42 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:25 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-04 8:32 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:32 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm: fix double mmap_sem unlock on MMF_UNSTABLE enforced SIGBUS Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:33 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] mm, oom: fix potential data corruption when oom_reaper races with writer Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 8:33 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 9:16 ` Re: [PATCH] " Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 9:16 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-04 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-04 11:00 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 11:00 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 14:56 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 14:56 ` Michal Hocko 2017-08-04 16:49 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-04 16:49 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-08-05 1:46 ` 陶文苇 2017-08-05 1:46 ` 陶文苇
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