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From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: g@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	yhs@fb.com, lkp@01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 00:18:11 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190306001811.c7cf77cb26b9d816a7561e7b@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190305145306.GL32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:53:06 +0100
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 10:58:01PM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> 
> > Could you tell me why WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) is needed in access_ok()?
> 
> That came from here:
> 
>   lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225145240.GB32534@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
> 
> Because in-irq usage is dodgy, since we don't actually know what mm or
> ds it loaded.

Yes, I would like to allow it only if setting pagefault-disable correctly.
(and setting ds too, it is good to me)

> 
> > > I dislike that whole KERNEL_DS thing, but obviously that's not something
> > > that's going away.
> > > 
> > > Would something like:
> > > 
> > > 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(in_task || segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)))
> > > 
> > > Work? Then we allow KERNEL_DS in task context, but for interrupt and
> > > others require USER_DS.
> > 
> > But what would this mean? I can't understand why we limit using
> > access_ok() so strictly and narrow the cases.
> 
> Because it's been a source of bugs. Any sanity checking we can put in
> seems like a good thing at this point.

Hmm, I see yours is strict, fit with current code, but complicated rule.

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory with set_fs(USER_DS) 
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory in IRQ context if
   pagefault is disabled and with set_fs(USER_DS). (but pagefault-disabled
   is not verified)

 - strncpy_from_user() never allowed to access kernel memory in IRQ context,
   even if pagefault is disabled and with set_fs(KERNEL_DS).


And mine is simple.

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user/kernel memory (depends on DS)
   in IRQ context if pagefault is disabled. (both verified)


Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: lkp@lists.01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2019 00:18:11 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190306001811.c7cf77cb26b9d816a7561e7b@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190305145306.GL32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2115 bytes --]

On Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:53:06 +0100
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 10:58:01PM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> 
> > Could you tell me why WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) is needed in access_ok()?
> 
> That came from here:
> 
>   lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225145240.GB32534(a)hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
> 
> Because in-irq usage is dodgy, since we don't actually know what mm or
> ds it loaded.

Yes, I would like to allow it only if setting pagefault-disable correctly.
(and setting ds too, it is good to me)

> 
> > > I dislike that whole KERNEL_DS thing, but obviously that's not something
> > > that's going away.
> > > 
> > > Would something like:
> > > 
> > > 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(in_task || segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)))
> > > 
> > > Work? Then we allow KERNEL_DS in task context, but for interrupt and
> > > others require USER_DS.
> > 
> > But what would this mean? I can't understand why we limit using
> > access_ok() so strictly and narrow the cases.
> 
> Because it's been a source of bugs. Any sanity checking we can put in
> seems like a good thing at this point.

Hmm, I see yours is strict, fit with current code, but complicated rule.

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory with set_fs(USER_DS) 
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory in IRQ context if
   pagefault is disabled and with set_fs(USER_DS). (but pagefault-disabled
   is not verified)

 - strncpy_from_user() never allowed to access kernel memory in IRQ context,
   even if pagefault is disabled and with set_fs(KERNEL_DS).


And mine is simple.

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
   in task context

 - strncpy_from_user() can access user/kernel memory (depends on DS)
   in IRQ context if pagefault is disabled. (both verified)


Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-05 15:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-28 16:02 [PATCH v5 0/6] tracing/probes: uaccess: Add support user-space access Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:02 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] uaccess: Add user_access_ok() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] uaccess: Use user_access_ok() in user_access_begin() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-03 17:39   ` [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x kernel test robot
2019-03-03 17:39     ` kernel test robot
2019-03-03 19:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-03 19:53       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  1:14       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  1:14         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  2:37         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  2:37           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  9:06           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  9:06             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:16             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:16               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:58               ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 15:58                 ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 18:59             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04 18:59               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-05  2:36               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  2:36                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  8:22                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  8:22                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:01                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:01                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:07                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05  9:07                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 13:58                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 13:58                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 14:53                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 14:53                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 15:18                       ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2019-03-05 15:18                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  3:20       ` [LKP] " Rong Chen
2019-03-04  3:20         ` Rong Chen
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 22:49   ` Yonghong Song
2019-03-01  2:29     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-01  6:30       ` Yonghong Song
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] tracing/probe: Add ustring type for user-space string Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] tracing/probe: Support user-space dereference Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests/ftrace: Add user-memory access syntax testcase Masami Hiramatsu

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