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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com
Cc: akiyks@gmail.com, stern@rowland.harvard.edu, glider@google.com,
	parri.andrea@gmail.com, andreyknvl@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, arnd@arndb.de, boqun.feng@gmail.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dja@axtens.net, dlustig@nvidia.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
	dvyukov@google.com, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	j.alglave@ucl.ac.uk, joel@joelfernandes.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	jpoimboe@redhat.com, luc.maranget@inria.fr, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	npiggin@gmail.com, paulmck@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, will@kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/9] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
Date: Mon,  4 Nov 2019 15:27:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191104142745.14722-3-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191104142745.14722-1-elver@google.com>

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v3:
* Split Documentation into separate patch.
* Fix typos.
* Accuracy: refer to unsoundness/completeness.
* Update with new slow-down after optimizations.
* Add Alternatives Considered section and move KTSAN mentions there.
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst | 217 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
index b0522a4dd107..1b756a7014e0 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ whole; patches welcome!
    kasan
    ubsan
    kmemleak
+   kcsan
    gdb-kernel-debugging
    kgdb
    kselftest
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf1093b0c64f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
+========================================
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+*Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)* is a dynamic data race detector for
+kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data race detector. Key
+priorities in KCSAN's design are lack of false positives, scalability, and
+simplicity. More details can be found in `Implementation Details`_.
+
+KCSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to instrument memory accesses. KCSAN is
+supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version 7.3.0 or later.
+With Clang it requires version 7.0.0 or later.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable KCSAN configure kernel with::
+
+    CONFIG_KCSAN = y
+
+KCSAN provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see
+their respective help text for more info).
+
+debugfs
+~~~~~~~
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` can be read to get stats.
+
+* KCSAN can be turned on or off by writing ``on`` or ``off`` to
+  ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan``.
+
+* Writing ``!some_func_name`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` adds
+  ``some_func_name`` to the report filter list, which (by default) blacklists
+  reporting data races where either one of the top stackframes are a function
+  in the list.
+
+* Writing either ``blacklist`` or ``whitelist`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan``
+  changes the report filtering behaviour. For example, the blacklist feature
+  can be used to silence frequently occurring data races; the whitelist feature
+  can help with reproduction and testing of fixes.
+
+Error reports
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical data race report looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_permission / kernfs_refresh_inode
+
+    write to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 175 on cpu 4:
+     kernfs_refresh_inode+0x70/0x170
+     kernfs_iop_permission+0x4f/0x90
+     inode_permission+0x190/0x200
+     link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0
+     path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0
+     filename_lookup+0x136/0x280
+     user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60
+     vfs_statx+0x9b/0x130
+     __do_sys_newlstat+0x50/0xb0
+     __x64_sys_newlstat+0x37/0x50
+     do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260
+     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+    read to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 166 on cpu 6:
+     generic_permission+0x5b/0x2a0
+     kernfs_iop_permission+0x66/0x90
+     inode_permission+0x190/0x200
+     link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0
+     path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0
+     filename_lookup+0x136/0x280
+     user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60
+     do_faccessat+0x11a/0x390
+     __x64_sys_access+0x3c/0x50
+     do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260
+     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+    Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+    CPU: 6 PID: 166 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #1
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+The header of the report provides a short summary of the functions involved in
+the race. It is followed by the access types and stack traces of the 2 threads
+involved in the data race.
+
+The other less common type of data race report looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KCSAN: data-race in e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10
+
+    race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff933db8a2ae6c of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
+     e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10
+     e1000_clean+0x533/0xda0
+     net_rx_action+0x329/0x900
+     __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2db
+     irq_exit+0x9b/0xa0
+     do_IRQ+0x9c/0xf0
+     ret_from_intr+0x0/0x18
+     default_idle+0x3f/0x220
+     arch_cpu_idle+0x21/0x30
+     do_idle+0x1df/0x230
+     cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
+     rest_init+0xc5/0xcb
+     arch_call_rest_init+0x13/0x2b
+     start_kernel+0x6db/0x700
+
+    Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+    CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #2
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+This report is generated where it was not possible to determine the other
+racing thread, but a race was inferred due to the data-value of the watched
+memory location having changed. These can occur either due to missing
+instrumentation or e.g. DMA accesses.
+
+Data Races
+----------
+
+Informally, two operations *conflict* if they access the same memory location,
+and at least one of them is a write operation. In an execution, two memory
+operations from different threads form a **data race** if they *conflict*, at
+least one of them is a *plain access* (non-atomic), and they are *unordered* in
+the "happens-before" order according to the `LKMM
+<../../tools/memory-model/Documentation/explanation.txt>`_.
+
+Relationship with the Linux Kernel Memory Model (LKMM)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The LKMM defines the propagation and ordering rules of various memory
+operations, which gives developers the ability to reason about concurrent code.
+Ultimately this allows to determine the possible executions of concurrent code,
+and if that code is free from data races.
+
+KCSAN is aware of *atomic* accesses (``READ_ONCE``, ``WRITE_ONCE``,
+``atomic_*``, etc.), but is oblivious of any ordering guarantees. In other
+words, KCSAN assumes that as long as a plain access is not observed to race
+with another conflicting access, memory operations are correctly ordered.
+
+This means that KCSAN will not report *potential* data races due to missing
+memory ordering. If, however, missing memory ordering (that is observable with
+a particular compiler and architecture) leads to an observable data race (e.g.
+entering a critical section erroneously), KCSAN would report the resulting
+data race.
+
+Implementation Details
+----------------------
+
+The general approach is inspired by `DataCollider
+<http://usenix.org/legacy/events/osdi10/tech/full_papers/Erickson.pdf>`_.
+Unlike DataCollider, KCSAN does not use hardware watchpoints, but instead
+relies on compiler instrumentation. Watchpoints are implemented using an
+efficient encoding that stores access type, size, and address in a long; the
+benefits of using "soft watchpoints" are portability and greater flexibility in
+limiting which accesses trigger a watchpoint.
+
+More specifically, KCSAN requires instrumenting plain (unmarked, non-atomic)
+memory operations; for each instrumented plain access:
+
+1. Check if a matching watchpoint exists; if yes, and at least one access is a
+   write, then we encountered a racing access.
+
+2. Periodically, if no matching watchpoint exists, set up a watchpoint and
+   stall for a small delay.
+
+3. Also check the data value before the delay, and re-check the data value
+   after delay; if the values mismatch, we infer a race of unknown origin.
+
+To detect data races between plain and atomic memory operations, KCSAN also
+annotates atomic accesses, but only to check if a watchpoint exists
+(``kcsan_check_atomic_*``); i.e.  KCSAN never sets up a watchpoint on atomic
+accesses.
+
+Key Properties
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+1. **Memory Overhead:**  The current implementation uses a small array of longs
+   to encode watchpoint information, which is negligible.
+
+2. **Performance Overhead:** KCSAN's runtime aims to be minimal, using an
+   efficient watchpoint encoding that does not require acquiring any shared
+   locks in the fast-path. For kernel boot on a system with 8 CPUs:
+
+   - 5x slow-down with the default KCSAN config;
+   - 3x slow-down from runtime fast-path overhead only (set very large
+     ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH`` and unset ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE``).
+
+3. **Annotation Overheads:** Minimal annotations are required outside the KCSAN
+   runtime. As a result, maintenance overheads are minimal as the kernel
+   evolves.
+
+4. **Detects Racy Writes from Devices:** Due to checking data values upon
+   setting up watchpoints, racy writes from devices can also be detected.
+
+5. **Memory Ordering:** KCSAN is *not* explicitly aware of the LKMM's ordering
+   rules; this may result in missed data races (false negatives).
+
+6. **Analysis Accuracy:** For observed executions, due to using a sampling
+   strategy, the analysis is *unsound* (false negatives possible), but aims to
+   be complete (no false positives).
+
+Alternatives Considered
+-----------------------
+
+An alternative data race detection approach for the kernel can be found in
+`Kernel Thread Sanitizer (KTSAN) <https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki>`_.
+KTSAN is a happens-before data race detector, which explicitly establishes the
+happens-before order between memory operations, which can then be used to
+determine data races as defined in `Data Races`_. To build a correct
+happens-before relation, KTSAN must be aware of all ordering rules of the LKMM
+and synchronization primitives. Unfortunately, any omission leads to false
+positives, which is especially important in the context of the kernel which
+includes numerous custom synchronization mechanisms. Furthermore, KTSAN's
+implementation requires metadata for each memory location (shadow memory);
+currently, for each page, KTSAN requires 4 pages of shadow memory.
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-11-04 14:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-04 14:27 [PATCH v3 0/9] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06  9:38   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-11-06  9:38     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-11-06  9:38     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-11-06 10:03     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06 10:03       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06 10:03       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06 19:11     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06 19:11       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-06 19:59   ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 19:59     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 19:59     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 19:59     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 20:34   ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 20:34     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 20:34     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-06 20:34     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-07 18:43     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-07 18:43       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-07 18:43       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-07 18:43       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-07 21:08   ` Bhupesh Sharma
2019-11-07 21:08     ` Bhupesh Sharma
2019-11-07 21:08     ` Bhupesh Sharma
2019-11-08 14:23     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-08 14:23       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2019-11-04 14:27   ` [PATCH v3 2/9] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 11:35   ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-05 11:35     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-05 11:35     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-05 11:35     ` kbuild test robot
2019-11-05 15:22     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 15:22       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 15:22       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 15:22       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
2019-11-04 14:27   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 16:47 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-04 18:41   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 18:41     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 18:41     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-04 19:46     ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-04 19:46       ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-05 11:10       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 11:10         ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 11:10         ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 14:20         ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-05 14:20           ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-05 15:25           ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 15:25             ` Marco Elver
2019-11-05 15:25             ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:05             ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:05               ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:05               ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 19:48               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-14 19:48                 ` Paul E. McKenney

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