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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 13:22:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251321.6C21B71F@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-25-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:32AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Check an ELF file's .note.gnu.property, and setup Shadow Stack if the
> application supports it.
> 
> v9:
> - Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig             |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h   | 13 +++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 6c34b701c588..d1447380e02e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1987,6 +1987,8 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>  	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
>  	select X86_INTEL_CET
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
> +	select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
> +	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
>  	---help---
>  	  Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against program
>  	  stack corruption.  It is active when the kernel has this
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> index 69c0f892e310..fac79b621e0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> @@ -367,6 +367,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  					      int uses_interp);
>  #define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
> +struct arch_elf_state {
> +	unsigned int gnu_property;
> +};
> +
> +#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE {	\
> +	.gnu_property = 0,	\
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_elf_pt_proc(ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0)
> +#define arch_check_elf(ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0)
> +#endif
> +
>  /* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */
>  enum align_flags {
>  	ALIGN_VA_32	= BIT(0),
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> index 506d66830d4d..99548cde0cc6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> @@ -732,3 +732,34 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
>  	return task_pt_regs(task)->sp;
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
> +int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
> +			     bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *state)
> +{
> +	if (type != GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (datasz != sizeof(unsigned int))
> +		return -ENOEXEC;
> +
> +	state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
> +{
> +	int r = 0;
> +
> +	memset(&current->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
> +			r = cet_setup_shstk();
> +		if (r < 0)
> +			return r;

This test is redundant; there's no loop. This can just fall through to
the final return.

-Kees

> +	}
> +
> +	return r;
> +}
> +#endif
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Pavel
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 13:22:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251321.6C21B71F@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-25-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:32AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Check an ELF file's .note.gnu.property, and setup Shadow Stack if the
> application supports it.
> 
> v9:
> - Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig             |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h   | 13 +++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 6c34b701c588..d1447380e02e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1987,6 +1987,8 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>  	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
>  	select X86_INTEL_CET
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
> +	select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
> +	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
>  	---help---
>  	  Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against program
>  	  stack corruption.  It is active when the kernel has this
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> index 69c0f892e310..fac79b621e0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> @@ -367,6 +367,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  					      int uses_interp);
>  #define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
> +struct arch_elf_state {
> +	unsigned int gnu_property;
> +};
> +
> +#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE {	\
> +	.gnu_property = 0,	\
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_elf_pt_proc(ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0)
> +#define arch_check_elf(ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0)
> +#endif
> +
>  /* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */
>  enum align_flags {
>  	ALIGN_VA_32	= BIT(0),
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> index 506d66830d4d..99548cde0cc6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> @@ -732,3 +732,34 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
>  	return task_pt_regs(task)->sp;
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
> +int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
> +			     bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *state)
> +{
> +	if (type != GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (datasz != sizeof(unsigned int))
> +		return -ENOEXEC;
> +
> +	state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
> +{
> +	int r = 0;
> +
> +	memset(&current->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
> +			r = cet_setup_shstk();
> +		if (r < 0)
> +			return r;

This test is redundant; there's no loop. This can just fall through to
the final return.

-Kees

> +	}
> +
> +	return r;
> +}
> +#endif
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-25 21:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 264+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06  0:16     ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:57     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:21         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:35             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:16                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 20:59                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:02                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 22:19                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11                           ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11                           ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:20                             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51                               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51                               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  0:08                                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  0:08                                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  1:21                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  2:13                                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  2:13                                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:04     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:06     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:10     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:03     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57     ` Pavel Machek
2020-02-26 19:57       ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:05     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:16         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11         ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27  3:57             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03             ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 18:03               ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 19:02         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:07     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:11     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:17     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 21:35     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:22         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:02     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:13     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:04     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:14     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:16     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:47     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:20     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:08     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 22:21         ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:59     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:34     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:55     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:10     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:17     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:18     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:20     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-02-25 21:22     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:31   ` Kees Cook

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