From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org, Paul McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>, "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>, Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V3 06/23] bug: Annotate WARN/BUG/stackfail as noinstr safe Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:00:02 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200320180032.994128577@linutronix.de> (raw) In-Reply-To: 20200320175956.033706968@linutronix.de Warnings, bugs and stack protection fails from noinstr sections, e.g. low level and early entry code, are likely to be fatal. Mark them as "safe" to be invoked from noinstr protected code to avoid annotating all usage sites. Getting the information out is important. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> --- arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h | 3 +++ include/asm-generic/bug.h | 9 +++++++-- kernel/panic.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h @@ -70,13 +70,16 @@ do { \ #define HAVE_ARCH_BUG #define BUG() \ do { \ + instr_begin(); \ _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, 0); \ unreachable(); \ } while (0) #define __WARN_FLAGS(flags) \ do { \ + instr_begin(); \ _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, BUGFLAG_WARNING|(flags)); \ + instr_end(); \ annotate_reachable(); \ } while (0) --- a/include/asm-generic/bug.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/bug.h @@ -83,14 +83,19 @@ extern __printf(4, 5) void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, const int line, unsigned taint, const char *fmt, ...); #define __WARN() __WARN_printf(TAINT_WARN, NULL) -#define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) \ - warn_slowpath_fmt(__FILE__, __LINE__, taint, arg) +#define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) do { \ + instr_begin(); \ + warn_slowpath_fmt(__FILE__, __LINE__, taint, arg); \ + instr_end(); \ + while (0) #else extern __printf(1, 2) void __warn_printk(const char *fmt, ...); #define __WARN() __WARN_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_TAINT(TAINT_WARN)) #define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) do { \ + instr_begin(); \ __warn_printk(arg); \ __WARN_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_NO_CUT_HERE | BUGFLAG_TAINT(taint));\ + instr_end(); \ } while (0) #define WARN_ON_ONCE(condition) ({ \ int __ret_warn_on = !!(condition); \ --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -662,10 +662,12 @@ device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs); * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value */ -__visible void __stack_chk_fail(void) +__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void) { + instr_begin(); panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB", __builtin_return_address(0)); + instr_end(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org, Paul McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>, "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>, Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RESEND][patch V3 06/23] bug: Annotate WARN/BUG/stackfail as noinstr safe Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:00:02 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200320180032.994128577@linutronix.de> (raw) Message-ID: <20200320180002.zP_wHHftYRQ5i_nPzvCDR0StUuWcOvN7iynMREqQ9YY@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: 20200320175956.033706968@linutronix.de Warnings, bugs and stack protection fails from noinstr sections, e.g. low level and early entry code, are likely to be fatal. Mark them as "safe" to be invoked from noinstr protected code to avoid annotating all usage sites. Getting the information out is important. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> --- arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h | 3 +++ include/asm-generic/bug.h | 9 +++++++-- kernel/panic.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h @@ -70,13 +70,16 @@ do { \ #define HAVE_ARCH_BUG #define BUG() \ do { \ + instr_begin(); \ _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, 0); \ unreachable(); \ } while (0) #define __WARN_FLAGS(flags) \ do { \ + instr_begin(); \ _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, BUGFLAG_WARNING|(flags)); \ + instr_end(); \ annotate_reachable(); \ } while (0) --- a/include/asm-generic/bug.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/bug.h @@ -83,14 +83,19 @@ extern __printf(4, 5) void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, const int line, unsigned taint, const char *fmt, ...); #define __WARN() __WARN_printf(TAINT_WARN, NULL) -#define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) \ - warn_slowpath_fmt(__FILE__, __LINE__, taint, arg) +#define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) do { \ + instr_begin(); \ + warn_slowpath_fmt(__FILE__, __LINE__, taint, arg); \ + instr_end(); \ + while (0) #else extern __printf(1, 2) void __warn_printk(const char *fmt, ...); #define __WARN() __WARN_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_TAINT(TAINT_WARN)) #define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) do { \ + instr_begin(); \ __warn_printk(arg); \ __WARN_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_NO_CUT_HERE | BUGFLAG_TAINT(taint));\ + instr_end(); \ } while (0) #define WARN_ON_ONCE(condition) ({ \ int __ret_warn_on = !!(condition); \ --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -662,10 +662,12 @@ device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs); * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value */ -__visible void __stack_chk_fail(void) +__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void) { + instr_begin(); panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB", __builtin_return_address(0)); + instr_end(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-20 18:38 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-03-20 17:59 [patch V3 00/23] x86/entry: Consolidation part II (syscalls) Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [patch V3 01/23] rcu: Dont acquire lock in NMI handler in rcu_nmi_enter_common() Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 15:37 ` [patch " Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [patch V3 02/23] rcu: Add comments marking transitions between RCU watching and not Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 15:38 ` [patch " Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [patch V3 03/23] vmlinux.lds.h: Create section for protection against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2020-04-03 8:08 ` Alexandre Chartre 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 04/23] kprobes: Prevent probes in .noinstr.text section Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-23 14:00 ` [patch " Masami Hiramatsu 2020-03-23 16:03 ` Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 5:49 ` Masami Hiramatsu 2020-03-24 9:47 ` Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-25 13:39 ` Masami Hiramatsu 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 05/23] tracing: Provide lockdep less trace_hardirqs_on/off() variants Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-04-03 8:34 ` Alexandre Chartre 2020-03-20 18:00 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message] 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 06/23] bug: Annotate WARN/BUG/stackfail as noinstr safe Thomas Gleixner 2020-04-02 21:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2020-04-02 21:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-04-02 21:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2020-04-02 21:49 ` Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 07/23] lockdep: Prepare for noinstr sections Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 08/23] x86/entry: Mark enter_from_user_mode() noinstr Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 09/23] x86/entry/common: Protect against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 10/23] x86/entry: Move irq tracing on syscall entry to C-code Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 11/23] x86/entry: Move irq flags tracing to prepare_exit_to_usermode() Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 12/23] context_tracking: Ensure that the critical path cannot be instrumented Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 13/23] lib/smp_processor_id: Move it into noinstr section Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 14/23] x86/speculation/mds: Mark mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() __always_inline Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 15/23] x86/entry/64: Check IF in __preempt_enable_notrace() thunk Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 16/23] x86/entry/64: Mark ___preempt_schedule_notrace() thunk noinstr Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 17/23] rcu/tree: Mark the idle relevant functions noinstr Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 16:09 ` Paul E. McKenney 2020-03-24 19:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 19:58 ` Paul E. McKenney 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 18/23] x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 19/23] x86/kvm/vmx: Add hardirq tracing to guest enter/exit Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-24 23:03 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-03-24 23:21 ` Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 20/23] x86/kvm/svm: Handle hardirqs proper on " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 21/23] context_tracking: Make guest_enter/exit_irqoff() .noinstr ready Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 22/23] x86/kvm/vmx: Move guest enter/exit into .noinstr.text Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [patch V3 23/23] x86/kvm/svm: " Thomas Gleixner 2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch " Thomas Gleixner
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