* [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh @ 2021-05-28 18:24 Nisha Parrakat 2021-07-14 12:48 ` [OE-core] " saloni 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Nisha Parrakat @ 2021-05-28 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw) To: openembedded-core, raj.khem; +Cc: Sana Kazi From: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Applied patch for CVE-2020-14145 Link: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Also, whitelisted below CVEs: 1.CVE-2020-15778: As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487 2.CVE-2008-3844: It was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable as our source is OpenBSD. Links: https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730 https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794 Also, for CVE-2007-2768 no fix is available yet as it's unavoidable drawback of using one time passwords as per https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2007-2768 Also it is marked as unimportant on debian https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2007-2768 Mailed to CPE to update database for CVE-2020-15778, CVE-2008-3844 and CVE-2007-2768. We can upstream CVE-2020-14145 till we recieve response from CPE. Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <nishaparrakat@gmail.com> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb | 13 ++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3adb981fb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000 +Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to + +prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the +best-preference default algorithm. + +feedback and ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f + +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +--- + sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +CVE: CVE-2020-14145 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk + +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */ ++static char * ++first_alg(const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *ret, *cp; ++ ++ ret = xstrdup(algs); ++ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL) ++ *cp = '\0'; ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static char * + order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + { +- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; ++ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL; ++ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL; + size_t maxlen; +- struct hostkeys *hostkeys; ++ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL; + int ktype; + u_int i; + +@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); + ++ /* ++ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best ++ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is. ++ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a ++ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to ++ * plain keys if necessary. ++ */ ++ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, ++ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) { ++ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, " ++ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best); ++ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys ++ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible. ++ */ + oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + first = xmalloc(maxlen); +@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (*first != '\0') + debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); + ++ out: ++ free(best); + free(first); + free(last); + free(hostname); +-- +cgit v1.2.3 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb index 6ed54a8139..64a0a72a8f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \ file://sshd_check_keys \ file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671" @@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768" # and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278" -# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries +# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp +# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion +# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used +# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of +# scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487 +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778" + +# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and +# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable +# as our source is OpenBSD. https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730 +# https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd" -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh 2021-05-28 18:24 [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh Nisha Parrakat @ 2021-07-14 12:48 ` saloni 2021-07-14 12:50 ` saloni 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: saloni @ 2021-07-14 12:48 UTC (permalink / raw) To: openembedded-core, raj.khem, nishaparrakat [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 12918 bytes --] Hello, Please take the below changes and merge them in upstream dunfell branch. Thanks & Regards, Saloni Thanks & Regards, Saloni ________________________________ From: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org> on behalf of Nisha Parrakat via lists.openembedded.org <nishaparrakat=gmail.com@lists.openembedded.org> Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 11:54 PM To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>; raj.khem@gmail.com <raj.khem@gmail.com> Cc: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Subject: [OE-core] [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh From: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Applied patch for CVE-2020-14145 Link: https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fanongit.mindrot.org%2Fopenssh.git%2Fpatch%2F%3Fid%3Db3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=58nmotzZqm2Po%2BHL7cacUspoI2mp3bigzMX%2B7cXWPcs%3D&reserved=0 Also, whitelisted below CVEs: 1.CVE-2020-15778: As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of scp for better security. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.redhat.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D1860487&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=D7a5ndV1zxZZoyL1%2FQC4IDm2NfzdhZZqAVL2twU1fyg%3D&reserved=0 2.CVE-2008-3844: It was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable as our source is OpenBSD. Links: https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecuritytracker.com%2Fid%3F1020730&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FocRMgY0OzvtyRPecXK2mZEPApTJHBpYj0iLAkhbE3Q%3D&reserved=0 https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.securityfocus.com%2Fbid%2F30794&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=19HGox5nLLnCLciNmH2%2F7rSXyY8CxeR2JPB14LdpdpY%3D&reserved=0 Also, for CVE-2007-2768 no fix is available yet as it's unavoidable drawback of using one time passwords as per https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.suse.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3DCVE-2007-2768&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=kK%2BD5EqSg8Kzy4zwiRjExvJ0twLz4GmObWrZ8tgHkP8%3D&reserved=0 Also it is marked as unimportant on debian https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurity-tracker.debian.org%2Ftracker%2FCVE-2007-2768&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FyhZJD1IsmrvacTdRJJv6xm3qpsjg7kuA3eIsw9iL48%3D&reserved=0 Mailed to CPE to update database for CVE-2020-15778, CVE-2008-3844 and CVE-2007-2768. We can upstream CVE-2020-14145 till we recieve response from CPE. Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <nishaparrakat@gmail.com> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb | 13 ++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3adb981fb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000 +Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to + +prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the +best-preference default algorithm. + +feedback and ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f + +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +--- + sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +CVE: CVE-2020-14145 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fanongit.mindrot.org%2Fopenssh.git%2Fpatch%2F%3Fid%3Db3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=58nmotzZqm2Po%2BHL7cacUspoI2mp3bigzMX%2B7cXWPcs%3D&reserved=0] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk + +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */ ++static char * ++first_alg(const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *ret, *cp; ++ ++ ret = xstrdup(algs); ++ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL) ++ *cp = '\0'; ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static char * + order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + { +- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; ++ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL; ++ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL; + size_t maxlen; +- struct hostkeys *hostkeys; ++ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL; + int ktype; + u_int i; + +@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); + ++ /* ++ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best ++ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is. ++ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a ++ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to ++ * plain keys if necessary. ++ */ ++ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, ++ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) { ++ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, " ++ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best); ++ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys ++ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible. ++ */ + oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + first = xmalloc(maxlen); +@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (*first != '\0') + debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); + ++ out: ++ free(best); + free(first); + free(last); + free(hostname); +-- +cgit v1.2.3 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb index 6ed54a8139..64a0a72a8f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fftp.openbsd.org%2Fpub%2FOpenBSD%2FOpenSSH%2Fportable%2Fopenssh-%24&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Pp7eKEBz5q1T1q17mC%2FFDo9ta6OgJLihdlV8z1L2nvU%3D&reserved=0{PV}.tar file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \ file://sshd_check_keys \ file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671" @@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768" # and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278" -# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries +# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp +# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion +# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used +# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of +# scp for better security. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.redhat.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D1860487&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=D7a5ndV1zxZZoyL1%2FQC4IDm2NfzdhZZqAVL2twU1fyg%3D&reserved=0 +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778" + +# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and +# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable +# as our source is OpenBSD. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecuritytracker.com%2Fid%3F1020730&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FocRMgY0OzvtyRPecXK2mZEPApTJHBpYj0iLAkhbE3Q%3D&reserved=0 +# https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.securityfocus.com%2Fbid%2F30794&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=19HGox5nLLnCLciNmH2%2F7rSXyY8CxeR2JPB14LdpdpY%3D&reserved=0 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd" -- 2.17.1 This message contains information that may be privileged or confidential and is the property of the KPIT Technologies Ltd. It is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to read, print, retain copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete all copies of this message. KPIT Technologies Ltd. does not accept any liability for virus infected mails. [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 22020 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh 2021-07-14 12:48 ` [OE-core] " saloni @ 2021-07-14 12:50 ` saloni 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: saloni @ 2021-07-14 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: openembedded-core, raj.khem, nishaparrakat [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 13456 bytes --] Hello, Sorry, please ignore the above mail, the changes have already been merged in dunfell branches, Thanks! Thanks & Regards, Saloni ________________________________ From: Saloni Jain <Saloni.Jain@kpit.com> Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2021 6:18 PM To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>; raj.khem@gmail.com <raj.khem@gmail.com>; nishaparrakat@gmail.com <nishaparrakat@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [OE-core] [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh Hello, Please take the below changes and merge them in upstream dunfell branch. Thanks & Regards, Saloni Thanks & Regards, Saloni ________________________________ From: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org> on behalf of Nisha Parrakat via lists.openembedded.org <nishaparrakat=gmail.com@lists.openembedded.org> Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 11:54 PM To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>; raj.khem@gmail.com <raj.khem@gmail.com> Cc: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Subject: [OE-core] [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh From: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Applied patch for CVE-2020-14145 Link: https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fanongit.mindrot.org%2Fopenssh.git%2Fpatch%2F%3Fid%3Db3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=58nmotzZqm2Po%2BHL7cacUspoI2mp3bigzMX%2B7cXWPcs%3D&reserved=0 Also, whitelisted below CVEs: 1.CVE-2020-15778: As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of scp for better security. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.redhat.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D1860487&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=D7a5ndV1zxZZoyL1%2FQC4IDm2NfzdhZZqAVL2twU1fyg%3D&reserved=0 2.CVE-2008-3844: It was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable as our source is OpenBSD. Links: https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecuritytracker.com%2Fid%3F1020730&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FocRMgY0OzvtyRPecXK2mZEPApTJHBpYj0iLAkhbE3Q%3D&reserved=0 https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.securityfocus.com%2Fbid%2F30794&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=19HGox5nLLnCLciNmH2%2F7rSXyY8CxeR2JPB14LdpdpY%3D&reserved=0 Also, for CVE-2007-2768 no fix is available yet as it's unavoidable drawback of using one time passwords as per https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.suse.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3DCVE-2007-2768&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=kK%2BD5EqSg8Kzy4zwiRjExvJ0twLz4GmObWrZ8tgHkP8%3D&reserved=0 Also it is marked as unimportant on debian https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurity-tracker.debian.org%2Ftracker%2FCVE-2007-2768&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FyhZJD1IsmrvacTdRJJv6xm3qpsjg7kuA3eIsw9iL48%3D&reserved=0 Mailed to CPE to update database for CVE-2020-15778, CVE-2008-3844 and CVE-2007-2768. We can upstream CVE-2020-14145 till we recieve response from CPE. Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <nishaparrakat@gmail.com> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb | 13 ++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3adb981fb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000 +Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to + +prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the +best-preference default algorithm. + +feedback and ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f + +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +--- + sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +CVE: CVE-2020-14145 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fanongit.mindrot.org%2Fopenssh.git%2Fpatch%2F%3Fid%3Db3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=58nmotzZqm2Po%2BHL7cacUspoI2mp3bigzMX%2B7cXWPcs%3D&reserved=0] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk + +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */ ++static char * ++first_alg(const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *ret, *cp; ++ ++ ret = xstrdup(algs); ++ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL) ++ *cp = '\0'; ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static char * + order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + { +- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; ++ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL; ++ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL; + size_t maxlen; +- struct hostkeys *hostkeys; ++ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL; + int ktype; + u_int i; + +@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); + ++ /* ++ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best ++ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is. ++ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a ++ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to ++ * plain keys if necessary. ++ */ ++ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, ++ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) { ++ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, " ++ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best); ++ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys ++ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible. ++ */ + oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + first = xmalloc(maxlen); +@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (*first != '\0') + debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); + ++ out: ++ free(best); + free(first); + free(last); + free(hostname); +-- +cgit v1.2.3 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb index 6ed54a8139..64a0a72a8f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fftp.openbsd.org%2Fpub%2FOpenBSD%2FOpenSSH%2Fportable%2Fopenssh-%24&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Pp7eKEBz5q1T1q17mC%2FFDo9ta6OgJLihdlV8z1L2nvU%3D&reserved=0{PV}.tar file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \ file://sshd_check_keys \ file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671" @@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768" # and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278" -# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries +# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp +# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion +# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used +# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of +# scp for better security. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.redhat.com%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D1860487&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=D7a5ndV1zxZZoyL1%2FQC4IDm2NfzdhZZqAVL2twU1fyg%3D&reserved=0 +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778" + +# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and +# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable +# as our source is OpenBSD. https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecuritytracker.com%2Fid%3F1020730&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=FocRMgY0OzvtyRPecXK2mZEPApTJHBpYj0iLAkhbE3Q%3D&reserved=0 +# https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.securityfocus.com%2Fbid%2F30794&data=04%7C01%7Csaloni.jain%40kpit.com%7C9e4063537db7438df0b708d92205dda0%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637578230901384840%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=19HGox5nLLnCLciNmH2%2F7rSXyY8CxeR2JPB14LdpdpY%3D&reserved=0 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd" -- 2.17.1 This message contains information that may be privileged or confidential and is the property of the KPIT Technologies Ltd. It is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to read, print, retain copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete all copies of this message. KPIT Technologies Ltd. does not accept any liability for virus infected mails. [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 23603 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-07-14 12:50 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-05-28 18:24 [poky][dunfell][PATCH] openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh Nisha Parrakat 2021-07-14 12:48 ` [OE-core] " saloni 2021-07-14 12:50 ` saloni
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