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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date: Thu,  2 Dec 2021 21:31:18 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211203023118.1447229-20-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211203023118.1447229-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
host is also created for the namespacing case.

Increment the user namespace's refcount_teardown value by '1' once
securityfs has been successfully setup since the initialization of the
filesystem causes an additional reference to the user namespace to be
taken. The early teardown function will delete the file system and release
the additional reference.

The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
system to a later point when securityfs initializes the fs_context.

This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:

mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/

The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available.

$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
total 0
lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 integrity

$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
total 0
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
-rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 policy
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 violations

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  17 +++
 security/inode.c                         |   8 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |   2 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          | 157 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |   6 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          |   2 +
 6 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 889e9c70cbfb..a13f934f15fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -220,6 +220,18 @@ struct ima_h_table {
 	struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
 };
 
+enum {
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR = 0,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS_COUNT,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_VIOLATIONS,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_IMA_POLICY,
+	IMAFS_DENTRY_LAST
+};
+
 struct ima_namespace {
 	struct kref kref;
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
@@ -266,6 +278,11 @@ struct ima_namespace {
 	struct mutex ima_write_mutex;
 	unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
 	int valid_policy;
+
+	struct dentry *dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_LAST];
+	struct vfsmount *mount;
+	int mount_count;
+	int (*late_fs_init)(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
 };
 
 extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 2738a7b31469..6223f1d838f6 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct vfsmount *securityfs_mount;
 static int securityfs_mount_count;
@@ -63,6 +64,13 @@ static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
 
 static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	if (fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init) {
+		rc = fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init(fc->user_ns);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
 	fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index bb9763cd5fb1..9bcd71bb716c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ struct ns_status {
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
+int ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+void ima_fs_ns_free(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 			   struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 6766bb8262f2..65b2af7c14dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -436,8 +437,14 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	ima_update_policy(ns);
 #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
-	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
-	ima_policy = NULL;
+	if (ns == &init_ima_ns) {
+		securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+		ima_policy = NULL;
+	} else {
+		securityfs_ns_remove(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_POLICY],
+				     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_POLICY] = NULL;
+	}
 #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
 	clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
 #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
@@ -509,3 +516,149 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
 	return -1;
 }
+
+static void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < IMAFS_DENTRY_LAST; i++) {
+		switch (i) {
+		case IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR:
+		case IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR:
+			/* files first */
+			continue;
+		}
+		securityfs_ns_remove(ns->dentry[i], &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	}
+	securityfs_ns_remove(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR],
+			     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	securityfs_ns_remove(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR],
+			     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+
+	memset(ns->dentry, 0, sizeof(ns->dentry));
+
+}
+
+/* Function to populeate namespace SecurityFS once user namespace
+ * has been configured.
+ */
+static int ima_fs_ns_late_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+	struct dentry *parent;
+
+	/* already initialized? */
+	if (ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR])
+		return 0;
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_dir("integrity", NULL,
+				     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_dir("ima", ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR],
+				     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima", NULL,
+				     &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	parent = ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR];
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, parent, NULL,
+				   &ima_measurements_ops,
+				   &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, parent, NULL,
+				   &ima_ascii_measurements_ops,
+				   &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS_COUNT] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, parent, NULL,
+				   &ima_measurements_count_ops,
+				   &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS_COUNT])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS_COUNT] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_VIOLATIONS] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+				   parent, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops,
+				   &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_VIOLATIONS])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_VIOLATIONS] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_IMA_POLICY] =
+	    securityfs_ns_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
+				   parent, NULL, &ima_measure_policy_ops,
+				   &ns->mount, &ns->mount_count);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_IMA_POLICY])) {
+		ns->dentry[IMAFS_DENTRY_IMA_POLICY] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+
+	return 0;
+
+out:
+	ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(ns);
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	ns->mount = securityfs_ns_create_mount(ns->user_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns->mount)) {
+		ns->mount = NULL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	ns->mount_count = 1;
+
+	/* Adjust the trigger for user namespace's early teardown of dependent
+	 * namespaces. Due to the filesystem there's an additional reference
+	 * to the user namespace.
+	 */
+	ns->user_ns->refcount_teardown += 1;
+
+	ns->late_fs_init = ima_fs_ns_late_init;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ima_fs_ns_free(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(ns);
+	if (ns->mount) {
+		mntput(ns->mount);
+		ns->mount_count -= 1;
+	}
+	ns->mount = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 22ff74e85a5f..86a89502c0c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
+	int rc = 0;
+
 	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
 	rwlock_init(&ns->ns_status_lock);
 	ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
@@ -52,8 +54,10 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	mutex_init(&ns->ima_write_mutex);
 	ns->valid_policy = 1;
 	ns->ima_fs_flags = 0;
+	if (ns != &init_ima_ns)
+		rc = ima_fs_ns_init(ns);
 
-	return 0;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 int __init ima_ns_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 4260f96c4eca..9d5917c97fcc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *old_ns,
 
 void ima_ns_userns_early_teardown(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
+	pr_debug("%s: ns=0x%p\n", __func__, ns);
+	ima_fs_ns_free(ns);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ima_ns_userns_early_teardown);
 
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-12-03  2:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-03  2:30 [RFC v2 00/19] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 01/19] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 02/19] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 03/19] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 04/19] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 05/19] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 06/19] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 16:50   ` kernel test robot
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 07/19] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 08/19] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 09/19] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 10/19] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 11/19] securityfs: Prefix global variables with securityfs_ Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 12/19] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 13/19] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 14/19] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 16:40   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-03 17:39     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 16/19] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 17/19] userns: Introduce a refcount variable for calling early teardown function Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 18/19] ima/userns: Define early teardown function for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2021-12-03 11:04   ` [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs " kernel test robot
2021-12-03 11:04     ` kernel test robot
2021-12-03 12:36   ` kernel test robot
2021-12-03 15:07   ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 17:03   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 18:06     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 18:50       ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 19:11         ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-04  0:33           ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 11:52             ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06  4:27           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:03             ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 14:11               ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 17:22                 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 19:37         ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-06 12:08           ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 13:38             ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:13               ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 15:44               ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 16:25                 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:11       ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:21         ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:42           ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:51             ` James Bottomley

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