[PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.19.272-rc1

Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
    usb: host: xhci-plat: add wakeup entry at sysfs

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: ensure sane device mtu in tunnels

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    panic: Introduce warn_limit

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
    ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate

Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
    h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition

Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
    hexagon: Fix function name in die()

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    exit: Add and use make_task_dead.

Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
    panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()

Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
    sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface

Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
    dmaengine: imx-sdma: Fix a possible memory leak in sdma_transfer_init

Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
    ARM: dts: imx: Fix pca9547 i2c-mux node name

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix to SYSRET

Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
    x86/asm: Fix an assembler warning with current binutils

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    drm/i915/display: fix compiler warning about array overrun

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/i8259: Mark legacy PIC interrupts with IRQ_LEVEL

Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
    Revert "Input: synaptics - switch touchpad on HP Laptop 15-da3001TU to RMI mode"

David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    net/tg3: resolve deadlock in tg3_reset_task() during EEH

Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
    net: ravb: Fix possible hang if RIS2_QFF1 happen

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
    sctp: fail if no bound addresses can be used for a given scope

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
    netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.

Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
    netfilter: conntrack: fix vtag checks for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    netlink: annotate data races around sk_state

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    netlink: annotate data races around dst_portid and dst_group

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid

Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
    netlink: remove hash::nelems check in netlink_insert

Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
    netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip elements in transaction from garbage collection

Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path

Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
    EDAC/device: Respect any driver-supplied workqueue polling value

Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
    ARM: 9280/1: mm: fix warning on phys_addr_t to void pointer assignment

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect

Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
    smbd: Make upper layer decide when to destroy the transport

Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru>
    trace_events_hist: add check for return value of 'create_hist_field'

Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    tracing: Make sure trace_printk() can output as soon as it can be used

Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
    module: Don't wait for GOING modules

Alexey V. Vissarionov <gremlin@altlinux.org>
    scsi: hpsa: Fix allocation size for scsi_host_alloc()

Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
    Bluetooth: hci_sync: cancel cmd_timer if hci_open failed

Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>
    fs: reiserfs: remove useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount

Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
    perf env: Do not return pointers to local variables

Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
    block: fix and cleanup bio_check_ro

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    netfilter: conntrack: do not renew entry stuck in tcp SYN_SENT state

Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
    w1: fix WARNING after calling w1_process()

Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
    w1: fix deadloop in __w1_remove_master_device()

Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
    tcp: avoid the lookup process failing to get sk in ehash table

Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
    dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()

Swati Agarwal <swati.agarwal@xilinx.com>
    dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix devm_platform_ioremap_resource error handling

Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com>
    dmaengine: xilinx_dma: program hardware supported buffer length

Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com>
    dmaengine: xilinx_dma: commonize DMA copy size calculation

Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
    HID: betop: check shape of output reports

Robert Hancock <robert.hancock@calian.com>
    net: macb: fix PTP TX timestamp failure due to packet padding

Koba Ko <koba.ko@canonical.com>
    dmaengine: Fix double increment of client_count in dma_chan_get()

Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
    net: mlx5: eliminate anonymous module_init & module_exit

Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>
    usb: gadget: f_fs: Ensure ep0req is dequeued before free_request

Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>
    usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent race during ffs_ep0_queue_wait

Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
    HID: check empty report_list in hid_validate_values()

Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
    net: mdio: validate parameter addr in mdiobus_get_phy()

Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
    net: usb: sr9700: Handle negative len

Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
    wifi: rndis_wlan: Prevent buffer overflow in rndis_query_oid

Jisoo Jang <jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr>
    net: nfc: Fix use-after-free in local_cleanup()

Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com>
    phy: rockchip-inno-usb2: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_usb2phy_power_on()

Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
    bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation

Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>
    amd-xgbe: Delay AN timeout during KR training

Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>
    amd-xgbe: TX Flow Ctrl Registers are h/w ver dependent

Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
    affs: initialize fsdata in affs_truncate()

Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
    IB/hfi1: Fix expected receive setup error exit issues

Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
    IB/hfi1: Reserve user expected TIDs

Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
    IB/hfi1: Reject a zero-length user expected buffer

Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
    tomoyo: fix broken dependency on *.conf.default

Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
    EDAC/highbank: Fix memory leak in highbank_mc_probe()

Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
    HID: intel_ish-hid: Add check for ishtp_dma_tx_map

Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
    ARM: dts: imx6qdl-gw560x: Remove incorrect 'uart-has-rtscts'

Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
    memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count |   6 ++
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count |   6 ++
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt                   |  20 ++++
 Makefile                                          |   4 +-
 arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c                         |   6 +-
 arch/alpha/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts                   |   2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi             |   1 -
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c                           |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/nommu.c                               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c                         |   3 +-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c                       |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/Kconfig                                 |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/mm/fault.c                              |   2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/m68k/mm/fault.c                              |   2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c               |   4 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c                         |   8 +-
 arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c                      |   2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c                       |   2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c                      |   2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/traps.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c                      |   4 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c                      |   4 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                         |   6 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                         |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                       |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c                           |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S                      |   2 +-
 arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c                        |   2 +-
 block/blk-core.c                                  |   5 +-
 drivers/dma/dmaengine.c                           |   7 +-
 drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c                   |  78 +++++++++++----
 drivers/edac/edac_device.c                        |  15 ++-
 drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_dp.c                   |  13 ++-
 drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c                         |  17 ++--
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c          |  10 ++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c         | 101 +++++++++++--------
 drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c                   |   1 -
 drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c                     |   3 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c          |  23 +++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c         |  24 +++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h              |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c               |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c          |   9 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c    |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c          |   4 +-
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c                        |   7 +-
 drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c                 |  19 ++--
 drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c     |   4 +-
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c                               |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c                |   7 ++
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-plat.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/w1/w1.c                                   |   6 +-
 drivers/w1/w1_int.c                               |   5 +-
 fs/affs/file.c                                    |   2 +-
 fs/cifs/connect.c                                 |   9 +-
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c                               | 115 ++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.h                               |   5 +-
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c                             |  33 +++++++
 fs/reiserfs/super.c                               |   6 --
 include/linux/kernel.h                            |   1 +
 include/linux/sched/task.h                        |   1 +
 include/linux/sysctl.h                            |   3 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                             |   4 +-
 kernel/exit.c                                     |  72 ++++++++++++++
 kernel/module.c                                   |  26 ++++-
 kernel/panic.c                                    |  75 ++++++++++++--
 kernel/sched/core.c                               |   3 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.c                              |   2 +
 kernel/trace/trace.h                              |   1 +
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c                  |   2 +
 kernel/trace/trace_output.c                       |   3 +-
 mm/kasan/report.c                                 |   3 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c                          |   1 +
 net/core/net_namespace.c                          |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c                        |  17 +++-
 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c                     |   8 +-
 net/ipv4/metrics.c                                |   2 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c                                |  12 ++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c                             |  10 +-
 net/ipv6/sit.c                                    |   8 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c           |  25 +++--
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c            |  10 ++
 net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c                    |  16 ++-
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c                          |  41 ++++----
 net/netrom/nr_timer.c                             |   1 +
 net/nfc/llcp_core.c                               |   1 +
 net/sctp/bind_addr.c                              |   6 ++
 security/tomoyo/Makefile                          |   2 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                             |   3 +-
 tools/perf/util/env.c                             |   4 +-
 109 files changed, 773 insertions(+), 304 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.19 01/80] memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit cb8fd6f75775165390ededea8799b60d93d9fe3e ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling
of devbus_get_timing_params() and of_platform_populate(), fix it by
replacing devm_clk_get and clk_prepare_enable by devm_clk_get_enabled.

Fixes: e81b6abebc87 ("memory: add a driver for atmel ram controllers")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221126044911.7226-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c b/drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c
index 981860879d02..ddd2e50814b7 100644
--- a/drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c
+++ b/drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c
@@ -294,10 +294,9 @@ static int mvebu_devbus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (IS_ERR(devbus->base))
 		return PTR_ERR(devbus->base);
 
-	clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+	clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(clk))
 		return PTR_ERR(clk);
-	clk_prepare_enable(clk);
 
 	/*
 	 * Obtain clock period in picoseconds,
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 02/80] ARM: dts: imx6qdl-gw560x: Remove incorrect uart-has-rtscts

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>

[ Upstream commit 9dfbc72256b5de608ad10989bcbafdbbd1ac8d4e ]

The following build warning is seen when running:

make dtbs_check DT_SCHEMA_FILES=fsl-imx-uart.yaml

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl-gw560x.dtb: serial@2020000: rts-gpios: False schema does not allow [[20, 1, 0]]
	From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/fsl-imx-uart.yaml

The imx6qdl-gw560x board does not expose the UART RTS and CTS
as native UART pins, so 'uart-has-rtscts' should not be used.

Using 'uart-has-rtscts' with 'rts-gpios' is an invalid combination
detected by serial.yaml.

Fix the problem by removing the incorrect 'uart-has-rtscts' property.

Fixes: b8a559feffb2 ("ARM: dts: imx: add Gateworks Ventana GW5600 support")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
Acked-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi
index b5986efe1090..143d249b821e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi
@@ -463,7 +463,6 @@ &ssi1 {
 &uart1 {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_uart1>;
-	uart-has-rtscts;
 	rts-gpios = <&gpio7 1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 	status = "okay";
 };
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 03/80] HID: intel_ish-hid: Add check for ishtp_dma_tx_map

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>

[ Upstream commit b3d40c3ec3dc4ad78017de6c3a38979f57aaaab8 ]

As the kcalloc may return NULL pointer,
it should be better to check the ishtp_dma_tx_map
before use in order to avoid NULL pointer dereference.

Fixes: 3703f53b99e4 ("HID: intel_ish-hid: ISH Transport layer")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c b/drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c
index 2783f3666114..ff4419c8ed4f 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c
@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ void *ishtp_cl_get_dma_send_buf(struct ishtp_device *dev,
 	int required_slots = (size / DMA_SLOT_SIZE)
 		+ 1 * (size % DMA_SLOT_SIZE != 0);
 
+	if (!dev->ishtp_dma_tx_map) {
+		dev_err(dev->devc, "Fail to allocate Tx map\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->ishtp_dma_tx_lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i <= (dev->ishtp_dma_num_slots - required_slots); i++) {
 		free = 1;
@@ -159,6 +164,11 @@ void ishtp_cl_release_dma_acked_mem(struct ishtp_device *dev,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (!dev->ishtp_dma_tx_map) {
+		dev_err(dev->devc, "Fail to allocate Tx map\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	i = (msg_addr - dev->ishtp_host_dma_tx_buf) / DMA_SLOT_SIZE;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->ishtp_dma_tx_lock, flags);
 	for (j = 0; j < acked_slots; j++) {
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 04/80] EDAC/highbank: Fix memory leak in highbank_mc_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit e7a293658c20a7945014570e1921bf7d25d68a36 ]

When devres_open_group() fails, it returns -ENOMEM without freeing memory
allocated by edac_mc_alloc().

Call edac_mc_free() on the error handling path to avoid a memory leak.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: a1b01edb2745 ("edac: add support for Calxeda highbank memory controller")
Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221229054825.1361993-1-linmq006@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c b/drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c
index 6092e61be605..bcf41601a977 100644
--- a/drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c
@@ -185,8 +185,10 @@ static int highbank_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	drvdata = mci->pvt_info;
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, mci);
 
-	if (!devres_open_group(&pdev->dev, NULL, GFP_KERNEL))
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!devres_open_group(&pdev->dev, NULL, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+		res = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free;
+	}
 
 	r = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	if (!r) {
@@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ static int highbank_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	edac_mc_del_mc(&pdev->dev);
 err:
 	devres_release_group(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+free:
 	edac_mc_free(mci);
 	return res;
 }
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 05/80] tomoyo: fix broken dependency on *.conf.default

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit eaf2213ba563b2d74a1f2c13a6b258273f689802 ]

If *.conf.default is updated, builtin-policy.h should be rebuilt,
but this does not work when compiled with O= option.

[Without this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

[With this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
    POLICY  security/tomoyo/builtin-policy.h
    CC      security/tomoyo/common.o
    AR      security/tomoyo/built-in.a
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

$(srctree)/ is essential because $(wildcard ) does not follow VPATH.

Fixes: f02dee2d148b ("tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/tomoyo/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index cca5a3012fee..221eaadffb09 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endef
 quiet_cmd_policy  = POLICY  $@
       cmd_policy  = ($(call do_policy,profile); $(call do_policy,exception_policy); $(call do_policy,domain_policy); $(call do_policy,manager); $(call do_policy,stat)) >$@
 
-$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,policy)
 
 $(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 06/80] IB/hfi1: Reject a zero-length user expected buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>

[ Upstream commit 0a0a6e80472c98947d73c3d13bcd7d101895f55d ]

A zero length user buffer makes no sense and the code
does not handle it correctly.  Instead, reject a
zero length as invalid.

Fixes: 97736f36dbeb ("IB/hfi1: Validate page aligned for a given virtual addres")
Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328547120.1472310.6362802432127399257.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
index 4e417ed08b09..4e0f7cd14c57 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(tinfo->vaddr))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (tinfo->length == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tidbuf = kzalloc(sizeof(*tidbuf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidbuf)
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 07/80] IB/hfi1: Reserve user expected TIDs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>

[ Upstream commit ecf91551cdd2925ed6d9a9d99074fa5f67b90596 ]

To avoid a race, reserve the number of user expected
TIDs before setup.

Fixes: 7e7a436ecb6e ("staging/hfi1: Add TID entry program function body")
Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328547636.1472310.7419712824785353905.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
index 4e0f7cd14c57..0a118f2963fb 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
@@ -351,16 +351,13 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	/* Find sets of physically contiguous pages */
 	tidbuf->n_psets = find_phys_blocks(tidbuf, pinned);
 
-	/*
-	 * We don't need to access this under a lock since tid_used is per
-	 * process and the same process cannot be in hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear()
-	 * and hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup() at the same time.
-	 */
+	/* Reserve the number of expected tids to be used. */
 	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	if (fd->tid_used + tidbuf->n_psets > fd->tid_limit)
 		pageset_count = fd->tid_limit - fd->tid_used;
 	else
 		pageset_count = tidbuf->n_psets;
+	fd->tid_used += pageset_count;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 
 	if (!pageset_count)
@@ -469,10 +466,11 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 nomem:
 	hfi1_cdbg(TID, "total mapped: tidpairs:%u pages:%u (%d)", tididx,
 		  mapped_pages, ret);
+	/* adjust reserved tid_used to actual count */
+	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
+	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count - tididx;
+	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	if (tididx) {
-		spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
-		fd->tid_used += tididx;
-		spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 		tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
 		tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 08/80] IB/hfi1: Fix expected receive setup error exit issues

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>

[ Upstream commit e0c4a422f5246abefbf7c178ef99a1f2dc3c5f62 ]

Fix three error exit issues in expected receive setup.
Re-arrange error exits to increase readability.

Issues and fixes:
1. Possible missed page unpin if tidlist copyout fails and
   not all pinned pages where made part of a TID.
   Fix: Unpin the unused pages.

2. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length
   when no pages were pinned.
   Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no pages were pinned.

3. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length when
   no rcvarray entries available.
   Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no rcvarray entries are available.

Fixes: 7e7a436ecb6e ("staging/hfi1: Add TID entry program function body")
Fixes: 97736f36dbeb ("IB/hfi1: Validate page aligned for a given virtual addres")
Fixes: f404ca4c7ea8 ("IB/hfi1: Refactor hfi_user_exp_rcv_setup() IOCTL")
Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328548150.1472310.1492305874804187634.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 83 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
index 0a118f2963fb..dab823aac95e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c
@@ -337,15 +337,14 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	tidbuf->psets = kcalloc(uctxt->expected_count, sizeof(*tidbuf->psets),
 				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidbuf->psets) {
-		kfree(tidbuf);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail_release_mem;
 	}
 
 	pinned = pin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf);
 	if (pinned <= 0) {
-		kfree(tidbuf->psets);
-		kfree(tidbuf);
-		return pinned;
+		ret = (pinned < 0) ? pinned : -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unpin;
 	}
 
 	/* Find sets of physically contiguous pages */
@@ -360,14 +359,16 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	fd->tid_used += pageset_count;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 
-	if (!pageset_count)
-		goto bail;
+	if (!pageset_count) {
+		ret = -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
+	}
 
 	ngroups = pageset_count / dd->rcv_entries.group_size;
 	tidlist = kcalloc(pageset_count, sizeof(*tidlist), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidlist) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto nomem;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
 	}
 
 	tididx = 0;
@@ -463,44 +464,60 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	}
 unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&uctxt->exp_mutex);
-nomem:
 	hfi1_cdbg(TID, "total mapped: tidpairs:%u pages:%u (%d)", tididx,
 		  mapped_pages, ret);
+
+	/* fail if nothing was programmed, set error if none provided */
+	if (tididx == 0) {
+		if (ret >= 0)
+			ret = -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
+	}
+
 	/* adjust reserved tid_used to actual count */
 	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count - tididx;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
-	if (tididx) {
-		tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
-		tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
 
-		if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(tinfo->tidlist),
-				 tidlist, sizeof(tidlist[0]) * tididx)) {
-			/*
-			 * On failure to copy to the user level, we need to undo
-			 * everything done so far so we don't leak resources.
-			 */
-			tinfo->tidlist = (unsigned long)&tidlist;
-			hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(fd, tinfo);
-			tinfo->tidlist = 0;
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto bail;
-		}
+	/* unpin all pages not covered by a TID */
+	unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, mapped_pages, pinned - mapped_pages,
+			false);
+
+	tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
+	tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(tinfo->tidlist),
+			 tidlist, sizeof(tidlist[0]) * tididx)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto fail_unprogram;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If not everything was mapped (due to insufficient RcvArray entries,
-	 * for example), unpin all unmapped pages so we can pin them nex time.
-	 */
-	if (mapped_pages != pinned)
-		unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, mapped_pages,
-				(pinned - mapped_pages), false);
-bail:
+	kfree(tidbuf->pages);
 	kfree(tidbuf->psets);
+	kfree(tidbuf);
 	kfree(tidlist);
+	return 0;
+
+fail_unprogram:
+	/* unprogram, unmap, and unpin all allocated TIDs */
+	tinfo->tidlist = (unsigned long)tidlist;
+	hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(fd, tinfo);
+	tinfo->tidlist = 0;
+	pinned = 0;		/* nothing left to unpin */
+	pageset_count = 0;	/* nothing left reserved */
+fail_unreserve:
+	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
+	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count;
+	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
+fail_unpin:
+	if (pinned > 0)
+		unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, 0, pinned, false);
+fail_release_mem:
 	kfree(tidbuf->pages);
+	kfree(tidbuf->psets);
 	kfree(tidbuf);
-	return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+	kfree(tidlist);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 09/80] affs: initialize fsdata in affs_truncate()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

[ Upstream commit eef034ac6690118c88f357b00e2b3239c9d8575d ]

When aops->write_begin() does not initialize fsdata, KMSAN may report
an error passing the latter to aops->write_end().

Fix this by unconditionally initializing fsdata.

Fixes: f2b6a16eb8f5 ("fs: affs convert to new aops")
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/affs/file.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/affs/file.c b/fs/affs/file.c
index ba084b0b214b..82bb38370aa9 100644
--- a/fs/affs/file.c
+++ b/fs/affs/file.c
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ affs_truncate(struct inode *inode)
 	if (inode->i_size > AFFS_I(inode)->mmu_private) {
 		struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
 		struct page *page;
-		void *fsdata;
+		void *fsdata = NULL;
 		loff_t isize = inode->i_size;
 		int res;
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 10/80] amd-xgbe: TX Flow Ctrl Registers are h/w ver dependent

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 579923d84b04abb6cd4cd1fd9974096a2dd1832b ]

There is difference in the TX Flow Control registers (TFCR) between the
revisions of the hardware. The older revisions of hardware used to have
single register per queue. Whereas, the newer revision of hardware (from
ver 30H onwards) have one register per priority.

Update the driver to use the TFCR based on the reported version of the
hardware.

Fixes: c5aa9e3b8156 ("amd-xgbe: Initial AMD 10GbE platform driver")
Co-developed-by: Ajith Nayak <Ajith.Nayak@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ajith Nayak <Ajith.Nayak@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>
Acked-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c
index 4666084eda16..9d6fe5a892d9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c
@@ -524,19 +524,28 @@ static void xgbe_disable_vxlan(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 	netif_dbg(pdata, drv, pdata->netdev, "VXLAN acceleration disabled\n");
 }
 
+static unsigned int xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
+{
+	unsigned int max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
+
+	/* From MAC ver 30H the TFCR is per priority, instead of per queue */
+	if (XGMAC_GET_BITS(pdata->hw_feat.version, MAC_VR, SNPSVER) >= 0x30)
+		return max_q_count;
+	else
+		return min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+}
+
 static int xgbe_disable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
-	unsigned int max_q_count, q_count;
 	unsigned int reg, reg_val;
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, q_count;
 
 	/* Clear MTL flow control */
 	for (i = 0; i < pdata->rx_q_count; i++)
 		XGMAC_MTL_IOWRITE_BITS(pdata, i, MTL_Q_RQOMR, EHFC, 0);
 
 	/* Clear MAC flow control */
-	max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
-	q_count = min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+	q_count = xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(pdata);
 	reg = MAC_Q0TFCR;
 	for (i = 0; i < q_count; i++) {
 		reg_val = XGMAC_IOREAD(pdata, reg);
@@ -553,9 +562,8 @@ static int xgbe_enable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
 	struct ieee_pfc *pfc = pdata->pfc;
 	struct ieee_ets *ets = pdata->ets;
-	unsigned int max_q_count, q_count;
 	unsigned int reg, reg_val;
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, q_count;
 
 	/* Set MTL flow control */
 	for (i = 0; i < pdata->rx_q_count; i++) {
@@ -579,8 +587,7 @@ static int xgbe_enable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 	}
 
 	/* Set MAC flow control */
-	max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
-	q_count = min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+	q_count = xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(pdata);
 	reg = MAC_Q0TFCR;
 	for (i = 0; i < q_count; i++) {
 		reg_val = XGMAC_IOREAD(pdata, reg);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 11/80] amd-xgbe: Delay AN timeout during KR training

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 926446ae24c03311a480fb96eb78f0ce7ea6d091 ]

AN restart triggered during KR training not only aborts the KR training
process but also move the HW to unstable state. Driver has to wait upto
500ms or until the KR training is completed before restarting AN cycle.

Fixes: 7c12aa08779c ("amd-xgbe: Move the PHY support into amd-xgbe")
Co-developed-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com>
Acked-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h      |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c
index 97167fc9bebe..7840eb4cdb8d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static enum xgbe_an xgbe_an73_tx_training(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata,
 	reg |= XGBE_KR_TRAINING_ENABLE;
 	reg |= XGBE_KR_TRAINING_START;
 	XMDIO_WRITE(pdata, MDIO_MMD_PMAPMD, MDIO_PMA_10GBR_PMD_CTRL, reg);
+	pdata->kr_start_time = jiffies;
 
 	netif_dbg(pdata, link, pdata->netdev,
 		  "KR training initiated\n");
@@ -632,6 +633,8 @@ static enum xgbe_an xgbe_an73_incompat_link(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 
 	xgbe_switch_mode(pdata);
 
+	pdata->an_result = XGBE_AN_READY;
+
 	xgbe_an_restart(pdata);
 
 	return XGBE_AN_INCOMPAT_LINK;
@@ -1275,9 +1278,30 @@ static bool xgbe_phy_aneg_done(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 static void xgbe_check_link_timeout(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
 	unsigned long link_timeout;
+	unsigned long kr_time;
+	int wait;
 
 	link_timeout = pdata->link_check + (XGBE_LINK_TIMEOUT * HZ);
 	if (time_after(jiffies, link_timeout)) {
+		if ((xgbe_cur_mode(pdata) == XGBE_MODE_KR) &&
+		    pdata->phy.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE) {
+			/* AN restart should not happen while KR training is in progress.
+			 * The while loop ensures no AN restart during KR training,
+			 * waits up to 500ms and AN restart is triggered only if KR
+			 * training is failed.
+			 */
+			wait = XGBE_KR_TRAINING_WAIT_ITER;
+			while (wait--) {
+				kr_time = pdata->kr_start_time +
+					  msecs_to_jiffies(XGBE_AN_MS_TIMEOUT);
+				if (time_after(jiffies, kr_time))
+					break;
+				/* AN restart is not required, if AN result is COMPLETE */
+				if (pdata->an_result == XGBE_AN_COMPLETE)
+					return;
+				usleep_range(10000, 11000);
+			}
+		}
 		netif_dbg(pdata, link, pdata->netdev, "AN link timeout\n");
 		xgbe_phy_config_aneg(pdata);
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h
index 0c93a552b921..729307a96c50 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@
 /* Auto-negotiation */
 #define XGBE_AN_MS_TIMEOUT		500
 #define XGBE_LINK_TIMEOUT		5
+#define XGBE_KR_TRAINING_WAIT_ITER	50
 
 #define XGBE_SGMII_AN_LINK_STATUS	BIT(1)
 #define XGBE_SGMII_AN_LINK_SPEED	(BIT(2) | BIT(3))
@@ -1266,6 +1267,7 @@ struct xgbe_prv_data {
 	unsigned int parallel_detect;
 	unsigned int fec_ability;
 	unsigned long an_start;
+	unsigned long kr_start_time;
 	enum xgbe_an_mode an_mode;
 
 	/* I2C support */
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 12/80] bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>

[ Upstream commit e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6 ]

To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.

However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.

To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.

The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:

  [...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
  // for no r9-r10 dependency.
  //
  *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
  // 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
  // store may be subject to SSB
  //
  // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
  //
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
  // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
  //
  // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
  r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
  if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
  // architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
  // only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
  [...]

After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.

In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.

Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.

Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Henriette Hofmeier <henriette.hofmeier@rub.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/edc95bad-aada-9cfc-ffe2-fa9bb206583c@cs.fau.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230109150544.41465-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 694ee0b1fefe..61f3a31abc1a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1012,7 +1012,9 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) {
+			u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i];
+
+			if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) {
 				sanitize = true;
 				break;
 			}
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 13/80] phy: rockchip-inno-usb2: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_usb2phy_power_on()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 5daba914da0e48950e9407ea4d75fa57029c9adc ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of
rockchip_usb2phy_power_on().

Fixes: 0e08d2a727e6 ("phy: rockchip-inno-usb2: add a new driver for Rockchip usb2phy")
Signed-off-by: Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205115823.16957-1-shangxiaojing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c b/drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c
index 5049dac79bd0..77c1c3ffaed7 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c
@@ -477,8 +477,10 @@ static int rockchip_usb2phy_power_on(struct phy *phy)
 		return ret;
 
 	ret = property_enable(base, &rport->port_cfg->phy_sus, false);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(rphy->clk480m);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	/* waiting for the utmi_clk to become stable */
 	usleep_range(1500, 2000);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 14/80] net: nfc: Fix use-after-free in local_cleanup()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jisoo Jang <jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr>

[ Upstream commit 4bb4db7f3187c6e3de6b229ffc87cdb30a2d22b6 ]

Fix a use-after-free that occurs in kfree_skb() called from
local_cleanup(). This could happen when killing nfc daemon (e.g. neard)
after detaching an nfc device.
When detaching an nfc device, local_cleanup() called from
nfc_llcp_unregister_device() frees local->rx_pending and decreases
local->ref by kref_put() in nfc_llcp_local_put().
In the terminating process, nfc daemon releases all sockets and it leads
to decreasing local->ref. After the last release of local->ref,
local_cleanup() called from local_release() frees local->rx_pending
again, which leads to the bug.

Setting local->rx_pending to NULL in local_cleanup() could prevent
use-after-free when local_cleanup() is called twice.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb()

Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:106)
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:306)
kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:189)
kfree_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:955)
local_cleanup (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:159)
nfc_llcp_local_put.part.0 (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:172)
nfc_llcp_local_put (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:181)
llcp_sock_destruct (net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:959)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2133)
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2181)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2192)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2203)
llcp_sock_release (net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:646)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:650)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1365)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:306)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:179)
ptrace_notify (kernel/signal.c:2354)
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:278)
syscall_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:296)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:86)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:106)

Allocated by task 4719:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:45)
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:325)
slab_post_alloc_hook (mm/slab.h:766)
kmem_cache_alloc_node (mm/slub.c:3497)
__alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:552)
pn533_recv_response (drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c:65)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1671)
usb_giveback_urb_bh (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1704)
tasklet_action_common.isra.0 (kernel/softirq.c:797)
__do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:571)

Freed by task 1901:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:45)
kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/genericdd.c:518)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:236)
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:3809)
kfree_skbmem (net/core/skbuff.c:874)
kfree_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:931)
local_cleanup (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:159)
nfc_llcp_unregister_device (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:1617)
nfc_unregister_device (net/nfc/core.c:1179)
pn53x_unregister_nfc (drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c:2846)
pn533_usb_disconnect (drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c:579)
usb_unbind_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458)
device_release_driver_internal (drivers/base/dd.c:1279)
bus_remove_device (drivers/base/bus.c:529)
device_del (drivers/base/core.c:3665)
usb_disable_device (drivers/usb/core/message.c:1420)
usb_disconnect (drivers/usb/core.c:2261)
hub_event (drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5833)
process_one_work (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 include/linux/jump_label.h:212 include/trace/events/workqueue.h:108 kernel/workqueue.c:2281)
worker_thread (include/linux/list.h:282 kernel/workqueue.c:2423)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:319)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:301)

Fixes: 3536da06db0b ("NFC: llcp: Clean local timers and works when removing a device")
Signed-off-by: Jisoo Jang <jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111131914.3338838-1-jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
index 4fa015208aab..3290f2275b85 100644
--- a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
+++ b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void local_cleanup(struct nfc_llcp_local *local)
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->rx_work);
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->timeout_work);
 	kfree_skb(local->rx_pending);
+	local->rx_pending = NULL;
 	del_timer_sync(&local->sdreq_timer);
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->sdreq_timeout_work);
 	nfc_llcp_free_sdp_tlv_list(&local->pending_sdreqs);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 15/80] wifi: rndis_wlan: Prevent buffer overflow in rndis_query_oid

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit b870e73a56c4cccbec33224233eaf295839f228c ]

Since resplen and respoffs are signed integers sufficiently
large values of unsigned int len and offset members of RNDIS
response will result in negative values of prior variables.
This may be utilized to bypass implemented security checks
to either extract memory contents by manipulating offset or
overflow the data buffer via memcpy by manipulating both
offset and len.

Additionally assure that sum of resplen and respoffs does not
overflow so buffer boundaries are kept.

Fixes: 80f8c5b434f9 ("rndis_wlan: copy only useful data from rndis_command respond")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111175031.7049-1-szymon.heidrich@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c | 19 ++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c
index 51e4e92d95a0..0bbeb61ec3a3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c
@@ -712,8 +712,8 @@ static int rndis_query_oid(struct usbnet *dev, u32 oid, void *data, int *len)
 		struct rndis_query	*get;
 		struct rndis_query_c	*get_c;
 	} u;
-	int ret, buflen;
-	int resplen, respoffs, copylen;
+	int ret;
+	size_t buflen, resplen, respoffs, copylen;
 
 	buflen = *len + sizeof(*u.get);
 	if (buflen < CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE)
@@ -748,22 +748,15 @@ static int rndis_query_oid(struct usbnet *dev, u32 oid, void *data, int *len)
 
 		if (respoffs > buflen) {
 			/* Device returned data offset outside buffer, error. */
-			netdev_dbg(dev->net, "%s(%s): received invalid "
-				"data offset: %d > %d\n", __func__,
-				oid_to_string(oid), respoffs, buflen);
+			netdev_dbg(dev->net,
+				   "%s(%s): received invalid data offset: %zu > %zu\n",
+				   __func__, oid_to_string(oid), respoffs, buflen);
 
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto exit_unlock;
 		}
 
-		if ((resplen + respoffs) > buflen) {
-			/* Device would have returned more data if buffer would
-			 * have been big enough. Copy just the bits that we got.
-			 */
-			copylen = buflen - respoffs;
-		} else {
-			copylen = resplen;
-		}
+		copylen = min(resplen, buflen - respoffs);
 
 		if (copylen > *len)
 			copylen = *len;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 16/80] net: usb: sr9700: Handle negative len

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ecf7cf8efb59789e2b21d2f9ab926142579092b2 ]

Packet len computed as difference of length word extracted from
skb data and four may result in a negative value. In such case
processing of the buffer should be interrupted rather than
setting sr_skb->len to an unexpectedly large value (due to cast
from signed to unsigned integer) and passing sr_skb to
usbnet_skb_return.

Fixes: e9da0b56fe27 ("sr9700: sanity check for packet length")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230114182326.30479-1-szymon.heidrich@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c b/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c
index 83640628c47d..8bee8286e41a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int sr9700_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		/* ignore the CRC length */
 		len = (skb->data[1] | (skb->data[2] << 8)) - 4;
 
-		if (len > ETH_FRAME_LEN || len > skb->len)
+		if (len > ETH_FRAME_LEN || len > skb->len || len < 0)
 			return 0;
 
 		/* the last packet of current skb */
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 17/80] net: mdio: validate parameter addr in mdiobus_get_phy()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 867dbe784c5010a466f00a7d1467c1c5ea569c75 ]

The caller may pass any value as addr, what may result in an out-of-bounds
access to array mdio_map. One existing case is stmmac_init_phy() that
may pass -1 as addr. Therefore validate addr before using it.

Fixes: 7f854420fbfe ("phy: Add API for {un}registering an mdio device to a bus.")
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cdf664ea-3312-e915-73f8-021678d08887@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c
index 1d1fbd7bd6fc..550806351049 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c
@@ -103,7 +103,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(mdiobus_unregister_device);
 
 struct phy_device *mdiobus_get_phy(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr)
 {
-	struct mdio_device *mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[addr];
+	struct mdio_device *mdiodev;
+
+	if (addr < 0 || addr >= ARRAY_SIZE(bus->mdio_map))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[addr];
 
 	if (!mdiodev)
 		return NULL;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 18/80] HID: check empty report_list in hid_validate_values()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>

[ Upstream commit b12fece4c64857e5fab4290bf01b2e0317a88456 ]

Add a check for empty report_list in hid_validate_values().
The missing check causes a type confusion when issuing a list_entry()
on an empty report_list.
The problem is caused by the assumption that the device must
have valid report_list. While this will be true for all normal HID
devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the assumption.

Fixes: 1b15d2e5b807 ("HID: core: fix validation of report id 0")
Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
index 62656636d30c..8cc79d0d11fb 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
@@ -980,8 +980,8 @@ struct hid_report *hid_validate_values(struct hid_device *hid,
 		 * Validating on id 0 means we should examine the first
 		 * report in the list.
 		 */
-		report = list_entry(
-				hid->report_enum[type].report_list.next,
+		report = list_first_entry_or_null(
+				&hid->report_enum[type].report_list,
 				struct hid_report, list);
 	} else {
 		report = hid->report_enum[type].report_id_hash[id];
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 19/80] usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent race during ffs_ep0_queue_wait

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>

[ Upstream commit 6a19da111057f69214b97c62fb0ac59023970850 ]

While performing fast composition switch, there is a possibility that the
process of ffs_ep0_write/ffs_ep0_read get into a race condition
due to ep0req being freed up from functionfs_unbind.

Consider the scenario that the ffs_ep0_write calls the ffs_ep0_queue_wait
by taking a lock &ffs->ev.waitq.lock. However, the functionfs_unbind isn't
bounded so it can go ahead and mark the ep0req to NULL, and since there
is no NULL check in ffs_ep0_queue_wait we will end up in use-after-free.

Fix this by making a serialized execution between the two functions using
a mutex_lock(ffs->mutex).

Fixes: ddf8abd25994 ("USB: f_fs: the FunctionFS driver")
Signed-off-by: Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>
Tested-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221215052906.8993-2-quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index 49eb4e3c760f..b3489a3449f6 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ static int __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(struct ffs_data *ffs, char *data, size_t len)
 	struct usb_request *req = ffs->ep0req;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!req)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	req->zero     = len < le16_to_cpu(ffs->ev.setup.wLength);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
@@ -1807,10 +1810,12 @@ static void functionfs_unbind(struct ffs_data *ffs)
 	ENTER();
 
 	if (!WARN_ON(!ffs->gadget)) {
+		mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex);
 		usb_ep_free_request(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		ffs->ep0req = NULL;
 		ffs->gadget = NULL;
 		clear_bit(FFS_FL_BOUND, &ffs->flags);
+		mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
 		ffs_data_put(ffs);
 	}
 }
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 20/80] usb: gadget: f_fs: Ensure ep0req is dequeued before free_request

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>

[ Upstream commit ce405d561b020e5a46340eb5146805a625dcacee ]

As per the documentation, function usb_ep_free_request guarantees
the request will not be queued or no longer be re-queued (or
otherwise used). However, with the current implementation it
doesn't make sure that the request in ep0 isn't reused.

Fix this by dequeuing the ep0req on functionfs_unbind before
freeing the request to align with the definition.

Fixes: ddf8abd25994 ("USB: f_fs: the FunctionFS driver")
Signed-off-by: Udipto Goswami <quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com>
Tested-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221215052906.8993-3-quic_ugoswami@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index b3489a3449f6..48bdb2a3972b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -1810,6 +1810,8 @@ static void functionfs_unbind(struct ffs_data *ffs)
 	ENTER();
 
 	if (!WARN_ON(!ffs->gadget)) {
+		/* dequeue before freeing ep0req */
+		usb_ep_dequeue(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex);
 		usb_ep_free_request(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		ffs->ep0req = NULL;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 21/80] net: mlx5: eliminate anonymous module_init & module_exit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit 2c1e1b949024989e20907b84e11a731a50778416 ]

Eliminate anonymous module_init() and module_exit(), which can lead to
confusion or ambiguity when reading System.map, crashes/oops/bugs,
or an initcall_debug log.

Give each of these init and exit functions unique driver-specific
names to eliminate the anonymous names.

Example 1: (System.map)
 ffffffff832fc78c t init
 ffffffff832fc79e t init
 ffffffff832fc8f8 t init

Example 2: (initcall_debug log)
 calling  init+0x0/0x12 @ 1
 initcall init+0x0/0x12 returned 0 after 15 usecs
 calling  init+0x0/0x60 @ 1
 initcall init+0x0/0x60 returned 0 after 2 usecs
 calling  init+0x0/0x9a @ 1
 initcall init+0x0/0x9a returned 0 after 74 usecs

Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
index a2b25afa2472..e09bd059984e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ static void mlx5_core_verify_params(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static int __init init(void)
+static int __init mlx5_init(void)
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -1708,7 +1708,7 @@ static int __init init(void)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void __exit cleanup(void)
+static void __exit mlx5_cleanup(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MLX5_CORE_EN
 	mlx5e_cleanup();
@@ -1717,5 +1717,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup(void)
 	mlx5_unregister_debugfs();
 }
 
-module_init(init);
-module_exit(cleanup);
+module_init(mlx5_init);
+module_exit(mlx5_cleanup);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 22/80] dmaengine: Fix double increment of client_count in dma_chan_get()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Koba Ko <koba.ko@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit f3dc1b3b4750851a94212dba249703dd0e50bb20 ]

The first time dma_chan_get() is called for a channel the channel
client_count is incorrectly incremented twice for public channels,
first in balance_ref_count(), and again prior to returning. This
results in an incorrect client count which will lead to the
channel resources not being freed when they should be. A simple
 test of repeated module load and unload of async_tx on a Dell
 Power Edge R7425 also shows this resulting in a kref underflow
 warning.

[  124.329662] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[  129.000627] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[  130.047839] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  130.052472] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[  130.057279] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 19364 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[  130.065811] Modules linked in: async_tx(-) rfkill intel_rapl_msr
intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd ipmi_ssif kvm_amd dcdbas kvm
mgag200 drm_shmem_helper acpi_ipmi irqbypass drm_kms_helper ipmi_si
syscopyarea sysfillrect rapl pcspkr ipmi_devintf sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
k10temp i2c_piix4 ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq vfat
fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ahci crct10dif_pclmul
libahci crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel igb megaraid_sas
i40e libata i2c_algo_bit ccp sp5100_tco dca dm_mirror dm_region_hash
dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: async_tx]
[  130.117361] CPU: 3 PID: 19364 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 5.14.0-185.el9.x86_64 #1
[  130.126091] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS
1.18.0 01/17/2022
[  130.133806] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[  130.139041] Code: 01 01 e8 6d bd 55 00 0f 0b e9 72 9d 8a 00 80 3d
26 18 9c 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 a3 03 9d c6 05 16 18 9c 01 01 e8 4a
bd 55 00 <0f> 0b e9 4f 9d 8a 00 80 3d 01 18 9c 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff
48 c7
[  130.157807] RSP: 0018:ffffbf98898afe68 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  130.163036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9da06028e598 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  130.170172] RDX: ffff9daf9de26480 RSI: ffff9daf9de198a0 RDI: ffff9daf9de198a0
[  130.177316] RBP: ffff9da7cddf3970 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
[  130.184459] R10: ffffbf98898afd00 R11: ffffffff9d9e8c28 R12: ffff9da7cddf1970
[  130.191596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  130.198739] FS:  00007f646435c740(0000) GS:ffff9daf9de00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  130.206832] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  130.212586] CR2: 00007f6463b214f0 CR3: 00000008ab98c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[  130.219729] Call Trace:
[  130.222192]  <TASK>
[  130.224305]  dma_chan_put+0x10d/0x110
[  130.227988]  dmaengine_put+0x7a/0xa0
[  130.231575]  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x178/0x280
[  130.237157]  ? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x145/0x1d0
[  130.242652]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[  130.246240]  ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
[  130.250178]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[  130.255243] RIP: 0033:0x7f6463a3f5ab
[  130.258830] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[  130.277591] RSP: 002b:00007fff22f972c8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000b0
[  130.285164] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b6786edd40 RCX: 00007f6463a3f5ab
[  130.292303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055b6786edda8
[  130.299443] RBP: 000055b6786edd40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  130.306584] R10: 00007f6463b9eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055b6786edda8
[  130.313731] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055b6786edda8 R15: 00007fff22f995f8
[  130.320875]  </TASK>
[  130.323081] ---[ end trace eff7156d56b5cf25 ]---

cat /sys/class/dma/dma0chan*/in_use would get the wrong result.
2
2
2

Fixes: d2f4f99db3e9 ("dmaengine: Rework dma_chan_get")
Signed-off-by: Koba Ko <koba.ko@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com>
Test-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221201030050.978595-1-koba.ko@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/dmaengine.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/dmaengine.c b/drivers/dma/dmaengine.c
index 8a52a5efee4f..e1cf7c250c33 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/dmaengine.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/dmaengine.c
@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ static int dma_chan_get(struct dma_chan *chan)
 	/* The channel is already in use, update client count */
 	if (chan->client_count) {
 		__module_get(owner);
-		goto out;
+		chan->client_count++;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (!try_module_get(owner))
@@ -236,11 +237,11 @@ static int dma_chan_get(struct dma_chan *chan)
 			goto err_out;
 	}
 
+	chan->client_count++;
+
 	if (!dma_has_cap(DMA_PRIVATE, chan->device->cap_mask))
 		balance_ref_count(chan);
 
-out:
-	chan->client_count++;
 	return 0;
 
 err_out:
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 23/80] net: macb: fix PTP TX timestamp failure due to packet padding

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Robert Hancock <robert.hancock@calian.com>

[ Upstream commit 7b90f5a665acd46efbbfa677a3a3a18d01ad6487 ]

PTP TX timestamp handling was observed to be broken with this driver
when using the raw Layer 2 PTP encapsulation. ptp4l was not receiving
the expected TX timestamp after transmitting a packet, causing it to
enter a failure state.

The problem appears to be due to the way that the driver pads packets
which are smaller than the Ethernet minimum of 60 bytes. If headroom
space was available in the SKB, this caused the driver to move the data
back to utilize it. However, this appears to cause other data references
in the SKB to become inconsistent. In particular, this caused the
ptp_one_step_sync function to later (in the TX completion path) falsely
detect the packet as a one-step SYNC packet, even when it was not, which
caused the TX timestamp to not be processed when it should be.

Using the headroom for this purpose seems like an unnecessary complexity
as this is not a hot path in the driver, and in most cases it appears
that there is sufficient tailroom to not require using the headroom
anyway. Remove this usage of headroom to prevent this inconsistency from
occurring and causing other problems.

Fixes: 653e92a9175e ("net: macb: add support for padding and fcs computation")
Signed-off-by: Robert Hancock <robert.hancock@calian.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Tested-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com> # on SAMA7G5
Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
index 50331b202f73..324d81516832 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
@@ -1738,7 +1738,6 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	bool cloned = skb_cloned(*skb) || skb_header_cloned(*skb) ||
 		      skb_is_nonlinear(*skb);
 	int padlen = ETH_ZLEN - (*skb)->len;
-	int headroom = skb_headroom(*skb);
 	int tailroom = skb_tailroom(*skb);
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 	u32 fcs;
@@ -1752,9 +1751,6 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 		/* FCS could be appeded to tailroom. */
 		if (tailroom >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
 			goto add_fcs;
-		/* FCS could be appeded by moving data to headroom. */
-		else if (!cloned && headroom + tailroom >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
-			padlen = 0;
 		/* No room for FCS, need to reallocate skb. */
 		else
 			padlen = ETH_FCS_LEN;
@@ -1763,10 +1759,7 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 		padlen += ETH_FCS_LEN;
 	}
 
-	if (!cloned && headroom + tailroom >= padlen) {
-		(*skb)->data = memmove((*skb)->head, (*skb)->data, (*skb)->len);
-		skb_set_tail_pointer(*skb, (*skb)->len);
-	} else {
+	if (cloned || tailroom < padlen) {
 		nskb = skb_copy_expand(*skb, 0, padlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!nskb)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 24/80] HID: betop: check shape of output reports

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>

[ Upstream commit 3782c0d6edf658b71354a64d60aa7a296188fc90 ]

betopff_init() only checks the total sum of the report counts for each
report field to be at least 4, but hid_betopff_play() expects 4 report
fields.
A device advertising an output report with one field and 4 report counts
would pass the check but crash the kernel with a NULL pointer dereference
in hid_betopff_play().

Fixes: 52cd7785f3cd ("HID: betop: add drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c")
Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c b/drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c
index 9b60efe6ec44..ba386e5aa055 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static int betopff_init(struct hid_device *hid)
 	struct list_head *report_list =
 			&hid->report_enum[HID_OUTPUT_REPORT].report_list;
 	struct input_dev *dev;
-	int field_count = 0;
 	int error;
 	int i, j;
 
@@ -89,19 +88,21 @@ static int betopff_init(struct hid_device *hid)
 	 * -----------------------------------------
 	 * Do init them with default value.
 	 */
+	if (report->maxfield < 4) {
+		hid_err(hid, "not enough fields in the report: %d\n",
+				report->maxfield);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
 	for (i = 0; i < report->maxfield; i++) {
+		if (report->field[i]->report_count < 1) {
+			hid_err(hid, "no values in the field\n");
+			return -ENODEV;
+		}
 		for (j = 0; j < report->field[i]->report_count; j++) {
 			report->field[i]->value[j] = 0x00;
-			field_count++;
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (field_count < 4) {
-		hid_err(hid, "not enough fields in the report: %d\n",
-				field_count);
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-
 	betopff = kzalloc(sizeof(*betopff), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!betopff)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 25/80] dmaengine: xilinx_dma: commonize DMA copy size calculation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 616f0f81d857e248a72b5af45ab185196556ae2e ]

This patch removes a bit of duplicated code by introducing a new
function that implements calculations for DMA copy size, and
prepares for changes to the copy size calculation that will
happen in following patches.

Suggested-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
index 0ba70be4ea85..e4ea94b93400 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ struct xilinx_dma_config {
  * @rxs_clk: DMA s2mm stream clock
  * @nr_channels: Number of channels DMA device supports
  * @chan_id: DMA channel identifier
+ * @max_buffer_len: Max buffer length
  */
 struct xilinx_dma_device {
 	void __iomem *regs;
@@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ struct xilinx_dma_device {
 	struct clk *rxs_clk;
 	u32 nr_channels;
 	u32 chan_id;
+	u32 max_buffer_len;
 };
 
 /* Macros */
@@ -969,6 +971,25 @@ static int xilinx_dma_alloc_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *dchan)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * xilinx_dma_calc_copysize - Calculate the amount of data to copy
+ * @chan: Driver specific DMA channel
+ * @size: Total data that needs to be copied
+ * @done: Amount of data that has been already copied
+ *
+ * Return: Amount of data that has to be copied
+ */
+static int xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan,
+				    int size, int done)
+{
+	size_t copy;
+
+	copy = min_t(size_t, size - done,
+		     chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
+
+	return copy;
+}
+
 /**
  * xilinx_dma_tx_status - Get DMA transaction status
  * @dchan: DMA channel
@@ -1002,7 +1023,7 @@ static enum dma_status xilinx_dma_tx_status(struct dma_chan *dchan,
 			list_for_each_entry(segment, &desc->segments, node) {
 				hw = &segment->hw;
 				residue += (hw->control - hw->status) &
-					   XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+					   chan->xdev->max_buffer_len;
 			}
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);
@@ -1262,7 +1283,7 @@ static void xilinx_cdma_start_transfer(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan)
 
 		/* Start the transfer */
 		dma_ctrl_write(chan, XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT,
-				hw->control & XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+				hw->control & chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
 	}
 
 	list_splice_tail_init(&chan->pending_list, &chan->active_list);
@@ -1365,7 +1386,7 @@ static void xilinx_dma_start_transfer(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan)
 
 		/* Start the transfer */
 		dma_ctrl_write(chan, XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT,
-			       hw->control & XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			       hw->control & chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
 	}
 
 	list_splice_tail_init(&chan->pending_list, &chan->active_list);
@@ -1729,7 +1750,7 @@ xilinx_cdma_prep_memcpy(struct dma_chan *dchan, dma_addr_t dma_dst,
 	struct xilinx_cdma_tx_segment *segment;
 	struct xilinx_cdma_desc_hw *hw;
 
-	if (!len || len > XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN)
+	if (!len || len > chan->xdev->max_buffer_len)
 		return NULL;
 
 	desc = xilinx_dma_alloc_tx_descriptor(chan);
@@ -1819,8 +1840,8 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *xilinx_dma_prep_slave_sg(
 			 * Calculate the maximum number of bytes to transfer,
 			 * making sure it is less than the hw limit
 			 */
-			copy = min_t(size_t, sg_dma_len(sg) - sg_used,
-				     XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			copy = xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(chan, sg_dma_len(sg),
+							sg_used);
 			hw = &segment->hw;
 
 			/* Fill in the descriptor */
@@ -1924,8 +1945,8 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *xilinx_dma_prep_dma_cyclic(
 			 * Calculate the maximum number of bytes to transfer,
 			 * making sure it is less than the hw limit
 			 */
-			copy = min_t(size_t, period_len - sg_used,
-				     XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			copy = xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(chan, period_len,
+							sg_used);
 			hw = &segment->hw;
 			xilinx_axidma_buf(chan, hw, buf_addr, sg_used,
 					  period_len * i);
@@ -2645,6 +2666,8 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
+	xdev->max_buffer_len = XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA)
 		xdev->mcdma = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,mcdma");
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 26/80] dmaengine: xilinx_dma: program hardware supported buffer length

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com>

[ Upstream commit ae809690b46a71dc56cda5b3b8884c8c41a0df15 ]

AXI-DMA IP supports configurable (c_sg_length_width) buffer length
register width, hence read buffer length (xlnx,sg-length-width) DT
property and ensure that driver doesn't program buffer length
exceeding the supported limit. For VDMA and CDMA there is no change.

Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com> [rebase, reword]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
index e4ea94b93400..6687cee26843 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
@@ -164,7 +164,9 @@
 #define XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT		0x28
 
 /* AXI DMA Specific Masks/Bit fields */
-#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN	GENMASK(22, 0)
+#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MIN	8
+#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX	23
+#define XILINX_DMA_V2_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX	26
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_COALESCE_MAX	GENMASK(23, 16)
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_CYCLIC_BD_EN_MASK	BIT(4)
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_COALESCE_SHIFT	16
@@ -2634,7 +2636,7 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct xilinx_dma_device *xdev;
 	struct device_node *child, *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
 	struct resource *io;
-	u32 num_frames, addr_width;
+	u32 num_frames, addr_width, len_width;
 	int i, err;
 
 	/* Allocate and initialize the DMA engine structure */
@@ -2666,10 +2668,24 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
-	xdev->max_buffer_len = XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+	xdev->max_buffer_len = GENMASK(XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX - 1, 0);
 
-	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA)
+	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA) {
 		xdev->mcdma = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,mcdma");
+		if (!of_property_read_u32(node, "xlnx,sg-length-width",
+					  &len_width)) {
+			if (len_width < XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MIN ||
+			    len_width > XILINX_DMA_V2_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX) {
+				dev_warn(xdev->dev,
+					 "invalid xlnx,sg-length-width property value. Using default width\n");
+			} else {
+				if (len_width > XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX)
+					dev_warn(xdev->dev, "Please ensure that IP supports buffer length > 23 bits\n");
+				xdev->max_buffer_len =
+					GENMASK(len_width - 1, 0);
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {
 		err = of_property_read_u32(node, "xlnx,num-fstores",
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 27/80] dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix devm_platform_ioremap_resource error handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Swati Agarwal <swati.agarwal@xilinx.com>

[ Upstream commit 91df7751eb890e970afc08f50b8f0fa5ea39e03d ]

Add missing cleanup in devm_platform_ioremap_resource().
When probe fails remove dma channel resources and disable clocks in
accordance with the order of resources allocated .

Signed-off-by: Swati Agarwal <swati.agarwal@xilinx.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817061125.4720-2-swati.agarwal@xilinx.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
index 6687cee26843..c56ce7cd1f6f 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
@@ -2663,9 +2663,10 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Request and map I/O memory */
 	io = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	xdev->regs = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, io);
-	if (IS_ERR(xdev->regs))
-		return PTR_ERR(xdev->regs);
-
+	if (IS_ERR(xdev->regs)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(xdev->regs);
+		goto disable_clks;
+	}
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
 	xdev->max_buffer_len = GENMASK(XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX - 1, 0);
@@ -2759,7 +2760,7 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	for_each_child_of_node(node, child) {
 		err = xilinx_dma_child_probe(xdev, child);
 		if (err < 0)
-			goto disable_clks;
+			goto error;
 	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {
@@ -2792,12 +2793,12 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	return 0;
 
-disable_clks:
-	xdma_disable_allclks(xdev);
 error:
 	for (i = 0; i < xdev->nr_channels; i++)
 		if (xdev->chan[i])
 			xilinx_dma_chan_remove(xdev->chan[i]);
+disable_clks:
+	xdma_disable_allclks(xdev);
 
 	return err;
 }
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 28/80] dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 596b53ccc36a546ab28e8897315c5b4d1d5a0200 ]

Since for_each_child_of_node() will increase the refcount of node, we need
to call of_node_put() manually when breaking out of the iteration.

Fixes: 9cd4360de609 ("dma: Add Xilinx AXI Video Direct Memory Access Engine driver support")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122021612.1908866-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
index c56ce7cd1f6f..5f9945651e95 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c
@@ -2759,8 +2759,10 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Initialize the channels */
 	for_each_child_of_node(node, child) {
 		err = xilinx_dma_child_probe(xdev, child);
-		if (err < 0)
+		if (err < 0) {
+			of_node_put(child);
 			goto error;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 29/80] tcp: avoid the lookup process failing to get sk in ehash table

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>

[ Upstream commit 3f4ca5fafc08881d7a57daa20449d171f2887043 ]

While one cpu is working on looking up the right socket from ehash
table, another cpu is done deleting the request socket and is about
to add (or is adding) the big socket from the table. It means that
we could miss both of them, even though it has little chance.

Let me draw a call trace map of the server side.
   CPU 0                           CPU 1
   -----                           -----
tcp_v4_rcv()                  syn_recv_sock()
                            inet_ehash_insert()
                            -> sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk)
__inet_lookup_established()
                            -> __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, list)

Notice that the CPU 0 is receiving the data after the final ack
during 3-way shakehands and CPU 1 is still handling the final ack.

Why could this be a real problem?
This case is happening only when the final ack and the first data
receiving by different CPUs. Then the server receiving data with
ACK flag tries to search one proper established socket from ehash
table, but apparently it fails as my map shows above. After that,
the server fetches a listener socket and then sends a RST because
it finds a ACK flag in the skb (data), which obeys RST definition
in RFC 793.

Besides, Eric pointed out there's one more race condition where it
handles tw socket hashdance. Only by adding to the tail of the list
before deleting the old one can we avoid the race if the reader has
already begun the bucket traversal and it would possibly miss the head.

Many thanks to Eric for great help from beginning to end.

Fixes: 5e0724d027f0 ("tcp/dccp: fix hashdance race for passive sessions")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230112065336.41034-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118015941.1313-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++--
 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c |  8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 3c58019f0718..d64522af9c3a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -579,8 +579,20 @@ bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk, bool *found_dup_sk)
 	spin_lock(lock);
 	if (osk) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_hash != osk->sk_hash);
-		ret = sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk);
-	} else if (found_dup_sk) {
+		ret = sk_hashed(osk);
+		if (ret) {
+			/* Before deleting the node, we insert a new one to make
+			 * sure that the look-up-sk process would not miss either
+			 * of them and that at least one node would exist in ehash
+			 * table all the time. Otherwise there's a tiny chance
+			 * that lookup process could find nothing in ehash table.
+			 */
+			__sk_nulls_add_node_tail_rcu(sk, list);
+			sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk);
+		}
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+	if (found_dup_sk) {
 		*found_dup_sk = inet_ehash_lookup_by_sk(sk, list);
 		if (*found_dup_sk)
 			ret = false;
@@ -589,6 +601,7 @@ bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk, bool *found_dup_sk)
 	if (ret)
 		__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, list);
 
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock(lock);
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
index 88c5069b5d20..fedd19c22b39 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ void inet_twsk_put(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_twsk_put);
 
-static void inet_twsk_add_node_rcu(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
-				   struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
+static void inet_twsk_add_node_tail_rcu(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
+					struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
 {
-	hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&tw->tw_node, list);
+	hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu(&tw->tw_node, list);
 }
 
 static void inet_twsk_add_bind_node(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void inet_twsk_hashdance(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sock *sk,
 
 	spin_lock(lock);
 
-	inet_twsk_add_node_rcu(tw, &ehead->chain);
+	inet_twsk_add_node_tail_rcu(tw, &ehead->chain);
 
 	/* Step 3: Remove SK from hash chain */
 	if (__sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(sk))
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 30/80] w1: fix deadloop in __w1_remove_master_device()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 25d5648802f12ae486076ceca5d7ddf1fef792b2 ]

I got a deadloop report while doing device(ds2482) add/remove test:

  [  162.241881] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  [  163.272251] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  [  164.296157] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  ...

__w1_remove_master_device() can't return, because the dev->refcnt is not zero.

w1_add_master_device()			|
  w1_alloc_dev()			|
    atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 2)		|
  kthread_run()				|
					|__w1_remove_master_device()
					|  kthread_stop()
  // KTHREAD_SHOULD_STOP is set,	|
  // threadfn(w1_process) won't be	|
  // called.				|
  kthread()				|
					|  // refcnt will never be 0, it's deadloop.
					|  while (atomic_read(&dev->refcnt)) {...}

After calling w1_add_master_device(), w1_process() is not really
invoked, before w1_process() starting, if kthread_stop() is called
in __w1_remove_master_device(), w1_process() will never be called,
the refcnt can not be decreased, then it causes deadloop in remove
function because of non-zero refcnt.

We need to make sure w1_process() is really started, so move the
set refcnt into w1_process() to fix this problem.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205080434.3149205-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/w1/w1.c     | 2 ++
 drivers/w1/w1_int.c | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/w1/w1.c b/drivers/w1/w1.c
index 890c038c25f8..c1d0e723fabc 100644
--- a/drivers/w1/w1.c
+++ b/drivers/w1/w1.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,8 @@ int w1_process(void *data)
 	/* remainder if it woke up early */
 	unsigned long jremain = 0;
 
+	atomic_inc(&dev->refcnt);
+
 	for (;;) {
 
 		if (!jremain && dev->search_count) {
diff --git a/drivers/w1/w1_int.c b/drivers/w1/w1_int.c
index 1c776178f598..eb851eb44300 100644
--- a/drivers/w1/w1_int.c
+++ b/drivers/w1/w1_int.c
@@ -60,10 +60,9 @@ static struct w1_master *w1_alloc_dev(u32 id, int slave_count, int slave_ttl,
 	dev->search_count	= w1_search_count;
 	dev->enable_pullup	= w1_enable_pullup;
 
-	/* 1 for w1_process to decrement
-	 * 1 for __w1_remove_master_device to decrement
+	/* For __w1_remove_master_device to decrement
 	 */
-	atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 2);
+	atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 1);
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->slist);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->async_list);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 31/80] w1: fix WARNING after calling w1_process()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 36225a7c72e9e3e1ce4001b6ce72849f5c9a2d3b ]

I got the following WARNING message while removing driver(ds2482):

------------[ cut here ]------------
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<000000002d50bfb6>] w1_process+0x9e/0x1d0 [wire]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 262 at kernel/sched/core.c:9817 __might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
CPU: 0 PID: 262 Comm: w1_bus_master1 Tainted: G                 N 6.1.0-rc3+ #307
RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
Call Trace:
 exit_signals+0x6c/0x550
 do_exit+0x2b4/0x17e0
 kthread_exit+0x52/0x60
 kthread+0x16d/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

The state of task is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE in loop in w1_process(),
set it to TASK_RUNNING when it breaks out of the loop to avoid the
warning.

Fixes: 3c52e4e62789 ("W1: w1_process, block or sleep")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205101558.3599162-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/w1/w1.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/w1/w1.c b/drivers/w1/w1.c
index c1d0e723fabc..cb3650efc29c 100644
--- a/drivers/w1/w1.c
+++ b/drivers/w1/w1.c
@@ -1169,8 +1169,10 @@ int w1_process(void *data)
 		 */
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->list_mutex);
 
-		if (kthread_should_stop())
+		if (kthread_should_stop()) {
+			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 			break;
+		}
 
 		/* Only sleep when the search is active. */
 		if (dev->search_count) {
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 32/80] netfilter: conntrack: do not renew entry stuck in tcp SYN_SENT state

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit e15d4cdf27cb0c1e977270270b2cea12e0955edd ]

Consider:
  client -----> conntrack ---> Host

client sends a SYN, but $Host is unreachable/silent.
Client eventually gives up and the conntrack entry will time out.

However, if the client is restarted with same addr/port pair, it
may prevent the conntrack entry from timing out.

This is noticeable when the existing conntrack entry has no NAT
transformation or an outdated one and port reuse happens either
on client or due to a NAT middlebox.

This change prevents refresh of the timeout for SYN retransmits,
so entry is going away after nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_syn_sent
seconds (default: 60).

Entry will be re-created on next connection attempt, but then
nat rules will be evaluated again.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
index 66cda5e2d6b9..955b73a9a05e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
@@ -1094,6 +1094,16 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, ctinfo, skb);
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 		}
+
+		if (index == TCP_SYN_SET && old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) {
+			/* do not renew timeout on SYN retransmit.
+			 *
+			 * Else port reuse by client or NAT middlebox can keep
+			 * entry alive indefinitely (including nat info).
+			 */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+		}
+
 		/* ESTABLISHED without SEEN_REPLY, i.e. mid-connection
 		 * pickup with loose=1. Avoid large ESTABLISHED timeout.
 		 */
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 33/80] block: fix and cleanup bio_check_ro

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

commit 57e95e4670d1126c103305bcf34a9442f49f6d6a upstream.

Don't use a WARN_ON when printing a potentially user triggered
condition.  Also don't print the partno when the block device name
already includes it, and use the %pg specifier to simplify printing
the block device name.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220304180105.409765-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 block/blk-core.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -2179,10 +2179,7 @@ static inline bool bio_check_ro(struct b
 
 		if (op_is_flush(bio->bi_opf) && !bio_sectors(bio))
 			return false;
-
-		WARN_ONCE(1,
-		       "generic_make_request: Trying to write "
-			"to read-only block-device %s (partno %d)\n",
+		pr_warn("Trying to write to read-only block-device %s (partno %d)\n",
 			bio_devname(bio, b), part->partno);
 		/* Older lvm-tools actually trigger this */
 		return false;

[PATCH 4.19 34/80] perf env: Do not return pointers to local variables

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit ebcb9464a2ae3a547e97de476575c82ece0e93e2 upstream.

It is possible to return a pointer to a local variable when looking up
the architecture name for the running system and no normalization is
done on that value, i.e. we may end up returning the uts.machine local
variable.

While this doesn't happen on most arches, as normalization takes place,
lets fix this by making that a static variable and optimize it a bit by
not always running uname(), only the first time.

Noticed in fedora rawhide running with:

  [perfbuilder@a5ff49d6e6e4 ~]$ gcc --version
  gcc (GCC) 10.0.1 20200216 (Red Hat 10.0.1-0.8)

Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/perf/util/env.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/perf/util/env.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/env.c
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ static const char *normalize_arch(char *
 
 const char *perf_env__arch(struct perf_env *env)
 {
-	struct utsname uts;
 	char *arch_name;
 
 	if (!env || !env->arch) { /* Assume local operation */
-		if (uname(&uts) < 0)
+		static struct utsname uts = { .machine[0] = '\0', };
+		if (uts.machine[0] == '\0' && uname(&uts) < 0)
 			return NULL;
 		arch_name = uts.machine;
 	} else

[PATCH 4.19 35/80] fs: reiserfs: remove useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>

commit 81dedaf10c20959bdf5624f9783f408df26ba7a4 upstream.

Since the commit c3d98ea08291 ("VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options
if not using generic_show_options") eliminates replace_mount_options
in reiserfs_remount, but does not handle the allocated new_opts,
it will cause memory leak in the reiserfs_remount.

Because new_opts is useless in reiserfs_mount, so we fix this bug by
removing the useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount.

Fixes: c3d98ea08291 ("VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211027143445.4156459-1-mudongliangabcd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/reiserfs/super.c |    6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/reiserfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/super.c
@@ -1443,7 +1443,6 @@ static int reiserfs_remount(struct super
 	unsigned long safe_mask = 0;
 	unsigned int commit_max_age = (unsigned int)-1;
 	struct reiserfs_journal *journal = SB_JOURNAL(s);
-	char *new_opts;
 	int err;
 	char *qf_names[REISERFS_MAXQUOTAS];
 	unsigned int qfmt = 0;
@@ -1451,10 +1450,6 @@ static int reiserfs_remount(struct super
 	int i;
 #endif
 
-	new_opts = kstrdup(arg, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (arg && !new_opts)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	sync_filesystem(s);
 	reiserfs_write_lock(s);
 
@@ -1605,7 +1600,6 @@ out_ok_unlocked:
 out_err_unlock:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(s);
 out_err:
-	kfree(new_opts);
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.19 36/80] Bluetooth: hci_sync: cancel cmd_timer if hci_open failed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>

commit 97dfaf073f5881c624856ef293be307b6166115c upstream.

If a command is already sent, we take care of freeing it, but we
also need to cancel the timeout as well.

Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index e87777255c47..497c8ac140d1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -1519,6 +1519,7 @@ static int hci_dev_do_open(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 			hdev->flush(hdev);
 
 		if (hdev->sent_cmd) {
+			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hdev->cmd_timer);
 			kfree_skb(hdev->sent_cmd);
 			hdev->sent_cmd = NULL;
 		}
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 37/80] scsi: hpsa: Fix allocation size for scsi_host_alloc()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Alexey V. Vissarionov <gremlin@altlinux.org>

[ Upstream commit bbbd25499100c810ceaf5193c3cfcab9f7402a33 ]

The 'h' is a pointer to struct ctlr_info, so it's just 4 or 8 bytes, while
the structure itself is much bigger.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: edd163687ea5 ("hpsa: add driver for HP Smart Array controllers.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118031255.GE15213@altlinux.org
Signed-off-by: Alexey V. Vissarionov <gremlin@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c b/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c
index 13931c5c0eff..25d9bdd4bc69 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c
@@ -5771,7 +5771,7 @@ static int hpsa_scsi_host_alloc(struct ctlr_info *h)
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *sh;
 
-	sh = scsi_host_alloc(&hpsa_driver_template, sizeof(h));
+	sh = scsi_host_alloc(&hpsa_driver_template, sizeof(struct ctlr_info));
 	if (sh == NULL) {
 		dev_err(&h->pdev->dev, "scsi_host_alloc failed\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 38/80] module: Dont wait for GOING modules

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>

commit 0254127ab977e70798707a7a2b757c9f3c971210 upstream.

During a system boot, it can happen that the kernel receives a burst of
requests to insert the same module but loading it eventually fails
during its init call. For instance, udev can make a request to insert
a frequency module for each individual CPU when another frequency module
is already loaded which causes the init function of the new module to
return an error.

Since commit 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for
modules that have finished loading"), the kernel waits for modules in
MODULE_STATE_GOING state to finish unloading before making another
attempt to load the same module.

This creates unnecessary work in the described scenario and delays the
boot. In the worst case, it can prevent udev from loading drivers for
other devices and might cause timeouts of services waiting on them and
subsequently a failed boot.

This patch attempts a different solution for the problem 6e6de3dee51a
was trying to solve. Rather than waiting for the unloading to complete,
it returns a different error code (-EBUSY) for modules in the GOING
state. This should avoid the error situation that was described in
6e6de3dee51a (user space attempting to load a dependent module because
the -EEXIST error code would suggest to user space that the first module
had been loaded successfully), while avoiding the delay situation too.

This has been tested on linux-next since December 2022 and passes
all kmod selftests except test 0009 with module compression enabled
but it has been confirmed that this issue has existed and has gone
unnoticed since prior to this commit and can also be reproduced without
module compression with a simple usleep(5000000) on tools/modprobe.c [0].
These failures are caused by hitting the kernel mod_concurrent_max and can
happen either due to a self inflicted kernel module auto-loead DoS somehow
or on a system with large CPU count and each CPU count incorrectly triggering
many module auto-loads. Both of those issues need to be fixed in-kernel.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y9A4fiobL6IHp%2F%2FP@bombadil.infradead.org/

Fixes: 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading")
Co-developed-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
[mcgrof: enhance commit log with testing and kmod test result interpretation ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/module.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3478,7 +3478,8 @@ static bool finished_loading(const char
 	sched_annotate_sleep();
 	mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
 	mod = find_module_all(name, strlen(name), true);
-	ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE;
+	ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE
+		|| mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING;
 	mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -3632,20 +3633,35 @@ static int add_unformed_module(struct mo
 
 	mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
 
-again:
 	mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
 	old = find_module_all(mod->name, strlen(mod->name), true);
 	if (old != NULL) {
-		if (old->state != MODULE_STATE_LIVE) {
+		if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
+		    || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
 			/* Wait in case it fails to load. */
 			mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
 			err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
 					       finished_loading(mod->name));
 			if (err)
 				goto out_unlocked;
-			goto again;
+
+			/* The module might have gone in the meantime. */
+			mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+			old = find_module_all(mod->name, strlen(mod->name),
+					      true);
 		}
-		err = -EEXIST;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are here only when the same module was being loaded. Do
+		 * not try to load it again right now. It prevents long delays
+		 * caused by serialized module load failures. It might happen
+		 * when more devices of the same type trigger load of
+		 * a particular module.
+		 */
+		if (old && old->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE)
+			err = -EEXIST;
+		else
+			err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	mod_update_bounds(mod);

[PATCH 4.19 39/80] tracing: Make sure trace_printk() can output as soon as it can be used

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 3bb06eb6e9acf7c4a3e1b5bc87aed398ff8e2253 upstream.

Currently trace_printk() can be used as soon as early_trace_init() is
called from start_kernel(). But if a crash happens, and
"ftrace_dump_on_oops" is set on the kernel command line, all you get will
be:

  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 347519us : Unknown type 6
  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 353141us : Unknown type 6
  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 358684us : Unknown type 6

This is because the trace_printk() event (type 6) hasn't been registered
yet. That gets done via an early_initcall(), which may be early, but not
early enough.

Instead of registering the trace_printk() event (and other ftrace events,
which are not trace events) via an early_initcall(), have them registered at
the same time that trace_printk() can be used. This way, if there is a
crash before early_initcall(), then the trace_printk()s will actually be
useful.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230104161412.019f6c55@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: e725c731e3bb1 ("tracing: Split tracing initialization into two for early initialization")
Reported-by: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Tested-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c        |    2 ++
 kernel/trace/trace.h        |    1 +
 kernel/trace/trace_output.c |    3 +--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8674,6 +8674,8 @@ void __init early_trace_init(void)
 			static_key_enable(&tracepoint_printk_key.key);
 	}
 	tracer_alloc_buffers();
+
+	init_events();
 }
 
 void __init trace_init(void)
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -1530,6 +1530,7 @@ extern void trace_event_enable_cmd_recor
 extern void trace_event_enable_tgid_record(bool enable);
 
 extern int event_trace_init(void);
+extern int init_events(void);
 extern int event_trace_add_tracer(struct dentry *parent, struct trace_array *tr);
 extern int event_trace_del_tracer(struct trace_array *tr);
 
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_output.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_output.c
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static struct trace_event *events[] __in
 	NULL
 };
 
-__init static int init_events(void)
+__init int init_events(void)
 {
 	struct trace_event *event;
 	int i, ret;
@@ -1413,4 +1413,3 @@ __init static int init_events(void)
 
 	return 0;
 }
-early_initcall(init_events);

[PATCH 4.19 40/80] trace_events_hist: add check for return value of create_hist_field

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru>

commit 8b152e9150d07a885f95e1fd401fc81af202d9a4 upstream.

Function 'create_hist_field' is called recursively at
trace_events_hist.c:1954 and can return NULL-value that's why we have
to check it to avoid null pointer dereference.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230111120409.4111-1-n.petrova@fintech.ru

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 30350d65ac56 ("tracing: Add variable support to hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -2314,6 +2314,8 @@ static struct hist_field *create_hist_fi
 		unsigned long fl = flags & ~HIST_FIELD_FL_LOG2;
 		hist_field->fn = hist_field_log2;
 		hist_field->operands[0] = create_hist_field(hist_data, field, fl, NULL);
+		if (!hist_field->operands[0])
+			goto free;
 		hist_field->size = hist_field->operands[0]->size;
 		hist_field->type = kstrdup(hist_field->operands[0]->type, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!hist_field->type)

[PATCH 4.19 41/80] smbd: Make upper layer decide when to destroy the transport

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 050b8c374019c10e4bcc3fbc9023884f76a85d9c ]

On transport recoonect, upper layer CIFS code destroys the current
transport and then recoonect. This code path is not used by SMBD, in that
SMBD destroys its transport on RDMA disconnect notification independent of
CIFS upper layer behavior.

This approach adds some costs to SMBD layer to handle transport shutdown
and restart, and to deal with several racing conditions on reconnecting
transport.

Re-work this code path by introducing a new smbd_destroy. This function is
called form upper layer to ask SMBD to destroy the transport. SMBD will no
longer need to destroy the transport by itself while worrying about data
transfer is in progress. The upper layer guarantees the transport is
locked.

change log:
v2: fix build errors when CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT is not configured

Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Stable-dep-of: b7ab9161cf5d ("cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/connect.c   |   9 ++--
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.h |   5 +-
 3 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index a7ef847f285d..37e91f27f49b 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ cifs_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 			 server->ssocket->state, server->ssocket->flags);
 		sock_release(server->ssocket);
 		server->ssocket = NULL;
-	}
+	} else if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server))
+		smbd_destroy(server);
 	server->sequence_number = 0;
 	server->session_estab = false;
 	kfree(server->session_key.response);
@@ -799,10 +800,8 @@ static void clean_demultiplex_info(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	wake_up_all(&server->request_q);
 	/* give those requests time to exit */
 	msleep(125);
-	if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server) && server->smbd_conn) {
-		smbd_destroy(server->smbd_conn);
-		server->smbd_conn = NULL;
-	}
+	if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server))
+		smbd_destroy(server);
 	if (server->ssocket) {
 		sock_release(server->ssocket);
 		server->ssocket = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
index 784628ec4bc4..c839ff9d4965 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
@@ -320,6 +320,9 @@ static int smbd_conn_upcall(
 
 		info->transport_status = SMBD_DISCONNECTED;
 		smbd_process_disconnected(info);
+		wake_up(&info->disconn_wait);
+		wake_up_interruptible(&info->wait_reassembly_queue);
+		wake_up_interruptible_all(&info->wait_send_queue);
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -1478,17 +1481,97 @@ static void idle_connection_timer(struct work_struct *work)
 			info->keep_alive_interval*HZ);
 }
 
-/* Destroy this SMBD connection, called from upper layer */
-void smbd_destroy(struct smbd_connection *info)
+/*
+ * Destroy the transport and related RDMA and memory resources
+ * Need to go through all the pending counters and make sure on one is using
+ * the transport while it is destroyed
+ */
+void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 {
+	struct smbd_connection *info = server->smbd_conn;
+	struct smbd_response *response;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (!info) {
+		log_rdma_event(INFO, "rdma session already destroyed\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	log_rdma_event(INFO, "destroying rdma session\n");
+	if (info->transport_status != SMBD_DISCONNECTED) {
+		rdma_disconnect(server->smbd_conn->id);
+		log_rdma_event(INFO, "wait for transport being disconnected\n");
+		wait_event(
+			info->disconn_wait,
+			info->transport_status == SMBD_DISCONNECTED);
+	}
 
-	/* Kick off the disconnection process */
-	smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection(info);
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "destroying qp\n");
+	ib_drain_qp(info->id->qp);
+	rdma_destroy_qp(info->id);
+
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "cancelling idle timer\n");
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&info->idle_timer_work);
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "cancelling send immediate work\n");
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&info->send_immediate_work);
+
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "wait for all send posted to IB to finish\n");
+	wait_event(info->wait_send_pending,
+		atomic_read(&info->send_pending) == 0);
+	wait_event(info->wait_send_payload_pending,
+		atomic_read(&info->send_payload_pending) == 0);
+
+	/* It's not posssible for upper layer to get to reassembly */
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "drain the reassembly queue\n");
+	do {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&info->reassembly_queue_lock, flags);
+		response = _get_first_reassembly(info);
+		if (response) {
+			list_del(&response->list);
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(
+				&info->reassembly_queue_lock, flags);
+			put_receive_buffer(info, response);
+		} else
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(
+				&info->reassembly_queue_lock, flags);
+	} while (response);
+	info->reassembly_data_length = 0;
+
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "free receive buffers\n");
+	wait_event(info->wait_receive_queues,
+		info->count_receive_queue + info->count_empty_packet_queue
+			== info->receive_credit_max);
+	destroy_receive_buffers(info);
+
+	/*
+	 * For performance reasons, memory registration and deregistration
+	 * are not locked by srv_mutex. It is possible some processes are
+	 * blocked on transport srv_mutex while holding memory registration.
+	 * Release the transport srv_mutex to allow them to hit the failure
+	 * path when sending data, and then release memory registartions.
+	 */
+	log_rdma_event(INFO, "freeing mr list\n");
+	wake_up_interruptible_all(&info->wait_mr);
+	while (atomic_read(&info->mr_used_count)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
+		msleep(1000);
+		mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
+	}
+	destroy_mr_list(info);
+
+	ib_free_cq(info->send_cq);
+	ib_free_cq(info->recv_cq);
+	ib_dealloc_pd(info->pd);
+	rdma_destroy_id(info->id);
 
-	log_rdma_event(INFO, "wait for transport being destroyed\n");
-	wait_event(info->wait_destroy,
-		info->transport_status == SMBD_DESTROYED);
+	/* free mempools */
+	mempool_destroy(info->request_mempool);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(info->request_cache);
+
+	mempool_destroy(info->response_mempool);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(info->response_cache);
+
+	info->transport_status = SMBD_DESTROYED;
 
 	destroy_workqueue(info->workqueue);
 	log_rdma_event(INFO,  "rdma session destroyed\n");
@@ -1514,17 +1597,9 @@ int smbd_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	 */
 	if (server->smbd_conn->transport_status == SMBD_CONNECTED) {
 		log_rdma_event(INFO, "disconnecting transport\n");
-		smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection(server->smbd_conn);
+		smbd_destroy(server);
 	}
 
-	/* wait until the transport is destroyed */
-	if (!wait_event_timeout(server->smbd_conn->wait_destroy,
-		server->smbd_conn->transport_status == SMBD_DESTROYED, 5*HZ))
-		return -EAGAIN;
-
-	destroy_workqueue(server->smbd_conn->workqueue);
-	kfree(server->smbd_conn);
-
 create_conn:
 	log_rdma_event(INFO, "creating rdma session\n");
 	server->smbd_conn = smbd_get_connection(
@@ -1741,12 +1816,13 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection(
 	conn_param.retry_count = SMBD_CM_RETRY;
 	conn_param.rnr_retry_count = SMBD_CM_RNR_RETRY;
 	conn_param.flow_control = 0;
-	init_waitqueue_head(&info->wait_destroy);
 
 	log_rdma_event(INFO, "connecting to IP %pI4 port %d\n",
 		&addr_in->sin_addr, port);
 
 	init_waitqueue_head(&info->conn_wait);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&info->disconn_wait);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&info->wait_reassembly_queue);
 	rc = rdma_connect(info->id, &conn_param);
 	if (rc) {
 		log_rdma_event(ERR, "rdma_connect() failed with %i\n", rc);
@@ -1770,8 +1846,6 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection(
 	}
 
 	init_waitqueue_head(&info->wait_send_queue);
-	init_waitqueue_head(&info->wait_reassembly_queue);
-
 	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&info->idle_timer_work, idle_connection_timer);
 	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&info->send_immediate_work, send_immediate_work);
 	queue_delayed_work(info->workqueue, &info->idle_timer_work,
@@ -1812,7 +1886,7 @@ static struct smbd_connection *_smbd_get_connection(
 
 allocate_mr_failed:
 	/* At this point, need to a full transport shutdown */
-	smbd_destroy(info);
+	smbd_destroy(server);
 	return NULL;
 
 negotiation_failed:
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.h b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.h
index b5c240ff2191..b0ca7df41454 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct smbd_connection {
 	struct completion ri_done;
 	wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
 	wait_queue_head_t wait_destroy;
+	wait_queue_head_t disconn_wait;
 
 	struct completion negotiate_completion;
 	bool negotiate_done;
@@ -288,7 +289,7 @@ struct smbd_connection *smbd_get_connection(
 /* Reconnect SMBDirect session */
 int smbd_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 /* Destroy SMBDirect session */
-void smbd_destroy(struct smbd_connection *info);
+void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 
 /* Interface for carrying upper layer I/O through send/recv */
 int smbd_recv(struct smbd_connection *info, struct msghdr *msg);
@@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ struct smbd_connection {};
 static inline void *smbd_get_connection(
 	struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct sockaddr *dstaddr) {return NULL;}
 static inline int smbd_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {return -1; }
-static inline void smbd_destroy(struct smbd_connection *info) {}
+static inline void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {}
 static inline int smbd_recv(struct smbd_connection *info, struct msghdr *msg) {return -1; }
 static inline int smbd_send(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, struct smb_rqst *rqst) {return -1; }
 #endif
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 42/80] cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit b7ab9161cf5ddc42a288edf9d1a61f3bdffe17c7 ]

In smbd_destroy(), clear the server->smbd_conn pointer after freeing the
smbd_connection struct that it points to so that reconnection doesn't get
confused.

Fixes: 8ef130f9ec27 ("CIFS: SMBD: Implement function to destroy a SMB Direct connection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Acked-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
index c839ff9d4965..591cd5c70432 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smbdirect.c
@@ -1576,6 +1576,7 @@ void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	destroy_workqueue(info->workqueue);
 	log_rdma_event(INFO,  "rdma session destroyed\n");
 	kfree(info);
+	server->smbd_conn = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 43/80] ARM: 9280/1: mm: fix warning on phys_addr_t to void pointer assignment

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>

commit a4e03921c1bb118e6718e0a3b0322a2c13ed172b upstream.

zero_page is a void* pointer but memblock_alloc() returns phys_addr_t type
so this generates a warning while using clang and with -Wint-error enabled
that becomes and error. So let's cast the return of memblock_alloc() to
(void *).

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.x +
Fixes: 340a982825f7 ("ARM: 9266/1: mm: fix no-MMU ZERO_PAGE() implementation")
Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/nommu.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void __init paging_init(const struct mac
 	mpu_setup();
 
 	/* allocate the zero page. */
-	zero_page = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	zero_page = (void *)memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (!zero_page)
 		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n",
 		      __func__, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);

[PATCH 4.19 44/80] EDAC/device: Respect any driver-supplied workqueue polling value

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>

commit cec669ff716cc83505c77b242aecf6f7baad869d upstream.

The EDAC drivers may optionally pass the poll_msec value. Use that value
if available, else fall back to 1000ms.

  [ bp: Touchups. ]

Fixes: e27e3dac6517 ("drivers/edac: add edac_device class")
Reported-by: Luca Weiss <luca.weiss@fairphone.com>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Steev Klimaszewski <steev@kali.org> # Thinkpad X13s
Tested-by: Andrew Halaney <ahalaney@redhat.com> # sa8540p-ride
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/COZYL8MWN97H.MROQ391BGA09@otso
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/edac/edac_device.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/edac/edac_device.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/edac_device.c
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(device_ctls_mutex);
 static LIST_HEAD(edac_device_list);
 
+/* Default workqueue processing interval on this instance, in msecs */
+#define DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL 1000
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EDAC_DEBUG
 static void edac_device_dump_device(struct edac_device_ctl_info *edac_dev)
 {
@@ -366,7 +369,7 @@ static void edac_device_workq_function(s
 	 * whole one second to save timers firing all over the period
 	 * between integral seconds
 	 */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);
@@ -396,7 +399,7 @@ static void edac_device_workq_setup(stru
 	 * timers firing on sub-second basis, while they are happy
 	 * to fire together on the 1 second exactly
 	 */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);
@@ -430,7 +433,7 @@ void edac_device_reset_delay_period(stru
 	edac_dev->delay	    = msecs_to_jiffies(msec);
 
 	/* See comment in edac_device_workq_setup() above */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_mod_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_mod_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);
@@ -472,11 +475,7 @@ int edac_device_add_device(struct edac_d
 		/* This instance is NOW RUNNING */
 		edac_dev->op_state = OP_RUNNING_POLL;
 
-		/*
-		 * enable workq processing on this instance,
-		 * default = 1000 msec
-		 */
-		edac_device_workq_setup(edac_dev, 1000);
+		edac_device_workq_setup(edac_dev, edac_dev->poll_msec ?: DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL);
 	} else {
 		edac_dev->op_state = OP_RUNNING_INTERRUPT;
 	}

[PATCH 4.19 45/80] net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 71ab9c3e2253619136c31c89dbb2c69305cc89b1 ]

If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries
to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer
itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is
smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018

 CPU: 2 PID: 1018 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2.mptcp_ae5ac65fbed5+ #1641
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9f
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x2b5
  print_report+0x11b/0x1fb
  kasan_report+0x87/0xc0
  ops_init+0x2de/0x320
  register_pernet_operations+0x2e4/0x750
  register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
  tcf_register_action+0x9f/0x560
  do_one_initcall+0xf9/0x570
  do_init_module+0x190/0x650
  load_module+0x1fa5/0x23c0
  __do_sys_finit_module+0x10d/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
 RIP: 0033:0x7f42518f778d
 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48
       89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
       ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d cb 56 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007fff96869688 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005568ef7f7c90 RCX: 00007f42518f778d
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005568ef41d796 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00005568ef41d796 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00005568ef7f7d30 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

This change addresses the issue by skipping the gen pointer
de-reference in the mentioned error-path.

Found by code inspection and verified with explicit error injection
on a kasan-enabled kernel.

Fixes: d266935ac43d ("net: fix UAF issue in nfqnl_nf_hook_drop() when ops_init() failed")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cec4e0f3bb2c77ac03a6154a8508d3930beb5f0f.1674154348.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 56c240c98a56..a87774424829 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ static int ops_init(const struct pernet_operations *ops, struct net *net)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (ops->id && ops->size) {
-cleanup:
 		ng = rcu_dereference_protected(net->gen,
 					       lockdep_is_held(&pernet_ops_rwsem));
 		ng->ptr[*ops->id] = NULL;
 	}
 
+cleanup:
 	kfree(data);
 
 out:
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 46/80] netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip elements in transaction from garbage collection

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit 5d235d6ce75c12a7fdee375eb211e4116f7ab01b ]

Skip interference with an ongoing transaction, do not perform garbage
collection on inactive elements. Reset annotated previous end interval
if the expired element is marked as busy (control plane removed the
element right before expiration).

Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e0 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
index 84d317418d18..78a0f4283787 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
@@ -375,23 +375,37 @@ static void nft_rbtree_gc(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct nft_rbtree *priv;
 	struct rb_node *node;
 	struct nft_set *set;
+	struct net *net;
+	u8 genmask;
 
 	priv = container_of(work, struct nft_rbtree, gc_work.work);
 	set  = nft_set_container_of(priv);
+	net  = read_pnet(&set->net);
+	genmask = nft_genmask_cur(net);
 
 	write_lock_bh(&priv->lock);
 	write_seqcount_begin(&priv->count);
 	for (node = rb_first(&priv->root); node != NULL; node = rb_next(node)) {
 		rbe = rb_entry(node, struct nft_rbtree_elem, node);
 
+		if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, genmask))
+			continue;
+
+		/* elements are reversed in the rbtree for historical reasons,
+		 * from highest to lowest value, that is why end element is
+		 * always visited before the start element.
+		 */
 		if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe)) {
 			rbe_end = rbe;
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (!nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext))
 			continue;
-		if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext))
+
+		if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext)) {
+			rbe_end = NULL;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		if (rbe_prev) {
 			rb_erase(&rbe_prev->node, &priv->root);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 47/80] netlink: remove hash::nelems check in netlink_insert

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>

[ Upstream commit 0041195d55bc38df6b574cc8c36dcf2266fbee39 ]

The type of hash::nelems has been changed from size_t to atom_t
which in fact is int, so not need to check if BITS_PER_LONG, that
is bit number of size_t, is bigger than 32

and rht_grow_above_max() will be called to check if hashtable is
too big, ensure it can not bigger than 1<<31

Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: c1bb9484e3b0 ("netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 6ffa83319d08..966c709c3831 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -578,11 +578,6 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
 	if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
 		goto err;
 
-	err = -ENOMEM;
-	if (BITS_PER_LONG > 32 &&
-	    unlikely(atomic_read(&table->hash.nelems) >= UINT_MAX))
-		goto err;
-
 	nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
 	sock_hold(sk);
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 48/80] netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit c1bb9484e3b05166880da8574504156ccbd0549e ]

syzbot reminds us netlink_getname() runs locklessly [1]

This first patch annotates the race against nlk->portid.

Following patches take care of the remaining races.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_getname / netlink_insert

write to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2315 on cpu 1:
netlink_insert+0xf1/0x9a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:583
netlink_autobind+0xae/0x180 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:856
netlink_sendmsg+0x444/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1895
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x19a/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2316 on cpu 0:
netlink_getname+0xcd/0x1a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1144
__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2026
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2041 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2038 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:2038
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xc9a49780

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 2316 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00030-ge8f60cd7db24-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 966c709c3831..52bf99ed7093 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -578,7 +578,9 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
 	if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
 		goto err;
 
-	nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
+	/* portid can be read locklessly from netlink_getname(). */
+	WRITE_ONCE(nlk_sk(sk)->portid, portid);
+
 	sock_hold(sk);
 
 	err = __netlink_insert(table, sk);
@@ -1133,7 +1135,8 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
 		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
 	} else {
-		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->portid;
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
+		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);
 		netlink_lock_table();
 		nladdr->nl_groups = nlk->groups ? nlk->groups[0] : 0;
 		netlink_unlock_table();
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 49/80] netlink: annotate data races around dst_portid and dst_group

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 004db64d185a5f23dfb891d7701e23713b2420ee ]

netlink_getname(), netlink_sendmsg() and netlink_getsockbyportid()
can read nlk->dst_portid and nlk->dst_group while another
thread is changing them.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 52bf99ed7093..5c630506b7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1091,8 +1091,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 
 	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
 		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
-		nlk->dst_portid	= 0;
-		nlk->dst_group  = 0;
+		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (addr->sa_family != AF_NETLINK)
@@ -1114,8 +1115,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 
 	if (err == 0) {
 		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_CONNECTED;
-		nlk->dst_portid = nladdr->nl_pid;
-		nlk->dst_group  = ffs(nladdr->nl_groups);
+		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));
 	}
 
 	return err;
@@ -1132,8 +1134,9 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 	nladdr->nl_pad = 0;
 
 	if (peer) {
-		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
-		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
+		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
+		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group));
 	} else {
 		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
 		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);
@@ -1163,8 +1166,9 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
 
 	/* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
 	nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
+	/* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
 	if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
-	    nlk->dst_portid != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
+	    READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
 		sock_put(sock);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 	}
@@ -1876,8 +1880,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 			goto out;
 		netlink_skb_flags |= NETLINK_SKB_DST;
 	} else {
-		dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
-		dst_group = nlk->dst_group;
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
+		dst_portid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
+		dst_group = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group);
 	}
 
 	/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 50/80] netlink: annotate data races around sk_state

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b663b5cbb15b494ef132a3c937641c90646eb73 ]

netlink_getsockbyportid() reads sk_state while a concurrent
netlink_connect() can change its value.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 5c630506b7cd..6a49c0aa55bd 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
-		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
+		/* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_UNCONNECTED);
 		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);
@@ -1114,7 +1115,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		err = netlink_autobind(sock);
 
 	if (err == 0) {
-		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_CONNECTED;
+		/* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_CONNECTED);
 		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));
@@ -1166,8 +1168,8 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
 
 	/* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
 	nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
-	/* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
-	if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
+	/* dst_portid and sk_state can be changed in netlink_connect() */
+	if (READ_ONCE(sock->sk_state) == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
 	    READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
 		sock_put(sock);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 51/80] ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 1d1d63b612801b3f0a39b7d4467cad0abd60e5c8 ]

if (!type)
		continue;
	if (type > RTAX_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;
	...
	metrics[type - 1] = val;

@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.

Fixes: 6cf9dfd3bd62 ("net: fib: move metrics parsing to a helper")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120133040.3623463-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/metrics.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/metrics.c b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
index 04311f7067e2..9a6b01d85cd0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/metrics.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ int ip_metrics_convert(struct net *net, struct nlattr *fc_mx, int fc_mx_len,
 		if (type > RTAX_MAX)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		type = array_index_nospec(type, RTAX_MAX + 1);
 		if (type == RTAX_CC_ALGO) {
 			char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 52/80] netfilter: conntrack: fix vtag checks for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>

[ Upstream commit a9993591fa94246b16b444eea55d84c54608282a ]

RFC 9260, Sec 8.5.1 states that for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, the chunk
MUST be accepted if the vtag of the packet matches its own tag and the
T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's vtag and the T bit is set
in chunk flags. Otherwise the packet MUST be silently dropped.

Update vtag verification for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE based on the above
description.

Fixes: 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Signed-off-by: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
index 8cb62805fd68..cadeb22a48f2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
@@ -317,22 +317,29 @@ static int sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 	for_each_sctp_chunk (skb, sch, _sch, offset, dataoff, count) {
 		/* Special cases of Verification tag check (Sec 8.5.1) */
 		if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_INIT) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (A) */
+			/* (A) vtag MUST be zero */
 			if (sh->vtag != 0)
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_ABORT) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (B) */
-			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
-			    sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir])
+			/* (B) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
+			 * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
+			 */
+			if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
+			    ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (C) */
-			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
-			    sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
-			    sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T)
+			/* (C) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
+			 * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
+			 */
+			if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
+			    ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (D) */
+			/* (D) vtag must be same as init_vtag as found in INIT_ACK */
 			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir])
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT) {
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 53/80] netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit 409db27e3a2eb5e8ef7226ca33be33361b3ed1c9 ]

syzbot reported a use-after-free in do_accept(), precisely nr_accept()
as sk_prot_alloc() allocated the memory and sock_put() frees it. [0]

The issue could happen if the heartbeat timer is fired and
nr_heartbeat_expiry() calls nr_destroy_socket(), where a socket
has SOCK_DESTROY or a listening socket has SOCK_DEAD.

In this case, the first condition cannot be true.  SOCK_DESTROY is
flagged in nr_release() only when the file descriptor is close()d,
but accept() is being called for the listening socket, so the second
condition must be true.

Usually, the AF_NETROM listener neither starts timers nor sets
SOCK_DEAD.  However, the condition is met if connect() fails before
listen().  connect() starts the t1 timer and heartbeat timer, and
t1timer calls nr_disconnect() when timeout happens.  Then, SOCK_DEAD
is set, and if we call listen(), the heartbeat timer calls
nr_destroy_socket().

  nr_connect
    nr_establish_data_link(sk)
      nr_start_t1timer(sk)
    nr_start_heartbeat(sk)
                                    nr_t1timer_expiry
                                      nr_disconnect(sk, ETIMEDOUT)
                                        nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0
                                        sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE
                                        sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)
nr_listen
  if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
    sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN
                                    nr_heartbeat_expiry
                                      switch (nr->state)
                                      case NR_STATE_0
                                        if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN &&
                                            sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
                                          nr_destroy_socket(sk)

This path seems expected, and nr_destroy_socket() is called to clean
up resources.  Initially, there was sock_hold() before nr_destroy_socket()
so that the socket would not be freed, but the commit 517a16b1a88b
("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire") accidentally
removed it.

To fix use-after-free, let's add sock_hold().

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807978d398 by task syz-executor.3/5315

CPU: 0 PID: 5315 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00165-gd9fc1511728c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
 print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1897 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1927
 __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1944 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1941 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1941
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fa436a8c0c9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa437784168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa436bac050 RCX: 00007fa436a8c0c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fa436ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffebc6700df R14: 00007fa437784300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5294:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038
 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
 nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433
 __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515
 sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 14:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline]
 __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline]
 __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166
 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline]
 __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192
 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203
 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
 nr_heartbeat_expiry+0x1d7/0x460 net/netrom/nr_timer.c:148
 call_timer_fn+0x1da/0x7c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
 expire_timers+0x2c6/0x5c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1751
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2022 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1995 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 kernel/time/timer.c:2035
 __do_softirq+0x1fb/0xadc kernel/softirq.c:571

Fixes: 517a16b1a88b ("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire")
Reported-by: syzbot+5fafd5cfe1fc91f6b352@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120231927.51711-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netrom/nr_timer.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_timer.c b/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
index 426d49609524..2bf99bd5be58 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static void nr_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t)
 		   is accepted() it isn't 'dead' so doesn't get removed. */
 		if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY) ||
 		    (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))) {
+			sock_hold(sk);
 			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 			nr_destroy_socket(sk);
 			goto out;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 54/80] sctp: fail if no bound addresses can be used for a given scope

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 458e279f861d3f61796894cd158b780765a1569f ]

Currently, if you bind the socket to something like:
        servaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        servaddr.sin6_port = htons(0);
        servaddr.sin6_scope_id = 0;
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &servaddr.sin6_addr);

And then request a connect to:
        connaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        connaddr.sin6_port = htons(20000);
        connaddr.sin6_scope_id = if_nametoindex("lo");
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe88::1", &connaddr.sin6_addr);

What the stack does is:
 - bind the socket
 - create a new asoc
 - to handle the connect
   - copy the addresses that can be used for the given scope
   - try to connect

But the copy returns 0 addresses, and the effect is that it ends up
trying to connect as if the socket wasn't bound, which is not the
desired behavior. This unexpected behavior also allows KASLR leaks
through SCTP diag interface.

The fix here then is, if when trying to copy the addresses that can
be used for the scope used in connect() it returns 0 addresses, bail
out. This is what TCP does with a similar reproducer.

Reported-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9fcd182f1099f86c6661f3717f63712ddd1c676c.1674496737.git.marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sctp/bind_addr.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
index f8a283245672..d723942e5e65 100644
--- a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
+++ b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ int sctp_bind_addr_copy(struct net *net, struct sctp_bind_addr *dest,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* If somehow no addresses were found that can be used with this
+	 * scope, it's an error.
+	 */
+	if (list_empty(&dest->address_list))
+		error = -ENETUNREACH;
+
 out:
 	if (error)
 		sctp_bind_addr_clean(dest);
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 55/80] net: ravb: Fix possible hang if RIS2_QFF1 happen

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>

[ Upstream commit f3c07758c9007a6bfff5290d9e19d3c41930c897 ]

Since this driver enables the interrupt by RIC2_QFE1, this driver
should clear the interrupt flag if it happens. Otherwise, the interrupt
causes to hang the system.

Note that this also fix a minor coding style (a comment indentation)
around the fixed code.

Fixes: c156633f1353 ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper")
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
index ff374d0d80a7..a1906804c139 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
@@ -738,14 +738,14 @@ static void ravb_error_interrupt(struct net_device *ndev)
 	ravb_write(ndev, ~(EIS_QFS | EIS_RESERVED), EIS);
 	if (eis & EIS_QFS) {
 		ris2 = ravb_read(ndev, RIS2);
-		ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
+		ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_QFF1 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
 			   RIS2);
 
 		/* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
 		if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF0)
 			priv->stats[RAVB_BE].rx_over_errors++;
 
-		    /* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
+		/* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
 		if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF1)
 			priv->stats[RAVB_NC].rx_over_errors++;
 
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 56/80] net/tg3: resolve deadlock in tg3_reset_task() during EEH

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ]

During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3
driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding
reset tasks:

crash> foreach UN bt
...
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067c6000  CPU: 8   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18
 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3]
 #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c
...

PID: 290    TASK: c000000036e5f800  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 296    TASK: c000000037a65800  CPU: 21  COMMAND: "kworker/21:1"
...
 #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 655    TASK: c000000036f49000  CPU: 16  COMMAND: "kworker/16:2"
...:1

 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and
tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of
their code blocks.  If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between
the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and
tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.

Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior
to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another
deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER
tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:

crash> foreach UN bt
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067d2000  CPU: 9   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88
...
PID: 363    TASK: c000000037564000  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c
 #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848
 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3]
 #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error
recovery is already in progress.

Fixes: db84bf43ef23 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize")
Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
index d1ca3d3f51a7..2cf144bbef3e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
@@ -11189,7 +11189,7 @@ static void tg3_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
 	rtnl_lock();
 	tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
 
-	if (!netif_running(tp->dev)) {
+	if (tp->pcierr_recovery || !netif_running(tp->dev)) {
 		tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING);
 		tg3_full_unlock(tp);
 		rtnl_unlock();
@@ -18240,6 +18240,9 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 
 	netdev_info(netdev, "PCI I/O error detected\n");
 
+	/* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
+	tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
+
 	rtnl_lock();
 
 	/* Could be second call or maybe we don't have netdev yet */
@@ -18256,9 +18259,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 
 	tg3_timer_stop(tp);
 
-	/* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
-	tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
-
 	netif_device_detach(netdev);
 
 	/* Clean up software state, even if MMIO is blocked */
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 57/80] Revert "Input: synaptics - switch touchpad on HP Laptop 15-da3001TU to RMI mode"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

commit 3c44e2b6cde674797b76e76d3a903a63ce8a18bb upstream.

This reverts commit ac5408991ea6b06e29129b4d4861097c4c3e0d59 because
it causes loss of keyboard on HP 15-da1xxx.

Fixes: ac5408991ea6 ("Input: synaptics - switch touchpad on HP Laptop 15-da3001TU to RMI mode")
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/824effa5-8b9a-c28a-82bb-9b0ab24623e1@kernel.org
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1206358
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ static const char * const smbus_pnp_ids[
 	"SYN3221", /* HP 15-ay000 */
 	"SYN323d", /* HP Spectre X360 13-w013dx */
 	"SYN3257", /* HP Envy 13-ad105ng */
-	"SYN3286", /* HP Laptop 15-da3001TU */
 	NULL
 };
 

[PATCH 4.19 58/80] x86/i8259: Mark legacy PIC interrupts with IRQ_LEVEL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 5fa55950729d0762a787451dc52862c3f850f859 upstream.

Baoquan reported that after triggering a crash the subsequent crash-kernel
fails to boot about half of the time. It triggers a NULL pointer
dereference in the periodic tick code.

This happens because the legacy timer interrupt (IRQ0) is resent in
software which happens in soft interrupt (tasklet) context. In this context
get_irq_regs() returns NULL which leads to the NULL pointer dereference.

The reason for the resend is a spurious APIC interrupt on the IRQ0 vector
which is captured and leads to a resend when the legacy timer interrupt is
enabled. This is wrong because the legacy PIC interrupts are level
triggered and therefore should never be resent in software, but nothing
ever sets the IRQ_LEVEL flag on those interrupts, so the core code does not
know about their trigger type.

Ensure that IRQ_LEVEL is set when the legacy PCI interrupts are set up.

Fixes: a4633adcdbc1 ("[PATCH] genirq: add genirq sw IRQ-retrigger")
Reported-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87mt6rjrra.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c   |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void make_8259A_irq(unsigned int
 	disable_irq_nosync(irq);
 	io_apic_irqs &= ~(1<<irq);
 	irq_set_chip_and_handler(irq, &i8259A_chip, handle_level_irq);
+	irq_set_status_flags(irq, IRQ_LEVEL);
 	enable_irq(irq);
 	lapic_assign_legacy_vector(irq, true);
 }
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
@@ -72,8 +72,10 @@ void __init init_ISA_irqs(void)
 
 	legacy_pic->init(0);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) {
 		irq_set_chip_and_handler(i, chip, handle_level_irq);
+		irq_set_status_flags(i, IRQ_LEVEL);
+	}
 }
 
 void __init init_IRQ(void)

[PATCH 4.19 59/80] drm/i915/display: fix compiler warning about array overrun

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit fec4d42724a1bf3dcba52307e55375fdb967b852 upstream.

intel_dp_check_mst_status() uses a 14-byte array to read the DPRX Event
Status Indicator data, but then passes that buffer at offset 10 off as
an argument to drm_dp_channel_eq_ok().

End result: there are only 4 bytes remaining of the buffer, yet
drm_dp_channel_eq_ok() wants a 6-byte buffer.  gcc-11 correctly warns
about this case:

  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c: In function ‘intel_dp_check_mst_status’:
  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:3491:22: warning: ‘drm_dp_channel_eq_ok’ reading 6 bytes from a region of size 4 [-Wstringop-overread]
   3491 |                     !drm_dp_channel_eq_ok(&esi[10], intel_dp->lane_count)) {
        |                      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:3491:22: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘const u8 *’ {aka ‘const unsigned char *’}
  In file included from drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:38:
  include/drm/drm_dp_helper.h:1466:6: note: in a call to function ‘drm_dp_channel_eq_ok’
   1466 | bool drm_dp_channel_eq_ok(const u8 link_status[DP_LINK_STATUS_SIZE],
        |      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       6:14 elapsed

This commit just extends the original array by 2 zero-initialized bytes,
avoiding the warning.

There may be some underlying bug in here that caused this confusion, but
this is at least no worse than the existing situation that could use
random data off the stack.

Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_dp.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_dp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_dp.c
@@ -4116,7 +4116,18 @@ intel_dp_check_mst_status(struct intel_d
 	bool bret;
 
 	if (intel_dp->is_mst) {
-		u8 esi[DP_DPRX_ESI_LEN] = { 0 };
+		/*
+		 * The +2 is because DP_DPRX_ESI_LEN is 14, but we then
+		 * pass in "esi+10" to drm_dp_channel_eq_ok(), which
+		 * takes a 6-byte array. So we actually need 16 bytes
+		 * here.
+		 *
+		 * Somebody who knows what the limits actually are
+		 * should check this, but for now this is at least
+		 * harmless and avoids a valid compiler warning about
+		 * using more of the array than we have allocated.
+		 */
+		u8 esi[DP_DPRX_ESI_LEN+2] = { 0 };
 		int ret = 0;
 		int retry;
 		bool handled;

[PATCH 4.19 60/80] x86/asm: Fix an assembler warning with current binutils

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>

commit 55d235361fccef573990dfa5724ab453866e7816 upstream.

Fix a warning: "found `movsd'; assuming `movsl' was meant"

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S
@@ -22,6 +22,6 @@
  */
 ENTRY(__iowrite32_copy)
 	movl %edx,%ecx
-	rep movsd
+	rep movsl
 	ret
 ENDPROC(__iowrite32_copy)

[PATCH 4.19 61/80] x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix to SYSRET

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit b2b1d94cdfd4e906d3936dab2850096a4a0c2017 upstream.

ignore_sysret() contains an unsuffixed SYSRET instruction. gas correctly
interprets this as SYSRETL, but leaving it up to gas to guess when there
is no register operand that implies a size is bad practice, and upstream
gas is likely to warn about this in the future. Use SYSRETL explicitly.
This does not change the assembled output.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/038a7c35-062b-a285-c6d2-653b56585844@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ END(nmi)
 ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	mov	$-ENOSYS, %eax
-	sysret
+	sysretl
 END(ignore_sysret)
 
 ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)

[PATCH 4.19 62/80] ARM: dts: imx: Fix pca9547 i2c-mux node name

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>

[ Upstream commit f78985f9f58380eec37f82c8a2c765aa7670fc29 ]

"make dtbs_check":

    arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dtb: i2c-switch@70: $nodename:0: 'i2c-switch@70' does not match '^(i2c-?)?mux'
	    From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-mux-pca954x.yaml
    arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dtb: i2c-switch@70: Unevaluated properties are not allowed ('#address-cells', '#size-cells', 'i2c@0', 'i2c@1', 'i2c@2', 'i2c@3', 'i2c@4', 'i2c@5', 'i2c@6', 'i2c@7' were unexpected)
	    From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-mux-pca954x.yaml

Fix this by renaming the PCA9547 node to "i2c-mux", to match the I2C bus
multiplexer/switch DT bindings and the Generic Names Recommendation in
the Devicetree Specification.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts
index f346673d34ea..0cb5f01f02d1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ &i2c1 {
 	scl-gpios = <&gpio3 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 	status = "okay";
 
-	i2c-switch@70 {
+	i2c-mux@70 {
 		compatible = "nxp,pca9547";
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 63/80] dmaengine: imx-sdma: Fix a possible memory leak in sdma_transfer_init

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 1417f59ac0b02130ee56c0c50794b9b257be3d17 ]

If the function sdma_load_context() fails, the sdma_desc will be
freed, but the allocated desc->bd is forgot to be freed.

We already met the sdma_load_context() failure case and the log as
below:
[ 450.699064] imx-sdma 30bd0000.dma-controller: Timeout waiting for CH0 ready
...

In this case, the desc->bd will not be freed without this change.

Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130090800.102035-1-hui.wang@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
index 709ead443fc5..5794d3120bb8 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
@@ -1347,10 +1347,12 @@ static struct sdma_desc *sdma_transfer_init(struct sdma_channel *sdmac,
 		sdma_config_ownership(sdmac, false, true, false);
 
 	if (sdma_load_context(sdmac))
-		goto err_desc_out;
+		goto err_bd_out;
 
 	return desc;
 
+err_bd_out:
+	sdma_free_bd(desc);
 err_desc_out:
 	kfree(desc);
 err_out:
-- 
2.39.0

[PATCH 4.19 64/80] sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>

commit 3ddd9a808cee7284931312f2f3e854c9617f44b2 upstream.

Patch series "sysctl: first set of kernel/sysctl cleanups", v2.

Finally had time to respin the series of the work we had started last
year on cleaning up the kernel/sysct.c kitchen sink.  People keeps
stuffing their sysctls in that file and this creates a maintenance
burden.  So this effort is aimed at placing sysctls where they actually
belong.

I'm going to split patches up into series as there is quite a bit of
work.

This first set adds register_sysctl_init() for uses of registerting a
sysctl on the init path, adds const where missing to a few places,
generalizes common values so to be more easy to share, and starts the
move of a few kernel/sysctl.c out where they belong.

The majority of rework on v2 in this first patch set is 0-day fixes.
Eric Biederman's feedback is later addressed in subsequent patch sets.

I'll only post the first two patch sets for now.  We can address the
rest once the first two patch sets get completely reviewed / Acked.

This patch (of 9):

The kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty
dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.

To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places
where they actually belong.  The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to
know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we
just care about the core logic.

Today though folks heavily rely on tables on kernel/sysctl.c so they can
easily just extend this table with their needed sysctls.  In order to
help users move their sysctls out we need to provide a helper which can
be used during code initialization.

We special-case the initialization use of register_sysctl() since it
*is* safe to fail, given all that sysctls do is provide a dynamic
interface to query or modify at runtime an existing variable.  So the
use case of register_sysctl() on init should *not* stop if the sysctls
don't end up getting registered.  It would be counter productive to stop
boot if a simple sysctl registration failed.

Provide a helper for init then, and document the recommended init levels
to use for callers of this routine.  We will later use this in
subsequent patches to start slimming down kernel/sysctl.c tables and
moving sysctl registration to the code which actually needs these
sysctls.

[mcgrof@kernel.org: major commit log and documentation rephrasing also moved to fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c                  ]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-2-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Qing Wang <wangqing@vivo.com>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c  |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/sysctl.h |    3 +++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
@@ -1376,6 +1377,38 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_sysctl);
 
+/**
+ * __register_sysctl_init() - register sysctl table to path
+ * @path: path name for sysctl base
+ * @table: This is the sysctl table that needs to be registered to the path
+ * @table_name: The name of sysctl table, only used for log printing when
+ *              registration fails
+ *
+ * The sysctl interface is used by userspace to query or modify at runtime
+ * a predefined value set on a variable. These variables however have default
+ * values pre-set. Code which depends on these variables will always work even
+ * if register_sysctl() fails. If register_sysctl() fails you'd just loose the
+ * ability to query or modify the sysctls dynamically at run time. Chances of
+ * register_sysctl() failing on init are extremely low, and so for both reasons
+ * this function does not return any error as it is used by initialization code.
+ *
+ * Context: Can only be called after your respective sysctl base path has been
+ * registered. So for instance, most base directories are registered early on
+ * init before init levels are processed through proc_sys_init() and
+ * sysctl_init().
+ */
+void __init __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
+				 const char *table_name)
+{
+	struct ctl_table_header *hdr = register_sysctl(path, table);
+
+	if (unlikely(!hdr)) {
+		pr_err("failed when register_sysctl %s to %s\n", table_name, path);
+		return;
+	}
+	kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
+}
+
 static char *append_path(const char *path, char *pos, const char *name)
 {
 	int namelen;
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl
 void unregister_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header * table);
 
 extern int sysctl_init(void);
+extern void __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
+				 const char *table_name);
+#define register_sysctl_init(path, table) __register_sysctl_init(path, table, #table)
 
 extern struct ctl_table sysctl_mount_point[];
 

[PATCH 4.19 65/80] panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>

commit 1a2383e8b84c0451fd9b1eec3b9aab16f30b597c upstream.

In the current code, the following three places need to unset
panic_on_warn before calling panic() to avoid recursive panics:

kernel/kcsan/report.c: print_report()
kernel/sched/core.c: __schedule_bug()
mm/kfence/report.c: kfence_report_error()

In order to avoid copy-pasting "panic_on_warn = 0" all over the places,
it is better to move it inside panic() and then remove it from the other
places.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-4-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Xuefeng Li <lixuefeng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/panic.c |   20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -142,6 +142,16 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
 	int old_cpu, this_cpu;
 	bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
 
+	if (panic_on_warn) {
+		/*
+		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
+		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
+		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
+		 * panic_mutex in panic().
+		 */
+		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
 	 * from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
@@ -530,16 +540,8 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line,
 	if (args)
 		vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
 
-	if (panic_on_warn) {
-		/*
-		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
-		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
-		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
-		 * panic_mutex in panic().
-		 */
-		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
-	}
 
 	print_modules();
 

[PATCH 4.19 66/80] exit: Add and use make_task_dead.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7 upstream.

There are two big uses of do_exit.  The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call.  The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure.  In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c           |    6 +++---
 arch/alpha/mm/fault.c               |    2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c             |    2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                 |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c           |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c               |    2 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c           |    2 +-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c               |    2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c         |    2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c          |    2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c            |    2 +-
 arch/ia64/mm/fault.c                |    2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c            |    2 +-
 arch/m68k/mm/fault.c                |    2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c |    4 ++--
 arch/mips/kernel/traps.c            |    2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c           |    8 ++++----
 arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c           |    4 ++--
 arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c        |    2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c          |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c         |    2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c           |    2 +-
 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c               |    2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c        |    2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c              |    2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/traps.c              |    2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c        |    4 +---
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c        |    4 +---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S           |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S           |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c         |    4 ++--
 arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c          |    2 +-
 include/linux/sched/task.h          |    1 +
 kernel/exit.c                       |    9 +++++++++
 tools/objtool/check.c               |    3 ++-
 35 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs
 		local_irq_enable();
 		while (1);
 	}
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_MATHEMU
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcod
 
 	printk("Bad unaligned kernel access at %016lx: %p %lx %lu\n",
 		pc, va, opcode, reg);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 
 got_exception:
 	/* Ok, we caught the exception, but we don't want it.  Is there
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ got_exception:
 		local_irq_enable();
 		while (1);
 	}
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ retry:
 	printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
 	       "virtual address %016lx\n", address);
 	die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, cause, (unsigned long*)regs - 16);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 
 	/* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that
 	   made us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.  */
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (signr)
-		do_exit(signr);
+		make_task_dead(signr);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ __do_kernel_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	show_pte(mm, addr);
 	die("Oops", regs, fsr);
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&die_lock, flags);
 
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static bool show_unhandled_signals_ratelimited(void)
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char
 	show_pte(addr);
 	die("Oops", regs, esr);
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	dump(fp);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
--- a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_r
 	printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
 		die("Oops", regs, error_code);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
 
 	return 1;
 }
--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_dead_task(err);
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ mca_handler_bh(unsigned long paddr, void
 	spin_unlock(&mca_bh_lock);
 
 	/* This process is about to be killed itself */
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 /**
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *re
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-  	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ retry:
 		regs = NULL;
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
 	if (regs)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	return;
 
   out_of_memory:
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt
 	pr_crit("%s: %08x\n", str, nr);
 	show_registers(fp);
 	add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 asmlinkage void set_esp0(unsigned long ssp)
--- a/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int send_fault_sig(struct pt_regs *regs)
 			pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel access");
 		pr_cont(" at virtual address %p\n", addr);
 		die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, 0 /*error_code*/);
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	pr_warn("Oops: %s, sig: %ld\n", str, err);
 	show_regs(fp);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	/* do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+	/* make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
 	 * context so we don't handle it here
 	 */
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
 
 /* for user application debugging */
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, str
 	if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current))
 		crash_kexec(regs);
 
-	do_exit(sig);
+	make_task_dead(sig);
 }
 
 extern struct exception_table_entry __start___dbe_table[];
--- a/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(die);
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ void unhandled_interruption(struct pt_re
 	pr_emerg("unhandled_interruption\n");
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
 }
 
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ void unhandled_exceptions(unsigned long
 		 addr, type);
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
 }
 
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ void do_revinsn(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	pr_emerg("Reserved Instruction\n");
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGILL);
 	force_sig(SIGILL, current);
 }
 
--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	show_regs(regs);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
 	/*
-	 * do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+	 * make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
 	 * context so we don't handle it here
 	 */
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
 
 void _exception(int signo, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
--- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	__asm__ __volatile__("l.nop   1");
 	do {} while (1);
 #endif
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /* This is normally the 'Oops' routine */
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /* gdb uses break 4,8 */
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags
 		panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
-	do_exit(signr);
+	make_task_dead(signr);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
 
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const cha
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code,
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ no_context:
 		(addr < PAGE_SIZE) ? "NULL pointer dereference" :
 		"paging request", addr);
 	die(regs, "Oops");
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 
 	/*
 	 * We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return the userspace
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -187,5 +187,5 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const cha
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception: panic_on_oops");
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void s390_handle_mcck(void)
 		       "malfunction (code 0x%016lx).\n", mcck.mcck_code);
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "mcck: task: %s, pid: %d.\n",
 		       current->comm, current->pid);
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_handle_mcck);
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void die_if_kernel(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
@@ -86,9 +86,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str,
 	}
 	printk("Instruction DUMP:");
 	instruction_dump ((unsigned long *) regs->pc);
-	if(regs->psr & PSR_PS)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead((regs->psr & PSR_PS) ? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_hw_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long type)
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
@@ -2565,9 +2565,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str,
 	}
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
-	if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead((regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(die_if_kernel);
 
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -1500,13 +1500,13 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
 END(async_page_fault)
 #endif
 
-ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
 	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
 
 	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
 	leal	-TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
 
-	call	do_exit
+	call	make_task_dead
 1:	jmp 1b
-END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
 	sysretl
 END(ignore_sysret)
 
-ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
 	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
@@ -1771,5 +1771,5 @@ ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
 	leaq	-PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
-	call	do_exit
-END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+	call	make_task_dead
+END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void)
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin);
 
-void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr);
+void __noreturn rewind_stack_and_make_dead(int signr);
 
 void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 {
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struc
 	 * reuse the task stack and that existing poisons are invalid.
 	 */
 	kasan_unpoison_task_stack(current);
-	rewind_stack_do_exit(signr);
+	rewind_stack_and_make_dead(signr);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
 
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
@@ -542,5 +542,5 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_reg
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern int sched_fork(unsigned long clon
 extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
 
 void __noreturn do_task_dead(void);
+void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr);
 
 extern void proc_caches_init(void);
 
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -922,6 +922,15 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
 
+void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
+	 * happened.
+	 */
+	do_exit(signr);
+}
+
 void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
 {
 	if (comp)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct ob
 		"panic",
 		"do_exit",
 		"do_task_dead",
+		"make_task_dead",
 		"__module_put_and_exit",
 		"complete_and_exit",
 		"kvm_spurious_fault",
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct ob
 		"fortify_panic",
 		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
-		"rewind_stack_do_exit",
+		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)

[PATCH 4.19 67/80] objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 1fb466dff904e4a72282af336f2c355f011eec61 upstream.

Recently the kbuild robot reported two new errors:

>> lib/kunit/kunit-example-test.o: warning: objtool: .text.unlikely: unexpected end of section
>> arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.o: warning: objtool: oops_end() falls through to next function show_opcodes()

I don't know why they did not occur in my test setup but after digging
it I realized I had accidentally dropped a comma in
tools/objtool/check.c when I renamed rewind_stack_do_exit to
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Add that comma back to fix objtool errors.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202112140949.Uq5sFKR1-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/objtool/check.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct ob
 		"fortify_panic",
 		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
-		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
+		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead",
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)

[PATCH 4.19 68/80] hexagon: Fix function name in die()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

commit 4f0712ccec09c071e221242a2db9a6779a55a949 upstream.

When building ARCH=hexagon defconfig:

arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c:217:2: error: implicit declaration of
function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
        make_dead_task(err);
        ^

The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
build error.

Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-2-nathan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	make_dead_task(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.19 69/80] h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

commit ab4ababdf77ccc56c7301c751dff49c79709c51c upstream.

When building ARCH=h8300 defconfig:

arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c:109:2: error: implicit declaration of function
'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
  109 |  make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

arch/h8300/mm/fault.c: In function 'do_page_fault':
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c:54:2: error: implicit declaration of function
'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
   54 |  make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
build error.

Additionally, include linux/sched/task.h in arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
to avoid the same error because do_exit()'s declaration is in kernel.h
but make_task_dead()'s is in task.h, which is not included in traps.c.

Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-3-nathan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c |    3 ++-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c     |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs
 	dump(fp);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
--- a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_r
 	printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
 		die("Oops", regs, error_code);
-	make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 
 	return 1;
 }

[PATCH 4.19 70/80] ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

commit dbecf9b8b8ce580f4e11afed9d61e8aa294cddd2 upstream.

In linux-next, IA64_MCA_RECOVERY uses the (new) function
make_task_dead(), which is not exported for use by modules.  Instead of
exporting it for one user, convert IA64_MCA_RECOVERY to be a bool
Kconfig symbol.

In a config file from "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>" for a
different problem, this linker error was exposed when
CONFIG_IA64_MCA_RECOVERY=m.

Fixes this build error:

  ERROR: modpost: "make_task_dead" [arch/ia64/kernel/mca_recovery.ko] undefined!

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124213129.29306-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/ia64/Kconfig |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
 	depends on PROC_KCORE
 
 config IA64_MCA_RECOVERY
-	tristate "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
+	bool "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
 
 config PERFMON
 	bool "Performance monitor support"

[PATCH 4.19 71/80] exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt |    9 ++++++++
 kernel/exit.c                   |   43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - msgmnb
 - msgmni
 - nmi_watchdog
+- oops_limit
 - osrelease
 - ostype
 - overflowgid
@@ -555,6 +556,14 @@ scanned for a given scan.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+oops_limit:
+
+Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
+as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
+
+==============================================================
+
 osrelease, ostype & version:
 
 # cat osrelease
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -68,6 +68,33 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
+/*
+ * The default value should be high enough to not crash a system that randomly
+ * crashes its kernel from time to time, but low enough to at least not permit
+ * overflowing 32-bit refcounts or the ldsem writer count.
+ */
+static unsigned int oops_limit = 10000;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kern_exit_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "oops_limit",
+		.data           = &oops_limit,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(oops_limit),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_douintvec,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_init(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_exit_table);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
+#endif
+
 static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
 {
 	nr_threads--;
@@ -924,10 +951,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
 
 void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 {
+	static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 	/*
 	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
 	 * happened.
 	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
+	 * to an object was held, the reference leaks.
+	 * If the oops doesn't also leak memory, repeated oopsing can cause
+	 * reference counters to wrap around (if they're not using refcount_t).
+	 * This means that repeated oopsing can make unexploitable-looking bugs
+	 * exploitable through repeated oopsing.
+	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
+	 * kernel may oops without panic().
+	 */
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit))
+		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
+
 	do_exit(signr);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.19 72/80] exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count |    6 ++++++
 kernel/exit.c                                     |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count

--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/rcuwait.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -95,6 +96,25 @@ static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_in
 late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
 #endif
 
+static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t oops_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&oops_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute oops_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(oops_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_exit_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &oops_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
 {
 	nr_threads--;
@@ -951,8 +971,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
 
 void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 {
-	static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
 	/*
 	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
 	 * happened.

[PATCH 4.19 73/80] exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt |    5 +++--
 kernel/exit.c                   |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -559,8 +559,9 @@ scanned for a given scan.
 oops_limit:
 
 Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
-``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
-as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the count. Setting this to  1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
 
 ==============================================================
 
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr
 	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
 	 * kernel may oops without panic().
 	 */
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit))
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
 		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
 
 	do_exit(signr);

[PATCH 4.19 74/80] panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.

Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/kernel.h |    1 +
 kernel/panic.c         |    9 +++++++--
 kernel/sched/core.c    |    3 +--
 mm/kasan/report.c      |    3 +--
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
 __printf(1, 2)
 void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
 void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin);
 extern void oops_enter(void);
 extern void oops_exit(void);
 void print_oops_end_marker(void);
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, con
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
 
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+{
+	if (panic_on_warn)
+		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+}
+
 /**
  *	panic - halt the system
  *	@fmt: The text string to print
@@ -540,8 +546,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line,
 	if (args)
 		vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
 
 	print_modules();
 
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -3316,8 +3316,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(stru
 		print_ip_sym(preempt_disable_ip);
 		pr_cont("\n");
 	}
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("scheduling while atomic\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("scheduling while atomic");
 
 	dump_stack();
 	add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -176,8 +176,7 @@ static void kasan_end_report(unsigned lo
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
 	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 

[PATCH 4.19 75/80] panic: Introduce warn_limit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt |   10 ++++++++++
 kernel/panic.c                  |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - threads-max
 - unprivileged_bpf_disabled
 - unknown_nmi_panic
+- warn_limit
 - watchdog
 - watchdog_thresh
 - version
@@ -1114,6 +1115,15 @@ example.  If a system hangs up, try pres
 
 ==============================================================
 
+warn_limit:
+
+Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
+
+==============================================================
+
 watchdog:
 
 This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
 bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
 int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
+static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly;
 
 int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
@@ -50,6 +51,26 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "warn_limit",
+		.data           = &warn_limit,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(warn_limit),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_douintvec,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_panic_table);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
+#endif
+
 static long no_blink(int state)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -127,8 +148,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
+	static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
+		panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
+		      origin, warn_limit);
 }
 
 /**

[PATCH 4.19 76/80] panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count |    6 ++++++
 kernel/panic.c                                    |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count

--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
@@ -71,6 +72,25 @@ static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_i
 late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
 #endif
 
+static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t warn_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&warn_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute warn_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(warn_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_panic_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &warn_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static long no_blink(int state)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -148,8 +168,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
-	static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
 

[PATCH 4.19 77/80] docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.

Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":

  Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0

Fix the typo.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+What:		/sys/kernel/warn_count
 Date:		November 2022
 KernelVersion:	6.2.0
 Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>

[PATCH 4.19 78/80] exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 7535b832c6399b5ebfc5b53af5c51dd915ee2538 upstream.

Use a temporary variable to take full advantage of READ_ONCE() behavior.
Without this, the report (and even the test) might be out of sync with
the initial test.

Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y5x7GXeluFmZ8E0E@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Fixes: 9fc9e278a5c0 ("panic: Introduce warn_limit")
Fixes: d4ccd54d28d3 ("exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops")
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/exit.c  |    6 ++++--
 kernel/panic.c |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr
 	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
 	 * happened.
 	 */
+	unsigned int limit;
 
 	/*
 	 * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr
 	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
 	 * kernel may oops without panic().
 	 */
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
-		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
+	limit = READ_ONCE(oops_limit);
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= limit && limit)
+		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", limit);
 
 	do_exit(signr);
 }
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -168,12 +168,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
+	unsigned int limit;
+
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
 
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
+	limit = READ_ONCE(warn_limit);
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= limit && limit)
 		panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
-		      origin, warn_limit);
+		      origin, limit);
 }
 
 /**

[PATCH 4.19 79/80] ipv6: ensure sane device mtu in tunnels

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit d89d7ff01235f218dad37de84457717f699dee79 upstream.

Another syzbot report [1] with no reproducer hints
at a bug in ip6_gre tunnel (dev:ip6gretap0)

Since ipv6 mcast code makes sure to read dev->mtu once
and applies a sanity check on it (see commit b9b312a7a451
"ipv6: mcast: better catch silly mtu values"), a remaining
possibility is that a layer is able to set dev->mtu to
an underflowed value (high order bit set).

This could happen indeed in ip6gre_tnl_link_config_route(),
ip6_tnl_link_config() and ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev()

Make sure to sanitize mtu value in a local variable before
it is written once on dev->mtu, as lockless readers could
catch wrong temporary value.

[1]
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffff80000b7a2f38 len:40 put:40 head:ffff000149dcf200 data:ffff000149dcf2b0 tail:0xd8 end:0xc0 dev:ip6gretap0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:120
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 10241 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
lr : skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
sp : ffff800020dd3b60
x29: ffff800020dd3b70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff00010df2a800
x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 00000000000000b0 x24: ffff000149dcf200
x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: 00000000000000d8 x21: ffff80000b7a2f38
x20: ffff00014c2f7800 x19: 0000000000000028 x18: 00000000000001a9
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80000db49158 x15: ffff000113bf1a80
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff000113bf1a80
x11: ff808000081c0d5c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 73f125dc5c63ba00
x8 : 73f125dc5c63ba00 x7 : ffff800008161d1c x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000080 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0001fefddcd0 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089
Call trace:
skb_panic+0x4c/0x50 net/core/skbuff.c:116
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:125 [inline]
skb_put+0xd4/0xdc net/core/skbuff.c:2049
ip6_mc_hdr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1714 [inline]
mld_newpack+0x14c/0x270 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1765
add_grhead net/ipv6/mcast.c:1851 [inline]
add_grec+0xa20/0xae0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1989
mld_send_cr+0x438/0x5a8 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2115
mld_ifc_work+0x38/0x290 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2653
process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860
Code: 91011400 aa0803e1 a90027ea 94373093 (d4210000)

Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221024020124.3756833-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ta: Backport patch for stable kernels < 5.10.y. Fix conflict in
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c, mtu initialized with:
mtu = rt->dst.dev->mtu - t_hlen;]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.y, 4.19.y, 5.4.y
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c    |   12 +++++++-----
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c |   10 ++++++----
 net/ipv6/sit.c        |    8 +++++---
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
@@ -1154,14 +1154,16 @@ static void ip6gre_tnl_link_config_route
 				dev->needed_headroom = dst_len;
 
 			if (set_mtu) {
-				dev->mtu = rt->dst.dev->mtu - t_hlen;
+				int mtu = rt->dst.dev->mtu - t_hlen;
+
 				if (!(t->parms.flags & IP6_TNL_F_IGN_ENCAP_LIMIT))
-					dev->mtu -= 8;
+					mtu -= 8;
 				if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
-					dev->mtu -= ETH_HLEN;
+					mtu -= ETH_HLEN;
 
-				if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
-					dev->mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+				if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+					mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+				WRITE_ONCE(dev->mtu, mtu);
 			}
 		}
 		ip6_rt_put(rt);
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -1435,6 +1435,7 @@ static void ip6_tnl_link_config(struct i
 	struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p = &t->parms;
 	struct flowi6 *fl6 = &t->fl.u.ip6;
 	int t_hlen;
+	int mtu;
 
 	memcpy(dev->dev_addr, &p->laddr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
 	memcpy(dev->broadcast, &p->raddr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
@@ -1477,12 +1478,13 @@ static void ip6_tnl_link_config(struct i
 			dev->hard_header_len = rt->dst.dev->hard_header_len +
 				t_hlen;
 
-			dev->mtu = rt->dst.dev->mtu - t_hlen;
+			mtu = rt->dst.dev->mtu - t_hlen;
 			if (!(t->parms.flags & IP6_TNL_F_IGN_ENCAP_LIMIT))
-				dev->mtu -= 8;
+				mtu -= 8;
 
-			if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
-				dev->mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+			if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+				mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+			WRITE_ONCE(dev->mtu, mtu);
 		}
 		ip6_rt_put(rt);
 	}
--- a/net/ipv6/sit.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c
@@ -1082,10 +1082,12 @@ static void ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(struct
 
 	if (tdev && !netif_is_l3_master(tdev)) {
 		int t_hlen = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
+		int mtu;
 
-		dev->mtu = tdev->mtu - t_hlen;
-		if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
-			dev->mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+		mtu = tdev->mtu - t_hlen;
+		if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+			mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+		WRITE_ONCE(dev->mtu, mtu);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 4.19 80/80] usb: host: xhci-plat: add wakeup entry at sysfs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>

commit 4bb4fc0dbfa23acab9b762949b91ffd52106fe4b upstream.

With this change, there will be a wakeup entry at /sys/../power/wakeup,
and the user could use this entry to choose whether enable xhci wakeup
features (wake up system from suspend) or not.

Tested-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200918131752.16488-6-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-plat.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-plat.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-plat.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int xhci_plat_probe(struct platfo
 			*priv = *priv_match;
 	}
 
-	device_wakeup_enable(hcd->self.controller);
+	device_set_wakeup_capable(&pdev->dev, true);
 
 	xhci->clk = clk;
 	xhci->reg_clk = reg_clk;

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Following patch caused build error on arm,

> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
>     memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()

drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
[-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
  297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
      |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:6: warning: assignment to 'struct
clk *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast
[-Wint-conversion]
  297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
      |      ^
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>

Build link, https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2LDxPVbsGpzKKtYLew33pC6wCSc/

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Krzysztof Kozlowski]

On 03/02/2023 12:04, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
>> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>> let me know.
>>
>> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>>
>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
>> or in the git tree and branch at:
>>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
>> and the diffstat can be found below.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> greg k-h
>>
> 
> Following patch caused build error on arm,
> 
>> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
>>     memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
> 
> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
> function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
>   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
>       |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Already reported:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/

Best regards,
Krzysztof

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 2/3/23 04:28, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
> On 03/02/2023 12:04, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
>> On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
>> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
>>> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>>> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>>> let me know.
>>>
>>> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
>>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>>>
>>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>>>          https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
>>> or in the git tree and branch at:
>>>          git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
>>> and the diffstat can be found below.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>>
>>> greg k-h
>>>
>>
>> Following patch caused build error on arm,
>>
>>> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
>>>      memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
>>
>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
>> function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
>> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
>>    297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
>>        |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> Already reported:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/
> 

I don't usually check if release candidate reports have been reported already.
If I know about it, I may add a reference to the report, but typically I still
report it.

Personally I find it discouraging to get those "already reported" e-mails.
To me it sounds like "hey, you didn't do your job properly". It should not matter
if a problem was already reported or not, and I find it valuable if it is
reported multiple times because it gives an indication of the level of test
coverage. I would find it better if people would use something like "Also
reported:" instead. But then maybe I am just oversensitive, who knows.

Anyway, yes, I noticed this problem as well (and probably overlooked it
in my previous report to Greg - sorry for that).

Thanks,
Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 01:28:59PM +0100, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
> On 03/02/2023 12:04, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> >> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> >> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> >> let me know.
> >>
> >> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> >> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >>
> >> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> >> or in the git tree and branch at:
> >>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> >> and the diffstat can be found below.
> >>
> >> thanks,
> >>
> >> greg k-h
> >>
> > 
> > Following patch caused build error on arm,
> > 
> >> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
> >>     memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
> > 
> > drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
> > drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
> > function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
> > [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
> >   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
> >       |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> Already reported:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/

I barely look at 0-day reports about the stable stuff as there is just
too much noise with it, and loads of false problems reported.

So this is a valid report, thanks!

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 04:34:40PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> > There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
> 
> Following patch caused build error on arm,
> 
> > Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
> >     memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
> 
> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
> function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
>   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
>       |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:6: warning: assignment to 'struct
> clk *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast
> [-Wint-conversion]
>   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
>       |      ^
> cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
> 
> Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
> 
> Build link, https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2LDxPVbsGpzKKtYLew33pC6wCSc/

Ick, sorry about that, I'll go drop the offending patch now and push out
a -rc2.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Krzysztof Kozlowski]

On 03/02/2023 16:51, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On 2/3/23 04:28, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
>> On 03/02/2023 12:04, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
>>> On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
>>> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
>>>> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>>>> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>>>> let me know.
>>>>
>>>> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
>>>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>>>>
>>>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>>>>          https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
>>>> or in the git tree and branch at:
>>>>          git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
>>>> and the diffstat can be found below.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>>
>>>> greg k-h
>>>>
>>>
>>> Following patch caused build error on arm,
>>>
>>>> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
>>>>      memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
>>>
>>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
>>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
>>> function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
>>> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
>>>    297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
>>>        |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>
>> Already reported:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/
>>
> 
> I don't usually check if release candidate reports have been reported already.
> If I know about it, I may add a reference to the report, but typically I still
> report it.
> 
> Personally I find it discouraging to get those "already reported" e-mails.
> To me it sounds like "hey, you didn't do your job properly". It should not matter
> if a problem was already reported or not, and I find it valuable if it is
> reported multiple times because it gives an indication of the level of test
> coverage. I would find it better if people would use something like "Also
> reported:" instead. But then maybe I am just oversensitive, who knows.
> 
> Anyway, yes, I noticed this problem as well (and probably overlooked it
> in my previous report to Greg - sorry for that).
> 

Let me rephrase it then:

This topic is already discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/

I proposed to drop both broken backports - mvebu-devbus and
atmel-sdramc, because they require new features in common clock
framework API.

Best regards,
Krzysztof

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 05:56:17PM +0100, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
> On 03/02/2023 16:51, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > On 2/3/23 04:28, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
> >> On 03/02/2023 12:04, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> >>> On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> >>> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> >>>> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> >>>> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> >>>> let me know.
> >>>>
> >>>> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> >>>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >>>>
> >>>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >>>>          https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> >>>> or in the git tree and branch at:
> >>>>          git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> >>>> and the diffstat can be found below.
> >>>>
> >>>> thanks,
> >>>>
> >>>> greg k-h
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Following patch caused build error on arm,
> >>>
> >>>> Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
> >>>>      memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
> >>>
> >>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
> >>> drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
> >>> function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
> >>> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
> >>>    297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
> >>>        |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >>
> >> Already reported:
> >> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/
> >>
> > 
> > I don't usually check if release candidate reports have been reported already.
> > If I know about it, I may add a reference to the report, but typically I still
> > report it.
> > 
> > Personally I find it discouraging to get those "already reported" e-mails.
> > To me it sounds like "hey, you didn't do your job properly". It should not matter
> > if a problem was already reported or not, and I find it valuable if it is
> > reported multiple times because it gives an indication of the level of test
> > coverage. I would find it better if people would use something like "Also
> > reported:" instead. But then maybe I am just oversensitive, who knows.
> > 
> > Anyway, yes, I noticed this problem as well (and probably overlooked it
> > in my previous report to Greg - sorry for that).
> > 
> 
> Let me rephrase it then:
> 
> This topic is already discussed here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202302020048.ZsmUJDHo-lkp@intel.com/
> 
> I proposed to drop both broken backports - mvebu-devbus and
> atmel-sdramc, because they require new features in common clock
> framework API.

Ah, I totally missed that, again, seeing the good in the mess of the
0-day reports here is hard and not obvious at all.  I ignored that and
hence the problem was here.  I've dropped the offending commit now.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 05:50:49PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 04:34:40PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On Fri, 3 Feb 2023 at 15:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> > > There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > let me know.
> > >
> > > Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > >
> > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > >         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > >         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > >
> > > thanks,
> > >
> > > greg k-h
> > >
> > 
> > Following patch caused build error on arm,
> > 
> > > Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
> > >     memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()
> > 
> > drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c: In function 'mvebu_devbus_probe':
> > drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:8: error: implicit declaration of
> > function 'devm_clk_get_enabled'
> > [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
> >   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
> >       |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c:297:6: warning: assignment to 'struct
> > clk *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast
> > [-Wint-conversion]
> >   297 |  clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
> >       |      ^
> > cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
> > 
> > Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
> > 
> > Build link, https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2LDxPVbsGpzKKtYLew33pC6wCSc/
> 
> Ick, sorry about that, I'll go drop the offending patch now and push out
> a -rc2.

Wait a minute, you have more issues to fix.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/80] 4.19.272-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 2/3/23 03:11, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release.
> There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah