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From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, criu@openvz.org,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4 POC] Allow executing code and syscalls in another address space
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2021 14:20:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <874kg99hwf.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez2z0a4x2GfHv9L0HmO1-uzsKtfOF40erPb8ADR-m+itbg@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Wed, 14 Apr 2021 13:24:30 +0200")

* Jann Horn:

> On Wed, Apr 14, 2021 at 12:27 PM Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> * Andrei Vagin:
>>
>> > We already have process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev to read and write
>> > to a process memory faster than we can do this with ptrace. And now it
>> > is time for process_vm_exec that allows executing code in an address
>> > space of another process. We can do this with ptrace but it is much
>> > slower.
>> >
>> > = Use-cases =
>>
>> We also have some vaguely related within the same address space: running
>> code on another thread, without modifying its stack, while it has signal
>> handlers blocked, and without causing system calls to fail with EINTR.
>> This can be used to implement certain kinds of memory barriers.
>
> That's what the membarrier() syscall is for, right? Unless you don't
> want to register all threads for expedited membarrier use?

membarrier is not sufficiently powerful for revoking biased locks, for
example.

For the EINTR issue, <https://github.com/golang/go/issues/38836> is an
example.  I believe CIFS has since seen a few fixes (after someone
reported that tar on CIFS wouldn't work because the SIGCHLD causing
utimensat to fail—and there isn't even a signal handler for SIGCHLD!),
but the time it took to get to this point doesn't give me confidence
that it is safe to send signals to a thread that is running unknown
code.

But as you explained regarding the set*id broadcast, it seems that if we
had this run-on-another-thread functionality, we would likely encounter
issues similar to those with SA_RESTART.  We don't see the issue with
set*id today because it's a rare operation, and multi-threaded file
servers that need to change credentials frequently opt out of the set*id
broadcast anyway.  (What I have in mind is a future world where any
printf call, any malloc call, can trigger such a broadcast.)

The cross-VM CRIU scenario would probably somewhere in between (not
quite the printf/malloc level, but more frequent than set*id).

Thanks,
Florian


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, criu@openvz.org,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4 POC] Allow executing code and syscalls in another address space
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2021 14:20:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <874kg99hwf.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez2z0a4x2GfHv9L0HmO1-uzsKtfOF40erPb8ADR-m+itbg@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Wed, 14 Apr 2021 13:24:30 +0200")

* Jann Horn:

> On Wed, Apr 14, 2021 at 12:27 PM Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> * Andrei Vagin:
>>
>> > We already have process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev to read and write
>> > to a process memory faster than we can do this with ptrace. And now it
>> > is time for process_vm_exec that allows executing code in an address
>> > space of another process. We can do this with ptrace but it is much
>> > slower.
>> >
>> > = Use-cases =
>>
>> We also have some vaguely related within the same address space: running
>> code on another thread, without modifying its stack, while it has signal
>> handlers blocked, and without causing system calls to fail with EINTR.
>> This can be used to implement certain kinds of memory barriers.
>
> That's what the membarrier() syscall is for, right? Unless you don't
> want to register all threads for expedited membarrier use?

membarrier is not sufficiently powerful for revoking biased locks, for
example.

For the EINTR issue, <https://github.com/golang/go/issues/38836> is an
example.  I believe CIFS has since seen a few fixes (after someone
reported that tar on CIFS wouldn't work because the SIGCHLD causing
utimensat to fail—and there isn't even a signal handler for SIGCHLD!),
but the time it took to get to this point doesn't give me confidence
that it is safe to send signals to a thread that is running unknown
code.

But as you explained regarding the set*id broadcast, it seems that if we
had this run-on-another-thread functionality, we would likely encounter
issues similar to those with SA_RESTART.  We don't see the issue with
set*id today because it's a rare operation, and multi-threaded file
servers that need to change credentials frequently opt out of the set*id
broadcast anyway.  (What I have in mind is a future world where any
printf call, any malloc call, can trigger such a broadcast.)

The cross-VM CRIU scenario would probably somewhere in between (not
quite the printf/malloc level, but more frequent than set*id).

Thanks,
Florian


_______________________________________________
linux-um mailing list
linux-um@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-um

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-14 12:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-14  5:52 [PATCH 0/4 POC] Allow executing code and syscalls in another address space Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52 ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52 ` [PATCH 1/4] signal: add a helper to restore a process state from sigcontex Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/x86: implement the process_vm_exec syscall Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14 17:09   ` Oleg Nesterov
2021-04-14 17:09     ` Oleg Nesterov
2021-04-23  6:59     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-23  6:59       ` Andrei Vagin
2021-06-28 16:13   ` Jann Horn
2021-06-28 16:13     ` Jann Horn
2021-06-28 16:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-28 17:14       ` Jann Horn
2021-06-28 17:14         ` Jann Horn
2021-06-28 18:18         ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-28 18:18           ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-29  1:01           ` Andrei Vagin
2021-06-29  1:01             ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02  6:22     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02  6:22       ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02 11:51       ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 11:51         ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 11:51         ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 20:40         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-02 20:40           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-02  8:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-07-02  8:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-07-02 22:21     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02 22:21       ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02 20:56   ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 20:56     ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 22:48     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02 22:48       ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52 ` [PATCH 3/4] arch/x86: allow to execute syscalls via process_vm_exec Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52 ` [PATCH 4/4] selftests: add tests for process_vm_exec Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  5:52   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  6:46 ` [PATCH 0/4 POC] Allow executing code and syscalls in another address space Jann Horn
2021-04-14  6:46   ` Jann Horn
2021-04-14 22:10   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14 22:10     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02  6:57   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02  6:57     ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-02 15:12     ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 15:12       ` Jann Horn
2021-07-02 15:12       ` Jann Horn
2021-07-18  0:38       ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-18  0:38         ` Andrei Vagin
2021-04-14  7:22 ` Anton Ivanov
2021-04-14  7:22   ` Anton Ivanov
2021-04-14  7:34   ` Johannes Berg
2021-04-14  7:34     ` Johannes Berg
2021-04-14  9:24     ` Benjamin Berg
2021-04-14  9:24       ` Benjamin Berg
2021-04-14 10:27 ` Florian Weimer
2021-04-14 10:27   ` Florian Weimer
2021-04-14 11:24   ` Jann Horn
2021-04-14 11:24     ` Jann Horn
2021-04-14 12:20     ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2021-04-14 12:20       ` Florian Weimer
2021-04-14 13:58       ` Jann Horn
2021-04-14 13:58         ` Jann Horn
2021-04-16 19:29 ` Kirill Smelkov
2021-04-16 19:29   ` Kirill Smelkov
2021-04-17 16:28 ` sbaugh
2021-04-17 16:28   ` sbaugh
2021-07-02 22:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-02 22:44   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-18  1:34   ` Andrei Vagin
2021-07-18  1:34     ` Andrei Vagin

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