All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org,
	glider@google.com, luto@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	dvyukov@google.com, christophe.leroy@c-s.fr,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, gor@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/5] kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 17:32:03 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <875zkqtt7g.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191014152717.GA20438@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>


> There is a potential problem here, as Will Deacon wrote up at:
>
>   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190827131818.14724-1-will@kernel.org/
>
> ... in the section starting:
>
> | *** Other architecture maintainers -- start here! ***
>
> ... whereby the CPU can spuriously fault on an access after observing a
> valid PTE.
>
> For arm64 we handle the spurious fault, and it looks like x86 would need
> something like its vmalloc_fault() applying to the shadow region to
> cater for this.

I'm not really up on x86 - my first thought would be that their stronger
memory ordering might be sufficient but I really don't know. Reading the
thread I see arm and powerpc discussions but nothing from anyone else,
so I'm none the wiser there...

Andy, do you have any thoughts?

Regards,
Daniel

>
> Thanks,
> Mark.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: gor@linux.ibm.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	glider@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, dvyukov@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/5] kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 17:32:03 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <875zkqtt7g.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191014152717.GA20438@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>


> There is a potential problem here, as Will Deacon wrote up at:
>
>   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190827131818.14724-1-will@kernel.org/
>
> ... in the section starting:
>
> | *** Other architecture maintainers -- start here! ***
>
> ... whereby the CPU can spuriously fault on an access after observing a
> valid PTE.
>
> For arm64 we handle the spurious fault, and it looks like x86 would need
> something like its vmalloc_fault() applying to the shadow region to
> cater for this.

I'm not really up on x86 - my first thought would be that their stronger
memory ordering might be sufficient but I really don't know. Reading the
thread I see arm and powerpc discussions but nothing from anyone else,
so I'm none the wiser there...

Andy, do you have any thoughts?

Regards,
Daniel

>
> Thanks,
> Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-15  6:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-01  6:58 [PATCH v8 0/5] kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01  6:58 ` [PATCH v8 1/5] " Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01 10:17   ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-01 10:17     ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-02  1:23     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-02  1:23       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-02  7:13       ` Christophe Leroy
2019-10-02  7:13         ` Christophe Leroy
2019-10-02 11:49       ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-02 11:49         ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-07  8:02   ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-07  8:02     ` Uladzislau Rezki
2019-10-11  5:15     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-11  5:15       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-11 19:57   ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-10-14 13:57     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-14 15:27       ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-14 15:27         ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-15  6:32         ` Daniel Axtens [this message]
2019-10-15  6:32           ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-15  6:29       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-16 12:19       ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-10-16 13:22         ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-16 13:22           ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-18 10:43           ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-10-18 10:43             ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-10-28  7:39             ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-28  7:39               ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-28  1:26           ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-28  1:26             ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-14 15:43   ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-14 15:43     ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-15  6:27     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-15  6:27       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01  6:58 ` [PATCH v8 2/5] kasan: add test for vmalloc Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01  6:58 ` [PATCH v8 3/5] fork: support VMAP_STACK with KASAN_VMALLOC Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01  6:58 ` [PATCH v8 4/5] x86/kasan: support KASAN_VMALLOC Daniel Axtens
2019-10-01  6:58 ` [PATCH v8 5/5] kasan debug: track pages allocated for vmalloc shadow Daniel Axtens

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=875zkqtt7g.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net \
    --to=dja@axtens.net \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=christophe.leroy@c-s.fr \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.